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Commentators' views on the relationship between copyright law and the human 
right of freedom of expression are currently diverse. The root of the problem lies in 
the difficulty in balancing authors' rights with human rights in general and the right 
of freedom of expression in particular. 
The thesis aims to illustrate that copyright is challenging the effective recognition of 
the principles of human rights, in particular the individual's right of freedom of 
expression. This proposition is submitted through an analysis, carried out at the 
international, regional and national levels, of copyright and author's right laws in 
relation to the right of freedom of expression. At the three levels, the author's basic 
moral and economic rights are juxtaposed against another party's right of freedom 
of expression, indicating conflicts, current and potential, between the two sets of 
rights. 
Present limitations and exceptions to copyright law are examined in detail in order 
to determine whether, and if so to what extent, they effectively safeguard another 
party's right to freedom of expression vis-ä-vis the author's rights. The fair use and 
fair dealing defences, the public interest aspect, the non-protection of ideas and the 
term of copyright protection are critically analysed to help unmask legal gaps and 
inconsistencies in this area under various international, regional and national laws. 
The thesis proposes that the Berne Convention (1971), generally regarded as the 
primary international copyright instrument, should be revised in order to alleviate the 
identified legal inconsistencies and conflicts between the two rights. On the basis 
that all human beings are entitled to human rights, the proposed revisions introduce 
firstly, the principle of non-discrimination, so that all authors are protected under the 
Convention, and secondly, the recognition in the Convention of the human right of 
freedom of expression, by providing that such right is taken into account in any 
proceedings concerning the application of the rights granted by the Convention. 
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The relationship between copyright and freedom of expression is controversial. Two 
opposing views have surfaced. At the one end of the spectrum is the argument that 
copyright is one of the means of securing freedom of expression as "Copyright 
guarantees the author a share in the marketing of his works, and as such is a 
means of securing the independence of authors from patronage, and possibly 
influence, by individuals or the state"'. 
At the other end, there is the argument that "Copyright is antithetical to freedom of 
expression. It prevents all, save the owner of copyright, from expressing information 
in the form of the literary work protected by copyright"2. Partisans of freedom of 
expression argue that having to ask for the author's permission in order to use his 
expression, or part of it, and occasionally the author's invoking of his moral rights 
critically limit another party's freedom of expression. 
There has been extensive discussion on the relationship between copyright and 
freedom of expression over the years in the United States of America3. However, 
the discussion has only flared up recently on a European level4 and, to an extent, 
on a national level5. As a result, the interaction between the two rights constitutes a 
' See, Jehoram, H. C., "Freedom of Expression in Copyright Law" [1984] 1 E. I. P. R. 3. 
2 Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] E. M. L. R. 44 (C. A. ) per Lord Phillips M. R. at 
para. 30. 
' See, for example, Goldstein, P., "Copyright and the First Amendment" (1970) 70 Columbia 
L. R. 983; Nimmer, M. B., "Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free 
Speech and Press? " (1970) 17 UCLA L. R. 1180; Zimmerman, S. S., "A Regulatory Theory of 
Copyright: Avoiding a First Amendment Conflict" (1986) 35 Emory L. J. 163. 
° See, for example, Jehoram, H. C., "Freedom of Expression in Copyright Law" [1984] 1 
E. I. P. R. 3; Hugenholtz, P. B., "Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe" in The 
Commodification of Information (Elkin-Koren, N. and Netanel, N. W., (eds), Kluwer, 2002). 
5 See, for example, Griffiths, J., "Copyright Law and Censorship - The Impact of the Human 
Rights Act 1998" (1999) 4 The Yearbook of Copyright and Media Law 3; Birnhack, M., 
"Acknowledging the Conflict Between Copyright Law and Freedom of Expression under the 
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grey area; no clear boundaries have been drawn between the rights, and there is no 
general consensus as to the role of freedom of expression in the context of 
copyright. 
This uncertainty in the relationship between copyright and the right to freedom of 
expression raises important issues which require comprehensive answers and 
which will be examined in the context of the thesis: 
  Is it desirable or valid for human rights to have priority over or even restrict 
forms of property rights? 
  Can one conclude that copyright (taken as embracing both the moral and 
economic rights) is too wide a right and thus requires further restrictions 
imposed upon it? If so, would the human right to freedom of expression be 
an appropriate means for laying down such restrictions? 
  Should moral and/or economic rights principles be altered in order to take 
into account instances of clash between them and the right to freedom of 
expression? 
" If it is argued that copyright is a property right, then taking into account that 
the right to property is a human right, could one view the issue as a conflict 
between the human rights of property and freedom of expression rather than 
between intellectual property and human rights? 
" Alternatively, if one assumes that copyright is in itself a human right under 
Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, should the issue be 
viewed as a potential conflict between the human rights of copyright and 
freedom of expression? 
In recent years, freedom of expression has gradually assumed a more important 
role. Sedley L. J. has gone as far as stressing the importance of protecting 
unpopular speech: 
Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the 
contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the 
Human Rights Act" [2003] 14(2) Ent. L. Rev. 24; Netanel, N. W., "Market Hierarchy and 
Copyright in Our System of Free Expression" (2000) Vanderbilt L. Rev. 53: 6,1879. 
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provocative, provided it does not provoke violence. Freedom only to 
speak inoffensively is not worth having6. 
This trend of analysis of the right to freedom of expression is of critical relevance in 
the present context; it raises questions about the nature and scope of the right. The 
thesis examines whether extending the right beyond a certain limit could lead to 
infringement both of the moral and economic rights of the author. 
2. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
The thesis studies the relationship between copyright and the right to freedom of 
expression. Currently, both sets of rights are safeguarded at international, regional 
and national levels. The thesis enquires into whether, at present, a balance is struck 
between the creator's right to protect the original expression of his work and the 
general public's right to exercise its right of freedom of expression. 
Taking into account the number of legislative instruments in place guaranteeing 
copyright and freedom of expression and the diversities among their respective 
provisions, the thesis examines the rights relationship within the context of: 
  International instruments, treaties and conventions. 
  Regional instruments, including directives, conventions and charters within 
the European Community and the American and African Regions. 
" National laws covering both common and civil law jurisdictions. 
The thesis will not be examining the issue of privacy and its repercussions on the 
thesis proposition in detail even though it is considered to be an important issue in 
the present context. However, judicial decisions on privacy that may have an impact 
on the considerations of this thesis will be referred to and their implications will be 
discussed. 
6 Redmond-Bate v. DPP (1999) 7 B. H. R. C. 375,382,383; and, see Silkin v. Beaverbrook 
Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 W. L. R. 743 in which Diplock J. described freedom of speech as 
"the right of the crank to say what he likes". 
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The thesis focuses on the author's copyright/author's right. It does not analyse the 
position with regard to related (neighbouring) rights' even though they enjoy legal 
protection at international, regional and national levels8. This work does not aspire 
to make specific recommendations regarding related rights. 
Similarly, the work does not deal with the question of the relationship between the 
right of freedom of expression and the proposed rights which may be granted with 
respect to traditional cultural expressions. 
The thesis has two main objectives. Primarily, it examines whether the protection of 
the respective rights gives or can give rise to conflicts and where those conflicts 
might arise. In particular, the thesis analysis considers whether copyright protection 
encroaches on the safeguard of the human right to freedom of expression; whether 
currently implemented legislation and case law tends to result in the author's 
overprotection and/or the general public's under-protection; and whether such 
tendencies can constitute evidence for even greater future conflicts. In the context 
of the thesis, a "conflict" is a situation which arises or may arise where one party 
claims that his copyright is infringed by an act which another party claims is 
As such, the thesis does not examine the following international and regional instruments: 
  Rome Convention 1961 
  Phonograms Convention 1971 
  WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996 
  EC Rental/Lending and Related Rights Directive 1992 
$ Related rights include the rights of performers, phonogram and film producers, wireless 
broadcasters and cable distributors. 
Performers are protected under the Rome Convention 1961 (Article 7), the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 (Article 1(3)), the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996 
(Articles 2(a) and 3), the EC Rental/Lending and Related Rights Directive 1992 (Article 2(1)) 
and Cartagena Decision 351 (Article 34). 
Phonogram producers are protected under the Phonograms Convention, the TRIPS 
Agreement 1994 (Article 1(3)), the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996 
(Articles 2(d) and 3), the EC Rental/Lending and Related Rights Directive 1992 (Article 
2(1)), NAFTA 1992 and Cartagena Decision 351 (Article 2). 
Film producers are protected under the EC Rental/Lending and Related Rights Directive 
1992 (Article 2(1)). 
Wireless Broadcasters are protected under the Rome Convention 1961 (Article 6), the 
TRIPS Agreement 1994 (Article 1(3)) and the EC Rental/Lending and Related Rights 
Directive 1992 (Article 2(1)). 
Cable distributors are protected under the EC Rental/Lending and Related Rights Directive 
1992 (Article 2(1)). 
Publishers are protected under national legislation. See, Author's Right and Related 
Protection Rights Law (Articles 70 and 71) and CDPA 1988 (section 1(1)(c)). 
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justifiable by the exercise of a human right, and vice versa, and where such a 
situation reveals that there is a serious issue to be examined. 
The secondary objective of the thesis is to put forward a legislative proposal that 
might serve as a solution to conflicts between copyright and freedom of expression. 
The importance of the proposal lies in its potential attributes: (a) it can be applied at 
all three levels, that is international, regional and national, (b) it can be implemented 
by economically developed and developing countries alike, (c) it provides a solution 
to clashes or gaps in the law observable at present, and (d) it can act as a 
preventive measure for clashes that may develop in the future due to the evolving 
nature of the legal rights in question and to technological advances. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
For the purpose of interpreting and analysing international, regional and national 
laws and case law, the thesis adopts a comparative law approach. 
For the purposes of the thesis, comparison at the international level means a 
comparison of the relevant international copyright and human rights instruments, 
and any conflicts that may arise between them, as opposed to an examination of 
countries in general. In view of the aims and recommendations of the thesis, it is 
considered that such analysis will, from a copyright law perspective, give an 
accurate general illustration of the international picture, as practically all countries 
have ratified the Berne Convention. From a human rights law perspective, almost 
every regional and national legislation has been inspired by the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights. 
The thesis refers both to civil and common law systems, since they have notable 
differences in their approach to copyright law. Even within those two broad legal 
systems, one can trace various distinctive national features that have to be 
addressed, as they directly affect the nature of copyright and consequently its 
relationship with human rights. As it is not here feasible to examine individually the 
laws of every country in the world, the thesis in the main makes specific reference 
to those countries with developed copyright/author's right laws and human rights 
laws. For these reasons, the thesis examines the national laws of the United 
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Kingdom and United States under the common law system and those of France and 
Germany under the civil law system. 
The analysis adopted in this work is mainly founded upon two principal sources of 
reference: 
I. National and European Community legislative instruments and judicial decisions. 
II. Legal literature and consultation documents. These public sources have been 
employed in order to complement and extend the scope of the analysis. Legal 
commentaries and committee reports have been of particular relevance in the 
examination of developing countries, in view of the lack of concrete legislation or 
case law in certain legal areas. Moreover, such sources serve as a tool for 
comparison between vague concepts adopted under various international 
instruments, and have proved significant in the critical analysis regarding civil 
law countries that do not embrace the principle of precedent in case law. 
The thesis adopts a wider comparative approach in order to lay down accurately the 
problems and propose viable solutions. However, certain limits have also been set 
on the width of the coverage of the subject. As such, the copyright issue is analysed 
from the perspective of the creative author, and the author's right is to be 
understood in the civil law sense viewed as a human personality right. Here it may 
be noted that there are differences in national laws as to the persons regarded as 
authors. 
4. GENERAL OUTLINE 
The structure of the work reflects the complex nature of the relationship between 
copyright and freedom of expression. It also contemplates the assimilation of a 
number of different legal approaches whose consideration is relevant to the thesis, 
conclusions and recommendations. 
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The thesis is divided into six Chapters: 
  Chapter 1- Copyright: A General Overview 
" Chapter 2- The Human Right of Freedom of Expression: Its Basis 
And Application in Law 
  Chapter 3- Moral Rights and Freedom of Expression: Areas of 
Potential Conflict 
" Chapter 4- Economic Rights and Freedom of Expression: Areas of 
Potential Conflict 
  Chapter 5- Copyright Limitations and Exceptions in Conflict Resolution 
  Chapter 6- Proposals and Conclusion 
  Chapter 1 is introductory and as such describes the historical background, 
basic concepts and principles of protection of copyright law. 
The Chapter sets out the main systems of copyright protection and 
examines important differences between them, focusing on the following 
topics: 
" terminology, and the basic approaches of the common law and civil 
law systems 
" the basic principles of protection under copyright law 
" duration of copyright 
"a short analysis of the author's moral rights 
" an analysis of the author's economic rights 
" the main limitations and exceptions 
" the development of copyright law at international, regional and 
national levels 
" in addition, the historical background and main copyright provisions 
under relevant multilateral treaties, European Directives, American 
Agreements and national statutes are analysed. 
  Chapter 2 examines the basis and application of human rights, with 
particular emphasis on the right to freedom of expression. It provides: 
" the historical background of international, regional and national 
instruments that safeguard the right 
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"a general overview of protection of human rights as relevant in the 
thesis 
0a detailed study of the right to freedom of expression under these 
instruments and how it should be interpreted under the relevant 
provisions 
It also examines copyright in its aspect as a human right. The Pari 
concludes with a discussion of the duration of human rights in general, 
and the right to freedom of expression in particular. 
  Chapter 3 examines the interaction between the author's moral rights, and 
in particular, the rights of paternity and integrity, and another party's right 
of freedom of expression, and the general areas of potential conflict 
between them. The Chapter starts with an introductory section that sets 
out the methodology and structure of the Chapter. The Chapter examines 
the rights relationship on a comparative basis. As a result, the 
international, regional and national copyright instruments are juxtaposed 
against international, regional and national human rights instruments. 
This Chapter aspires to propose situations where the protection afforded 
by moral rights on one hand and the right of freedom of expression, on the 
other gives rise to tensions between the respective rights, with the 
possibility of jeopardizing an individual's legal protection. It is important to 
identify areas where the two sets of rights are complementary and areas 
where they are not. In order to reach a comprehensive conclusion in such 
situations, instruments within the international, regional and national 
contexts are examined. 
  Chapter 4 examines the interaction between the author's economic right of 
reproduction and another party's . right of 
freedom of expression. The 
structure and approach of analysis of the Chapter follows that of Chapter 
3. The relevant rights are examined on a comparative basis on the 
international, regional and national levels. Relevant case law and statutory 
provisions are discussed in order to draw comprehensive conclusions 
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regarding the rights interaction and to identify situations that illustrate legal 
gaps, inconsistencies and uncertainty in this context. 
  Chapter 5 represents the next step in the development of the hypothesis 
of the thesis. Situations of potential conflict between the two sets of rights 
having been identified, this Chapter questions whether existing copyright 
limitations and exceptions soften or have the potential of reducing the 
tensions. An introductory section is followed by an examination of the fair 
use/fair dealing exceptions, the public interest aspect, the principle of non- 
protection of ideas and the limited term of copyright protection. 
If one concludes that current exceptions and limitations may alleviate 
potential conflicts, the basis of a solution is already in place. However, it is 
the intention of this Chapter to show that this is not the case and as such, 
different solutions have to be devised, and are presented in Chapter 6. 
" Chapter 6 puts forward the solutions of the thesis. The proposals are in 
the form of a concrete and practical, as opposed to a rhetorical, solution. 
They relate mainly to the international level and reflect the thesis approach 
that copyright and freedom of expression should no longer be viewed and 
treated as separate, yet complementary, rights but rather as two rights of a 
. 
different nature in that they should each be given adequate legal 
consideration within copyright law. If copyright is viewed as a human right 
itself then copyright and freedom of expression should be treated as two 
distinct human rights with courts and legislatures expressly balancing their 
respective importance and consequently, balancing the rights of the 
individuals in whom these rights are vested. 
Overall, the proposed solutions aspire to create a novel legal landscape 
within the area of international copyright law in order to harmonise it with 
the right of freedom of expression and more importantly to return it to its 
roots as a human right. 
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CHAPTER I 
Copyright: A General Overview 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter maps out the international, regional and national landscapes of 
protection and status of copyright. 
It examines the systems of protection, focusing on the distinction between the 
common (copyright) and civil (author's right) law system. 
In addition, it discusses the basic principles of copyright protection and briefly 
analyses their general underlying concepts with a view to illustrating the different 
national approaches. Such principles are examined in the context of international, 
regional and national laws and their connection to subsequent parts of this work is 
highlighted, where necessary. 
The final sections of the Chapter provide a general overview of the international and 
regional copyright instruments as well as the historical background to the 
development of national copyright laws. 
1.2 SYSTEMS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
Copyright, albeit a comparatively young right', has evolved into a system of rights 
that relates to a wide variety of subject-matter ranging from books, pictures, 
photographs, films, sound recordings and broadcasts to buildings, sculptures and 
paintings. Having gained worldwide acceptance as a legal right, copyright has, as a 
' In the ancient world of Greece and Rome, and even during the Middle Ages, the possibility 
of making multiple copies of a work were negligible as no technical means for copying had 
been developed. The situation changed with the introduction of printing into Western Europe 
around 1450, which made rapid reproduction of texts and their distribution to the public 
possible. 
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result, been accepted in numerous countries whose social, economic and political 
backgrounds differ dramatically. Two distinct systems of protection developed; the 
copyright system in the common law countries and the author's right system in civil 
law countries. 
Even though the great majority of national laws fall under one of those systems, 
there are some national legislations that have adopted a composite system, that is 
a system that draws elements both from the copyright and author's right systems, 
and also add different features of their own. In general however, there are 
considerable variations between different countries within the same system. 
1.2.1 COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT SYSTEM 
The foundation of copyright within the common law system may be said to be the 
grant of rights of an economic nature to prevent the copying, public performance, 
broadcasting and other uses of protected material. Copyright is said to embrace a 
negative concept, in that its owner has the right to prevent any reproduction or use 
of his material which he has not authorised. 
The copyright law system is characteristic of the common law system and applies in 
the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, Ireland and United States. 
1.2.2 CIVIL LAW AUTHOR'S RIGHT SYSTEM 
The countries with an author's right system have drawn their inspiration largely from 
the Roman law heritage, in addition to other sources and, by giving precedence to 
written law, many of them have opted for a systematic codification of their law. This 
system regards author's right as a natural and human right: "la plus sacree, la plus 
legitime, la plus inattaquable ... la plus personelle de toutes les proprietes"Z. The 
basic theory of the protection of authors lies in the premise that the right is 
inextricably linked to the personality of the author; it is the creation of the author's 
mind. 
2 Le Chapelier, Le Moniteur Universel, 15 January 1791. Cited in Renouard, A. C., Traite des 
droits d' auteur dans la literature, les sciences et les beaux-arts, 2 vol., Paris, Jules 
Renouard, 1838-1839 at p. 309 (volume 1). For a detailed discussion and text of Le 
Chapelier's Report, see Sterling at pp. 51-53. 
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The author's right is characteristic of the civil law system and applies, in particular in 
Continental Europe, Central and South America and some African countries. 
1.2.3 COMPOSITE SYSTEMS 
Composite systems of protection draw elements both from copyright and author's 
right systems, while at the same time adding distinctive features of their own. 
Examples of composite systems are the laws of China and Japan3. 
1.2.4 MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS 
Miscellaneous systems of protection are systems that do not fit into any of the 
above-mentioned classifications. Such systems do provide protection rules, albeit of 
a character different from those of the copyright and author's right systems. The 
Law of Saudi Arabia may, for example, be said to be in this category'. 
1.3 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION 
1.3.1 GENERAL 
Copyright and author's right laws alike are founded upon a skeleton of basic 
principles. The aim of this section is two-fold. Firstly, it aspires to set out the general 
legal framework within which this intellectual property right operates and, in 
particular, the conditions under which it is granted, the nature and limitations of the 
right available and the circumstances under which infringement of such a right or 
rights can be successfully established. 
Secondly, this part seeks to illustrate that some copyright principles are diverse not 
only among international and regional instruments but also among national 
jurisdictions. 
For the purposes of the thesis, the basic principles of copyright/author's right 
protection that are discussed are as follows: 
" The idea/expression dichotomy 
" The concept of originality/creativity 
" Moral rights 
3 Composite systems are in general not considered in this thesis. 
4 Miscellaneous systems are not directly relevant for the purposes of the thesis. 
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" Economic rights 
" Limitations and exceptions 
" Duration of protection 
1.3.2 SPECIFIC ASPECTS 
1.3.2.1 THE IDEA/EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY 
The idealexpression dichotomy principle suggests that there is a distinction 
between, on the one hand, an author's mere idea, which is not protected under 
copyright and, on the other, its creative expression, which is protected. 5 
The exclusion of ideas from copyright protection has been a judicial development. 
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement 19946 there had been no such exclusion in the 
international and regional copyright instruments. 
This principle has been the basis of copyright jurisprudence in many countries'. The 
1976 US Copyright Act expressly acknowledges the principle under s. 102(b)6. One 
can however trace the concept's origins further back in time as early as 18799. 
' For a discussion of the idea/expression dichotomy principle and freedom of expression see 
Burrell, R. and Coleman, A., Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), Chapter 1. 
6 Article 9(2) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that "Copyright protection shall extend to 
expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts 
as such". Similarly Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 recognizes the concept in 
the same wording as TRIPS. In contrast, the Berne Convention contains no statement of 
this principle. 
' New Zealand: Plix Products Limited v. Frank M. Winstone (Merchants) and Others (1986) 
F. S. R. 63, and for a detailed discussion of the case and Pritchard J. 's judgement, see 
Suthersanen, U., "Exclusions to Design Protection -A New Paradigm" in Perspectives In 
Intellectual Property (Vol. 2, ed. Sterling) (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at p. 49. 
UK: "It is an assumption of British copyright legislation that all subject matter requires to 
exist in some material form before it gains copyright. It is possible to look upon this as a 
corollary of the principle that the protection goes only to the particular expression of ideas", 
Cornish, W., R., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (5`h 
ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at p. 277. 
' "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such 
work". 
9 In Baker v Selden 101 U. S. 99 (1879), the U. S. Supreme Court stated that where there is 
only one way of expressing an idea, the idea has inextricably merged with the expression 
and thus no protection will be available, at p. 179. 
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The issue of what constitutes an idea is controversial. At what point an 
unprotectable idea ends and a protectable original expression1° begins is an aspect 
not possible to define precisely. Thus, each situation has, to an extent, to be 
assessed on its own merits". 
1.3.2.2 THE CONCEPT OF ORIGINALITY/CREATIVITY 
Most national jurisdictions provide that for a work to be protected under the 
copyright or author's right system, it must be an intellectual creation or possess 
original elements. 
In general, there appears to be no internationally accepted definition of the term 
"originality". However, it is generally acknowledged that the term can have two 
meanings depending on the legal system from which it originates. Given the lack of 
express statutory definition, the boundaries of this principle rest largely on judicial 
interpretation. 
As a general rule, civil law countries and the United States determination of 
originality is divergent from that of the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth 
countries (and Ireland). Nevertheless, it can be said that interpretative differences 
can be traced not only among the various national laws, but also within judicial 
precedents of individual jurisdictions themselves12. 
In order for an author's work to be original it has to fulfil a rather high threshold in 
that it has to be the author's own creative work. In France, the general theory of the 
Cour de Cassation is that for a work to be original it must bear "the mark of the 
personality of its author and confer on the created object a specific aspect", the 
10 For judicial development of the concept in the US, see Nichols v. Universal Pictures 45 
F. 2d 119 (1930). See also Sterling at p. 220. 
"For an extensive discussion of what has been held to constitute an idea and the 
application of the idea/expression dichotomy on literary, dramatic and musical works, see 
Laddie, H., Prescott, P. and Vitoria, M., The Modem Law of Copyright and Designs (3rd ed., 
Butterworths, 2000), at pp. 97-114. 
The principle of non-protection of ideas and its implications, present and potential, in the 
context of the relationship between copyright and the human right of freedom of expression, 
are discussed extensively in para. 5.4. 
12 For a discussion of the various interpretations attached to the concept of originality, see 
generally Sterling at p. 176. 
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"seal of the personality of the author"13 or a "reflection of the personality of the 
authors14. In Babolat Maillot litt v. Pachot15, the Court departed from the criterion 
of "mark of personality", focusing instead on the author's "intellectual contribution" 
16 (apport intellectuel) 
German law will protect personal intellectual creations provided there is some 
independent intellectual activity, albeit not now one of a particularly high standard. 
The "small change" provision, under which author's right has been granted to works 
such as forms and catalogues, is evidence of the relatively low creativity 
threshold". 
The US test for originality previously embraced the so-called "sweat of one's 
browi1e theory, according to which the work had to "owe its origin to the author"19 
and effort, time, knowledge and skill must have been expended in its preparation20. 
However, in 1991, the Supreme Court, in Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co. Inc. 21, rejected this approach and stated that what was required was a 
"modicum of creativity". 
" Decision of CA Paris, le ch., April 1,1957: (1957) 18 R. I. D. A. 198. 
14 Decision of CA Paris, 4e ch., March 4,1982: 1983 Da!! oz 93. 
It could however be argued that, in relation to computer programs and compilations, French 
jurisprudence has shifted and that it resembles more the common law standard. Lucas and 
Lucas do acknowledge that this "logiciel" area is controversial, as these works do not 
present information or "sentiments" to other people but merely permit the use of machines. 
See, Lucas, A. and Lucas, H. J., Traite de la Propriete Litteraire et Artistique (2"d ed., Litec, 
2001) at p. 97. 
15 Babolat Maillot Witt v. Pachot, Cass., March 7,1986: (1986) 129 R. I. D. A 130. 
16 These cases predate the introduction of the EC Database Directive 1996. 
" Stewart, S. M., International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, (2nd ed., Butterworths, 
1989). 
'a Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co, 566 F. 2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977). 
19 Per Judge Jerome Frank in Alfred Bell & Co Ltd v. Catalda Fine Arts Inc., 191 F. 2d 99 (2d 
Cir. 1951). 
20 Rand McNally & Co v. Fleet Management Systems, 634 F. Supp. 604 (ND 111 986). 
21 499 U. S. 340 (1991). In this case, the court denied protection to a White Pages telephone 
directory as the plaintiffs selection, co-ordination and arrangement of its listings did not 
satisfy the minimum Constitutional requirements for copyright protection, in respect of the 
notion of "author". 
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In order for an author's work to be original under UK law, it must generally satisfy 
three conditions. Firstly, it must not be merely a copy of a previous work22. 
Secondly, it must originate from the author23 and thirdly, the work must be the 
product of a reasonable degree of individual skill, judgement and labour; if it is only 
trivial, the work will not attract copyright24. 
1.3.2.3 MORAL RIGHTS 
It is generally accepted, on the international and national levels, that copyright has a 
dual task, and thus a dual structure. On the one hand, it protects the author's 
interests in the financial/commercial exploitation of his work through economic 
rights25. On the other, it safeguards the author's "intangible "26 interests that relate to 
his personality and the integrity of his work. 
Moral rights, as opposed to economic rights, only began to be recognized in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, with France and Germany considered being 
their precursors27. 
As a general rule, civil and common law countries have had different approaches to 
the endorsement of moral rights. While the civil law countries called for the author's 
22 In Interlego AG v. Tyco Industries Inc. [1989] A. C. 217, the meticulous copying of 
technical drawings which were out of copyright was held not to be significant enough as to 
qualify for copyright protection. 
2' In University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd. (1916] 2 Ch. 601 (Ch. 
D. ), Peterson J. stated that "the Act does not require that the expression must be in an 
original or novel form, but that the work must not be copied from another work, that it should 
originate from the author". 
24 In G. A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank Smythson Ltd. [1944] A. C. 329, the House of Lords 
concluded that the layout of a pocket diary did not constitute an appreciable contribution and 
thus did not attract copyright, being merely a "commonplace selection of goblets of 
information and a commonplace arrangement, neither of which involved any real exercise of 
knowledge, labour, judgement or skill" (per Viscount Simon LC at p. 334). In Exxon Corp. v. 
Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd. [1982] R. P. C. 69, the House of Lords 
refused copyright protection to the single word EXXON as being too short, even though 
extensive research had gone into devising this name for a commercial enterprise. 
In Australia and Canada, the questions of creativity and of invested labour in relation to the 
criterion of originality have been discussed in a number of cases. For details, see Sterling at 
pp. 316-321. 
Z5 For a general discussion of the author's economic rights, see para. 1.3.2.4. 
26 Dietz, A., Copyright Law in the European Community (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978) at p. 66. 
27 For a more detailed discussion, see Dietz, A., "Legal Principles of Moral Rights in Civil 
Law Countries" (1993) 2 Copyright Reporter 1, and Roeder, M. A., "The Doctrine of Moral 
Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators" (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554. 
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reputation and integrity to be explicitly protected by specific statutory rights, 
common law countries in general considered that such rights were already being 
protected under contract and defamation laws28. However, these countries have 
begun to change their stance towards greater endorsement of moral rights29. 
The Berne Convention appears to adopt the author's right approach to moral rights, 
ON which are viewed as personal rights embodying the notion that the author's work is 
an extension of his being. 
Under the Convention, the rights are generally regarded as inalienable30 and last for 
at least as long as the author's economic rights31. Article 6bis of the Convention 
guarantees the author the moral rights of paternity and integrity in his work. 
The right of paternity32 guarantees the author's positive right to have his authorship 
of his works recognised in a clear and unambiguous way and the negative right of 
false attribution. Thus, the right can be invoked in situations where: 
" no reference is made to the author at all, 
  reference is made, albeit in an unclear fashion, or 
" the work is attributed to a person other than the author 33 
The integrity right is recognised under Article 6bis(1) and is defined as the author's 
right "to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other 
28 Sterling at p. 338. 
29 It is important to note however that their original reluctance towards moral rights, and 
especially that of the United States, is reflected in Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement 
which, while imposing on Member States the obligation to comply with the provisions of the 
Berne Convention, excludes obligations under Article 6bis in this respect. 
'o Note that the Convention does not expressly state so. 
" Berne Convention 1971, Article 6bis(2). This duration provision is different from that in 
some national laws, which protect the author's moral rights in perpetuity; for example, 
French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 121-1. 
32 Berne Convention 1971, Article 6bis(1). 
" The paternity-right under Article 6bis does not appear to apply to a situation where the 
author is seeking to deny (as opposed to seeking to establish) his authorship. See, 
Ricketson and Ginsburg at p. 601. 
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derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his 
honour or reputation-34 
"Distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action": The 
wording is wide enough to cover any change made to the author's work. Ricketson 
and Ginsburg indicate that the test for "derogatory action" is subjective and suggest 
that examples of changes to a work would include typographical errors and colour 
imperfections (in cases of reproduction), deletions or additions to the text, 
paraphrases of literal works, rearrangement of a musical work to a different style or 
the caricature of a work of art35 
"Derogatory action in relation to the work" appears to refer to something other than 
changes in the work itself. Examples of such derogatory action include "the 
publication of a book with an offensive jacket cover, the production of a serious play 
in a manner that derides the author or his views, the reproduction of an artistic work 
in juxtaposition with pornographic material"36 
"Prejudice to the honour or reputation of the author": The wording in the Convention 
is taken to mean that the changes to an author's work have to be prejudicial to his 
honour and reputation37. This requirement has been regarded as setting an 
objective test. Nevertheless, delegates at the Brussels Conference 1948 sought to 
define the scope of "honour or reputation"; the general consensus was that any 
change should not just be prejudicial to a person's reputation as an author but as a 
man (or woman) as well38. The wording also implies that the test of what will 
constitute a modification or derogatory treatment of the work is subjective. 
34 Berne Convention 1971, Article 6bis(1). 
's See Ricketson and Ginsburg at p. 602. 
36 See Ricketson and Ginsburg at pp. 603-04. 
" "The concepts of 'distortion' and 'mutilation' appear highly subjective. However, the 
expression 'other modifications' is quite neutral, and must therefore cover any change to the 
work that does not fall within the scope of a 'distortion' or 'mutilation'. In any case, a 
limitation on the scope of the composite expression 'distortion, mutilation or other 
modification' is imposed by the objective requirement that these changes must be prejudicial 
to the honour or reputation of the author", Ricketson and Ginsburg at p. 602. 
38 "The author should be protected as a writer just as much as in his capacity as a 
personality on the literary scene. This is why you have added that he may object to any 
other action, implying by this any action likely to be prejudicial to the man, as a result of the 
distortion of, his work", Documents de la Conference de Bruxelles, Brussels, 1948 (Bureau 
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Under the CDPA 1988, the author's moral rights can be waived by an instrument in 
writing signed by him39. They cannot however be assigned 40. The duration of moral 
rights is the same as that of copyright41, namely the right of the author plus seventy 
years 
The author of a copyright literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work and the director 
of a copyright film have the right to be identified as the author or director of the 
work42. The right can only be exercised where some form of exploitation has taken 
place43. Any reasonable form of identification can be used44. The identification must 
be clear and reasonably prominent; consequently, identification in small print or in a 
non-apparent position may not suffice. Section 77(2)-(8) lists a number of acts that 
can infringe the right. 
A controversial condition imposed by the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 
is that the author or director must formally assert his right of identification in order to 
exercise V. The right can either be asserted on an assignment of copyright or by 
some other instrument in writing which must be brought to the attention of the 
person to be made liable. The right is subject to a number of exceptionsas 
Section 84 of the CDPA 1988 provides for protection against false attribution, as a 
right distinct from that of paternity. There are no statutory exceptions to the right. 
Section 84(2)-(7) sets out an exhaustive list of acts that will be held to infringe the 
author's right. 
de I'Union Internationale pour la Protection des Oeuvres Litteraires et Artistiques, Berne, 
1951) at pp. 97-98. 
39 CDPA 1988, section 87(2). 
40 CDPA 1988, section 22. 
41 CDPA 1988, section 86. 
42 CDPA 1988, section 77(1). The Act grants two other moral rights, namely the right against 
false attribution (section 84, considered in Chapter 3) and the right of privacy concerning 
certain photographs and films (section 85, beyond the scope of the thesis). 
" For example, in the case of commercial exploitation of a work, the author has to be 
identified on each and every copy (CDPA 1988, section 77(7)(a)). 
44 CDPA 1988, section 77(8). Note that if the author (or director), in asserting his rights, 
specifies a pseudonym, initials or some other particular form of identification, that form must 
be used. 
as CDPA 1988, section 78(2). 
46 CDPA 1988, section 79. 
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The author's integrity right is defined in section 80 of the CDPA 1988 as the right of 
the author not to have his work subjected to derogatory treatment. Unlike the case 
of the paternity right, there is no statutory requirement that this right must have 
been asserted as a prerequisite to its exercise. However, as with the right of 
paternity, the right only applies in relation to a work in which copyright subsists. 
"Treatment" of a work means "any addition to, deletion from or alteration to or 
adaptation of the work"47. Treatment applies to any part of the work, and does not 
need to be done in relation to a substantial part of it48. 
A treatment of a work is derogatory if it amounts to "distortion or mutilation of the 
work or is otherwise prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author or director". 
A distortion of a work involves "some form of twisting or perversioni49 of it, while 
mutilation involves "some form of cuffing or destructioni5° of the work51. Effectively, 
any derogatory treatment of the work that has taken place must be prejudicial to the 
author's honour or reputation. It is suggested that "reputation" sets an objective 
standard "referring to what is generally said or believed about a person" whereas 
"honour" is more associated with "respect for a person and his position n52. The 
intention of the person subjecting the work to derogatory treatment is irrelevant. 
Section 81 sets out a list of exceptions to the right. 
47 CDPA 1988, section 80(2)(a). Section 80(2)(a)(i) and (ii) provides a list of exceptions to 
the right, which includes "a translation of a literary or dramatic work" and "an arrangement 
or transcription of a musical work involving no more than a change of key or register". 
°ß Morrison Leahy Music Ltd. v. Lightbond Ltd. [1993] E. M. L. R. 144 (making of new 
recording by taking short "snatches" of songs and slightly changing the original songs' lyrics 
was "treatment") and Tidy v. Trustees of the Natural History Museum (1995) 39 I. P. R. 501 
(scaling down of plaintiff's cartoons and altered background colour was "treatment"). 
49 See, Garnett, K., Davies, G. and Harbottle, G., Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(15th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at pp. 644-48. 
so However, a private act of destruction apparently cannot infringe the right because the right 
can only be infringed if certain specified actions are done in relation to the derogatory 
treatment. For a list of such "specified" acts see, Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 
section 80(3), (4), (5) and (6). 
51 Humphreys v. Thomson & Co. Ltd [1905-10] Mac. C. C. 148 (cuts, additions and alterations 
in the name of characters of the work due for a serial publication, were injurious to the 
author's reputation), Frisby v. British Broadcasting Corp. [1967] Ch. 932 (omission of a few 
words from a play was capable of weakening its structure). 
$2 See Garnett, K., Davies, G. and Harbottle, G., Copinger and Skone James on Copv, ight 
(151h ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at p. 647. 
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UNITED STATES Before the passing of VARA there was no general federal statutory protection of the 
OF AMERICA author's rights of paternity and integrity. Instead, these rights had been stated as 
GENERAL being available under general principles of law53, for example, contract, defamation, 
PRINCIPLES and misrepresentation, unfair competition and privacy54. 
OF LAW 
In 1985, Roberta Kwall noted that "the increasingly liberal applications of unfair 
competition law generally and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act in particular"" did in 
effect protect authors' moral rights. This observation was anchored in the Second 
Circuit's 1976 decision in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies56; members 
of Britain's Monty Python comedy troupe sought to stop ABC from broadcasting 
shortened versions of the Monty Python Flying Circle shows. Monty Python's claims 
concerned allegations of copyright infringements, breach of contract and unfair 
competition claims. The Court concluded that Monty Python had a cause of action 
under the Lanham Act, stating that while "American copyright law, as presently 
written, does not recognize moral right"57 ABC's editing "mutilated the original work 
and that consequently the broadcast of those programs as the creation of Monty 
Python violated the Lanham Actn58, Judge Lumbard reasoning that ABC had 
"represented to the public as the product of appellants what was actually a mere 
caricature of their talentsi59. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corporation60 was called to establish the scope of section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act regarding a previously copyright work that had fallen in the public domain. The 
Court offered an interpretation of "origin" in section 43(a): "the most natural 
understanding of the 'origin' of 'goods' ... is the producer of the tangible product 
" See, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, 538 F. 2d 14 (2"d Cir. 1976) (protection 
against editing of Monty Python film). Cf. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 
et al 123 S. Ct. 2041 (June 2,2003), on re-hearing C. D. Cal. 68 USPQ 2d 1538 (October 14, 
2003). 
s' See Sterling at p. 351. 
ss Kwall, R., "Copyright and the Moral Right: Is An American Marriage Possible? " (1985) 38 
Vend. L. Rev. 1, at 18. See also, Hughes, J., "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property" 
(1988) 77 Geo. L. J. 287 (discussing how moral rights-like protection might be provided 
under a compendium of common law causes of action). 
56 538 F. 2d 14 (2nd Cir. 1976). 
57 538 F. 2d at 23. 
S$ 538 F. 2d at 24. 
59 538 F. 2d at 29. 
60 123 S. Ct. 2041 (June 2,2003). 
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sold in the marketplace and as used in the Lanham Act, the phrase 'origin of goods' 
is in our view incapable of connoting the person or entity that originated the ideas or 
communications that 'goods' embody or contain"6t. The importance of the Dastar 
case lays in its unanimous decision that vis-ä-vis works in the public domain, there 
is no Lanham Act obligation to credit the original creator or copyright owner as the 
"origin" of the work. In view of the Dastar decision, the strength of the Gilliam case 
as supporting claims of moral rights under the Lanham Act is under discussion. 
VARA 1990 The passing of the Visual Artists Rights Act 1990, inserting s. 106A in the Copyright 
Act 1976, marked an important development in the recognition of the author's moral 
rights under Federal law. The Act amended the US Copyright Act 1976 and 
guarantees certain rights for authors of works of visual art. 
Under VARA, moral rights automatically vest in the author of a work of visual art. 
For the purposes of VARA, visual art includes paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures 
and photographs, existing in a single copy or a limited edition of 200 signed and 
numbered copies or fewer. VARA only protects works of recognised stature: 
posters, maps, globes, motion pictures, electronic publications, and applied art are 
among the categories of visual works explicitly excluded from VARA protection. A 
general comment is therefore that these federal statutory moral rights are only 
available for specific categories of artistic works, not copyright works in general. 
[PATERNITY] The author of a work of visual art is guaranteed the right of paternity. Under the Act, 
the paternity right embraces the author's right to: 
a) claim authorship of the work62, 
b) prevent false attribution of authorship63, and 
c) prevent use of the author's name as the author of the work where such work 
is prejudicially distorted, mutilated or modified64 
61 123 S. Ct. at 2047. 
62 1976 US Copyright Act, section 106A(1)(A). 
63 1976 US Copyright Act, section 106A(1)(B) 
64 1976 US Copyright Act, section 106A(a)(2). 
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[INTEGRITY] The author's integrity right safeguards the author's right to prevent intentional 
distortion, mutilation etc. of the work which is prejudicial to the author's honour or 
reputation65. An interesting feature of the author's integrity right is the Act's express 
provision relating to the destruction of a work: the author has the right to "prevent 
any destruction of a work of recognised stature, and any intentional or grossly 
negligent destruction of that worka66 
Section 106A(c) of the Act provides for a number of limitations on the author's 
integrity right, including the following: 
" The modification of a work that results from the passage of time, the 
inherent nature of the materials or of failed conservation efforts does not 
violate VARA67. The Act does not hold a party liable for damaging an artist's 
work if such damage is the result of negligence68. 
M The modification of a work that results from conservation or the public 
presentation of the work does not violate VARA unless such modification is 
caused by gross negligence69. Thus an inferior quality reproduction of the 
artist's work in a pamphlet would not, unless resulting from such negligence, 
constitute an infringement of the author's moral right of integrity7°. 
  VARA does not protect works "made for hire"". 
FRANCE Under the French Intellectual Property Code, the author's right of respect embraces 
both the rights of paternity and integrity72. The author's moral rights are perpetual, 
inalienable and imprescriptible73. 
651976 US Copyright Act, section 106A(a)(3)(A). 
66 1976 US Copyright Act, section 106A(a)(3)(B). 
671976 US Copyright Act, section 106A(c)(1). 
68 See, Lubner v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. App. 4°t 525 (1996). The case involved two 
artists who lost much of their lives' work after a City garbage truck, parked at the top of a hill, 
rolled down and crashed their studio. The artists recovered damages in tort, but not for a 
violation of the California Act, which, like VARA, excludes liability for damages caused by 
gross negligence. The court added that even if the California Act did allow recovery for 
negligence, VARA would have pre-empted such recovery. 
69 1976 US Copyright Act, section 106A(c)(2). 
'° See, Pavia v. 1129 Ave. of Americas Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620 (S. D. N. Y. 1994). 
" 1976 US Copyright Act, section 106A(c)(3). 
72 French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 121-1. 
" French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 123-1. 
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[PATERNITY] The right of paternity embraces both the author's right to be acknowledged as the 
author of a work and his right against false attribution. The right has been found to 
have been infringed where the author was falsely described as a "co-author" when 
he was in fact the sole author74. 
[INTEGRITY) The author's integrity right is not specifically described under article L. 123-1. The 
Berne Convention's requirement that any derogatory action should be prejudicial to 
the author's honour or reputation is notably absent75. It thus appears that, as a 
general rule, French courts will look at the author's view to determine whether the 
action complained of was indeed derogatory; they will consider whether the 
allegedly derogatory act is made to "denature the ethic of the work"76. 
GERMANY Under the statutory provisions of the 1965 Law, the author's moral rights shall be 
protected for the same period of time as his economic rights, namely they expire 
seventy years after the death of the author". 
[PATERNITY] The paternity right of the author is safeguarded under article 13 of the Author's 
Right and Related Protection Rights Law 1965. The right appears to be two-fold in 
nature. It embraces the author's positive right to claim authorship of his work as well 
as the negative right to take action against usurpation of authorship by third 
parties78. 
74 See, Ophals v. Agence France Presse, TGI Paris, Jere ch., May 5,1999: (2002) 183 
R. I. D. A. 345. 
75 For a detailed examination, see Lucas, A., and Lucas, H. J., Traite de la Propriete Litteraire 
et Artistique (2nd ed, Litec, 2001) at pp. 366-427. 
76 See, Chaplin v. Chatelus, TGI Paris, January 24,2000: (2000) 186 R. I. D. A. 305. Also, see 
"Dali costumes" (accessories added to costumes designed by Dali did not infringe the moral 
right as they did not distort the spectator's judgment) Cass., March 5,1968, D. 1968,382; 
"Godot" (moral rights infringed, when after the death of the author and against his wish, 
roles were played by male as well as female actors) TGI Paris, October 15,1992: (1993) 
155 R. I. D. A. 225; Schoendocrffer v. Mod Films (moral right of director infringed when the 
duration of his film was reduced without his consent) TGI Paris, March 23,1994: (1995) 164 
R. I. D. A. 401; Scrive v. Rennes (infringement of moral right as fountain designed for and 
placed in the hall of a commercial centre was dismantled by the proprietor alleged risk to 
customers) C. A. Paris, July 10,1975, D. 1977.342: (1997) 91 R. I. D. A. 114. For an extensive 
list of cases, see Sterling at pp. 358-363. 
"Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law 1965, article 64. 
78 See Sterling at p. 347. 
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[INTEGRITY] Article 14 of the German law recognises the author's right of integrity as the 
author's right to "prohibit any distortion or any other mutilation of is work which 
would jeopardize his legitimate intellectual or personal interests in the work"79. The 
test for assessing infringement of this right is an objective one, as is the case under 
the Berne Convention80. Under article 39(2) of the Author's Right and Related 
Protection Rights Law 1965, a licensee shall be allowed to make alterations in the 
work provided the author could not have in good faith refused them. This provision 
appears to enhance the objective element of the test for the right's infringement. 
1.3.2.4 ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
Economic rights are those rights that give the author the opportunity to control and 
participate in the benefits of the commercial and/or financial exploitation of his work. 
In general, they are exclusive in nature since the copyright owner alone can 
authorise and/or prohibit the carrying out of the specific acts. 
There are four main types of economic rights, namely the right of reproduction, 
adaptation, distribution and communication of a work to the public81. 
REPRODUC- The right of reproduction refers to the action of making a copy or to the copy 
TION RIGHT produced by the act of reproduction. 
On the international level, the right was written in the Berne Convention during the 
1967 Stockholm Revision82; Article 9(1) provides that "authors of literary and artistic 
works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right of authorising the 
reproduction of these works, in any manner or form". The scope of the right is 
79 See "Oppenheimer" (moral right infringed by frequent and relatively long comments 
interrupting a play) OLG Munich, April 15,1971; "Maske in Blau" (moral right infringement as 
the modern version of an operetta involved deletions from original script, insertions of film 
and other composers music) BGH, April 29,1970: (1971) G. R. U. R. 35. For an extensive list 
of cases, see Sterling at pp. 359-363. 
80 Under Article 6bis(2) of the Convention, the author must prove that his honour or 
reputation has been prejudiced. 
$' In examining the relationship between the author's economic rights and the individual's 
right of freedom of expression, the thesis focuses on the right of reproduction (which can be 
said to cover, to an extent, the right of communicating a work to the public). For this 
analysis, see Chapter 4. 
$Z According to Ricketson and Ginsburg at p. 622, the reason for the delay of the 
reproduction right's incorporation into the Convention was the lack of agreement on the 
right's scope and content. 
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further defined in Article 9(3) "any sound or visual recording shall be considered as 
a reproduction for the purposes of this Convention". 
National legislations define the right in equally broad terms as the Berne 
Convention. The UK CDPA 1988 defines "copying" as "reproducing the work in any 
material form , 83. The US Copyright Act 1976 grants the exclusive right to reproduce 
a copyrighted work in "copies or phonorecords"84. The French Intellectual Property 
Code 1992 relies on broad language defining reproduction as the material fixation 
of a work by any process and adding illustrative examples, including mechanical 
film or magnetic recording65 while the German author's right law defines it as "the 
right to make copies of the work by whatever method and in whatever quantityi8s 
Reproduction will be in material form (in the same or different mediums) and its 
content can be literal or non-literal87. Such material form includes storage in an 
electronic medium88. However, as a result of the development of contemporary 
technologies for the transmission of works protected by copyright/author's right, 
there is the as yet unanswered question relating to the duration of the reproduction. 
In other words, should the right encompass ephemeral copies made in the digital 
network, or should there be a level of duration of retention, and if so, what should 
that level be? Even though no agreement has been reached on an international 
level on this issue, a proposal that would have supported the inclusion of ephemeral 
copies within the scope of the reproduction right was dropped by the 1996 WIPO 
Diplomatic Conference89. 
83 CDPA 1988, section 17. 
84 US Copyright Act 1976, section 106(1). The Act defines both copies and phonorecords in 
section 101. Copies are stated to be "material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a 
work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be 
perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device". Phonorecords are "material objects in which sounds, other than those 
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now 
known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device". 
85 French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 122-3. 
86 Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law 1965, article 16(1). 
87 Literal reproduction is that reproduction which will not change the basic format of the 
original work, while non-literal reproduction can be the encoding, adaptation or translation of 
the original work. For a detailed discussion, see Sterling at p. 179-80. 
88 See, WIPO Copyright Treaty Agreed Statement Concerning Article 1(4). 
89 The Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Questions 
(Geneva, December 2-20,1996) rejected a draft proposal (proposed Article 7) on this issue 
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ADAPTATION The right of adaptation relates to the author's right to control transformation of his 
RIGHT work into another type of presentation - for example, by translation, by changing a 
story into a play or a popular song into an orchestral arrangement. Article 8 of the 
Berne Convention, one of the first provisions to be included as a minimum 
requirement, ensures the author's right "of making and of authorising the translation 
of their works". Furthermore, Article 12 of the Convention provides that the authors 
of literary or artistic works "shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorising the 
adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of their works"so 
Some countries, such as France91 and Belgium, treat the adaptation right as an 
aspect of the reproduction right, while others, such as the United Kingdom92 and 
Japan93 recognize it as a distinct economic right. It could therefore be said that the 
adaptation right (where the adaptation is recorded) overlaps with that of 
reproduction in that all adaptations involve reproduction where the essential 
features of the adapted work are used. In addition, the right can sometimes overlap 
with the moral right of integrity which similarly empowers authors to control certain 
alterations in their work. 
to be included in what came into being as the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The titles of the relevant documents are Basic 
Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions Concerning the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (August 30,1996, WIPO Document CRNR/DC/4), 
and Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty for the Protection of the 
Rights of Performers and Producers of Phonograms (August 30,1996, WIPO Document 
CRNR/DC/5). 
Replying to the question of ephemeral copies, the Diplomatic Conference stated that "The 
reproduction right, as set out in Article 9 of the Berne Convention, and the exceptions 
permitted thereunder, fully apply in the digital environment, in particular to the use of works 
in digital form. It is understood that the storage of a protected work in digital form in an 
electronic medium constitutes a reproduction within the meaning of Article 9 of the Berne 
Convention" (WIPO Document CRNR/DC/96, Concerning Article 1(4), Dec. 23,1996). 
See generally, Gendreau, Y. "The Reproduction Right and the Internet" (1998) 178 R. I. D. A. 
2, and Vinje, T., "The New WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Happy Result in Geneva" (1997) 19 
E. I. P. R. 230. 
90 For a more detailed discussion, see Ricketson and Ginsburg at pp. 645-56. 
9' French Intellectual Property Code 1992, articles L. 122-1,122-4. 
92 CDPA 1988, section 16(1)(e). There are similar provisions in other Commonwealth 
legislation. 
93 Copyright Act 1970, article 27. 
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DISTRIBUTION The distribution right relates to the author's right to control dissemination of physical 
RIGHT copies of his work. The WIPO Copyright Treaty 199694 introduced a broad 
distribution right for literary and artistic works. Even though not all countries 
recognise the right, the States of the EC95, the United Kingdom96, Germany97 and 
the United States98 are some of the countries that do provide for a comprehensive 
distribution right. 
In recent years, advances in the reproduction technologies that facilitate copies of 
motion pictures, phonograms and, in some instances, computer software, have led 
to the need to protect rental rights. The TRIPS Agreement" and the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty10° have introduced certain rental rights. On a regional level, rental 
rights are established under the 1992 EC Rental/Lending and Related Rights 
Directive, NAFTA and Cartagena Decision 351. 
COMMUNICA- The author's right of communicating his work to the public has traditionally 
TION TO THE encompassed a variety of activities, including giving a performance of the work in 
PUBLIC RIGHT public or communicating the work through intangible means such as wireless or 
cable transmission. 
The definition and thus potential scope of the right has nevertheless generated 
world-wide debate for a number of reasons. Firstly, the requirement underpinning all 
formulations of the right -i. e. that the exploitation of the work must be in public, and 
in particular the meaning of the word "public"- has given rise to extensive national 
debates. Although at present there is a general consensus that "public" excludes 
the group of persons within the purely domestic circle101, there are still variations in 
the interpretation of the term "public" among various countries102. 
94 Article 6(1). 
9s Information Society Directive 2001, Article 4. 
96 CDPA 1988, section 18. 
97 Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law 1965, article 17(1). 
98 US Copyright Act 1976, section 106(3). 
99 Article 14(4). 
goo Articles 7(1) and 7(3). 
10' See, French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 122-5, Author's Right and Related 
Protection Rights Law 1965, article 15(3). The US Copyright Act 1976 defines, in section 
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Secondly, the emerging communication technologies and, in particular, the Internet, 
that enable individuals to receive performances of works on demand in the privacy 
of their homes have raised new and complicated questions about the meaning of 
"public" 103. The advent of the Internet not only further entangles the definition of 
"public" but also greatly complicates the determination of the place where the 
communication takes place. 
There is a lack of uniformity in the granting of this right among national 
legislations104. Some laws grant the general right of communicating the work 
publicly1°5 while others employ specific terms such as rights of public performance 
and broadcasting'06 
It appears that an equal level of diversity exists among different international 
instruments. The Universal Copyright Convention 1952 prescribes the exclusive 
right of the author to control "public performance and broadcasting°, while the 107 
101, "perform or display a work publicly" as "to perform or display [the work] at a place open 
to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal 
circle of family and its social acquaintances are gathered". 
102 An example of such variations occurs in the case of reception in hotel rooms. There is a 
lack of uniformity among national case law as to whether transmission of films, video and 
radio programs by the hotel proprietor to guests in their room would constitute 'making 
available to the public' and thus an infringement. For a detailed analysis and examples of 
relevant national case law, see Sterling at pp. 374-75. 
103 For a detailed discussion of the right of communication see Makeen, M. F., Copyright in a 
Global Information Society: The Scope of Copyright Protection under International, US, UK 
and French Law (Kluwer Law International, 2000), Chapter 6, and generally Burrell, R. and 
Coleman, A., Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
Chapter 7. 
t04 For discussion of the historical development of the right under national laws see Makeen, 
M. F., Copyright in a Global Information Society: The Scope of Copyright Protection under 
International, US, UK and French Law (Kluwer Law International, 2000), Chapters 1 (UK), 2 
(USA) and 3 (France). 
For discussions of the right under national laws see Bently, L. and Cornish, W. R., "United 
Kingdom", Schwartz, E. J. and Nimmer, D., "United States", Lucas, A. and Kamina, P., 
"France" and Dietz, A., "Germany" in Nimmer, M. B. and Geller, P. W., International Copyright 
Law and Practice (Matthew Bender, 1988-) at para. 8[1][b]. 
105 For example, Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law 1965, article 15(2); 
French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 122-2. The US could be said to belong to 
this category of national laws as, while it assimilates wireless broadcasting and cable 
transmission to its public performance right (US Copyright Act 1976, section 106(4)), it also 
grants a separate public display right (US Copyright Act 1976, section 106(5)). 
106 For example, Canadian Copyright Act, section 3(1), CDPA 1988, section 16. 
107 Universal Copyright Convention 1952, Article IVbis(1). 
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Berne Convention 1971 grants the separate rights to perform108, recite109 and 
broadcast. 
1.3.2.5 LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 
Limitations to copyright law appear under the diverse headings of permitted acts, 
restrictions, exceptions and limitations according to the legal background and 
culture of the jurisdiction in which they developed. Such restrictions are primarily 
designed to balance the interests of the copyright owner against the public interest, 
pressing social and cultural needs and, commercial issues1'. 
Limitations to copyright law are provided for on the international, regional and 
national levels. The Berne Convention sets out a number of such exceptions that 
can apply to curtail the exclusive rights vested in the author of a work. In addition to 
allowing for specific limitations"', Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, in 
conjunction with Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994, provide for the so-called 
'three-step test'12, which in general governs the way in which existing limitations 
are to apply and the way in which new ones can be implemented by national 
legislatures. 
For the purposes of the thesis, on the national level, the limitations of fair 
dealing/fair use and the public interest aspect constitute areas of importance' 13 ; 
they are employed to illustrate the role of limitations in the context of the 
relationship between copyright and freedom of expression. Accordingly, these 
108 Berne Convention 1971, Article 11. 
109 Berne Convention 1971, Article 11 ter. 
10 For an in-depth discussion of current limitations and exceptions to copyright, see ALAI 
Study Days Documents, Cambridge 1998, The Boundaries of Copyright - Its Proper 
Limitations and Exceptions (Australian Copyright Council, 1999). 
"' For a general discussion of the limitations provided under the Berne Convention, see 
para. 4.3. 
"Z "It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction 
of [literary and artistic] works in certain special cases, provided such reproduction does not 
conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author". 
"' For a discussion of copyright exceptions see Burrell, R. and Coleman, A., Copyright 
Exceptions: The Digital Impact (Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapters 2 and 4. 
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exceptions and their repercussions, actual and potential, on interaction of the rights 
are examined in detail in the thesis' 4. 
1.3.2.6 DURATION OF PROTECTION 
Copyright has traditionally been granted to authors for a limited period of time 
mainly on policy grounds: to safeguard the right of the public to have access to 
works. 
Following the Brussels Diplomatic Conference in 1948, the Berne Convention 
incorporated the provision that the term of copyright "shall be the life of the author 
and fifty years after his death"115. However, in some European countries the 
duration of protection exceeded life plus fifty years (as is permissible under the 
Berne Convention). In order to achieve uniformity, in 1993, the Term Directive 
harmonized the term of copyright protection to the life of the author and seventy 
years after his death16, subject to reciprocity in the case of non-EU/EEA works. The 
justification provided in the Preamble of the Directive reads as follows: "The 
Commission stresses the need to harmonise copyright and neighbouring rights at a 
high level of protection since these rights are fundamental to intellectual creation 
and stresses that their protection ensures the maintenance and development of 
creativity in the interest of authors, cultural industries, consumers and society as a 
whole""'. 
Statutory provisions within national jurisdictions, in uniformity with the Term 
Directive, specify for the term of protection of the author's copyright to be for his life 
14 See paras. 5.2 (fair dealing/fair use and freedom of expression/free speech) and 5.3 
(public interest and freedom of expression). 
15 Berne Convention 1971, Article 7(1). 
The comparison of terms test under Article 7(8) of the Berne Convention, as applying to 
duration of protection, is one of the permissible exceptions to the national treatment rule of 
Article 5(1) of the Convention. 
116 Term Directive 1993, Article 1(1). 
A proposal by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) to extend the term of 
protection for authors to seventy years after their death in the form of an additional Protocol 
to the Berne Convention (Memorandum of the International Bureau of WIPO on Questions 
concerning a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, Doc. BCP/CE/I/3, October 1991) 
was rejected by the Assembly of the Berne Union on September 19,1992. For a detailed 
discussion, see Davies, G., Copyright and the Public Interest (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
2002). 
117 Term Directive 1993, Preamble, recital 10. 
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and seventy years after his death"'. The United States of America has also 
extended the term of protection for the author by 20 years thus meeting the 70 
years period of European instruments19, and avoiding the imposition in the EC of 
the lesser term for US works. 
The issue of how long the copyright term should last for has been a controversial 
issue120. On the one hand, partisans of perpetual rights argue for an even longer 
term of protection which will enhance the position of copyright owners; on the other, 
extension of the term has been met with opposition: "... one may be concerned that 
term extension will result in an overall weakening of copyright protection... one may 
fear that 'user rights' advocates will contend, and courts will agree, that copyright 
now endures for so long a time, that the subsisting (and excessive) period of 
exclusivity must be tempered by more vigorous exceptions to copyright 
protection""'. 
1.4 GENERAL OVERVIEW: MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND REGIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
1.4.1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES 
1.4.1.1 GENERAL 
The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the multilateral copyright 
treaties relevant to the thesis. These instruments primarily relate to authors rights 
and are employed throughout the thesis in the context of its comparative approach 
in examining the relationship of copyright and freedom of expression on the 
international level. 
The multilateral treaties discussed are as follows: 
  The Berne Convention 1971 
' See, United Kingdom: CDPA 1988, sections 12(1)-(3); France: Intellectual Property Code 
1992, article L. 123-1; Germany: Author's Right and Related Protection Rights 1965, article 
67. 
19 The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,112 Stat. 2827 
(1998), Also, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186 (2003). 
120 This issue and its importance in the context of the relationship between copyright and 
freedom of expression are further examined in para. 5.5. 
121 Ginsburg, J. C., "News from US (I)", (1999) 179 R. I. D. A. 143. 
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  The TRIPS Agreement 1994, and 
  The WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 
1.4.1.2 BERNE CONVENTION 1886 -1971 
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works is the oldest 
international copyright convention. Since its adoption in 1886, it has been revised 
on a number of occasions. 
The Convention provides for certain minimum rights for authors of literary and 
artistic works122; it guarantees authors a number of economic123 and moral rights124 
and national treatment125. The term of protection is fixed at the author's life plus fifty 
years. 
1.4.1.3 TRIPS AGREEMENT 1994 
The TRIPS Agreement closely follows the Berne Convention and sets international 
standards for intellectual property rights, including both copyright and related 
rights126. 
Authors of literary and artistic are protected under Article 9 of the Agreement for the 
same term as is provided under the Berne Convention"'. 
TRIPS provides authors with the same economic rights as the Berne Convention12'. 
However, it absolves Member States from the obligation of implementing the moral 
rights provisions as specified in Article 6bis of the Convention12'. 
The Agreement contains provisions regarding the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights130 as well as dispute prevention and resolution procedures". 
'Z2 Berne Convention 1971, Article 1. - 
123 The economic rights include the rights of translation (Article 8), reproduction (Article 9), 
public performance (Article 11) and adaptation (Article 12). 
124 The moral rights include the rights of paternity and integrity (Article 6bis). 
125 Berne Convention 1971, Article 5(1). 
126 The related rights aspects of the Agreement are not examined in the context of the thesis. 
12' TRIPS Agreement 1994, Articles 9 and 12. 
'Z$ TRIPS Agreement 1994, Articles 9,11 and 14(3). 
129 TRIPS Agreement 1994, Article 9(1). 
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1.4.1.4 WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY 1996 
Member States of the WIPO Copyright Treaty have to comply with the substantive 
provisions of the Berne Convention132. 
The Treaty covers authors of literary and artistic works133 for a term of the author's 
life plus fifty years134, and confers upon them the same economic and moral rights 
1 as are provided under the Berne Convention35 
The Treaty also makes provision for new rights for authors13', while it contains 
obligations concerning technological measures13' and protection of rights 
management information1 ' 
1.4.2 REGIONAL COPYRIGHT INSTRUMENTS 
1.4.2.1 EUROPE 
It can be said that, to date, there is no single regional copyright instrument within 
the European Community. Authors rights are generally safeguarded through the 
statutory provisions of a number of Directives. The Directives cover various 
copyright-related issues, such as the term of protection13' and authors rights in the 
information society140. The relevant provisions of these Directives are the subject of 
consideration in the thesis. 
1° TRIPS Agreement 1994, Part III. Article 41 provides that "Members shall ensure that 
enforcement procedures ... are available under their law so as to permit effective action 
against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, 
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a 
deterrent to further infringements". 
13' TRIPS Agreement 1994, Part V. 
12 WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Article 1. 
13 WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Articles 4-8. 
14 WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Articles 1(4) and 9 (full term for photographic works). 
15 WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Articles 1(4) and 6-8. 
136 WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Article 8 (right of communication to the public by wire or 
wireless means). 
"' WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Article 11. 
"$ WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Article 12. 
139 Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonising the term of protection of 
copyright and certain related rights. 
140 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society. 
Other EC Directives concern the protection of databases, computer programs, the author's 
resale right and rental and lending rights. Such Directives are not directly associated with 
the present work. 
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1.4.2.2 NORTH, CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA 
The relevant regional American instruments that shall be referred to in subsequent 
chapters are the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1992 and the 
Cartagena Decision 351 1993141. 
In general, NAFTA follows the Berne Convention and protects, among others, 
authors of literary and artistic works for a term of the life of the author plus fifty 
years142. Such authors are vested with a number of economic rights, including the 
right of reproduction and the right of communication of a work to the public143 
NAFTA however excludes the protection of authors moral rights, as provided for 
under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention"' 
The Cartagena Decision 351 protects, among others, authors and other owners of 
rights in works of the mind, in the literary, artistic or scientific field145. The term of 
copyright protection is the same as under NAFTA and the Berne Convention146. 
This instrument provides authors with both a number of economic (including, rights 
of reproduction, communication to the public, translation, adaptation)"' and moral 
(including, divulgation, paternity and integrity rights)148 rights. 
1.4.3.3 OTHER REGIONS 
The thesis also examines the African region; however, in the context of copyright, 
there appears to be no regional instrument in place"' 
Other EC Directives concern the protection of databases, computer programs, the author's 
resale right and rental and lending rights. Such Directives are not directly associated with 
the present work. 
14' These instruments are mostly relevant in the examination of the relationship between 
copyright and freedom of expression on the regional (American) level. See paras. 3.4.2 
(moral rights and freedom of expression) and 4.4 (economic rights and freedom of 
expression). 
142 NAFTA, Article 1705. 
'"' NAFTA, Articles 1701 and 1705(2). 
144 NAFTA, Article 1701. 
145 Cartagena Decision 351, Article 1. 
146 Cartagena Decision 351, Article 18. 
147 Cartagena Decision 351, Articles 13-16. 
148 Cartagena Decision 351, Article 11. 
149 For a discussion of the regional human rights instrument, see para. 2.4.4. 
49 
1.5 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: NATIONAL LAWS 
1.5.1 GENERAL 
This section examines in more detail the development of national copyright and 
author's right systems. It discusses the historical background of the adoption of 
legislative instruments safeguarding the authors copyright. 
The process of formation of the first national copyright laws can be said to 
constitute evidence of each jurisdiction's subsequent approach to this area. Legal 
history has shaped, to an extent, the copyright landscape of the present times and 
can thus be employed as a tool to comprehend the current diversities and 
similarities among national copyright legislations. 
Accordingly, the following paragraphs briefly examine the development of the 
copyright laws of those countries that are of primary importance in the comparative 
approach of the thesis. The relevant countries include: 
  The United Kingdom, 
  The United States of America, 
  France, and 
  Germany 
1.5.2 UNITED KINGDOM LAW 
The first UK Act recognising the right of the author to authorise the reproduction of 
his work was the Statute of Anne 1710150. The Act remained in force effectively until 
the major revision Copyright Act of 184215' at a time when the issue of the period of 
protection was controversial. This later Act is considered to have "formed the basis 
of modern copyright law: it provided the groundwork for the domestic aspects of the 
Aso Seville, C., Literary Copyright Reform in Early Victorian England (the Framing of the 1842 
Copyright Act) (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
15' On the background to and history of the passing of the 1710 Act, see Deazley, R., On 
The Origin of the Right to Copy (Hart Publishing, 2004), Chapters 1 and 2. Other Acts were 
passed which extended the term and scope of rights granted to authors. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Davies, G., Copyright and the Public Interest (2"d ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2002) at pp. 28-32; Dworkin, G., "United Kingdom" in International Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights (Stewart, S. M. and Sandison, H. (eds. ), 2nd ed., Butterworths, 1989), 
Chapter 18; Sherman, B. and Bently, L., The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002) at pp. 111-28. 
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1911 Act, and this foundation was to a significant extent carried forward in the 1956 
SZ and 1988 Acts"'. 
Until the passing of the Copyright Act 1911, a number of legislative amendments 
were made. The Act brought about several reforms partly in order to comply with 
the Berlin Revision of the Berne Convention (1908)153 - it codified the law, 
extended the term of protection to meet the Berne Convention standard, and 
introduced the requirement of originality. 
The 1911 Act remained in operation until the Copyright Act 1956 came into force on 
July 1,1957. The 1956 Act was in turn repealed by the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988. Since the 1988 Act came into force, its provisions have been 
amended on a number of occasions in order to implement the European 
Community Directives in the field of copyright and related rights. 
1.5.3 - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LAW 
The fountainhead of intellectual property protection in the United States is the US 
Constitution itself, which empowers Congress to "promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings"' 54 
The first copyright statute in the United States was the Act of May 31,1790. 
General revisions of the copyright law were effected in the statutes of 1891 
(protecting works originating outside the United States), 1909 and 1976. 
The Act of October 19,1976 completely reformed the 1909 Act. The new Act 
abolished the old dual system whereby Federal statutory protection was extended 
to published material while common law protection under State law existed for 
152 Seville, C., Literary Copyright Reform in Early Victorian England (the Framing of the 1842 
Copyright Act) (Cambridge University Press, 1999) at pp. 6-7. 
'' For an analytical discussion, see Sterling, J. A. L. and Carpenter, M. C. L., Copyright Law in 
the United Kingdom and the Rights of Performers, Authors and Composers in Europe (Legal 
Books, 1986, supplement 1987), chapter 1. 
154 US Constitution 1787, Article 1, section 8. For a discussion of the development of US 
copyright law, see Ringer, B. and Sandison, H., "United States of America" in International 
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (Stewart, S. M. and Sandison, H. (eds. ), 2"d ed., 
Butterworths, 1989), Chapter 21. 
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unpublished works. The Act established Federal dominance by pre-empting state 
common law copyright in works falling within the subject-matter of the Federal 
statute, whether published or unpublished. 
The US Copyright Act 1976 has, in turn, been amended a number of times, as a 
result of the United States' adherence to the Berne Convention 1971, North 
American Free Trade (NAFTA) Agreement 1992, TRIPS Agreement 1994 and 
WIPO Treaties 1996. 
1.5.4 FRENCH LAW 
Before the French Revolution, public performance and printing were covered by 
royal privileges155. In the wake of the French Revolution, these privileges controlling 
the performance and printing of authors' works were abolished156 
The Decree of January 13-19,1791 settled relations between authors and theatre 
impresarios by conferring upon every citizen the right to set up a public theatre and 
perform all kinds of works157. The Decree also contained provisions relating to the 
performance of works both of living and dead authors158. 
The Decree of 19-24 July 1793 established for the first time the exclusive right of 
reproduction based primarily on the concept of property: "Authors of writings of 
every sort, composers of music, and painters and designers who engrave paintings 
(tableaux) or designs, shall enjoy for their whole life the exclusive right to sell, 
arrange sale and distribute their works in the territory of the Republic, and to assign 
such property in whole or in part"159 
iss Report of Antoine-Louis Seguier, Avocat-General (1777). Cited in Renouard, A. C., Traite 
des droits d' auteur dans la literature, les sciences et les beaux-arts (2 vol., Paris, Jules 
Renouard, 1838-1839) at p. 182 (volume 1). 
156 Royal privileges were abolished by the Constituent Assembly on 4 August 1789. 
For a discussion of the historical development of the French author's right law, see 
Chesnais, P., "France" in International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (Stewart, S. M. 
and Sandison, H. (eds. ), 2"d ed., Butterworths, 1989), Chapter 14; Ginsburg, J. C., "A Tale of 
Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America" (1991) 147 R. I. D. A. 
125. 
' 57 Article 1. 
158 Articles 2 and 3. 
's9 Decree of 19/24 July 1973, Article 1. Translation by Sterling, J. A. L. in Sterling at p. 1260. 
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The few lines of the Decrees of 1791 and 1793 remained, with a number of 
statutory amendments, the basis of authors' protection until the Law on Literary and 
Artistic Property came into force on March 11,1957. 
Neighbouring rights were introduced by Parliament in the amending law of July 3, 
1985'so 
In 1992, the 1957 Law was replaced by the Code on Intellectual Property 1992, 
currently in force. 
1.5.5 GERMAN LAW 
In Germany, Imperial privileges awarded from the beginning of the sixteenth century 
to printers, publishers, important artists and, in some cases, authors for protection 
against copying were the precursors of copyright16'. 
The concept of intellectual property developed gradually, the fragmentation of the 
country into different states did not aid the creation of any uniform code of 
protection. In a piece-meal way, local regulations came to replace the system of 
privileges and by the nineteenth century, Germany was faced with the need to 
devise a body of rules harmoniously applicable to the whole country. 
The first comprehensive enactment of authors' right was the Prussian Law of 1837 
for the Protection of Ownership of Works of Science and Art. The German Empire 
of the Laws of 1871 (literary, musical and dramatic works) and 1876 followed, the 
latter being replaced in 1907 by the Law on Artistic Works and Photography. 
Following the adoption of the Berne Convention in 1886, the Law of 1901 (literary 
and musical works and a separate statute relating to publishing) was enacted. The 
Revision Conferences of the Berne Convention critically influenced the German law. 
The Berlin Act of 1908 brought about the amending law of 1910, taking into account 
'6o Neighbouring rights are beyond the scope of the thesis. 
16' For a general discussion of the background to the development of the German author's 
right system, see Ulmer, E. and von Rauscher, H. H., "Germany (Federal Republic)" in 
International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (Stewart, M. S. and Sandison, H. (eds. ), 2nd 
ed., Butterworths, 1989), Chapter 15. 
53 
phonograms and films for the first time. After the Revision Conference in Rome in 
1928, which took broadcasting into account and introduced the "droit moral" in the 
text of the Conventions, the Brussels Revision of the Berne in 1948 and various 
studies and consultations, the Author's Right Law of 1965 was adopted. Under this 
law, author's right and related rights were distinctly differentiated while the duration 
of protection was extended to 70 years from the death of the author. 
1.6 SUMMARY 
Generally, copyright can be described as a bundle of rights. it encompasses not 
only the exclusive rights awarded to authors of works, but also a number of 
limitations and exceptions to such rights which serve to accommodate the interests 
of the general public. Its aim is to strike the right balance between the legal power 
given to authors and the larger public interest. 
However, this appears to be a difficult task to accomplish given the myriads of rights 
that make up copyright. This difficulty is exacerbated by the diverse historical 
backgrounds, legal traditions and cultures that characterise international, regional 
and national instruments. Furthermore, modern technological advancement render 
it constantly necessary to update this legal area. 
To date, it appears that most of these factors have been taken into account, when 
and as required, in developing and drafting copyright laws worldwide, while the role 
of copyright within international and regional markets is steadily increasing. 
Nevertheless, this process has, at times, given rise to a number of concerns. There 
has been the argument that authors should not be given extensive protection over 
their creations: copyright has not been designed to create intellectual monopolies. 
At the heart of this issue appears to lie the general public's right to free expression. 
Debates propose that copyright should be curtailed so as not to suppress 
individuals right to express themselves freely; alternatively, the law should be 
amended or enriched in such a way that freedom of expression should be taken into 
account vis-ä-vis the author's exclusive rights. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Human Right of Freedom of Expression: Its 
Basis and Application in Law 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter maps out the international, regional and national landscapes of 
protection and status of the human rights, and in particular the right of freedom of 
expression. In outline, the following instruments (and constitutions) that recognise 
freedom of expression are examined at the respective levels: 
International Instruments 
" The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
" The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
Regional Instruments 
  The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
  The American Convention on Human Rights 1969 
  The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 1981 
National instruments and Constitutions 
  The UK Human Rights Act 1998 
  The American Declaration of 1948; the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution 
  The French Declaration of 1789; the French Constitution of 1958; the status 4 
of the European Convention on Human Rights 
  The German Constitution (Basic Law) of 1949; the status of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
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The chapter looks at the historical background of each of the above-mentioned 
instruments, considering the social pressures and needs that triggered their coming 
into being as well as the signatory States' efforts, in the case of international and 
regional arrangements, to reach a consensus as to their content and scope. 
The provisions on the right of freedom of expression under each instrument are 
analysed. The aim of this process is to define the scope of this right and the extent 
of the limitations placed upon it, as well as discussing the relevant jurisprudence 
and case law to date. Differences among international, regional and national 
instruments in their respective definitions, scope and interpretation of the right are 
thus illustrated. 
The chapter provides a brief discussion of the approach that copyright itself can be 
considered to be a human right. The relevant human rights instruments that support 
this view are set out and their respective provisions studied. 
In general, this Chapter sets the background to the human rights, and freedom of 
expression in particular, the main aspect of the subsequent comparative study of 
the thesis. 
2.2 COPYRIGHT AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
It can be argued that copyright has a dual nature. On the one hand, it is part of the 
legal body of intellectual property, a regime of bilateral, regional and multilateral 
treaties. On the other hand, the rights of intellectual property, and of copyright in 
particular, can be characterised as human rights. ' The principal international 
document that can be said to constitutionalise human rights, and thus copyright as 
a human right, is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 27(2) of the 
Declaration provides that "Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
' See Drahos, P., "The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights: Origins and 
Development" in (1999) Intellectual Property and Human Rights, WIPO (Geneva), 13. This 
paper was also presented at The Panel Discussion to Commemorate the 50"' anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, WIPO (Geneva, November 9,1998). Also, see 
Ostergard, R. L., "Intellectual Property: A Universal Human Right? " (1999) 21 H. R. Q. 156. 
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he is the author "Z. An important factor influencing the recognition of the author's 
right as a human right was Article 13 of the American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man of 1948, and the drafters' desire to achieve harmonisation 3. Article 13 
provides that "Every person has the right to take part in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts, and to-participate in the benefits that result from 
intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries. He likewise has the right to 
the protection of his moral and material interests as regards his inventions or any 
literary, scientific or artistic works of which he is the author s4. 
The recognition of copyright as a human right in the Universal Declaration appears 
to be supported by the subsequent adoption of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. Article 15(1)(c) of the Covenant 
recognises the right of the author "to benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which 
he is the author"5. 
Copyright, in its capacity as a human right, is characterised by a number of 
features, which are, arguably, absent when it is viewed as an intellectual property 
right. These features derive, to an extent, from the very nature of the human rights 
body and are reflected in the provisions of Article 27 of the Universal Declaration. 
Z This provision, which in effect recognises the need to protect the author of a work, can be 
said to be counter-balanced by the provisions of Article 27(1), which ensures the use and 
diffusion of information, and artistic and scientific creations. Article 27(1) reads as follows: 
"Everyone has the right to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts 
and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits". For a discussion of the background 
to the drafting of Article 27 and its inclusion in the Declaration, see Morsink, J., The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights - Origins, Drafting & Intent (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), at pp. 217-22. 
' For a more detailed discussion, see Chapman, A. R., "Approaching Intellectual Property as 
a Human Right: Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c)" (2001) vol. XXXV, No. 3 Copyright 
Bulletin 4. 
For a discussion of the historical background to the adoption of Article 27 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, see Torremans, P. L. C., "Copyright As A Human Right", in 
Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of Expression - Intellectual Property - Privacy 
(Torremans, P. L. G. (ed. ), Kluwer Law International, 2004), 1, at Pp. 4-7. 
° American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O. A. S. Res. XXX, adopted by The 
Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogota, Columbia, 1948. 
S For an extensive discussion of this provision, its origins, drafting and substance, see 
Chapman, A. R., "Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right: Obligations Related 
to Article 15(1)(c)" (2001) vol. XXXV, No. 3 Copyright Bulletin 4. 
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Firstly, as a human right, copyright recognises the equal importance of the 
economic and moral rights of the author, who is viewed as the scientist, creator and 
artist. In other words, copyright is also regarded as a personality right6, as opposed 
to a strong, principally economic right' under the intellectual property regime'. 
Secondly, human rights provisions highlight the need to balance the right of the 
author against the interests of the broader human community. This concept is 
echoed in copyright law to the extent that there is an overall desire to strike a 
balance between an individual's intellectual property rights and the common good of 
humanity as a whole, such desire not, it is submitted, being granted the prominence 
it enjoys within the human rights regimes. 
Thirdly, copyright as a human right is a universal right10. It is vested in each and 
every individual, as non-discrimination is inherent in the concept of human rights. 
This is not, however, reflected in any of the international instruments of copyright 
codification, including the Berne Convention". 
6 This view is similar to the author's right system in civil law countries. This approach is 
discussed in para. 1.2.2. 
This approach is more prominent in common law systems of copyright. These systems as 
briefly discussed in para. 1.2.1. 
$ "A human rights orientation acknowledges that intellectual products have an intrinsic value 
as an expression of human dignity and creativity. Put another way, artistic and scientific 
works are not first and foremost economic commodities whose value is determined by their 
utility and economic price tag. ", Chapman, A. R., "Approaching Intellectual Property as a 
Human Right: Obligations Related to Article 15(1)(c)" (2001) vol. XXXV, No. 3 Copyright 
Bulletin 4, at p. 14. 
9 "A human rights approach also takes the implicit balance between the rights of inventors 
and creators and the interests of the wider society within intellectual property paradigms and 
makes it far more explicit and exacting. A human rights orientation is predicated on the 
centrality of protecting and nurturing human dignity and the common good. ", Chapman, 
A. R., "Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right: Obligations Related to Article 
15(1)(c)" (2001) vol. XXXV, No. 3 Copyright Bulletin 4, at p. 14. 
10 For a discussion of the concept of 'universalism' within human rights, see Steiner, H. J. 
and Alston, P., International Human Rights in Context - Läw, Politics, Morals (2"d ed., 
Oxford University Press, 2000) at pp. 366 - 402. " Protection under the Berne Convention largely depends on criteria of nationality of 
authors, place of publication of works, etc. For an extensive discussion of these provisions, 
see paras. 6.4.2.1 and 6.4.3.1. 
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2.3 INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The following paragraphs examine those human rights instruments that safeguard 
an individual's right of freedom of expression on an international level. These 
instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
They also provide a brief discussion of the historical background to the adoption of 
these instruments and the nature of the rights they recognise. The instruments 
respective provisions relating to the protection of freedom of expression are also 
analysed. 
2.3.2 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1948 
2.3.2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Charter of the United Nations was the first international organ that gave formal 
and authoritative expression to the human rights movement12 which began at the 
end of the Second World War13. It was signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945 
and entered into force in October of the same year. 
In the autumn of 1945, the Preparatory Commission recommended that the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) should establish a Commission of 
Human Rights14 to produce and submit reports and proposals on an International 
Bill of Rights. The Commission was set up in 1946 and first met early in 1947. 
Some representatives recommended that the draft bill of rights under preparation 
should take the form of a Declaration15, while others urged the Commission to 
prepare a draft Convention containing legal obligations. 
12 lt has to be noted however that within the Charter itself, there has been no elaboration as 
to the meaning of the concept of human rights nor does the Charter contain a catalogue of 
human rights. 
" The Charter, in its Preamble, promotes human rights "We the peoples of the United 
Nations determined ... to reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small 
... have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims". ""The Economic and Social Council shall set up Commissions in economic and social fields 
and for the promotion of human rights... ", Charter of United Nations 1945, Article 68. 
15 That is "a recommendation by the General Assembly to Member States that would exert a 
moral and political influence on states rather than constitute a legally binding instrument", 
Steiner, H. J., and Alston, P., International Human Rights in Context (2 ed., Oxford 
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The first recommendation was followed and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was adopted on 10 December 194816 by the General Assembly with forty- 
eight states voting in favour, none against and eight abstaining". 
2.3.2.2 RECOGNISED RIGHTS 
The Declaration is not legally binding as such; rather, the intention of those who 
drafted the Declaration was for it to establish general legal principles and goals for 
States to aim to achieve1e. In effect, the aspiration was for it to be "first and 
foremost a declaration of the basic principles to serve as a common standard for all 
nations. It might become "the Magna Carta of all mankind"19. 
Since 1948, the influence of the Universal Declaration has been profound. It has 
been recognised as a statement of principles which all States should observe20. it 
reflects the human rights as prescribed within the United Nations Chartert'. Even 
outside the United Nations circle, it has inspired the creation and adoption of 
University Press, 2000) at p. 138. Also, see Gearon, L., Freedom of Expression and Human 
Rights: Historical, Literary and Political Contexts (Sussex Academic Press, 2006), Chapter 
9. 
16 For the purpose of drafting the Declaration, a committee was appointed which consisted of 
representatives of the state members of the Commission, namely, Australia, Chile, China, 
France, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, United States and USSR. The committee was 
chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt. 
" For a detailed discussion of the historical background to the adoption and drafting process 
of the Universal Declaration, see Morsink, J., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
Origins, Drafting & Intent (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), Chapter 1. 
`8 The Declaration, in its preamble, states that "The General Assembly proclaims this 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping 
this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote 
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and 
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both 
among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories 
under their jurisdiction". 
19 Words of Mrs. Roosevelt in the General Assembly. Quoted by Sohn, L. B., "A short history 
of United Nations documents on human rights" in The United Nations and Human Rights, 
181h Report of the Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace, New York, 1968 at p. 70. 
Z0 See, for example, the Declaration on Colonialism adopted in 1960 by the General 
Assembly (Resolution 1514 (XV)) which states that "All States shall observe faithfully and 
strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the present Declaration". 
21 "Each right contained in the Universal Declaration is effectively incorporated into the 
Charter", Rodley, N. S., The Treatment of Prisoners in International Law (2"d ed., Clarendon 
Press, 1999) at p. 63. 
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numerous human rights treaties in Europe, the United States and Africa; these 
instruments frequently quote its provisions on the impact of the Declaration. Steiner 
states "The Declaration has retained its place of honour in the human rights 
movement. No other document has so caught the historical moment, achieved the 
same moral and rhetorical force, or exerted as much influence on the movement as 
a whole"ZZ. 
The rights safeguarded under the Declaration are not binding as such; "when 
approved or adopted, [the Declaration] is hortatory and aspirational, 
recommendatory, rather than, in a formal sense, binding"23. 
The Declaration covers a broad range of human rights topics -including economic 
and social rights (Articles 22-26) as well as civil and political rights (Articles 1-21). 
No other treaty achieved this coverage again until the adoption of the International 
Covenants in 196624. 
All human rights under the Universal Declaration are vested in individuals, in each 
and every individual25 thus reflecting the universal nature of the rights; "Human 
rights are those rights held simply because one is a human being, goods, services, 
and opportunities to which everyone is entitled. Because one either is or is not a 
human being, human rights are held equally by all. Because one cannot stop being 
human, no matter how inhuman one's behaviour or the treatment one is forced to 
endure, they are inalienable rights"26. Even though the Declaration does not state 
the duration of the rights explicitly, it can be assumed that, being individual rights, 
they shall last at least for the life of the individual. 
22 See, Steiner, H. J., "Securing Human Rights: The First Half-Century of the Universal 
Declaration, and Beyond", Harvard Magazine, September -October 1998, at p. 45. 23 Steiner, H. J., and Alston, P., International Human Rights in Context (2"d ed., Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 2000) at p. 142. 
24 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is examined in para. 2.2.3. The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not recognise freedom 
of expression and therefore is not referred to in detail in the thesis. 
25 This is evident from the opening wording of the Articles of the Declaration; "Everyone has 
the right... ", "Everyone is entitled to... ", "No one shall... ". 
26 Donnelly, J., "The Universal Declaration Model of Human Rights: A Liberal Defence" in 
Lyons, G. M. and Mayall, J. (eds. ), International Human Rights in the 21St Century: Protecting 
the Rights of Groups (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), at para. 1A. 
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2.3.2.3 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 recognises the 
individual's right of freedom of expression and reads as follows: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers. 
The provision that information and ideas can be received and imparted "regardless 
of frontiers" is evidence of the drafters' intention to secure full exchange both within 
nations and internationally. In other words, individuals are entitled to impart and 
receive information and ideas to and from individuals or groups in other States27. In 
addition, the fact that information and ideas can be exchanged "through any media" 
implies the use of both communication by conventional methods as well as use of 
modern technology. 
2.3.3 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
2.3.3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
At the time the Universal Declaration was adopted, the Commission had also 
prepared and submitted a draft of the Covenant which was however referred back 
by the General Assembly. The Commission had initially prepared a text on civil and 
political rights which, having followed the guidance of the General Assembly in 
195028, it later changed to include in addition economic, social and cultural rights as 
well. The new text was further changed in 1952 when the General Assembly, 
considering the Security Council's recommendations, finally decided, following a 
long debate, that due to the differences between the two sets of rights 
acknowledged in the text, two separate Covenants should be adopted recognising 
each category of rights. Thus, the International Covenant on Civil Rights and the 
Z' The same provision can be found in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and 
the American Convention on Human Rights 1961. For a more detailed discussion of this 
issue, see Smith, R. K. M., Textbook on International Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 
2003) at p. 285. 
Z$ Resolution 421(V) of 4 December 1950. The Covenant did not come into force until 23 
March 1976. 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were adopted, 
albeit not until 1966. 
The drafting process was long, lasting eighteen years. When the draft Covenants 
were reviewed by the General Assembly's Third Committee, even though there was 
a general consensus that the primary obligation under the Covenant would be 
implementation at the national level by States, there was continuing disagreement 
on the basic issue of international measures of implementation. The views of the 
Commission's members were sharply divided. On the one hand, some argued that 
such measures were contrary to the principle of domestic jurisdiction29 and as such 
would undermine State sovereignty, while others held the view that they were a 
form of exercise of domestic jurisdiction and indeed a very beneficial one as 
observance of human rights constituted an international concern. Even within those 
States that favoured international measures there was widespread diversity 
regarding the types of measures that should be put into place; they ranged from the 
establishment of an International Court of Human Rights to that of reporting 
procedures covering some or all of the Covenant provisions. 
When the Covenant was finally unanimously approved by the General Assembly on 
16 December 1966, a "double system of implementation"30 was effectively adopted: 
the functions relating to interstate communications were made optional31 while a 
new Human Rights Committee32 was established with competence to receive 
violation reports33. In effect, "the result was a compromise between those States 
which favoured strong international measures and those which emphasized the 
primacy of national sovereignty and responsibility,, 34 
29 "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene 
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter", Article 2(7), 
Charter of the United Nations 1945. 
'o See, Robertson, A. H., and Merrills, J. G., Human Rights in the World (4U' ed., Manchester 
University Press, 1996) at p. 33. 
" International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 1. 
32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Part IV, Articles 28-45. 
" Arrangements providing for the consideration of individual complaints of violations were 
not included in the Covenant but put in the (First) Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights instead approved in 1966 by majority vote. 
34 Opsahl, T., "The Human Rights Committee" in The United Nations and Human Rights 
(Alston P. (ed. ), 1992) at p. 371. 
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2.3.3.2 RECOGNISED RIGHTS 
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, like the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights35, stipulates that realisation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in 
it, is immediate3s 
The status of the Covenant is binding and, as such, it binds the State parties in 
accordance with its terms. 
The Covenant contains 27 Articles which define, in greater detail than the Universal 
Declaration, a variety of rights and freedoms. 
In essence, the Covenant sets out what some commentators regard as "first 
generation" human rights, that is "the fundamental basic human rights required to 
be exercisable by everyone in a fair democratic society"37 . 
2.3.3.3 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The right of freedom of expression is recognised in Article 19 of the Covenant, 
which reads as follows: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article 
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
3s The Charter is discussed in para. 2.3.3. 
36 Article 2 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 provides: I. Each party to the 
Present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, ... 2. Where not 
already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such 
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in 
the present Covenant ... ". " Smith, R. K. M., Textbook on International Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 
p. 46. Note that the Covenant, as is the case with the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, does not provide for a right to property. 
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subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided 
by law and are necessary: 
(a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or 
of public health or morals. 
The Article, interestingly, makes a distinction in the treatment of the right to hold 
opinions and the right to freedom of expression. On the one hand, the right to hold 
opinions38 seems to be absolute as no interference from any source is permissible. 
On the other hand, the provisions relating to freedom of expression39 are subject to 
restrictions set out in paragraph 3 of the Article. In a general comment concerning 
Article 19, the Human Rights Committee emphasised the three requirements 
imposed by paragraph 3 with which any restriction must comply; "When a State 
party imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these 
may not put in jeopardy the right itself. Paragraph 3 lays down conditions and it is 
only subject to these conditions that restrictions may be imposed: the restrictions 
must be "provided by law"; they may only be imposed for one of the purposes set 
out in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3; and they must be justified as 
"necessary" for that State party for one of those purposes"ao 
2.4 REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
2.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
On a regional level, the Chapter focuses on the human rights instruments of the 
European, American and African regions. All instruments recognise and protect the 
author's right of freedom of expression, and include: 
  The European Convention on Human Rights, 
  The American Convention on Human Rights, and 




39 Article 19, para. 2. 
40 Report of the Human Rights Committee to the General Assembly, 38`h Sess., Supp. No. 
40,1983 (A/38140), Annexe VI, General Comment 10. 
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There follows a brief description of the historical background to the adoption of the 
instruments, the rights they recognise and the scope of freedom of expression for 
each region. 
2.4.2 EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 1950 
2.4.2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Three factors led to the adoption of the European Convention. Firstly, it was a 
natural response to the atrocities of the Nazi and Fascist systems that led to the 
Second World War whereby the denial of human rights was a deliberate instrument 
of policy. An effective system of protection of human rights was seen as the best 
means to "erect a bulwark against any recrudescence of dictatorship"41. 
Secondly, both the Council of Europe and the European Union held the view that 
regional integration and institutionalisation of common values constituted the best 
way of ensuring that Germany would be a force in peace. This view is reflected in 
the Preamble of the Convention which talks of "governments of European countries 
which are likeminded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, 
freedom and the rule of law". 
Thirdly, the creation of the Convention was triggered by the belief, in the post-war 
years, that countries of Western Europe needed protection against the Communist 
style of despotism. The document protecting fundamental freedoms would, as 
Robert Schuman put it, set "the foundations on which to base the defence of human 
personality against all tyrannies and against all forms of totalitarianism". 
The task of writing up the Convention was assumed by the Consultative Assembly 
of the Council of Europe in 1949. The Convention was signed in Rome in November 
1950 and entered into force on 3 September 195342. Having overcome concerns 
over sovereignty and State accountability, the Convention's Preamble 
41 Robertson, A. H. and Merrills, J. G., Human Rights in the World (4`" ed., Manchester 
University Press, 1996) at p. 120. 
42 For a list of the countries that are members of the Convention, see Appendix 3. 
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acknowledges that it constitutes merely "the first steps for the collective 
enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal Declaration". 
In the summer of 1950, even before the Convention was signed, the Assembly 
proposed the inclusion of three further rights43 which were subsequently written up 
in Protocol No. 1 signed in March 1952 4a 
2.4.2.2 RECOGNISED RIGHTS 
The importance of the European Convention system has been described as "the 
first comprehensive treaty in the world in this field; it established the first 
international complaints procedure and the first international court for the 
determination of human rights matters; it remains the most judicially developed of 
all the human rights systems; and it has generated a more extensive jurisprudence 
than any other part of the international system"45 
The Convention and its Protocols46 define twenty five rights and freedoms all of 
which are civil and political rights. 
Some of the rights are set out in detail. Articles first provide a general affirmation of 
the relevant right or freedom, similar to the wording of the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights. They then lay down the limitations to which the right or freedom may 
be subject to. The right of freedom of expression (Article 10) is an example of such 
a structure. 
Member states have to guarantee the rights and freedoms of the Convention to all 
persons within their jurisdiction, regardless of their national or legal status. This 
43 The three new rights included the right to property (Article 1), the right of parents to ensure 
the education of their children in conformity with their own religious and philosophical 
convictions (Article 2) and the right to free elections (Article 3). 
as Ten further Protocols have been concluded to the present, with Protocol No. 11 having 
been signed in 1994. 
as Steiner, H., J., and Alston, P., International Human Rights In Context (2"d ed., Oxford 
University Press, 2000) at p. 786. 
46 Eleven Protocols have been concluded since the Convention entered into force in 1953 
and 1994. Protocols 10 (concerning voting arrangements) and 11 (concerning the control 
system) are not yet in force. For a detailed analysis of the historical background to and 
content of the Protocols, see Robertson, A. H., and Merrills, J. G., Human Rights in the World 
(4th ed., Manchester University Press, 1996), chapter 4. 
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obligation is assumed by each state under Article 1 of the Convention which reads: 
"The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in section 1 of the Convention". 
2.4.2.3 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The right to freedom of expression has been acknowledged to be an "essential 
foundation of a democratic society" and a "basic condition for its progress and for 
the development of every mans47. The right is protected under Article 10 of the 
Convention, which reads as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This 
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions 
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
The right can be relied upon by "everyone", including legal and natural persons48 
Thus, Article 10 has been held to apply to publishers49, authors50, profit-making 
corporate bodies, such as newspapers', journalists, and civil servants, including 
teachers52, judges53, local government officers" and members of the armed 
forces55 
4' Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) 1 E. H. R. R. 737 (ECtHR) at para. 49 and Zana V. 
Turkey (18954/91) (1997) 27 E. H. R. R. 667 (ECtHR) at para. 51. 
48AutotronicA. G. v. Switzerland (1990) 12 E. H. R. R. 485 (ECtHR). 
49 Unabhängige Initiative Informations Vielfalt v. Austria (2003) 37 E. H. R. R. 33 (ECtHR). 
$° Groppera Radio A. G. v. Switzerland (1990) 12 E. H. R. R. 321 (ECtHR). 
51 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979) 2 E. H. R. R. 245 (ECtHR). 
52 Morissens v. Belgium (11389/85) (1988) 56 D. R. 127 (ECommHR). 
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The scope of the right appears to be wide as "expression" has been interpreted 
broadly to include communications of any kind or subject matter: spoken or written 
words, television programs and broadcasting56, films57, paintings", videos59, 
photographs60, dress61, graffiti62, banners or posters63, press conferences and 
interviews64, musical performances by street musicians6s 
Almost all forms of expression fall within the scope of Article 10. Thus, political 
expression66, commercial expression s7, artistic expression68 and scientific literature 
s' H v. Austria, App. No. 20831/92; Decision of 2.3.94 (unpublished). 
54 Ahmed v. United Kingdom (1998) 29 E. H. R. R. 1 (ECtHR). 
ss Engel v. Netherlands (1976) 1 E. H. R. R. 647 (ECtHR). 
56 Hodgson, Woolf Productions, and National Union of Journalists and Channel 4 Television 
v. United Kingdom (11553/85 and 11685/85) (1987) 51 DR 136; (1987) 10 E. H. R. R. 503, 
ECommHR. 
S' Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1994) 19 E. H. R. R. 34 (ECtHR). 
58 Muller v. Switzerland (1988) 13 E. H. R. R. 212 (ECtHR). 
'9 Wingrove v. United Kingdom (1996) 24 E. H. R. R. 1 (ECtHR). 
60 Douglas v. Hello! (2001) 2 All E. R. 289. 
61 Stevens v. United Kingdom (11674/85) (1986) 46 D. R. 245 (ECommHR). 
62 N v. Switzerland (1982) 34 D. R. 208 (ECtHR). 
63 X v. Germany (9235/81) (1982) 29 D. R. 194 (ECommHR) (defendant convicted for putting 
a poster denying the Holocaust in his garden). 
64 K (A Child) v. BBC (2001) All E. R. 323. 
65 H and K v. United Kingdom (1983) 34 D. R. 218. 
66 In Thorgeir Thorgeirson Islande v. Iceland (1992) 14 E. H. R. R. 843 (ECtHR), it was held 
that political expression has to be interpreted broadly so as to include both political matters 
in the strict sense as well as other matters of public interest. See also, Barfod v. Denmark 
(1989) 13 E. H. R. R. 493 (ECtHR) (protection accorded to publication concerning the 
impartiality of a court), Tidende v. Norway (2001) 31 E. H. R. R. 430 (ECtHR) (protection 
accorded to publication concerning public health). 
67 It is the aim of the expression that determines whether it is "commercial". Thus, if it is 
directed at promoting commercial or financial interests it can be considered "commercial" - 
Demuth v. Switzerland, App. No. 38743/97, Judgment of November 5,2002 (paras. 41 and 
42). However, the fact that a publication has a commercial value does not in itself render it 
"commercial" - Barthold v. Germany (1985) 7 E. H. R. R. 383 (ECtHR). 68 In Muller v. Austria (1988) 13 E. H. R. R. 212 (ECtHR), the Court held freedom of 
expression to include "... freedom of artistic expression - notably within freedom to receive 
and impart information and ideas- which affords the opportunity to take part in the public 
exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all kinds" (para. 27). 
Further, the Court emphasised that "those who create, perform, distribute or exhibit works of 
art contribute to the exchange of ideas and opinions which is essential for a democratic 
s6iety" and as such, the state should not encroach unduly upon their freedom of 
expression (para. 33). See e. g. X Ltd. and Y v. United Kingdom (8710/79)(1982) 28 D. R. 77 
(ECommHR) (concerning allegedly blasphemous poems), Familiapress-Zeitungs-Gmbh v. 
Austria (1992) 80 D. R. 74 (ECtHR) (a strike-out report after admissibility where the case 
concerned, the exchange of satirical poems between newspapers). 
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and information69 are all protected under this human right. "Expression" is also 
applicable to ideas or opinions that "offend, shock, or disturb" the State or any 
sector of the population70. Thus, in Jersild v. Denmark, the Court held that 
sentencing a journalist who edited a television program to include crude racist 
comments by a "group of extremist youths" was disproportionate to the need to 
protect those whom he had insulted - "It is not for this Court, nor for the national 
courts for that matter, to substitute their own views for those of the press as to what 
technique of reporting should be adopted by journalists"". 
However, the European Court of Human Rights has held that expression negating 
"clearly established historical facts", such as the Holocaust, "would be removed 
from the protection of Article 10"72. Further, the Court has occasionally suggested 
that "valueless" expression may not be protected under Article 1 073. 
The Article distinguishes between ideas and information, thus making it clear that 
"expression" is not restricted to statements of fact. It has been held to include 
criticisms, speculations and value judgments, regardless of whether or not they are 
objectively "true"74. Nevertheless, an opinion must amount to fair comment or have 
some foundation in the circumstances75. 
69 See e. g. Tv. United Kingdom (1978) 49 D. R. 5 (ECtHR) (prohibition on sending scientific 
literature out of prison), M v. France (1982) 41 D. R. 103 (ECtHR) (conviction of a computer 
scientist for passing scientific information to foreign agents). 
70 R v. Central Independent Television plc [1994] 3 All E. R. 641, C. A.. 
" Jersild v. Denmark (1994) 19 E. H. R. R. 1 (ECtHR) at para. 31. 
72 Lehideux and Isornia v. France (24662194) RJD 1998-VII 2864; (1998) 5 B. H. R. C. 540 
(ECtHR). See also, for a similar approach, Walendy v. Germany, App. No. 21128/92; 80 
D. R. 94 (denying the policy of extermination of Jews by the Nazi regime), Marais v. France, 
App. No. 31159/96; 86-A D. R. 184 (ECtHR) (denying the existence of gas chambers in 
concentration camps). 
" In Otto Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1994) 19 E. H. R. R. 34 (ECtHR), the applicants 
complained about the seizure and forfeiture of a satirical film with a religious subject-matter 
under domestic blasphemy laws. The Court, stressing that any "formality", "restriction", 
"condition", or "penalty" imposed must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, held 
that on the facts, the film offered insufficient contribution to public debate or artistic merit to 
outweigh the features that made it offensive. 
74 Lingens v. Austria (Series A No. 103) (1986) 8 E. H. R. R. 4 103 (ECtHR). In Thorgeir 
Thorgeirson Islande v. Iceland (1992) 14 E. H. R. R. 843 (ECtHR), the Court held that 
requiring a' journalist to prove the truth of "rumours" or "stories" relating to police brutality 
that he reported, was an impossible task and as such, his conviction for criminal defamation 
violated Article 10. 
75 A value judgment without any factual basis to support it may be considered excessive - 
De Haes v. Belgium (1997) 25 E. H. R. R. 1 (ECtHR) at para. 47. In Feldek v. Slovakia, App. 
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Furthermore, the fact that views are expressed in polemical or aggressive 76, 
exaggerated or provocative", or even insulting78 manner does not automatically 
take them outside the scope of Article 1079. Thus, in De Haes and Gijsels v. 
Belgium80, journalists who criticised certain members of the judiciary for their 
handling of child abuse and incest proceedings when writing critical articles were 
entitled to rely on Article 10 - "Although the applicants comments are severely 
critical, they nevertheless appear proportionate to the stir and indignation caused by 
the matters allegedn8'. 
Article 10 prohibits the State from restricting the receipt by an individual of 
information or ideas that others wish to impart to him, this right having been 
described as the "lifeblood" of democracy82. In cases concerning freedom of the 
press, the European Court of Human Rights has recognised that the right of the 
public to receive information and ideas on matters of public interest is a corollary of 
the function of journalists to impart such information and ideas83. 
The Convention was the first human rights instrument to provide expressly for 
express limitations on the right of freedom of expression. Given the wide scope of 
Article 10(1) most cases involve consideration of whether a restriction on or 
interference with expression can be justified under Article 10(2). 
The first point is that, under Article 10(2), any interference with freedom of 
expression must be prescribed by law. The Court has ruled that the phrase 
No. 29032/95,2001 at paras. 75 and 86 (ECtHR), it was stated that the necessity of a link 
between a value judgment and its supporting facts may vary from case to case in 
accordance with the specific circumstances". 
76 De Haes Gijsels v. Belgium (1997) 25 E. H. R. R. 1 (ECtHR). 
17 Pragerand Oberschlick v. Austria (1995) 21 E. H. R. R. 1 (ECtHR). 
'$ Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2) (1997) 25 E. H. R. R. 357 (ECtHR). 
79 The fact that a journalist could have made his point without the use of insults but chose 
not to, could constitute a strong argument against the journalist's reliance upon Article 10 - 
Tammer v. Estonia, Judgment of February 6,2001; App. No. 41205/98, ECtHR 2001 (para. 
67). 
80 (1997) 25 E. H. R. R (ECtHR). 
81 (1997) 25 E. H. R. R. 1 (ECtHR) at para. 48. 
$Z R. v. Home Secretary, Ex p. Simms [2000] A: C. 115, at 126 per Lord Steyn. Also see, 
Leander v. Sweden (1987) 9 E. H. R. R. 433 (ECtHR) at para. 74. 
83 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark (1976) 1 E. H. R. R. 711(ECtHR) at para. 
52. 
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"prescribed by law" creates three requirements, namely that, the interference in 
question must have some basis in domestic law, the law must be adequately 
accessible and that it must be formulated so that it is sufficiently foreseeable84. 
Further, the "necessity" test of Article 10(2) has been expressed as the requirement 
that the means employed must be proportionate to the aim pursued or that the 
restriction should correctly balance the conflicting individual and public interests at 
stake85. In assessing whether or not an interference is "necessary in a democratic 
society", the European Court of Human Rights applies a three-step test, namely it 
examines whether the interference complained of corresponds to a "pressing social 
need", whether it is "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued", and whether the 
reasons given by the national authority to justify are "relevant and sufficient"86. 
Article 10(2) contains the further element that the authors of the expression have 
certain "duties and responsibilitiesi87. Judicial jurisprudence has set out certain 
factors that have to be taken into account in determining whether, and to what 
extent, any duties and responsibilities must be weighed against any restriction or 
penalty imposed. The restricted expression must in some way be linked to those 
84 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (1979) 2 E. H. R. R. 245 (ECtHR); Silver v. United 
Kingdom (1983) 5 E. H. R. R. 347 (ECtHR); Malone v. United Kingdom (1984) 7 E. H. R. R. 14 
(ECtHR). 
85 Venables v. News Group Newspapers [2001] 1 All E. R. 908: it would seem to me 
however that whether it is called a balancing process or any other description, the conflict 
that may arise between Art. 10(1) and Art. 10(2) has to be resolved and the legitimate aim in 
restricting freedom of expression within the exceptions in Art. 10(2) given proportionate 
weight according to the facts of the individual case" (paras. 32-33,42-43). 
86 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No. 1) (1979) 2 E. H. R. R. 245 (ECtHR) at para. 62. 
87 "Whoever exercises his freedom of expression undertakes 'duties and responsibilities' the 
scope of which depends on his situation and the technical means he uses. The Court cannot 
overlook such a person's 'duties and responsibilities' when it enquires ... whether 'restrictions' or 'penalties' were conductive to the [legitimate aim] which made them 
`necessary' in a 'democratic society", Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) 1 E. H. R. R. 737 
(ECtHR) at para. 49. 
4 
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duties and responsibilities88, the connection must be substantiated "by specific 
examples"89 and the impact of the medium used on the public must be considered90. 
Overall, the fundamental principles of the scope of the right of freedom of 
expression, as provided for under Article 10 of the Convention, can be summarised 
using the statement of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Zana v. 
Turkey91: 
"(1) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of 
a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and 
for each individual's self fulfilment. Subject to Article 10(2), it is applicable 
not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded 
as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, 
shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the 
demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which 
there is no 'democratic society'. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is 
subject to exceptions which must, however, be construed strictly, and the 
need for any restrictions must be established convincingly92. 
(2) The adjective 'necessary' within the meaning of Article 10 implies the 
existence of a 'pressing social need'. The Contracting States have a 
certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, 
but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the 
legislation and the decisions relating to it, even those given by an 
independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final 
88 "Permissible conditions affecting freedom of expression only arise where they are 
necessary in a democratic society in the light of the actual duties and responsibilities which 
are implied by the exercise of freedom of expression and opinion by a given individual. The 
necessity for conditions or restrictions must therefore flow from the applicant's 
circumstances", Kosiek v. Germany (Series A No. 105) (1986) 9 E. H. R. R. 328 (ECtHR) at 
para. 88. 
89 Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Osterreichs and Gubi v. Austria (Series A No. 302) 
(1994) 20 E. H. R. R. 55 (ECtHR). 
90 "... the potential impact of the medium concerned is an important factor and it is 
commonly acknowledged that the audio-visual media have often had a much more 
immediate and powerful effect than1the print media. The audio-visual media have means of 
conveying through images meanings which the print media are not able to impart", Jersild v. 
Denmark (1994) 19 E. H. R. R. 1 (ECtHR) at para. 39. 
91 (1997) 27 E. H. R. R. 667 (ECtHR) at para. 51. 
92 Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) 1 E. H. R. R. 737 (ECtHR) at para. 49; Lingens v. 
Austria (Series A No. 103) (1986) 8 E. H. R. R. 103 (ECtHR) at para. 31. 
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ruling on whether a 'restriction' is reconcilable with freedom of expression 
as protected by Article 1093 
(3) In exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court must look at the 
whole, including the content of the remarks held against the applicant and 
context in which he made them. In particular, it must determine whether 
the interference in issue is `proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' 
and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities are 'relevant 
and sufficient'94. In so doing the Court has to satisfy itself that the national 
authorities applied standards which are in conformity with the principles 
embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they based themselves on an 
acceptable assessment of the relevant facts95. "
2.4.3 AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1969 
2.4.3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
At the ninth Inter-American Conference, held in Bogota in May 1948, the American 
States adopted the "Charter of Bogota"96 and thereby established the Organisation 
of American States (OAS). The Conference also adopted the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was created by a resolution of 
the foreign ministers at Santiago in 1959. The purpose of the Convention can be 
found in its Preamble to be the States intention "to consolidate in this hemisphere, 
within the framework of democratic institutions, a system of personal liberty and 
social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man". 
The process of drafting and negotiation of the Inter-American Treaty began in 1959 
with a draft Convention prepared by the Inter-American Council of Jurists and the 
93 Lingens v. Austria (Series A No. 103) (1986) 8 E. H. R. R. 103 (ECtHR) at para. 39. 
9i Barfod v. Denmark (1989) 13 E. H. R. R. 493 at para. 28. 
9s Jersild v. Denmark (1994) 19 E. H. R. R. 1, at para. 31. 
96 The Charter entered into force in December 1951 and has since been amended by the 
Protocol of Buenos Aires of 1967, the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias of 1985, the Protocol 
of Washington of 1992, and the Protocol of Managua of 1993. 
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final text of the American Convention on Human Rights97 was adopted at a Special 
Conference on Human Rights held in San Jose, Costa Rica in November 1969. 
Following closely the model of the European Convention, the American 
Convention98 provides for interpretation, application and enforcement by the Inter- 
American Commission99 and a new Inter-American Court on Human Rights. 
2.4.3.2 RECOGNISED RIGHTS 
In general, the application of the American Convention, despite its long history, is 
not as developed as the European system. Nevertheless, the achievements have 
been remarkable considering that, for many years, a number of Latin American 
States were in the grip of military rule and the turmoil of revolution. According to a 
former member of the Inter-American Commission, "in many ways the Inter- 
American system has not been as efficient as the European regional system, 
though its mandate is notably broader. The challenges the Inter-American system 
has faced are, however, severe and make its accomplishments all the more 
impressive. The fact that government leaders, diplomats, commission and court 
members, and many non-governmental organizations in the Americas have been 
able, often in an ongoing adversarial collaboration, to fashion and implement a 
useful human rights instrument may be of particular importance to those interested 
in establishing regional human rights systems""' 
The Convention restricts itself to a detailed codification of civil and political rights 
(Articles 3-25). 
9' The Convention is also known as the "Pact of San Jose". It was signed on 22 November 
1969 and entered into force on 18 July 1978. 
98 For a list of the countries that are members of the Convention, see Appendix 3. 
99 In 1967, in the amended Charter, the Commission became a statutory organ of the 
Organisation of American States "whose principal function shall be to promote the 
observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative document organ 
of the Organisation in these matters", Third Special Inter-American Conference, Buenos 
Aires, February 1967. 
10° Reisman, M., W., "Practical Matters for Consideration in the Establishment of a Regional 
Human Rights Mechanism: Lessons from the Inter-American Experience" (1995) St. Louis- 
Warsaw Transnat'l 89. 
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Economic, social and cultural rights are all covered in a single Article (Article 26) 
which cross-refers to the Charter of the Organization of American States (as 
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires)101 
2.4.3.3 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Article 13 of the Convention recognises the right to freedom of thought and 
expression and reads as follows: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought and expression. 
This right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's choice. 
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall 
not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent 
imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the 
extent necessary in order to ensure: 
(a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or 
(b) the protection of national security, public order, or public health or 
morals. 
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or 
means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over 
newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the 
dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the 
communication and circulation of ideas and opinions. 
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public 
entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole 
purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood 
and adolescence. 
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or 
religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any 
other similar illegal action against any person or group of persons on any 
1' On this issue, the Organisation of American States, in 1988 adopted the Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador). The Protocol mainly reflects the rights of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. 
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grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin 
shall be considered as offenses punishable by law. 
Under the Convention the right of freedom of expression has a "dual" character. On 
the one hand, it safeguards the right of the individual to express his own thoughts. 
On the other, it protects the collective right to seek and receive any information102. 
Nevertheless, the two dimensions of the right must be guaranteed simultaneously; 
the one dimension cannot be undermined for the interest of the other: "One cannot 
legitimately rely on the right of a society to be honestly informed in order to put in 
place a regime of prior censorship for the alleged purpose of eliminating information 
deemed to be untrue in the eyes of the censor. It is equally true that the right to 
impart information and ideas cannot be invoked to justify the establishment of 
private or public monopolies of the communications media designed to mold public 
opinion by giving expression to only one point of view°'03. In addition, the 
expression and dissemination of ideas and information are indivisible concepts104. 
In addition, Article 13 provides that "any medium" deemed appropriate to impart 
ideas and have them reach as wide an audience as possible can be used. 
The Article explicitly recognises the authority of the State to place limitations upon 
the right to freedom of expression. At the same time however, both the Commission 
and the Court have made it clear that any discretion given to the State must be 
construed narrowly'os 
The Convention does provide for restrictions that can be placed on the exercise of 
the right. However, in determining their legitimacy, it is necessary to consider 
102 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Compulsory Membership in an Association 
Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on 
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13,1985. Series A No. 5, para. 30, 
Annex A. 
103 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1995 Annual Report, Report No. 2/96 
(Case No. 10.325 - Steve Clark), Grenada at paras. 8 and 9. 104 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1998, Organisation of 
the American States (O. A. S. ), Chapter II: Freedom of Expression within the Context of the 
Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, 13, OEA/ser. L/V/11.102 doc. 6 
rev. 
pos Clark v. Grenada, Case 10.325, Report No. 2/96, Inter-Am. C. H. R., OEA/Ser. LN/11.91 
Doc. 7 at 113 (1996). 
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whether the provisions of Article 13(2) have been respected. Article 13(2) sets out 
the means by which permissible limitations upon freedom of expression may be 
established: there are requirements of form as well as substantive requirements 
referring to the legitimacy of the ends that such restrictions on freedom of 
expression are designed to achieve -i. e. the principle of proportionality. 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Article illustrate that the use of preventive measures to 
control any abuse of the right are not permissible106. Abuse can only be controlled 
through subsequent imposition of sanctions in cases where such a restriction is 
"necessaryi107. 
Paragraph 3 in particular, illustrates that the Convention is particularly concerned 
with freedom of the press. This is different from other instruments that merely imply 
a prohibition on indirect restrictions on media in that it is the only instrument that 
expressly prohibits "privacy controls" that produce the same result. The prohibition 
of prior censorship is absolute and unique to the Convention. 
2.4.4 AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 1981 
2.4.4.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) is the official regional body of all African 
States. The Organisation of African Unity's Charter was adopted in 1963, in the 
wake of rapid and widespread decolonisation, by a summit conference of Heads of 
State and Government held in Addis Ababa. It was primarily aimed at "[eradicating] 
all forms of colonialism from Africa" and "[promoting) the unity and solidarity of the 
African States" as well as the defence of "their sovereignty, their territorial integrity 
and independences108. As such, of central importance in the Charter are the 
principles of sovereign equality of all member States and non-interference in their 
internal affairs. The Charter also stipulates that "freedom, equality, justice and 
dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of 
"' Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1996 Annual Reprt, Report No. 11/96 
(Case No. 11.230 - Francisco Martorell), Chile, para. 55. 107 This requirement should be interpreted in the same way as the respective requirement 
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950. That is, for the 
restriction to be "necessary", the "existence of a pressing social need" has to be established. 
It is not enough for it to be "useful", "reasonable" or "desirable". 
108 Charter of the Organisation of African Unity 1993, Article 11(1). 
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the African peoplesi109 acknowledging both the United Nations Charter and the 
Universal Declaration. 
The process of the formation of an African Commission on Human Rights began in 
1961110 and extended over the next twenty years culminating with the adoption of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 19811". The legal basis for 
this Charter can be found in the Organisation of African Unity's Charter which states 
that member States should "coordinate and intensify their collaboration and efforts 
to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa""' and "promote international co- 
operation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rightsi13. 
The implementation of the Charter74 is entrusted to a Commission, the main 
executive African organ. It is composed of eleven members elected by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and the Government. The role of the Commission is 
three-fold. It has promotional functions15, and is responsible for ensuring the 
adequate protection16 and for interpreting the Charter rights. 
2.4.4.2 RECOGNISED RIGHTS 
The African Charter is the youngest developed regional system and has been 
described as "the newest, the least developed or effective ... the most distinctive 
and most controversial of the three [i. e. the European, the Inter-American and the 
109 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 1981, Article II(1)(e). 
10 The creation of an African Commission on Human Rights was first proposed at the 
African Conference on the Rule of Law, organised by the International Commission of 
Jurists in Lagos in 1961 where it was declared that "in order to give full effect to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this Conference invites the African Governments to 
study the possibility of adopting an African Convention on Human Rights". 
"' The Charter was approved at the eighteenth summit meeting of the Organisation of 
African Unity, held in Nairobi in June 1981 and came into force in October 1986. The 
Charter is also known as the Banjul Charter after Banjul, Gambia's capital city, where the 
Charter was drafted. 
112 Organisation of African Unity's Charter, Article 11(1)(b). 
113 Organisation of African Unity's Charter, Article II(1)(e). 
14 For a list of the countries that are members of the Charter, see Appendix 3. 
15 Article 45(1) of the Charter sets out the promotional role of the Commission. 
116 The Charter provides for a mandatory procedure for inter-State complaints (Article 48) as 
well as a procedure for individual complaints (Articles 55-59). 
-l# 
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African] established human rights regime"'". It must nevertheless be acknowledged 
that even the very existence of a coherent system of protection of human rights is a 
major achievement for the region given the prevalence of oppressive regimes and 
serious, systematic violations of human rights. 
The Charter is unique among international and regional instruments in its emphasis 
on the importance of the community and society to the individual and its express 
cataloguing of the duties of the individual to the State. This rationale is reflected in 
its inclusion of peoples rights. According to Sieghart18, the primary reason for this 
emphasis has been the desire of the States to promote the concept that civil and 
political rights should be counter-balanced by duties of social solidarity. Interestingly 
however, the drafters of the Charter have avoided the complex issue of the 
definition of the term "peoples"119. 
Another notable feature of this instrument is that States are not permitted to 
derogate from the Articles of the Charter120. 
The Charter combines all types of rights in one instrument. Its preamble states that 
"civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural 
rights in their conception as well as universality" and goes further to emphasise that 
"the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights". 
As such, the Charter starts by setting out a catalogue of civil and political rights 
(Articles 2-14), it continues with a list of economic, social and cultural rights (Articles 
15-18) and goes on with certain provisions relating to rights of "peoples" (i. e. 
collective rights), as opposed to rights of individuals (Articles 19-24). The Charter 
"' Steiner, H. J., and Alston, P., International Human Rights in Context (2nd ed., Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
"$ Sieghart, P., The International Law of Human Rights (Clarendon Press, 1983), at p. 238. 
19 For a detailed discussion on the lack of a uniform meaning to the term "peoples", see 
Sieghart, P., The International Law of Human Rights (1983, Clarendon Press, Oxford), at 
pp. 250-51. 
20 "The Member States of the Organisation of African Unity parties to the present Charter 
shall recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake 
to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them", African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights 1981, Article 1. 
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then moves on to duties for States (Articles 25 and 26) and individuals (Articles 27- 
29). 
2.4.4.3 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The African Charter safeguards freedom of expression in Article 9 which provides 
that: 
1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information. 
2. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his 
opinion within the law. 
The Article provides only for the right to receive information as opposed to 
respective provisions in other instruments which provide for the right to `receive and 
impart information and ideas". It appears that in this way, the Charter creates the 
unusual right to "receive information". 
An important feature of this Charter Article, which has proven to be controversial, is 
its provision of the so-called "claw-back" clause -"within the law"- which authorises 
the State to deprive the individual of their rights121. It has been criticised on the 
ground that it confers upon the State a wide margin of discretion to exclude 
enjoyment of the right as it is allowed to justify limitations on the right by reference 
to its own domestic laws122. Although the grant of the right is supposed to be 
paramount, the claw-back clause may, in effect, take away the right granted. 
2.5 NATIONAL LAWS 
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section examines the protection of the right of freedom of expression on a 
national level. It discusses relevant human rights instruments and, where 
appropriate, national constitutions that safeguard that right. This section also makes 
121 Claw-back clauses are used in Artciles 5-12 of the Charter and not only in the case of 
freedom of expression. 
122 For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Welch, J., "The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights: A Five Year Report and Assessment" (1992) 14 H. R. Q. 43 at 
p. 46 and, Higgins, R., "Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties" (1976-77) 48 B. Y. I. L. 
281. 
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reference to relevant national case law in order to ascertain the scope of the right 
and any limitations that are placed upon it by the respective legislatures. 
On a national level, freedom of expression is examined in the context of the 
relevant laws of the following countries: 
  The United Kingdom, 
  The United States of America, 
  France, and 
" Germany 
2.5.2 UNITED KINGDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
Until the passing of the Human Rights Act in 1998 the rights of freedom of 
expression in English law, like other civil liberties, was largely residual. In other 
words, it existed where common law or legislation did not restrict its application 123. 
Its role was not considered to be prominent124 as it was often treated as an 
exception or defence to other rights, such as defamation125, breach of confidence 
and contempt of court. 
However, in recent years, with the adoption of the European Convention on Human 
Rights126 and its incorporation into UK law by the Human Rights Act, freedom of 
123 For a detailed discussion of the position of freedom of expression in UK law prior to the 
Human Rights Act, see Barendt, E., Freedom of Speech (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 
2005) at pp. 40-42; Clayton, R. and Tomlinson, H., The Law of Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2000) at pp. 1006-45 and 1207-09. 
124 "Freedom of discussion is in England little else than the right to write or say anything 
which a jury, consisting of twelve shopkeepers, think it expedient should be said or written", 
Dicey, A. V., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed., Macmillan, 
1959), at Chapter VI; Boyle, A., "Freedom of Expression as a Public Interest in English Law" 
[1992] PL 574. 
125 Bonnard v. Perryman [1891] 2 Ch. 269. 
126 "Lord Goff of Chieveley in A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [[1990] 1 A. C. 109, at 
283-84] expressed the opinion that in the field of freedom of speech there was no difference 
in principle between English law on the subject and article 10 of the Convention. I agree and 
can only add that I find it satisfactory to be able to conclude that the common law of England 
is consistent with the obligations assumed by the Crown under the treaty in this particular 
field", Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] A. C. 534, at 553F, per 
Lord Keith. 
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expression has steadily assumed a more positive and active role127. Under the Act, 
the United Kingdom must secure the rights set out in the Convention 128. Where 
legislation conflicts with Convention rights, the courts will have to comply with a 
strong interpretative obligation to read and give effect to the legislation, so far as is 
possible, in order for it to be compatible with the Convention rights129. 
The Act is designed to provide a minimum standard of human rights protection and 
to ensure that protection "does not restrict any other right or freedom conferred on 
[a person] or by [a person] or under the law having effect in any part of the United 
Kingdom"13o 
Section 12, the statutory provision recognising freedom of expression, was 
introduced as a result of concerns expressed by the media as to the impact of the 
privacy rights on the freedom of the press131. Its aim was to "enhance press 
freedom in a wider way than would arise simply from the incorporation of the 
Conventioni132. 
Section 12(1) establishes the scope of its application, namely the protection of 
freedom of expression as the right is enshrined under the European Convention on 
127 "There is a general principle in our law that the expression of opinion and the conveyance 
of information will not be restrained by the courts save on pressing grounds. Freedom of 
expression is as much a sinew of the common law as it is of the European Convention... ", R 
v. Advertising Standards Authority Ltd, ex parte Vemons Organsisations Ltd [1992] 1 W. L. R. 
1289, at 1293A. 
128 Under section 1(1), the Human Rights-Act gives effect to Articles 2-12 and 14 of the 
Convention (and Articles 1-3 of the First Protocol and Articles 1 and 2 of the Sixth Protocol 
to the Convention). 
The Human Rights Act received Royal Assent on November 9,1998 while its main 
provisions were brought into effect on October 2,2000. 
The general aims of the Act are set out in the White Paper, Rights Brought Home: The 
Human Rights Bill, CM 3782 (HMSO, October 1997). 
129 Human Rights Act 1998, s. 3(1). 
130 Human Rights Act, section 11(a). 
131 Jack Straw, MP set out the main aim of section 12: "So far as we are able in a manner 
consistent with the Convention and its jurisprudence, we are saying to the court that 
wherever there is a clash between article 8 and article 10 rights, they must pay particular 
attention to the article 10 rights", HC Deb., July 2,1998, Col. 538ff: The Home Secretary. 
For Hansard extracts on section 12, see Wadham, J. and Mountfiled, H., Blackstone's Guide 
to the Human Rights Act 1998 (Blackstone, 1999) at 227-30. 
132 See, the statement of the Home Secretary on its introduction: Hansard, HC col 535 (2 
July 1998) and, Wadham, J., and Mountfield, H., Blackstone's Guide to the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (Blackstone, 1999) at pp. 227-230. 
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Human Rights. It provides that "This section applies if a court is considering 
whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the 
Convention right to freedom of expression". 
Section 12 will apply to "any relief' which, if granted, "might affect" the exercise of 
the Convention right. This wording suggests that: 
" The right extends beyond the protection of press freedom. Thus, injunctions 
granted in actions for copyright can affect the exercise of freedom of 
expression. 
  Relief under the Act is not restricted to injunctive relief; it must include 
awards of damages in civil actions1 ' 
Section 12(2)134 sets out the requirements that have to be satisfied for an injunction 
to be granted in cases where the respondent is absent. 
Section 12(3)135 establishes that for an injunction to be granted, the claimant must 
show that he is likely to succeed at trial136 
Section 12(4) states that the court must have particular regard to the importance of 
the right to freedom of expression when granting relief. It also sets out factors that 
the court must take into account where the proceedings relate to journalistic, literary 
or artistic materiai137. The section reads as follows: 
133 See, Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom (1995) 20 E. H. R. R. 442. Also, see Human 
Rights Act 1998, sectionl2(5). 
14 Section 12(2) provides as follows: 
If the person against whom the application for relief is made ('the respondent') is neither 
present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is satisfied - 
(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or 
(b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified. 
'3s Section 12(3) provides as follows: "No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain 
publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that 
publication should not be allowed". 
36 See, NWL Ltd v. Nelson [1979] ICR 867 (injunctions in industrial relations disputes). For 
the interpretation and application of the word 'likely' in the section 12(3) provision, see 
Cream Holdings Ltd v. Banerjee [2004] HL 44; [2005] AC 253. 
137 For an in-depth analysis of the provisions of section 12 and relevant case law, see 
Clayton, R. and Tomlinson, H., The Law of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2000) at 
pp. 1087-1112; Clayton, R. and Tomlinson, H., Privacy and Freedom of Expression (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) at Chapter 15. 
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"The court must have particular regard to the importance of the 
Convention right to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings 
relate to material which the respondent claims, or which appears to the 
court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to conduct connected 
with such material), to - 
(a) the extent to which - 
(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or 
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be 
published; 
(b) any relevant privacy code". 
It appears that, under the Act, freedom of expression is not accorded pre- 
eminence but must be balanced against competing Convention rights and 
interests13'. Case law seems to suggest that any restrictions imposed on 
freedom of expression must satisfy the principle of proportionality. In other 
words, any restriction must not go further than is necessary to safeguard the 
competing interest at issue13'. 
2.5.3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Freedom of speech was first recognised in Article 4 of the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948140 
The principal legal provision safeguarding free speech in the U. S. today is the First 
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, which provides that "Congress shall make no 
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press". 
"$ The importance of this balancing exercise is evident in the case of Campbell V. MGN 
[2004] HL 22; [2004] 2 AC 257, where the House of Lords highlighted the value of achieving 
a balance between freedom of expression and the right to respect for private life, as 
guaranteed under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court ruled 
that the right of freedom of expression of the Daily Mirror newspaper to publish details of the 
model Naomi Campbell receiving therapy from Narcotics Anonymous did not outweigh the 
model's right to privacy. 
139 R v. Shayler [2003] 1 A. C. 247, H. L. (Held that revelation to the public of information 
under the Official Secrets Act 1989, was covered by the right of freedom of expression). 
140 Article 4 reads as follows: "Every person has the right to freedom of investigation, of 
opinion , and of the expression and dissemination of ideas, by any medium whatsoever. " 
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Given the open-ended wording of the provision, it has been interpreted in many 
ways over the years, and the various interpretations (some more literal and 
restrictive than others) have been based on different free speech theories. Free 
speech justifications range from the establishment of democracy of self-fulfilment to 
the development of a 'marketplace of ideas' and the protection of the interests of 
opposition and minorities141. 
It appears that the First Amendment not only empowers "speakers to speak" but 
embraces the right to "receive information"142. As Judge Alex Kozinski stated in 
Conant v. Walters143, "the right to hear and the right to speak are flip sides of the 
same coin"144. The court in Neinast v. Board of Trustees of the Columbus 
Metropolitan Library145 noted that the right to receive information under the First 
Amendment includes "the right to some level of access to a public library, the 
146 quintessential locus of the receipt of information" 
Decisions of the US courts have clarified that free speech protection under the First 
Amendment is not limited to the expression of ideas and information747 but extends 
to entertainment, including motion pictures148, video games"' and programs 
broadcast by radio and television15o 
14' For an extensive discussion of free speech justifications in the U. S. and the different 
interpretations accorded to the First Amendment, see Barendt, E., Freedom of Speech (2"a 
ed., Oxford University Press, 2005) at pp. 6-27 and 48-50. 
142 See, for example, Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U. S. 748,756-57,96 S. Ct. 1817,48 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1976); Klaindienst v. Mandel, 
408 U. S. 753,762-63,92 S. Ct. 2576,33 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1972). 
143 Conant v. Walters, 309 F. 3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002). 
144 Conant v. Walters, 309 F. 3d 629,643 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
gas Neinast v. Board of Trustees of Columbus Metropolitan Library, 346 F. 3d 585,2003 FED 
App. 0363P (6`h Cir. 2003). 
'a6 Neinast v. Board of Trustees of Columbus Metropolitan Library, 346 F. 3d 585,590,2003 
FED App. 0363 P (6' Cir. 2003) quoting Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of 
Morristown, 958 F. 2d 1242,1255 (3d Cir. 1992). 
147 Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507,68 S. Ct. 665,92 L. Ed. 840 (1948). 
148 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495,72 S. Ct. 777,96 L. Ed. 1098,1 Media L. 
Rep. (BNA) 1357 (1952). 
149 Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P. 16,314, 
106 A. L. R. 5`h 759 (D. Conn. 2002); Entertainment Software Assn v. Granholm, 404 F. 
Supp. 2d 978 (E. D. Mich. 2005); Entertainment Software Assn v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 
2d 1051 (N. D. III. 2005); Interactive Digital Software Assn v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 
F. 3d 954 (8"' Cir. 2003). Courts however have, in some cases, held that video games are 
not speech or expression protected under the First Amendment on the basis that they lack 
sufficient expressive or informational content. See, Maiden Amusement Co., Inc. v. City of 
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The Supreme Court has stated that "the First Amendment literally forbids the 
abridgment only of 'speech', but we have long recognized that its protection does 
not end at the spoken or written word"151. In determining the scope of the right of 
free speech, the courts have had to assess whether speech embraces conduct. In 
United States v. O'Brien152, the court ruled that the respondent's act of burning his 
draft-card, as a means of communicating his opposition to conscription for the war 
in Vietnam, could not be characterised as speech under the First Amendment153 
The Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in the case of Texas v. 
Johnson154, where it ruled that the conviction of the defendant for setting the U. S. 
flag on fire during a demonstration violated the First Amendment, as it constituted 
expressive conduct15'. In City of Dallas v. Stanglin'S6, the court stated that "It is 
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person 
undertakes -for example, walking down the street, or meeting one's friends at a 
shopping mall - but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the 
protection of the First Amendment". Further, U. S. courts have ruled that free speech 
also embraces the right not to speak157. The Supreme Court, in West Virginia State 
Board of Education V. Bamette158, reached the conclusion that the students of a 
public school had the right not to be coerced into embracing beliefs they did not 
Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297 (D. Mass. 1983); America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City 
of New York, Dept. of Bldgs, 536 F. Supp. 170 (E. D. N. Y. 1982). 
For a detailed analysis of the level of protection of video games under the First Amendment 
to the US Constitution, see Kemper, K. A., "First Amendment Protection Afforded to 
Commercial and Home Video Games" 106 A. L. R. 5th 337. 
Aso Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61,101 S. Ct. 2176,68 L. Ed. 2d 671,7 
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1426 (1981). 
15' Texas v Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989). 
152 391 U. S. 367 (1968). 
153 The case has been criticised both on the basis of the decision and the reasoning. See 
Nimmer, M. B., "The Meaning of Symbolic Speech under the First Amendment" (1973) 21 
UCLA L. Rev. 29; Henkin, L., "On Drawing Lines" (1968) 82 Harvard L. Rev. 63; Ely, J. H., 
"Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First 
Amendment Analysis" (1975) 88 Harvard L. Rev. 1482. 
154 491 U. S. 397 (1989). 
155 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566 (1974), at 589 ("Although neither written nor spoken, an 
act may be sufficiently communicative to invoke the protection of the first amendment. "); 
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 (1966), at 142 ("First Amendment rights are not confined 
to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action. "); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 
U. S. 157 (1961), at 201 ("This court has never limited the right to speak... to mere verbal 
expression. ") 
116 City of Dallas v. Stranglin, 490 U. S. 19,109 S. Ct. 1591,104 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1989). 
157 Or act, thus covering a negative freedom. 
158 319 U. S. 624 (1943). 
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hold. Jackson J. confirmed the students' right of free speech, in the context of 
religious freedom, by stating that "if there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox 
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein"' 59 
Overall, in deciding free speech cases, the U. S. Supreme Court balances the right 
against other rights and principles, such as public order, national security and the 
right to reputation'so 
An important principle that the U. S. courts have developed in assessing free speech 
cases is that content-based restrictions on speech should be subject to strict or 
heightened scrutiny: governmental regulations based upon the content of speech 
must, in general, satisfy the strict scrutiny test16'. As a rule of thumb, such 
regulations or laws will be upheld if they are justified by compelling governmental 
interests, and are the least restrictive means of giving effect to these interests162. At 
1s9 319 U. S. 624 (1943), at 642. Also, see Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974) 
(editors had First Amendment right not to publish readers' replies to personal attacks); 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209 (1977) (workers, who were not trade 
union members, had the right not to be coerced into financing trade union political activities). 
160 American Communications Ass. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950), at 399 (In balancing free 
speech against public order, "the duty of the courts is to determine which of these two 
conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances 
presented"); Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951), at 524-5 ("The demands of free 
speech in a democratic society as well as the interestsin national security are better served 
by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the 
judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-euclidean problems 
to be solved. ") 
To an extent, courts will carry out this balancing exercise on a case-by-case basis. 
However, such an approach can lead to legal vagueness and inconsistency. Therefore, 
courts have, over the last eighty years, developed a list of principles which they generally 
adhere to in reaching their decisions. 
16' Schneck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919), at 52 ("The most stringent protection of 
free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a 
panic... The question in every case is whether the words used... create a clear and present 
danger... "); Frisby v. Schultz, 478 U. S. 474 (1988), at 481 (Even speech that is highly 
protected under the first amendment can be subject to "regulations of the time, place, and 
manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication". ) 
'62 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969); Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. 
FCC, 492 U. S. 115 (1989); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976). 
88 
the other end of the spectrum, regulations that are content-neutral - not based on 
speech content, shall be subject to less rigorous scrutiny163 
In general, it appears that the courts afford lesser protection to some types of 
speech under the First Amendment: "The Constitution... affords a lesser protection 
to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expressions164. 
Commercial speech has been defined as "speech that proposes a commercial 
'ss transaction" 
Overall, free speech under the First Amendment has been the subject of extensive 
jurisprudence and judicial interpretation for a number of reasons. Courts have 
developed numerous free speech doctrines and principles in an effort to safeguard 
this right efficiently. In addition, free speech had occupied a central role within the 
American legal landscape for a longer time than, for example, in the UK, which 
started to develop equivalent jurisprudence with the passing of the Human Rights 
Act in 1998. Despite the fact that free speech in the U. S. can be viewed as 
complex, it has provided courts with the opportunity to develop a rich body of 
precedents. 
2.5.4 FRANCE 
The right of freedom of expression was first recognised in the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789. Articles 10 and 11 of the Declaration 
read as follows: 
"No man ought to be molested on account of his opinions, not even on 
account of his religious opinions, provided his avowal of them does not 
disturb the public order established by the law. 
163 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 514 (2001) (content-neutral statute prohibiting the 
publication of illegally intercepted communications violated the First Amendment). 
164 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U. S. 418 (1993). 
165 Board of Trustees of The State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469 (1989), at 
482. In Central Hudson Gas & Electrical Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 
447 U. S. 557 (1980), the Supreme Court se out a four-tier test for determining whether 
commercial speech is constitutional. For a more detailed discussion, see Cohen, H., 
Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment, CRS Report for 
Congress (95-815), June 2,2006; Stone, G. R., "Restrictions of Speech Because of its 
Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions" (1987) 46 Univ. of Chicago L. 
Rev. 81. 
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The unrestrained communication of thoughts and opinions being one of 
the most precious rights of man, every citizen may speak, write and 
publish freely, provided he is responsible for this liberty in cases 
determined by the law"166 
The French Constitution of 4 October 1958 does not contain express provisions on 
the right to freedom of expression because drafters did not attempt to enumerate 
fundamental rights. However, the Preamble to the Constitution recognises the 
attachment of the French people to the rights defined in the Declaration of 1789167. 
In addition, Article 34 prescribes that it would be unconstitutional for the government 
to pass a statute circumscribing the exercise of a civil liberty, including freedom of 
expression76'. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Council ('Conseil Constitutionnel')169 has, on a 
number of occasions held that laws must comply with the Declaration of 1789 and 
in particular, the right of freedom of expression safeguarded under it170. 
France has also ratified the European Convention"'. The Convention occupies an 
intermediate status as a result of its ratification. It has a higher status than national 
166 Translation, Paine, T., Collins, H. and Foner, E., Rights of Man (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1984). 
167 "The French people hereby solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and 
the principle of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, reaffirmed and 
complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946... ". 
168 Article 34 of the Constitution of 1958 provides that "Statutes shall be passed by 
Parliament. Statutes shall determine the rules concerning: civic rights and the fundamental 
guarantees granted to citizens for the exercise of their public liberties... ". 
169 The constitutional council was created by the Constitution of 1958. It is a permanent court 
with judicial and consultative powers. The decisions of the council are binding on public, 
administrative and judicial authorities and cannot be appealed against. For more information 
on the constitutional council, see Avril, P. and Gicquel, J., Le Conseil Constitutionnel (4"' 
ed., Montchrestien, 1998). 
170 "Enterprises de Presse", Decision 84-181 DC of 10-11 October 1984 (Council considered 
a challenge to a law limiting newspaper holdings to 15 per cent of the market and requiring 
transparency regarding their ownership and financing. It held that Parliament could regulate 
freedom of communication but should balance it against other constitutional rights and 
values. ); Decision 86-21ODC of 29 July 1986 (Council held media pluralism to be a 
constitutional value which could set restraints on and be balanced against other 
constitutional rights, such as the freedom of the press. ). For a more detailed discussion of 
these and other similar cases, see Barendt, E., Freedom of Speech (2"d ed., Oxford 
University Press, 2005) at pp. 68-9. 
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legislation but a lower status than the Constitution. As such, the Convention will 
prevail over national legislation 12. 
2.5.5 GERMANY 
The right to freedom of expression is protected under the "Basic Law", the German 
Constitution173. Its protection has been justified on the basis that the right is 
necessary to protect the democratic nature of the Constitution 14. Article 5 of the 
Basic Law provides that: 
(1) Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate 
his opinions in speech, writing, and pictures and to inform himself without 
hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and 
freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be 
guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. 
(2) These rights shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in 
provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal 
honour. 
(3) Art and scholarship, research, and teaching shall be free. The 
freedom of teaching shall not release any person from allegiance to the 
Constitution. 
It has been stated that the right of freedom of expression and opinion under the 
Basic Law has three distinct dimensions; an internal dimension (the formation 
"' France ratified the Convention and the First Protocol to the European Convention on 
November 28,1974. 
12 For a general discussion on the status of the European Convention in domestic law see, 
Steiner, E., "France" in Gearty, C. A. (ed. ), European Civil Liberties and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Kluwer, 1997). See also, Bernhardt, R., "The Convention and 
Domestic Law" in MacDonald, R. St. J., and Matscher, F., and Petzold, H. (eds. ), The 
European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Nijhoff, 1993). 
13 Grundgesetz of 23 May 1949. 
174 "The fundamental right to free expression of opinion is, as the most direct expression of 
human personality in society, one of the foremost human rights of all... For a free 
democratic State system, it is nothing other than constitutive, for it is only through it that the 
constant intellectual debate, the clash of opinions, that is its vital element is made 
possible... It is in a certain sense the basis of every freedom whatsoever, 'the matrix, the 
indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. ", "Lüth", 7 BVerfGE 198 
(1958), at 208. 
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of an opinion), a communicative dimension (the expression of an opinion), and 
an external dimension (the effect of the expression of an opinion)1'. 
The scope of the individual's right to express an opinion has been defined by 
the Federal Constitutional Court as follows: "[the] point of expression of opinion 
is to produce mental effects on the environment, to act, to mould opinion and to 
persuade... The protection of the fundamental right relates primarily to the 
speaker's own opinion... It is immaterial whether his utterance is 'valuable' or 
'worthless', 'right' or 'wrong', emotionally or rationally justified... "16. The Court 
has further clarified that hate speech is within the right's scope, "the basic 
right's protection also extends to the statement's form. An expression of 
opinion does not lose this protection by being sharply or hurtfully worded""'. 
Despite the fact that the right to express an opinion has been held to protect 
assertions of fact, such right does not extend to the protection of inaccurate 
quotations1'. 
However, the right of freedom of expression under German law is subject to 
restrictions19 from general laws180, provisions for the protection of young 
persons and the right to personal honour18'. In general, it appears that the 
15 Brugger, W., "The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law (Partl)", 
(2002) 3 (12) German Law Journal, available at: 
http: //www. germanlawiournal. com/print. php? id=212. 
16 "Election campaign", 61 BVerfGE 1 (1982), at 7. 
"' "Römerberg Speech", 54 BVerfGE 129 (1980), at 136. 
"$ "[Factual] assertions are not, strictly speaking, expressions of opinion... But this does not 
mean that they lie outside the protective scope of Article 5(1), first sentence... Protection of 
factual assertions ends only where such representations cannot contribute anything to the 
constitutional presupposed formation of opinion. Viewed from this angle, incorrect 
information is not an interest that merits protection. The Federal Constitutional Court has 
consistently ruled therefore that protection of freedom of expression does not encompass a 
factual assertion that the utterer knows is, or that has proven to be true", "Auschwitz Lie", 90 
BVerfGE 241 (1994), at 247. Also see "Böll", 54 BVerfGE 208 (1980), at 219. 
19 German Basic Law 1949, article 5(2). 
Aso "[General laws] are to be seen as meaning all laws that do not prohibit an opinion as 
such, are not directed against the utterance of the opinion as such, but instead serve to 
protect an object of legal protection that is to be protected as such, without regard to a 
particular opinion, to protect a communal value taking priority over the exercise of freedom 
of opinion... ", "Lüth", 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958), at 209. 
'B' The constitutional protection of personality is provided for under Article 2(1) of the Basic 
Law. A number of cases have reached the courts where freedom of expression under Article 
5(3) has been balanced against the personality right. The "Strauß Caricature" case, 75 
BVerfGE 369 (1987), demonstrates that although political criticism is covered by freedom of 
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German Constitutional Court, in assessing whether such restrictions should 
apply to a person's constitutional right of freedom of expression, shall have 
regard to the principle of proportionality182 and the importance of the relevant 
rights' S3. The Court makes its assessment on a case-by-case basis and has 
not developed as yet any legal rules regarding prioritisation of specific 
constitutional and other rights. Each case is therefore determined on its own 
merits and individual facts184. 
expression, it does not extend to derogatory statements which are unrelated or marginal to 
any political message. On the facts of the case, a satirical magazine portrayed the then 
Prime Minister of Bavaria as a pig engaged in sexual activity in a caricature. The Federal 
Constitutional Court held that there was infringement of the Prime Minister's right to 
personality and human dignity despite the fact that the picture was a satire and thus covered 
by Article 5(3). The Court defined the scope of the personality right as follows: 
"[What] was plainly intended was an attack on [the] personal dignity of the person 
caricatured. It is not his human features, his personal peculiarities, that are brought home to 
the observer through the alienation chosen. Instead, the intention is to show that he has 
marked 'bestial' characteristics and behaves accordingly. Particularly the portrayal of sexual 
conduct, which in man still today forms part of the core of intimate life deserving of 
protection is intended to devalue the person concerned as a person, to deprive him of his 
dignity as a human being... a legal system that takes the dignity of man as the highest value 
must disapprove of [such a portrayal]. " (75 BverfGE 369 (1987) at 379. 
The relationship between the two constitutional rights was also the focus of the "Soldiers- 
Are-Murderers" (Tucholsky) case, 93 BVerfGE 266 (1995). On the facts of the case, posters 
and leaflets accusing German soldiers of being murders were distributed to the public. The 
lower court, reversing the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, held that the personal 
honour of the soldiers had been severely attacked. However, the court did agree with part of 
the reasoning of the Constitutional Court, in particular that each case should be judged on 
its specific facts and linguistic context on an objective level: "The decisive thing is... neither 
the subjective intention of the utterer nor the subjective understanding of those affected by 
the utterance, but the meaning it has for the understanding of an unbiased, reasonable 
audience" (93 BVerfGE 266 (1995) at 295). 
For a more detailed discussion of these and similar cases, see Brugger, W., "The Treatment 
of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law (Partl)", (2003) 3(1) German Law Journal, 
available at http: //www. germanlawiournal. com/print. php? id=212. 
182 "While the principle of proportionality is not explicitly mentioned in the German 
Constitution, it forms an implicit standard gleaned from the general prioritization of personal 
liberty over governmental regulation", Brugger, W., "The Treatment of Hate Speech in 
German Constitutional Law (Part I)", (2002) 3(12) German Law Journal, available at: 
http: //www. qermanlawiournal. com/print. php? id=212. 
The proportionality principle is also discussed in the context of the right of freedom of 
expression under the European Convention on Human Rights; see para. 2.5.2.3. 
183 "[Any] interpretation and application of statutes that have a limiting effect on freedom of 
expression must take account of that freedom's significance", "Auschwitz Lie", 90 BVerfGE 
241 (1994), at 248. 
184 "Soldiers are Murderers", 93 BVerfGE 266 (1995), at 294. However, Courts have 
developed some rules for case-specific balancing, in particular when assessing the right of 
personality vis-6-vis freedom of expression. See "Holocaust Denial", 90 BVerfGE 241 
(1994), at 248 ("Freedom of opinion by no means always takes precedence over protection 
of personality... Rather, where an expression of opinion must be viewed as a formal criminal 
insult or vilification, protection of personality routine comes before freedom of expression. 
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Germany has also ratified the European Convention on Human Rights 
1950185. In Germany, the Convention automatically becomes part of the law 
and takes precedence over existing national legislation18s 
2.6 SUMMARY 
It appears that freedom of expression is considered to be an important right. It is 
recognised in every principal human right instrument at the international, regional 
and national levels. Although the interpretation of the right's scope can vary among 
different levels and national laws, the basic justifications underpinning its widely 
recognised value and preservation are generally uniform; 
"Freedom of expression is, of course, intrinsically important: it is value for 
its own sake. But it is well recognised that it is also instrumentally 
important. It serves a number of broad objectives. First it promotes the 
self-fulfilment of individuals in society. Secondly, in the famous words of 
Holmes, J. (echoing John Stuart Mill), 'the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition marketr187. Thirdly, 
freedom of speech is the lifeblood of democracy. The free flow of 
information and ideas informs political debate. It is a safety valve: people 
are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if they can in 
principle seek to influence them. It acts as a brake on the abuse of power 
by public officials. It facilitates the exposure of errors in the governance 
and administration of justice of the countryi188. 
Where expressions of opinion are linked to factual assertions, the protection merited can 
depend on the truth of the underlying factual assumption. If these assumptions have been 
proven untrue, freedom of expression will routinely yield to personality protection. 
Otherwise, the issue is which legal interest deserves protection in that specific case. Even 
then, it must be recalled that presumption in favour of free speech applies concerning issues 
of essential importance to the public. "). 
185 Germany ratified the Convention on December 5,1952 and the First Protocol to the 
European Convention on February 13,1957. 
186 For a discussion of the status of the European Convention on Human Rights in Germany, 
see Voss, E., "Germany" in Gearty, C. A. (ed. ), European Civil Liberties and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Kluwer, 1997). 
'$' Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919), at 630, per Holmes, J. (dissenting). 
'$$ R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [1999] 3 W. L. R. 328, 
at 337, per Lord Steyn. 
94 
Given the relevance of freedom of expression in the context of copyright, the 
rights of the author to express his personality and intellect in a specific manner 
and protect his very expression, it is surprising that freedom of expression does 
not occupy a more influential position within copyright. It could be beneficial for 
the legal body of copyright to echo some of the fundamental principles that 
underlie freedom of expression as a human right in order to enhance its 
aspiring universal and non-discriminatory character. This may be achieved by 
expressly recognising the right of freedom of expression and the need to 
balance it against the author's copyright in the Berne Convention. The thesis 
puts forward detailed proposals regarding the way that such a revision of the 
Convention can be effected. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Moral Rights and Freedom of Expression: General 
Areas of Potential Conflict 
3.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
This Chapter consists of an enquiry into the relationship of an author's moral 
rights and another party's right of freedom of expression. This relationship is 
examined on the international, regional and national levels in order to ascertain 
whether and, if so, under what circumstances, there can be instances of conflict 
or overlap between the two sets of rights. 
As far as moral rights are concerned, there is a degree of variation in the 
number of such rights vested in the author, not only among various levels but 
also among national laws'. It is suggested that for the purposes of the thesis 
analysis, the moral rights of paternity and integrity are relevant and are thus 
examined in detail2. For the purposes of the thesis analysis, the moral right of 
paternity is examined in the context of the author's right against false attribution 
as it is suggested that the right of the author to be identified as the author of a 
work, which is also part of his paternity right, does not appear to give rise to 
' For a discussion of the various moral rights vested in an author at the international, 
regional and national levels, see para. 1.3.2.3. 
2 Two other moral rights that are vested in the author, in some national laws, but not 
examined in this Chapter are the author's rights of divulgation and retraction. 
The divulgation right is the author's right to decide when, where and in what form his 
work will be divulged to other persons. The right is provided for in the national copyright 
laws of France (French Intellectual Property Code, article L. 121-2)) and Germany 
(Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law 1965, article 12(1)). 
The retraction right is the right of the author to withdraw his work from publication. The 
right is recognised in the national copyright laws of France (French Intellectual Property 
Code, article L. 121-4) and Germany (Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law 
1965, article 12(2)). 
For the purposes of the thesis, it is suggested that neither of these rights can give rise to 
situations of conflict with freedom of expression, and are thus not analysed in the 
Chapter. 
For a discussion of the rights of divulgation and retraction, see Sterling at pp. 340 and 
343. 
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situations of conflict with another party's freedom of expression. Case law 
concerning the interaction between the moral rights of paternity and integrity and 
freedom of expression does not appear to have developed, but the Chapter 
attempts to analyse their respective relationship on the basis of existing case 
law and the potential judicial approach to and interpretation of hypothetical 
situations of conflict between the rights. 
This Chapter is primarily designed to provide a comprehensive answer to the 
following question: Are there or can there be circumstances where the author's 
invoking of his moral rights of paternity and integrity in his work can interfere 
with or otherwise restrict another party's freedom of expression and vice versa? 
If such conflicts can be established or potential conflicts foreseen, they could 
amount to a serious gap in the present national laws, such conflicts going to the 
heart of the relations between the author, the party using his work and the 
general public. 
3.2 CASES FOR COMPARISON 
In the thesis, a number of hypothetical "standard" cases3 are taken for the 
purpose of comparison at various levels, namely: 
The Secret Diaries Case 
A is a well-known comedienne, and the author of a published work on the 
historical development of comedy, and of a published collection of diary entries, 
documenting aspects of her public and private life, written in an entertaining and 
humourous style. 
B, a newspaper proprietor, publishes a series written by his employee C and 
comprising parodies of A's diaries. Each article is entitled "A's Secret Diary" and 
prominently features a photograph of A. Underneath, there is an introductory 
paragraph identifying C as the author of the diaries, and containing C's name in 
capital letters, together with a short statement that the diary entries are C's 
imaginery description of how A would record her daily life. The diary entries refer 
to current events, and are at times written in an exaggerated style in order to 
depict the satirical nature of the series. 
3 For the purpose of the present analysis, infringement of economic rights is not taken 
into consideration, this aspect being considered in Chapter 3. 
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The Paris Novel Case 
D is the author of a well-known fictional novel. The novel's central theme is the 
friendship of a group of adolescents with physical disabilities in Paris. Through 
its storyline, the play depicts their carefree daily lives and the adventures they 
embark on in order to achieve their dream of visiting all the historical landmarks 
of the city. 
E is the author of a parody novel. In his work, E uses some scenes and a 
number of original characters from D's novel. E's work criticises D's novel in its 
depiction of the everyday life of people with disabilities and, in turn, portrays the 
struggles and discrimination that people with mobility restrictions face on a daily 
basis. 
3.3 COMPARISON AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
On the international level, freedom of expression is guaranteed under the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights4 and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights5 while Article 6bis of the Berne Conventions safeguards the 
author's moral rights, including the moral rights of paternity and integrity'. 
3.3.1 PATERNITY RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
In considering situations of potential conflict between the author's attribution 
right and another party's right of freedom of expression, this section considers 
the attribution, within the context of the Berne Convention, as encompassing: 
The right to assert that the author is the work's creator, 
4 The Universal Declaration and the scope of freedom of expression under its provisions 
are discussed in para. 2.3.2. 
5 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the scope of freedom of 
expression under its provisions are discussed in para. 2.3.3. 
6 This section will not consider the following international copyright instruments for the 
reasons that are briefly given: (1). Universal Copyright Convention 1956 (contains no 
moral rights provisions); (2). Rome Convention 1961 (authors of works are not 
beneficiaries of protection); (3). Phonograms Convention 1971 (authors of works are not 
beneficiaries of protection); (4). TRIPS Agreement 1994 (contains no express provisions 
on moral rights and states that the Berne Convention provisions on moral rights (Article 
6bis) shall not be binding (Article 9)); (5). WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
1996 (authors of works are not beneficiaries of protection). 
The moral rights provisions under the Berne Convention are also examined in para. 
1.3.2.3. -. Contracting Parties to the WIPO Copyright Treaty must also comply with this Article. 
See WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Article 1(4). 
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ii. The right to publish anonymously or pseudonymously, with the option of 
later changing his mind and abandoning anonymity, and 
iii. The right to prevent use of his name with reference to a work that he did 
not create8. 
On the facts of The Secret Diaries case9, A will claim that her right, under the 
Convention, to prevent use of her name with reference to a work that she did not 
create has been violated. The court will have to assess whether C's diary entries 
mislead the average reader as to their source of origin. If the court finds that A's 
paternity right has been infringed, B will have no defence available to him under 
the Berne Convention. The fair use defence under Article 10bis(2) appears to be 
restricted to infringement of the author's economic rights, and no parody 
defence is provided for under the Convention. 
Alternatively, B could invoke his right of freedom of expression as a defence per 
se. It is difficult to predict how a court would decide The Secret Diaries case in 
this context. The Convention does not expressly make provision for such a 
defence or exception, while case law involving an alleged infringement of the 
author's paternity right and another party's freedom of expression under 
international human rights instruments appears to be lacking. 
The Berne Convention, like the Universal Declaration and International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is an instrument whose primary purpose 
is to set minimum standards of copyright protection, which its country members 
must observe10. Consequently, each country has formulated its own 
copyright/author's right and human rights legislation and this may provide 
authors and other parties alike with greater protection than that afforded under 
the respective international instruments. It would therefore appear that a person 
wishing to claim that his freedom of expression is being stifled by an author's 
paternity right could find no basis for this claim under the Berne Convention but 
would have to rely on the relevant national law, depending on the 
circumstances of the individual case. It would be unsound to reach any 
' These three branches of the Berne paternity right are elaborated on in the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the Berne Convention 41 (1978). For a 
discussion of the author's paternity right under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, see 
ara. 1.3.2.3. 
For the facts of the case, see para. 3.2. 
10 The same is, to an extent, true for the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 
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conclusions on the rights relationship under such general provisions and lack of 
judicial guidance and interpretation. 
3.3.2 INTEGRITY RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Under Article 6bis(1) of the Berne Convention, the author's right of integrity is 
defined as the author's right to "object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which 
would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation"". 
In order to determine whether any "distortion, mutilation or other modification of, 
or other derogatory action" in relation to the author's work has taken place a 
court may employ a subjective test12. The fact that a court may take into account 
the author's view as to whether he considers his work to have been distorted or 
mutilated in any way widens the scope of the scope of his right. This is however 
to be balanced against the limiting objective nature of the test determining 
prejudice to the author's honour or reputation. 
On the facts of The Paris Novel case13, D will claim that his work has been 
distorted as a result of E's novel and thus his integrity right infringed. As the test 
for proving distortion of a work under the Berne Convention is subjective, it is 
likely that D will succeed in arguing that there has been some distortion of his 
original work. However, the court will then have to. assess whether D's honour or 
reputation, both as a creative author and a person, has been prejudiced. That 
will be assessed on an objective basis. Thus, a court would probably examine 
whether as a result of E's novel, members of the public could develop a lowered 
opinion of D. On the present facts, it would appear that although the author's 
creative reputation - i. e. the technical aspect of his authorship - might remain 
unaffected, it is likely that his personal reputation will suffer, his qualities of 
judgment and perception might come under attack14. 
" Note that the integrity right does not, in contrast to some continental jurisdictions, 
encompass the author's right to object to the destruction of his work. See Ricketson and 
Ginsburg at p. 605. 
12 This approach is similar to that found in the moral rights provisions of France. See 
para. 3.5.4.2. 
13 For the facts of this (hypothetical) case, see para. 2.2. 
14 However note that "it appears too difficult and indeed perhaps theoretically unsound to 
distinguish between an author's 'creative' and 'personal' reputations", Griffiths, J., "Not 
Such A 'Timid Thing': The UK's Integrity Right and Freedom of Expression" in Copyright 
and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Griffiths and Suthersanen 
(eds. ), Oxford University Press, 2005) at pp. 325-28. 
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If one assumes that the court finds infringement of D's integrity right, defences 
available to E should be examined. The Berne Convention does not specifically 
provide for any defence to the infringement of an author's integrity right. Article 
10bis(2) provides for a fair use defence but its application appears to be 
restricted to infringement of the author's economic rights and not extend to his 
moral rights. In addition, as mentioned, no parody defence is recognised in the 
Convention. 
Alternatively, E could invoke his right of freedom of expression as a defence per 
se to D's infringement claim. The Berne Convention does not provide for such a 
defence or exception. Furthermore, there appears to be no developed case law 
on this subject on an international level. It is therefore difficult to predict whether 
a court would take such an argument into account and balance it against D's 
integrity right, and how such a case would ultimately be decided by a court. 
However, if the freedom of expression defence is dismissed, and given the lack 
of any other statutory defences open to E, it appears that E might be held to 
have infringed D's right. 
The Berne Convention, as the Universal Declaration and International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, is an instrument whose primary purpose is to set 
minimum standards of copyright protection, which its Member States must 
observe15. Consequently, each country has formulated its own copyright and 
human rights legislation and this may provide authors and other parties alike 
with greater protection than that afforded under the respective international 
instruments. It would therefore appear that a person wishing to claim that his/her 
freedom of expression is being stifled by an author's integrity right could find no 
basis for this claim under the Berne Convention but would have to rely on the 
relevant national law, depending on the circumstances of the individual case. In 
conclusion, it would be unsound to reach any conclusions on the rights 
relationship under such general provisions and lack of judicial guidance and 
interpretation. 
15 The same is, to an extent, true for the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 
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3.4 COMPARISON AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
A comparison of the respective copyright and human rights instruments can be 
made in the context of the relationship between the author's moral rights and 
freedom of expression within the American region, but not in Europe and Africa 
where there are no general regional copyright agreements. 
In the American region, the main copyright instruments are NAFTA and 
Cartagena Decision 35116. However, moral rights are only recognised under 
Cartagena Decision 351 since NAFTA does not oblige its Member States to 
protect the author's moral rights". The human right of freedom of expression is 
guaranteed under the American Convention on Human Rights 196918. 
The author's right of paternity under the Cartagena Decision 351 appears to be 
worded broadly. Article 11(b) provides for the author's right to claim authorship 
of the work at any time. There are no express limitations imposed on the right 
and there are no prerequisites that must be satisfied for the author to claim 
authorship. It is unclear whether the author's paternity right embraces his right to 
publish or disseminate his work anonymously or pseudonymously. It is also 
unclear whether the paternity right embraces the three circumstances included 
in those covered by Article 6bis(1) of the Berne Convention19. 
Under Article 11(c) of the Cartagena Decision 351, an author has the right to 
"object to any distortion, mutilation or alteration of the work that is prejudicial to 
the integrity thereof or to the reputation of the author". 
The Cartagena Decision 351 is generally consistent with the TRIPS Agreement 
and the Berne Convention, with questions nevertheless arising regarding waiver 
of moral rights. However, it is generally considered to serve as a tool for 
integration within the Andean Community and for setting the stage for further 
enhancement of intellectual property protection. Each of"its member countries20 
has developed its own copyright legislation, safeguarding, among other rights, 
the author's moral rights. As such, case law on moral rights under this 
16 A brief description of these instruments is set out in para. 1.4.2.2. 
" NAFTA, Annex 1701.3. 
18 Article 13. For a discussion of the Convention and the scope of freedom of expression 
under Article 13, see para. 2.4.3. 
19 The author's paternity right under the Berne Convention is examined in paras. 1.3.2.3 
and 3.3.2. 
20 Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela (subject to confirmation). 
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instrument over the years has been sparse. Thus, for the purposes of the 
present examination, Cartagena Decision 351 cannot provide an adequate 
forum for examining the interaction between moral rights and freedom of 
expression. Any cases regarding such issues shall generally arise on a national 
level instead. In conclusion, it would be unsound to reach any conclusions on 
the rights relationship under such general provisions and lack of judicial 
guidance and interpretation. 
3.5 COMPARISON AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
3.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Part examines the relationship between the author's moral rights of 
paternity and integrity and another party's right of freedom of expression on a 
national level. The countries whose laws are analysed are: the United Kingdom, 
the United States of America, France and Germany. 
In order to provide a general overview of the rights' relationship, the following 
paragraphs examine: 
(i) whether freedom of expression is or could be effectively 
accommodated within the framework of existing legislative moral 
rights provisions and limitations to such provisions, and 
(ii) whether freedom of expression per se is afforded sufficient 
recognition as an actual or potential limitation to the author's moral 
rights. 
The following Tables summarise the relevant rights and legislative provisions 
that are considered under each national law. 
United Kingdom 
False Attribution Right Integrity Right Freedom of Expression 
CDPA 1988, section 84 CDPA 1988, sections 80-83 HRA 1998, section 12 
ECHR 1950, Article 10 
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United States 
Paternity Right Integrity Right Freedom of Expression 
Copyright Act 1976, Copyright Act 1976, American Declaration of 1948, 
section 106A section 106A Article 4 
First Amendment to the US 
Constitution 
France 
Paternity Right Inte rity Right Freedom of Expression 
French Intellectual French Intellectual French Declaration of 1789, Articles 
Property Code 1992, Property Code 1992, 10,11 
article L. 121-1 article L. 121-1 French Constitution of 1958, 
Preamble 
ECHR 1950, Article 10 
Germany 
Paternity Right Integrity Right Freedom of Expression 
Author's Right and Author's Right and Related German Basic Law 1949, 
Related Protection Rights Protection Rights Law Article 5 
Law 1965, article 13 1965, article 14 ECHR 1950, Article 10 
3.5.2 UNITED KINGDOM 
3.5.2.1 FALSE ATTRIBUTION AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The author's paternity right under the CDPA 1988 is defined as the right to be 
identified as the author of a copyright work (or director of a film)21. The Act also 
provides for the author's right to have a work published anonymously, 
pseudonymously or using some other particular form of identification22. In the 
Act, the right concerning false attribution is recognised as a distinct moral right 
separate from that of paternity, and is defined as the right not to have a 
copyright work falsely attributed to an author (or a copyright film falsely 
attributed to a director)23. It is submitted that it is the right of the author not to 
have a copyright work falsely attributed to him; this may give rise to potential 
21 CDPA 1988, section 77(1). 
22 CDPA _1988, section 77(8). 23 CDPA 1988, section 84. For a detailed analysis of the nature of the paternity right, see 
para. 1.3.2.3. 
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conflicts with an individual's right of freedom of expression24. Thus, it is only in 
this context that the author's "paternity right"25 is examined in this paragraph. 
The right concerning false attribution applies to literary, dramatic, musical and 
artistic works and to films26. The right also applies to adaptations of literary, 
dramatic and musical works and to copies of artistic works that are falsely 
represented as being copies made by the author of the artistic work 27. Unlike the 
paternity right, the right concerning false attribution does not have to be 
asserted28. Similarly, there are no exceptions or defences to this right. 
Since the early years of the nineteenth century, the law of passing off and 
defamation29 have afforded authors protection against false attribution of 
authorship30. More recently, the court addressed the issue of this right's 
infringement in the case of Clark v. Associated Newspapers Ltd31. On the facts 
of the case, Alan Clark MP brought an action against the London Evening 
Standard and invoked two rights to protection from false attribution, one 
statutory, under section 84(1)(a) of the CDPA 1988, and one common law, 
under the law of passing off. The newspaper published a "spoof" diary based on 
what a journalist imagined that Alan Clark might record in his diary. The article 
24 It is hereby suggested that the other two rights embraced by the author's paternity 
right, although capable of being infringed within the context of copyright law, cannot give 
rise to conflicts with another party's freedom of expression if infringed. 
25 In most international, regional and national laws, the false attribution right is treated as 
part of the author's paternity right. The United Kingdom is the sole country examined in 
the thesis that clearly separates the two rights. 
26 CDPA 1988, section 84(1). 
27 CDPA 1988, section 84(8). 
28 CDPA 1988, sections 77(1) and 78. 
29 Moore v. News of the World [1972] 1 Q. B. 441. In this case, Mrs. Edna May Moore 
alleged that an article that appeared in the News of the World newspaper infringed her 
false attribution right (under section 43 of the Copyright Act 1956) and was defamatory. 
The article was claimed to be an interview of Mrs. Moore to a newspaper journalist and 
was headed 'How My Love For The Saint Went Sour'. The jury awarded the plaintiff 
damages both for false attribution and libel. 
30 Marengo v. Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd. (1948) 65 R. P. C. 242 (The plaintiff 
was a well-known cartoonist using the pseudonym 'Kem' and the defendant published 
the work of another cartoonist using the pseudonym 'Kim' but without the dot over the T. 
Lord Simonds stated that "In a passing-off action the persons whose evidence is most 
cogent are those who, because they know only the plaintiff's goods, are the most easily 
deceived by the similarity of the defendant's goods and it is from that deception that the 
plaintiff is entitled to be protected". Id. at 250); Moore v. News of the World Ltd. [1972] 1 
Q. B. 441 (News of the World published an article under the headline 'The Girl Who Lost 
the Saint. When Love Turns Sour by Dorothy Squires talking to Weston Taylor. '. The 
plaintiff claimed that the words in the article were wrongly attributed to her, when in fact 
they were the words of Weston Taylor. The jury found that the article did pretend to be 
written by Dorothy Squires. A breach of the tort was held to have been committed. ). 
31 [1998] 1 W. L. R. 1558. 
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was headed 'Alan Clark's Secret Political Diaries' and included a picture of 
Clark. The introductory paragraph of the article did however identify the 
newspaper journalist as the author. 
The court clarified that section 84 of the CDPA 1988 confers a right on everyone 
not to have authorship of a literary work attributed to him: "Two distinctive 
features of the statutory tort are: (a) that it is unnecessary that the plaintiff be a 
professional author and accordingly that he has any goodwill or reputation as an 
author to protect or which may be damaged by false attribution; and (b) 
consequently the tort is actionable per se without proof of damage"32. It held that 
the defendants had violated both rights and that in order to decide whether 
deception as to the author's identity had taken place the article in question had 
to be viewed as a whole. The court then went on to assess whether, in this 
context, a substantial number of readers of the article would be misled as to its 
author. So long as a reasonable reader would understand that the articles in 
question were a false attribution of authorship to A, it would be likely that the 
court would hold that false attribution has been established - "The headings of 
the articles contain a clear and unequivocal false statement attributing their 
authorship to the plaintiff, and the vice of this statement is not cured by the 
various counter-messages relied on by the defendant"33 
On the facts of The Secret Diaries case34, A will bring a claim of infringement of 
her moral right of paternity against B under section 84(1) of the CDPA 1988. 
Based on the ruling of the Clark35 case, it appears that, so long as a reasonable 
reader would understand that A had authored the diary entries, the court would 
find in favour of A. Even though the newspaper diaries included an introductory 
paragraph identifying C as the author, the fact that the article was entitled "A's 
Secret Diary" and was accompanied by A's picture would seem to suggest that 
the average reader would assume that A was the author. If the court accepted 
this to be the case, B would not be able to rely on a defence since there are no 
statutory exceptions to the author's false attribution right. 
32 [1998] 1 W. L. R. 1558, at 1565 per Lightman J.. 
"[1998] 1-W. L. R. 1558, at 1572. 
34 The facts of this hypothetical case are set out in para. 3.2. 
35 [1998] 1 W. L. R. 1558 
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However B could invoke his right of freedom of expression as a defence to A's 
false attribution infringement claim. There is no such statutory defence in the 
CDPA and case law on the subject appears to be limited. Nevertheless, the 
Clark case36 did make explicit reference to the right of freedom of expression in 
the context of an infringement of the author's false attribution right, highlighting 
that there is no parody defence per se. Lightman J. stated that: 
"I should consider, if only to brush aside, one argument addressed to 
me by ... counsel for the defendant, in respect of both claims by the 
plaintiff. [Counsel] invoked article 10(1) of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, which 
provides that everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression, 
and he waxed eloquent on what he denigrated as an attempt by the 
plaintiff in this action to interfere with the right of the defendant to 
publish parodies. This argument is totally misconceived. First, there is 
no interference with the defendant's freedom of expression. The right 
of the defendant to parody the works of the plaintiff has never been in 
question and could never be in question. Secondly, article 10(2) of the 
Convention of 1953 spells out that the citizen's right to freedom of 
expression is subject to the rights of others, and these must include the 
rights which the plaintiff seeks to enforce in this action. The only 
limitation on the defendant's freedom is in respect of the presentation 
or packaging of the parody. The defendant is required to respect the 
right of the plaintiff to object to false attribution of authorship"37. 
If one were to rely on the judgment of the Clark case in order to ascertain courts 
approach to a defendant's freedom of expression defence to moral right 
infringement it would appear that it does not allow a wide margin of appreciation 
for this right38. The court in Clark arguably demonstrated great reluctance to 
36 [1998] 1 W. L. R. 1558. 
37 [1998] 1 W. L. R. 1558, at 1566. 
38 The Alan Clark case has received mixed reactions. See Thorne, C. D., "The Alan Clark 
Case - What It Is; What It Is Not" (1998) 20(5) E. I. P. R. 194 ("[The Alan Clark case] is to 
be welcomed as a responsible decision. It demonstrates that the existing law has 
remedies and that perhaps the vocal clamour for further legislation to curtail the press 
and introduce a tort of privacy is unjustified. " at 196). Cf. Harrison, R., "Pastiched-Off" 
(1998) 9(5) Ent. L. Rev. 181 ("The decision has given judges a further opportunity to 
extend passing-off beyond its role in protecting commercial goodwill into a wider 
economic tort with affinities with defamation. It has made the confusion test easier for 
plaintiffs to surmount because little is done to test precisely how, why and with what 
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acknowledge that freedom of expression could come into play in situations of 
infringement and that the balancing of the two rights could be a welcome feature 
of the law. Likewise, Lightman J. appears to have refused to acknowledge the 
possibility of any conflicts existing or arising between the two rights. If the 
defendant's argument of freedom of expression was characterised as "totally 
misconceived", it could be argued that the likelihood of conflict between the 
author's false attribution right and an individual's freedom of expression is high. 
3.5.2.2 INTEGRITY RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Under the provisions of the CDPA 1988, the author's right of integrity39 has often 
been described as somewhat limited in nature. Criticism has focused upon the 
extensive qualifications and exceptions to the right, the limited scope of the right 
itself and the fact that the right can be easily waived 40 
Section 80 only prohibits the "derogatory treatment" of a work which is more 
narrowly defined than "... any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or 
other derogatory action in relation to the ... work", as provided in Article 6bis of 
the Berne Convention41. It is generally accepted that the author's integrity right 
can only be breached where the structure of the work has been altered; the 
placing of the work itself in a prejudicial/controversial environment or context will 
generally not breach the author's right42. 
Unlike other jurisdictions, UK law does not provide for defences to a claim for 
infringement of the integrity right; there is no defence equivalent to that of fair 
dealing in an action for infringement of copyright. In cases where the work is 
found to have been subjected to derogatory treatment "the motive or purpose for 
carrying out the prohibited act does not appear to afford any defence s, 43 
justification the relevant witnesses are confused. If Lightman J. 's decision is followed, we 
risk giving in to a culture where we are all treated as morons in a hurry" at 186). 
39 For a discussion of the author's integrity right under section 80 of the CDPA 1988, see 
para. 1.3.2.3. 
40 For a more extensive analysis, see Ginsburg, J. C., "Moral Rights in a Common Law 
System" [1990] 1(4) Ent. L. Rev. 121; Stamatoudi, I., "Moral Rights of Authors in 
England: The Missing Emphasis on the Creators" [1997] IPQ 478 and Barron, A., 
"Copyright Law and the Claims of Art" [2002] IPQ 368. 
41 For an analysis of the scope of the integrity right under the Berne Convention, see 
para. 1.3.2.3. 
42 See Griffiths, J., "Not Such A "Timid Thing": The UK's Integrity Right and Freedom of 
Expression" in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses 
(Griffiths and Suthersanen (eds. ), Oxford University Press, 2005. 
43 Laddie et al., The Modern Law of Copyright And Designs (3`d ed., Butterworths, 2000). 
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The right's limited scope appears to be reinforced by the apparently sparse UK 
case law. Section 80 has seemingly only been considered in four reported 
44 cases, while it appears not to have succeeded following a full trial. 
Despite the criticism the integrity right has attracted, there can be circumstances 
where the right does afford strong protection to authors and directors. It is under 
such circumstances that any potential conflict between the author's integrity right 
and another party's right of freedom of expression might arise. 
On the facts of The Paris Novel case45, D will bring a claim against E for 
infringement of his moral right of integrity. In order for D to succeed in his claim, 
he will have to establish that E subjected his work to derogatory treatment. It is 
arguable that there has been "treatment" of D's novel, since E has not only 
made use of D's plots and characters, but has added to and altered D's work. If 
the court accepts this argument, E will have committed an infringing act under 
section 80(3)(a) of CDPA 1988 by publishing commercially a derogatory 
treatment of D's work. The court will then have to assess whether D's honour or 
reputation has been prejudiced by such a distortion of his work. This issue will 
be decided objectively: "the treatment accorded to his work is either a distortion 
or mutilation that prejudices his honour or reputation as an artist. It is not 
sufficient that the author is himself aggrieved by what has occurred"46. On the 
present facts, it is arguable that E has, to an extent, distorted D's novel. A 
considerable proportion of the public, having read E's novel, may have 
developed an unfavourable, or even negative opinion of D and his work. Thus, it 
is likely that an English court would rule that D's work was subjected to 
derogatory treatment, thereby infringing D's integrity right. 
44 Morrison Leahy Music Ltd v. Lightbond Limited, [1993] E. M. L. R. 144 (The production 
of a sound recording from a medley of lyrics and music from other songs could 
potentially amount to derogatory treatment. However, the issue was never decided as 
the case did not reach full trial); Tidy v. Trustees of the Natural History Museum, [1996] 
39 IPR 501 (a reproduction of drawings in reduced size did not distort the original 
drawings); Pasterfield v. Denham, [1999) F. S. R. 168 (reproduction of an artist's drawing 
in a leaflet altering its details and colours did not amount to derogatory treatment, the 
allegedly distorting changes and omissions being minor); Confetti Records v. Warner 
Music UK Ltd., [2003] E. M. L. R. 35 (a rap song super-imposed on a track allegedly 
referring to violence and drug-taking did not constitute derogatory treatment of the 
original track as it could not be demonstrated that the composer's honour or reputation 
had been prejudiced). 
45 For an analysis of the facts of this hypothetical case, see para. 3.2. 
46 Pasterfield v. Denham [1999] F. S. R. 168, at 182. 
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If the court upholds D's claim, it appears that none of the defences available 
under section 81 of the CDPA 1988 will be open to E. It is possible that E would 
resort to relying on the provision of section 81(3), which allows for a defence of 
"reporting current events". However, it is unlikely that the court would accept that 
an effort to describe the difficulties faced by people with disabilities through a 
work of fiction could amount to a report of "current events". In addition, the 
CDPA does not provide for a parody defence to an integrity right infringement 
claim, which E could have relied upon as his novel is primarily a parody of D's 
work. 
Alternatively, E could rely on his right of freedom of expression as a defence to 
D's claim of moral right infringement. There appears to be no case law to 
present where the relationship between the integrity right and freedom of 
expression has been considered. The closest UK courts have come to comment 
upon the potential interaction between copyright (as opposed to the integrity 
right) and freedom of expression was in Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. 47 On 
the relationship of the respective rights, the Court ruled in favour of the copyright 
owner rejecting the claim that copyright does not accommodate the right to 
freedom of expression. The court's reasoning and conclusion could also 
arguably be applicable to the author's moral rights. Even though the Court of 
Appeal stated that "copyright is antithetical to freedom of expression", it 
proceeded to emphasise the narrowness of the statement: "Rare circumstances 
can arise where the right of freedom of expression will come into conflict with the 
protection afforded by the Copyright Act, notwithstanding the express exceptions 
to be found in the Act. In these circumstances, we consider that the court is 
bound, insofar as it is able, to apply the Act in a manner that accommodates the 
right of freedom of expression. This will make it necessary for the court to look 
closely at the facts of individual cases (as indeed it must whenever a fair dealing 
defence is raised). We do not foresee this leading to a flood of litigation i48. 
The Court of Appeal's approach appears to suggest that not only does copyright 
not clash with freedom of expression, but that it promotes and is capable, within 
its current framework, of accommodating freedom of expression. 
47 [2002] Ch. 149. For an extensive discussion of the facts of, and ruling in, the case see 
para. 4.5.2.1. 
48 [2002] Ch. 149, at para. 45. 
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In conclusion, the courts reluctance to safeguard freedom of expression 
specifically vis-ä-vis moral rights infringement claims, coupled with the lack of a 
fair dealing or a statutory parody defence, appears to suggest that conflicts 
between the two sets of rights can possibly arise. It is difficult to ascertain any 
circumstances within this national copyright regime under which a party's 
freedom of expression would take precedence over the author's integrity right. 
3.5.3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
3.5.3.1 PATERNITY RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
i GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Before the enactment of the federal Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) 1990 by 
Congress, and in the absence of specific legislation49, US courts have at times 
afforded protection to interests analogous to moral rights through extending 
common law rights or through an expansive interpretation of particular statutory 
rights, such as trademark laws. 
In examining situations of potential conflict between the author's attribution (or 
paternity) right and another party's right of free speech in the context of general 
legal principles, this section considers the attribution right as encompassing: 
i. The right to be credited as the author of the work, and 
ii. The right to prevent use of the author's name in relation to a work that he 
did not create. 
As far as the author's right to be credited as the author of a work is concerned, 
the right has been upheld by courts under contract law5° and the tort of reverse 
52 passing offs'. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., can be 
49 For a discussion of the development of moral rights in the United States of America 
and their distinct protection under general principles of law and VARA, see para. 1.3.2.3. 
50 Luster Enters., Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 156 U. S. P. Q. 422 (S. Ct. 
N. Y. County 1967) ("Credits run off on the screen immediately prior to or after the 
showing of the story portion of the film are of more interest to the industry than to the 
public. Adequate opportunity will exist, if this case is expeditiously processed, to ensure 
publication of plaintiff Winston's authorship of the idea to the industry if she is ultimately 
held entitled to such credit. "). 
51 However, see Luster Enters., Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 156 U. S. P. Q. 
422 (S. Ct. N. Y. County, 1967) ("Credits run off on the screen immediately prior to or 
after the showing of the story portion of the film are of more interest to the industry than 
to the public. Adequate opportunity will exist, if this case is expeditiously processed, to 
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described as the leading case in the context of requiring use of the author's 
name and appears to illustrate the limited nature of protection afforded to this 
right. In this case, the Supreme Court considered for the first time the doctrine 
of reverse passing off 3 and held that vis-ä-vis works in the public domain there 
is no Lanham Act54 obligation to credit the original creator or copyright owner as 
the "origin of the work"55. Overall, the decision appears to limit the availability of 
moral rights claims under the Lanham Act56 by stating that the purpose of the 
Congress passing the Visual Artists Right Act 1990 was to confer affirmative 
rights to claim attribution: "Recognizing a §43(a) cause of action for 
misrepresentation of authorship of noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) 
would render these limitations superfluous. A statutory interpretation that 
renders another statute superfluous is of course to be avoided57". Given the 
limited scope of application of this right, it is not likely that it would give rise to 
situations of conflict with the right of freedom of expression. 
For the purposes of this analysis, the right of the author against false attribution 
is more likely to lead to such situations of conflict. The use of the author's name 
ensure publication of plaintiff Winston's authorship of the idea to the industry if she is 
ultimately held entitled to such credit. "). 
52 539 U. S. 23 (2003). 
53 The Dastar case seems to override the previous case of Smith v. Montoro, 648 F. 2d 
602 (91" Cir. 1981) on reverse passing off. The Ninth Circuit held that there would be a 
Lanham Act remedy to a published work where the author's name and attribution was 
omitted by the new publisher of the work. For a more extensive discussion of the case, 
see Nimmer, M. B., Nimmer, D., Copyright (Mathew Bender, looseleaf, 1963-) at para. 
8D. 03[A][2][a]. 
54 For a detailed discussion of §43(a) of the Lanham Act in the context of the author's 
moral rights, see Suhl, N. C., "Moral Rights Protection in the United States under the 
Berne Convention: A Fictional Work? " (2002)12 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 
1203; Kwall, R. R., "The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire 
between Copyright and Section 43(a)" (2002) 77 Wash. L. Rev. 985. 
ss For a discussion of the interpretation of "origin" in this case, see para. 1.3.2.3 (Moral 
Rights under US law - Protection under general principles). 56 §43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act provides as follows: "Any person who, on or in connection 
with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, 
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of 
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of 
fact, which -- 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, 
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or 
commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he 
or she is likely to be damaged by such act". 
57 539 U. S. 23 (2003), at 35. 
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in relation to a work that he did not create58 has been held to be wrongful under 
several legal principles, including contract law", unfair competitionso 
defamation61, the right of privacy62 and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act63 
Infringement of the right appears to depend on whether, and if so, to what 
extent, the author's work has been altered or distorted. If the author's work is 
58 Clevenger v. Baker, Voorhis & Co, 8 N. Y. 2d 187,168 N. E. 2d 643 (1960), appeal 
denied, 9 N. Y. 2d 755,214 N. Y. S. 2d 736 (1961); Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. 
Supp. 261 (S. D. N. Y. 1968), 295 F. Supp. 331 (S. D. N. Y. 1968); Clemens v. Belford, 
Clark & Co, 14 F. 728 (C. C. N. D. III. 1883). For a more extensive list of cases, see 
Nimmer, M. B., Nimmer, D., Copyright (Mathew Bender, looseleaf, 1963-), para. 
8D. 03[B]. 
59 Granz v. Harris, 198 F. 2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952). 
60 Under unfair competition law, it has been held wrongful to pass off the work of an 
individual as that of an author. See, Granz v. Harris, 198 F. 2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (even 
when the author assigns or licenses a work granting the right to make reasonable 
changes to his work, it is an actionable wrong to credit the author as the creator of the 
work, without his consent, if the has been the subject of extensive changes that render 
the new work a departure from the author's original creation). Cf. Carte v. Ford, 15 F. 
439 (C. C. D. Md. 1883) (when the author assigns or licenses a work granting the right to 
make reasonable changes to his work and the changes substantially alter the original 
creation, a prominent notice clarifying the portions written by the author and those 
written by others will prevent an action of false attribution from succeeding); Landon V. 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450 (S. D. N. Y. 1968). 
61 Defamation claims have generally been raised in cases where the work falsely 
attributed to the author is of inferior quality to the original work, and as such damages 
his reputation. See Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N. Y. 250,167 N. E. 432 
(1929); Gershwin v. Ethical Publishing Co., 166 Misc. 39,1 N. Y. S. 2d 904 (S. Ct. N. Y. 
County 1937); American Law Book Co. v. Chamberlayne, 165 F. 313 (2d Cir. 1908). 
62 Follett v. Arbor House Publishing Co., 208 U. S. P. Q. 597 (S. D. N. Y. 1980); Kerby v. Hal 
Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207,127 P. 2d 577 (1942); Gieseking v. Urania Records, 
Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034,155 N. Y. S. 2d 171 (S. Ct. N. Y. County 1956); Williams v. Weisser 
Publishing Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1969) (truthful attribution of the author's name on an 
unauthorised publication of a previously unpublished work - on the basis that the 
original author did not consider the work worthy of publication - was held to violate the 
author's right of privacy as it suggested to the public the author's approval of publication 
of his work); Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F. 2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978) (use of the 
author's name on a revised version of a previously published work, where the 
publication of the revision was not authorised by the author, was held to violate the 
author's right of privacy). 
63 False attribution has been held to constitute a false description or representation and 
thus violate section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting 
Cos., 538 F. 2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Jaeger v. American Intl Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 
274 (S. D. N. Y. 1971) (common law unfair competition and Lanham Act both suggested 
as possible causes of action); Benson v. Paul Winley Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 
(S. D. N. Y. 1978) (publication of a work created by the author in the past and 
misrepresented as being the author's contemporary work was held to violate section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act); Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 (S. D. N. Y. 1975) (use of 
a current photograph of an author in connection with an old text was held to violate 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act). Note: According to Nimmer, "this construction can 
survive Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U. S. 23 (2003), to the 
extent that it arises under the false advertising paragraph of Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, rather than under its catch-all protection statements as to "origin". See, 
Nimmer, M. B., Nimmer, D., Copyright (Mathew Bender, looseleaf, 1963-), at para. 
8D. 03[ß][3]. 
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substantially altered without his consent and he is credited as the creator of the 
new work, he can claim violation of his false attribution right64. If, on the other 
hand, the new work carries a notice which truthfully indicates that the work is 
based upon or derived from the author's work, thus not representing that it is 
created or authorised by the author, a false attribution claim is unlikely to 
succeed6s 
On the facts of The Secret Diaries case66, A will claim that her right of false 
attribution has been infringed by the publication of the diary entries by B. It is not 
clear how US courts would decide this case. C did not make use of As work but 
wrote some fictional diary entries, which at first sight might have led the average 
reader to assume that they had been authored by A. In addition, it is not clear 
whether B can rely on any defences under general principles of law. However, B 
could invoke his right of freedom of expression under the First Amendment as a 
defence to the publication of the diary entries. US courts have, on a number of 
occasions, examined the application of free speech arguments in the context of 
an author's attribution right infringement claims under general principles of Iaw67. 
The case of Rogers v. Grimaldi, involved a movie by Federico Fellini entitled 
"Ginger and Fred". The characters, albeit fictitious, were two Italian cabaret 
performers who made a living by imitating Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers. 
Rogers brought an action against the distributors and producers of the movie for 
violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and infringement of her common 
law rights of publicity and privacy. The Second Circuit dismissed the claim. 
Given the fact that there was some artistic relevance between the title and 
content of the movie, First Amendment interests were held to prevail, despite the 
limited potential of consumer confusion. The court ruled that "most consumers 
64 Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331 (S. D. N. Y. 1968). 
bs Hospital For Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 516 F. Supp. 67 (E. D. Va. 
1980) ("The use of words such as 'based on' or 'derived from' may be sufficient to 
negate any false designation or description that may otherwise be present"); King v. 
Innovation Books, Div. of Innovative Corp., 976 F. 2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992), at 829 (A 
motion picture derived from Stephen King's "The Lawnmower Man" should not be 
advertised as "Stephen King's The Lawnmower Man" as that would be a false 
statement; however, giving King a "based upon" credit would not violate King's 
attribution right). 
66 For the facts of the case, see para. 3.2. 
67 Some of the cases discussed below involve trade mark law infringement. They are 
however considered important because of the courts rulings on the application of free 
speech. 
68 875 F. 2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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are well aware that they cannot judge a book solely by its title any more than by 
its cover69i and stated that "We believe that in general the [Lanham] Act should 
be construed to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding 
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression7 ". In affect, 
the court ruled that the Lanham Act has to be construed narrowly when applied 
to titles because of First Amendment concerns". However, the court went on to 
state that an explicitly misleading title such as "The True Life Story of Ginger 
and Fred" would not escape court sanction72. 
Following this precedent, later cases have appeared to uphold the importance of 
First Amendment arguments. In the case of Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 73, 
at issue was the song by Dutch band Aqua entitled "Barbie Girl" and its 
suggestive lyrics, which included provocative dialogues between Barbie and 
Ken. Mattel, the maker of the Barbie doll, filed suit on several grounds, with the 
primary claims being trademark infringement and dilution. The district court 
granted MCA's motion for summary judgment and rejected Mattel's argument 
that its property interests were being harmed by the association of the Barbie 
doll with unsavoury song lyrics. The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision and ruled 
that the song's parody was protected speech "inextricably entwined" with its 
commercial purpose. In order to delineate the boundary between commercial 
and non-commercial speech, the court went on to discuss the case of Hoffman 
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 74 where the Ninth Circuit had stated that "the core 
notion of commercial speech" is that "it does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction "75. On the basis of this analysis, the court held that "if 
speech is not 'purely commercial' - that is, if it does more than propose a 
commercial transaction - then, it is entitled to full First Amendment protection" 
and that First Amendment protection outweighed Mattel's trade mark interest76: 
69 875 F. 2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), at 1000. 
70 875 F. 2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), at 998-99. 
" It should be noted that the argument that Rogers v. Grimaldi only applies to works of 
parody has been rejected. See Simon & Shuster Inc. v. Dove Audio Inc., 970 F. Supp. 
279 (S. D. N. Y. 1997). 
72 936 F. Supp. 156 (S. D. N. Y. 1996), at 1000. "To illustrate, some titles - such as 
'Nimmer on Copyright' and 'Jane Fonda's Workout Book' explicitly state the author of the 
work or at least the name of the person the publisher is entitled to associate with the 
preparation of the work". Id at 999. 
73 296 F. 3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U. S. 1171 (2003). 
" 255 F. 3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
75 255 F. 3d 1180 (91h Cir. 2001), at 1184. 
76 Following the Second Circuit's judgment in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F. 2d 994 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
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"Applying Rogers to our case, we conclude that MCA's use of Barbie is not an 
infringement of Mattel's trademark. Under the first prong of Rogers, the use of 
Barbie in the song title clearly is relevant to the underlying work, namely the 
song itself. As noted, the song is about Barbie and the values Aqua claims she 
represents. The song title does not explicitly mislead as to the source of the 
work; it does not, explicitly or otherwise, suggest that it was produced by 
Mattel"". Likewise, the panel upheld the district court's dismissal of Mattel's 
defamation claim. 
Similarly, in 1996, the court allowed a motion picture docudrama about the Black 
Panther Party to use "the name and likeness" of party founder Bobby Seale78, 
while, in 2002, in the case of Comins v. Discovery Comms., Inc. 79 the court once 
again delineated the boundaries of trademark law6o 
However, in the case of Parks v. LaFace Records81, the Sixth Circuit ruled 
against the defendants First Amendment claims. The case involved a dispute 
over the name of a rap song with an "explicit content" entitled "Rosa Parks "82 
Rosa Parks, a prominent figure in the US civil rights movement, sued the 
defendants for defamation, interference with business relationships and for 
violating her publicity rights under the Lanham Act and Ohio state law. The 
district court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment and held that 
their song was expression protected under the First Amendment. However, the 
Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the basis that use of Rosa 
Park's name in the title was purportedly not "artistically related to the content of 
the song". 
In Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. 83, the 
Second Circuit held that "in deciding the reach of the Lanham Act in any case 
where an expressive work is alleged to infringe a trademark, it is appropriate to 
weigh the public interest in free expression against the public interest in avoiding 
"875 F. 2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), at 902. 
78 Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331 (E. D. Pa. 1996), at 339-40. 
79 200 F. Supp. 2d 512 (D. Md. 2002), at 522. 
80 "However ungracious it may seem for Defendants to have included Comins in its 
'thank you' list after deciding not to produce a film based on the Book, the Lanham Act 
should not be used as a remedy for a bruised ego". (200 F. Supp. 2d 512 (D. Md. 2002), 
at 522). See also Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S. D. Cal. 
1998). 
$' 329 F. 3d 437,442,456 (6'h Cir. ), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003). 
82 The song featured the lyric "Everybody move to the back of the bus..... 
83 886 F. 2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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consumer confusion"aa The courts line of reasoning appeared to be similar in 
the defamation case of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell85, whereby it was ruled that 
"The mere fact that a person's/celebrity's name is attached to something 
offensive is not enough to overcome a defendant's First Amendment rights"86 
On the facts of The Secret Diaries case, it is not clear whether the court would 
consider the Rogers test of artistic relevance in order to determine whether B's 
publication of the diary entries has violated A's publicity rights under the Lanham 
Act. The court might examine the series artistic relevance to A's underlying work 
- i. e. her collection of selected diary entries - and whether they explicitly 
mislead the public as to the source and content of the series. In turn, B will 
counter claim that the publication of the series falls within the ambit of his right of 
free speech, and that therefore does not violate section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act. On this basis, the court is likely to balance B's First Amendment claim 
against the plaintiffs interests. Following the line of reasoning of existing case 
law, it is difficult to predict whether the court would hold that free speech would 
predominate A's moral right. However, the existing body of case law in this 
context, could suggest that the First Amendment has often been the victor in a 
tug of war between free speech and intellectual property interests. Perhaps, the 
concluding remarks of Judge Alex Kozinski in the case of Mattel, Inc. v. MCA 
Records, Inc. 87, even though somewhat exaggerated, sum up the American 
stance to a rather limited attribution right protection until recently: 
"All of these [words] are variants of the invective most often hurled at 
accused infringers, namely 'piracy'. No one hearing this accusation 
understands intellectual property owners to be saying that infringers 
are nautical cutthroats with eye-patches and peg legs who board 
galleons to plunder cargo. In context, all these terms are non- 
actionable 'rhetorical hyperbole'.... The parties are advised to chill". 
8; 886 F. 2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989), at 494. 
85 485 U. S. 46 (1988). The case applied the public figure defamation test to deny a 
celebrity the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the defendant's 
magazine for its depiction of him engaging in incest and alcohol abuse. 
86 485 U. S. 46 (1988), at 57. 
87 296 F. 3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U. S. 1171 (2003). 
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However, the court's approach appears to have changed since 2003 with the 
passing of the judgement in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 88. 
The case has arguably put an end to most causes of action for false and 
misleading attributions of artistic works89. 
This section would conclude that, in the United States of America, until the 
decision in Dastar, under general principles of law, and the Lanham Act in 
particular, courts were likely to take into account a defendant's claims to free 
speech protection and carry out a balancing exercise. Such an exercise did not 
appear to have been established on the basis of any identifiable rules of thumb 
and it was thus likely that courts would hand down the rulings on a case-by-case 
basis. However, since Dastar the protection of moral rights under section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act appears to be weak. The difficulty of establishing 
infringement of the author's right of false attribution renders any potential 
conflicts with free speech of less relevance. Consequently, one could even go 
as far as to argue that potential conflicts between the two rights are hard to 
arise, at least under the Lanham Act, given that their availability to him under the 
Act is under question. On the facts of The Secret Diaries case, if one assumes 
that the Dastar decision applies equally to literary works, A might not be allowed 
to claim infringement of her moral right of false attribution. Any potential conflict 
with B's right of free speech would thus not materialise. 
ii VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT 1990 
In considering situations of potential conflict between the author's attribution 
right and another party's right of freedom of expression, this section considers 
the attribution right, within the context of VARA 1990, as encompassing: 
The right of the author to claim authorship90, which includes the right to 
publish anonymously or pseudonymously91, 
ii. The right to prevent use of his right as the author of the work that he did 
not create92, and 
88 539 U. S. 23 (2003). The case is further discussed in para. 3.5.3.2(i). 
89 For a critical analysis of Dastar, see Landau, M., "Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox: 
The Need for Stronger Protection of Attribution Rights in the United States" (2005) 61 
N. Y. U. Annual Survey of American Law 273. 
90 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(a)(1)(A). 
9' United States House of Representatives Report No. 101-514,1015' Congress, Second 
Session 15 (1990), quoting Final Report of Ad Hoc Working Group on U. S. Adherence to 
the Berne Convention, 10 Colum. -VLA J. L. & Arts 550 (1986). 
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iii. The right to prevent use of his name as the author of a work of visual art 
that, although he might have created, has been subjected to "a distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification ... which would be prejudicial to ... [his] 
honor or reputation n93. In order to establish that an act is "prejudicial" to 
the author's honour or reputation, the "modification of a work of 
recognized stature [must] generally establish harm to honor or 
reputation94", while "the best approach to construing the term 'honor or 
reputation' ... is to focus on the artistic or professional honor or 
reputation of the individual as embodied in the work that is protected95". 
VARA provides for a number of exceptions to the artist's attribution right. The 
right "shall not apply to any reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a 
work in, upon, or in any connection with any item described in subparagraph (A) 
or (B) of the definition of 'work of visual art'96". The reference to subparagraph 
(A) is reference to the exclusion of among other items, any poster, map, globe, 
chart, motion picture, book, magazine, data base, electronic publication, 
merchandising item, packaging material etc97. In other words, a depiction of a 
protected work of visual art upon any of the afore-mentioned items need not be 
accompanied by the artist's name. Reference to subparagraph (B) is reference 
to the exclusion of "works made for hirei96. As such, any reproduction upon or in 
any connection with any work for hire need not be accompanied by the artist's 
name. 
Thus, the attribution right under VARA merely covers original tangible art objects 
(artefacts) as opposed to intangible intellectual creations99. In addition, it 
appears that case law under VARA is sparse10°. For the purposes of the present 
analysis, given the limited application of the Act and lack of relevant case law, it 
92 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(a)(1)(B). 
93 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(a)(2). 
9; United States House of Representatives Report No. 101-514,101st Congress, Second 
Session 15 (1990). 
9s United States House of Representatives Report No. 101-514,101St Congress, Second 
Session 15 (1990), at 15. 
96 Section 106A(c)(3). 
97 See US Copyright Act 1976, section 101. 
98 For the definition of a "work made for hire", see US Copyright Act 1976, section 101. 
99 For an analysis of the author's moral rights under VARA, see Karlen, P. H., "What's 
Wrong With VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral Rights" (1993) 15 Hastings Comm. & 
Ent. L. J. 905; Ciolino, D. S., "Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use" 
(1997) 54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 33. 
10° The majority of the reported cases under VARA involve alleged violations of the 
artist's integrity right. See para. 3.5.3.2(ii). 
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is difficult to envisage situations where free speech would come into play within 
this context. 
3.5.3.2 INTEGRITY RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
i GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
In examining situations of potential conflict between the author's integrity right 
and another party's right of free speech in the context of general principles, this 
section considers the integrity right as encompassing: 
i. The right of the author to prevent distortion, truncation or mutilation of his 
work, and 
ii. The right of the author, under certain circumstances, to object to the 
destruction of his work. 
The right of the author to prevent distortion or truncation of his work has been 
recognised in a number of early cases101, but was clearly established in the 
landmark case of Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies102. The Second 
Circuit held that unauthorized changes in a work that are so substantial as to 
impair the integrity of the original work shall constitute copyright infringement; in 
this case, substantial alteration was held to be the omission of twenty-four 
minutes from the original ninety- minutes long recording of the plaintiffs "Monty 
Python" television show103. Nimmer has interpreted the Gilliam decision, on a 
contract law respect, to mean that "A grant of certain rights, such as 
reproduction and/or performance, does not in itself constitute a grant of any 
other rights conferred upon the author, such as the adaptation right. Material 
changes to a work would infringe this right, even if the person making such 
changes were an unconditional grantee of the reproduction and/or performance 
rights"' 04 
10' Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music Enters., Inc., 160 F. Supp. 77 (S. D. Cal. 1958); Autry v. 
Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F. 2d 667 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied, 348 U. S. 858 (1954); Rice v. 
American Program Bureau, 446 F. 2d 685 (2d Cir. 1971); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. 
Speber, 332 F. Supp. 1206 (S. D. N. Y. 1971), modified, 457 F. 2d 50 (2d Cir. 1972). 
102 538 F. 2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
103 For a more detailed discussion of the facts of the case, see para. 1.3.2.3 (Moral 
Rights under US law - Protection under general principles). 104 Nimmer, M. B. and Nimmer, D., Copyright (Mathew Bender, looseleaf, 1963-) at para. 
8D. 04[A][ 1 ]. 
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Violation of the author's integrity right has been held to include the speeding up 
of the movement in a video game105, the insertion of a defendant's advertising 
into an otherwise authorized reproduction of the plaintiff's work106 and a 
defendant's marketing of a tape to be used in the plaintiff's "Teddy Ruxpin" toy 
bear (damaging the commercial value of the plaintiff's work)'o' 
On the other hand, cases have held that presenting a work in a manner 
consistent with the licensee's style shall not constitute infringement108. Thus, a 
magazine's minor cropping of a photograph709 and the reproduction of an 
excerpt of a letter-to-the-editor (despite its submission under the express 
condition that it can only be reproduced in its entirety)1° have been held to 
constitute fair use, thus not infringing the author's right of integrity. 
The Gilliam case recognised a second interpretation to the author's integrity 
right, separate from that rooted in principles of copyright infringement"'. Under 
this right, the cause of action is based on mutilation of the author's work and has 
been termed as "the right of the artist to have his work attributed to him in the 
form in which he created it12". In effect, this right combines the integrity right 
with the attribution right. Consequently, in this context, violation of the author's 
integrity violation could entail a violation of his attribution right as well. At the 
heart of Gilliam's ruling on this right is that "ABC impaired the integrity of the 
appellants' work and represented to the public as the product of the appellants 
what was actually a mere caricature of their talentsi13. 
At present however, the strength of the Gilliam case as supporting claims of 
moral rights under the Lanham Act is under discussion14 as a result of the 
105 Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Antic International, Inc., 704 F. 2d 1009 (7`h Cir. ), cert. 
denied, 464 U. S. 823 (1983). 
106 National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W. D. Tex. 1980). 
107 Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Sys., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 351 (N. D. Tex. 
1986). 
108 This approach appears to be consistent with the ruling in the Gilliam case. 
109 Marvullo v. Gruner & Jahr, 105 F. Supp. 2d 225 (S. D. N. Y. 2000). 
110 Diamond v. Am-Law Corp., 745 F. 2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984). 
"' The case is extensively discussed in para. 1.3.2.3. 
112 538 F. 2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), at 24. See, also Community for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 846 F. 2d 1485,1498 (D. C. Cir. 1988) (dictum), aff'd, 490 U. S. 730 (1989). 
113 538 F. 2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), at 25. 
114 For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Nimmer, M. B., Nimmer, D., Copyright 
(Mathew Bender, looseleaf, 1963-) at para. 8D. 04[A][2]. Also, see Suhl, N. C., "Moral 
Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne Convention: A Fictional Work? " 
(2002) 12 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 1203 at 1224 ("The Gilliam holding is 
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decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 15, which seems to 
limit significantly the availability of moral rights claims under such general 
principles of law1". "When Congress has wished to create such an addition to 
the law of copyright, it has done so with much more specifically than the Lanham 
Act's ambiguous use of 'origin'. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 provides 
that the author of an artistic work 'shall have the right ... to claim authorship of 
that work'. That express right of attribution is carefully limited and focused: It 
attaches only to specified 'works of visual art', is personal to the artist, and 
endures only for 'the life of the author'. Recognizing in § 43(a) a cause of action 
for misrepresentation of authorship of noncopyrighted works (visual or 
otherwise) would render these limitations superfluous"'". 
lt is not clear how The Paris Novel case"8 would be decided by a US court at 
present. Its facts19 are dissimilar to both the Dastar and Gilliam cases as 
infringement of the author's integrity right is centred on injury to his honour or 
reputation through parody rather than through some form of mutilation of his 
work. However, the line of reasoning of existing case law can be used in order to 
determine the way in which the courts would decide this case under general 
principles of law. 
If the case were to be decided under Dastar, it would appear that the court 
would be reluctant to uphold infringement of D's integrity right outside the scope 
of VARA. The Supreme Court ruled that the limited right of attribution created by 
VARA "negates a construction whereby section 43(a) of the Lanham Act creates 
an open-ended attribution right120i. Consequently, it would seem unlikely that E's 
right of free speech would be stifled. 
problematic as precedent because the facts are so unique and represent a clear case of 
mutilation; therefore, many courts who are not inclined to protect the right to integrity will 
distinguish the facts of Gilliam. "). 
15 539 U. S. 23 (2003). 
16 Fora detailed discussion of the Dastar case, see paras. 1.3.2.3 and 2.5.3.1(i). 
11' 539 U. S. 23 (2003), at 34-35. 
"$ For the facts of the case, see para. 3.2. 
19 The facts of The Paris Novel case raise issues such as the legal importance parody. 
This issue is examined in para. 4.5.3.1. 
120 539 U. S. 23 (2003), at 34-35. 
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On the other hand, if the case were to be decided under Gilliam121, the court 
could uphold a violation of D's integrity right under the Lanham Act. On this 
basis, E would invoke his free speech right under the First Amendment. The free 
speech doctrine does not appear to have been invoked to date in cases 
involving violation of the author's integrity right under general principles of law. 
However, it could be argued that if it were invoked, the courts approach would 
be similar to that in cases involving alleged violations of the author's moral right 
of attribution under general principles of law122. On this basis, US courts would 
take into account First Amendment concerns. As such, it would appear unlikely 
that E's free speech right would be in any way stifled. 
Overall, it would appear that the seemingly limited scope of the integrity right 
coupled with evidence that US courts value First Amendment concerns, do 
alleviate conflicts between the rights, however only to an extent. Cases are 
assessed on their individual facts and there seems to be no general rule 
established regarding First Amendment claims vis-ä-vis the author's integrity 
right. 
ii VISUAL ARTISTS RIGHTS ACT 1990 
Section 106A of the US Copyright Act confers upon the authors of works of visual 
art the right to "prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification 
of that work that would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation°123. 
Furthermore, the artist "has the right to prevent any destruction of a work of 
'recognized stature'124 and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that 
right is violation of that right". It is thus notable that although an intentional and 125 
12 That would only occur if the Gilliam ruling survives Dastar. As discussed above, the 
strength of the Gilliam case as supporting claims of moral rights under the Lanham Act 
is under discussion. See Choe v. Fordham University School of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44 
(S. D. N. Y. 1995); Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F. 3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000); Marvullo v. 
Gruner & Jahr, 105 F. Supp. 2d 225 (S. D. N. Y. 2000). 
122 For an analysis of such cases and the courts approach, see para. 2.5.3.1(i). 
123 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(a)(3)(A). 
124 The court in Carter v. Hemsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228 (S. D. N. Y. 1994), later 
opinion, 861 F. Supp. 303 (S. D. N. Y. 1994), established a two-tier test for works of 
"recognized stature" requiring the artist to show that: (a). the visual art in question has 
stature, and is viewed as meritorious, and (b). the stature is recognised by art experts, 
other members of the artistic community, or by some cross-section of society. In Martin 
v. City of Indianapolis 982 F. Supp. 625 (S. D. Ind. 1997), the court, following Carter, held 
that a stainless steel sculpture had "recognized stature" when it had won "best of show" 
in an annual art show, an art critic described it as a fine piece of sculpture and an art 
gallery director described it as interesting and aesthetically stimulating. 
125 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(a)(3)(B). 
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prejudicial mutilation is an integrity right violation126, with respect to destruction, 
the act must be intentional or grossly negligent in order for it to amount to an 
integrity right violation127. 
Section 106A provides for a number of exceptions to the integrity right. Firstly, 
the modification of a work of visual art which results from "the passage of time or 
the inherent nature of the materials"128 shall not constitute a distortion, mutilation 
or other modification 129. This exception however, does not extend to works of 
recognized stature130. Secondly, the modification of a work of visual art that 
results from "conservation, or the public presentation including lighting and 
placement of a work" 131 shall not constitute destruction, distortion, mutilation or 
other modification 132. This exception however does not apply in cases where the 
modification is caused by gross negligence133. Thirdly, the last exception is 
coterminous with the exception to the attribution right134. In the same way as a 
poster, map, or database is exempt from the artist's attribution right, such uses 
are also exempt from liability as violations of the artist's integrity right. 
The first published case to consider any of the rights afforded under VARA did 
not arise until 1994135. The case related to the exception for artworks 
incorporated into buildings. Three artists brought an action to prevent the 
removal, alteration and destruction of art work commissioned by a property 
developer for installation in a lobby of a commercial building. The art work 
consisted of interrelated sculptural elements made of recycled materials and 
installed on walls, the ceiling and in a floor mosaic. The owners of the building 
wanted to remove the work, but the removal could not be carried out without 
causing alteration or destruction of some elements. On appeal, the Second 
Circuit reversed the district court's decision and found for the defendants on 
different grounds, holding that the subject building installation was ineligible for 
protection, being a work for hire. This decision coupled with the fact that only a 
126 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(a)(3)(A). 
127 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(a)(3)(B). 
128 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(c)(1). 
129 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(a)(3)(A). 
130 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(a)(3)(B). 
131 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(c)(2). 
132 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(a)(3). 
133 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(c)(2). 
134 Copyright Act 1976, section 106A(c)(3). For a more detailed discussion of the 
exception, see para. 3.5.3.1(ii). 
135 Carter v. Hemsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228 (S. D. N. Y. 1994), later opinion, 861 
F. Supp. 303 (S. D. N. Y. 1994). 
124 
limited number of cases have been brought under VARA since its enactment, 
means that "few precedential decisions have defined the contours of the Visual 
Artists Rights Act 1990,136 
Thus, the author's integrity right under VARA is limited in nature as it is 
applicable in cases of work of visual art. In addition, the number of judgments 
delivered under VARA is limited and reported judgments137 do not cover 
situations of actual or potential conflict between the right of integrity and free 
speech. For the purposes of the present analysis, it is difficult to envisage 
situations where free speech interests would come into play within this context. 
3.5.4 FRANCE 
3.5.4.1 PATERNITY RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Article L. 121-1 of the French Intellectual Property Code provides for the author's 
paternity right, which covers both his right to be identified as the author of a 
work735 and the false attribution right. The statutory provision appears to be 
worded in general terms. It does not specifically set out what would constitute an 
infringing act neither does it specify any exceptions or defences to the rights. 
Case law on the false attribution right appears to be limited. In 1957, the Cour 
de Paris upheld infringement of the author's moral right where the works of an 
artist were included in a book exhibition and the way they were exhibited had 
falsely led people attending the exhibition to believe that someone else was the 
artist of the works39. Similarly, in 1961, the Cour de Cassation held that creating 1 
136 Nimmer, M. B., Nimmer, D., Copyright (Mathew Bender, looseleaf, 1963-) at para. 
8D. 06[D]. 
137 See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625 (S. D. Ind. 1997) (The court found 
that the City of Indianapolis violated a sculptor's moral rights by demolishing a sculpture 
installed on municipality-acquired land. ); Pavia v. 1129 Avenue of the Americas Assocs., 
901 F. Supp. 620 (S. D. N. Y. 1995) (A sculptor filed an action against the owner of one of 
his sculptures for the altered display of his work, alleging that the improper display of his 
work damaged his honor and reputation); English v. BFC &R East 11 ̀ Street LLC, No. 
97 Civ. 7446,1997 WL 746444 (S. D. N. Y. 1997), aff'd, 198 F. 3d 233 (2d Cir. 1999) (The 
court held that VARA is inapplicable to art work that is placed on the property of others 
without their consent when such art work cannot be removed from the site in question. ). 
138 This aspect of the author's paternity right and relevant case law is not examined 
hereby as it is submitted that freedom of expression cannot and should not be employed 
as a defence to the omission by a party to attribute a work to its author. For a discussion 
of French cases involving altered reproductions of original works, see Ginsburg, J. C., 
"Art and the Law: Suppression and Liberty" (2001) 19 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 9; 
Merryman, J. H., "The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet" (1976) 27 Hastings L. J. 1023. 
139 Decision of Cour De Paris, October 29,1957: (1959) Ann. 205. The Tribunal de 
Grande Instance later held that violation of the author's paternity right shall be infringed 
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a false impression that a work has been created by someone other than the 
74o author would constitute a violation of the author's moral right 
On the facts of The Paris Novel case141, A will bring an action against B for 
infringement of his moral right. French law appears to suggest that so long as 
the courts are satisfied that the public has been misled as to the identity of the 
work's author it will rule that a violation of Article L. 121-1 has taken place. 
Although the newspaper article that B published did acknowledge the journalist 
as being its author, the fact that it was headed 'A's Secret Diaries' and 
prominently featured A's picture could lead the average reader to believe that 
the author was A. The fact that the article could create such an impression 
would seem to suffice for a French court to find infringement. 
If one assumes that the court holds that a moral right infringement has occurred, 
it appears that B will have no grounds of defence. The French Intellectual 
Property Code does not make provision for any specific limitations or exceptions 
to the author's paternity right142. 
Alternatively B could rely on the right of freedom of expression as a defence. 
Case law involving the application of the author's paternity right vis-ä-vis another 
party's freedom of expression right appears to be sparse. It is therefore difficult 
to predict how a French court would assess such an argument at this stage of 
the development of the jurisprudence 143. However, it is evident that there can be 
situations of conflict between the two rights, as this discussion has illustrated. 
not only by failure to mention his name in connection with his works but also by falsely 
crediting them to another person. See Decision of Tribunal Grande Instance de Paris, 
March 31,1969: (1970) RTDC 395 (No. 1). For a more detailed analysis of these cases, 
see Price, M. E., "Resuscitating a Collaboration with Melville Nimmer: Moral Rights and 
Beyond, " (1998) Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property, Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law Yeshiva University, No. 3. 
140 Decision of Cour de Cassation, January 31,1961: (1961) Dalloz 81. On the facts of 
the case, the defendant used three of the plaintiffs book covers (the plaintiff being a 
book cover maker) in a book exhibit and placed his own business cards next to the 
covers, thus creating the impression that he was the maker of the covers. 
14' The facts of this hypothetical case are set out in para. 3.2. 
142 In addition, the pastiche and parody defence under article L. 122-5(4) cannot be 
invoked as it is not relevant on the facts of this case. 
13 See further paras. 3.5.4.2 (examination of the author's integrity right vis-ä-vis freedom 
of expression) and 4.5.4.1 (examination of the author's reproduction right vis-b-vis 
freedom of expression) which appear to support this conclusion. 
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3.5.4.2 INTEGRITY RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
It appears that the scope of the author's integrity right144 under the French 
Intellectual Property Code and the way in which it has been interpreted by the 
courts is broad. One of the aspects of the right that is different both from 
equivalent provisions in other jurisdictions and Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention is that, as a general rule, the courts determine infringement of the 
integrity right to a large extent by looking at the opinion of the author himself 
about whether his work has received derogatory treatment145 
The integrity right's broader scope appears to be supported by French case law. 
It is interesting to draw a comparison between a French14' and a UK case147 with 
similar facts that have been decided differently by the respective courts. Both 
cases involved the reproduction of original works with altered and added 
colours. While the UK court did not find infringement of the author's integrity 
right, the French court did. 
Nevertheless, the seemingly wide scope of the author's right of integrity is 
limited through the provision of an equally wide exception. When a work has 
been made public, the author cannot forbid "parody, pastiche and caricature, 
taking account of the laws of the genre" 148 
On the facts of The Paris Novel case149, D will claim that his integrity right in the 
work has been infringed. Since the author does not have the burden of proving 
prejudice to his honour or reputation, it can be argued that it is likely that A will 
be able to establish that his novel has received derogatory treatment and that 
the court, accepting D's assessment, will rule that there has been infringement 
of his right under article L. 121-1 of the French Intellectual Property Code. 
"' French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 121-1. For a detailed discussion of 
the author's integrity right under French law, see para. 1.3.2.3. 
'QS "Godot", TGI Paris, October 15,1992, (1993) 155 R. I. D. A. 225; Schoendoerffer v. 
Mod Films, TGI Paris, March 23,1994, (1995) 164 R. I. D. A. 401; Duchene v. David 
Lachapelle Studios et al., TGI Paris, 3e ch., May 10,2002, (2002) 194 R. I. D. A. 332. 
146 Deveria v. °I'Express" CA Paris, October 31,1988; Cahiers du Droit d' Auteur, April 
22,1989 (reproduction of a portrait of Liszt with added colours in a newspaper). 
147 Tidy v. Trustees of the Natural History Museum [1996] EIPR 86; (1995) 39 IPR 501 
(reproduction of cartoon drawings with altered colours and in reduced size). 
148 Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 122-5(4). 
149 For an analysis of the facts of this hypothetical case, see para. 3.2. 
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E, on the other hand, will rely on the parody exception. Firstly, E will have to 
establish that, in writing his novel, he had not motivated by malice against 
D150. Even though E is free to rely on this defence, he must take account of "the 
laws of the genre"151. For the defence to succeed, E will have to establish two 
elements - the "connection" element and the "purpose" element'52. It is arguable 
that he will be able to prove the connection element; the genral public will 
recognise his reference to D's work and also that the two works are separate. It 
is debatable whether the court will accept the existence of the purpose element. 
E's novel does not produce comic or even satirical effects as such, and even 
though his comments are not purposefully malicious, they can potentially injure 
D's honour or reputation. In the case of Ste Marc Dorcel v. Ste Edgar Rice 
Burroughs153, the defendant produced a film based on a novel using characters 
and scenes from the novel in pornographic episodes. The Court held that this 
was incompatible with the qualities of humour and derision of the parody 
exception which, consequently, could not be claimed. The present case does 
not involve issues like pornography. It is arguable that on the present facts, the 
parody defence might be allowed. 
Alternatively, E could invoke his right of freedom of expression as a defence to 
D's infringement claim. There appears to be no French case ruling or 
commentary on the relationship between the integrity right and freedom of 
expression. Although courts have had to balance freedom of expression against 
other rights, often constitutional in nature, there does not appear to be a decided 
case to date where the right has been juxtaposed against an author's moral 
rights154. Thus, it is difficult to predict how the courts would react. if E were to 
raise a freedom of expression defence. 
Overall, at this stage of the development of the jurisprudence, it appears difficult 
to assess with certainty the stance of French courts towards a case involving the 
competing interests of the integrity right and freedom of expression. On the one 
150 If that was the case, the parody defence would not be available. See Dechavanne, 
CA Douai, December 23,1992, comment by Logie in [1993] 4 Ent. L. Rev. 121. 
15' Intellectual Property Code, article L. 122-5(4). 
152 For an extensive discussion of these elements, see Sterling at pp. 522-23. 
's' Versailles Court of Appeal, November 6,1998: (1999) 181 R. I. D. A. 314. 
Asa Cases where French courts have had to balance freedom of expression against other 
constitutional rights are discussed in para. 1.3.2.3. Also, see a discussion of the 
relationship between an author's economic right of reproduction and freedom of 
expression in para. 4.5.4.1. 
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hand, case law on the matter seems to be sparse, the author's integrity right can 
be broad in nature while the French judiciary attaches considerable weight to the 
author's "personality rights". On the other hand, the courts have to be satisfied 
with the author's assessment that his work has been "denatured", and a party's 
right of freedom of expression can potentially be acknowledged and addressed 
through the availability of the relatively broad parody, pastiche and caricature 
defence. Freedom of expression could potentially be accommodated through the 
parody defence, however the scope of the defence is limited to specific cases 
and does not cover derivative works that do not fall under the parody or pastiche 
classification. 
3.5.5 GERMANY 
3.5.5.1 PATERNITY RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The author's paternity right is recognised in article 13 of the 1965 Law and does 
encompass not only the author's positive right of claiming authorship of his work 
but also the negative right of taking action against others for usurping it155. It 
appears that this negative aspect of the right has not been frequently invoked 
since case law on the subject is sparse. This also appears to be the case where 
the right of false attribution and the right of freedom of expression may be 
invoked. Thus, case law appears to be once again sparse. 
If one were to decide how a German court would rule on the facts The Secret 
Diaries case15', one would probably have to reach a conclusion based on the 
general approach of German jurisprudence to the issue of potential conflicts 
between copyright and freedom of expression as within the context of the 
author's "false attribution" there seems to be no case law or legal commentary 
that could provide some guidance. Consequently, it is difficult to determine the 
scope and nature of the author's moral right and thus how much this could limit 
another party's freedom of expression. There appears to be no decided case to 
date with facts similar to this hypothetical case and thus, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions regarding the interaction of the rights. 
155 See Dietz, A., "Germany" in International Copyright Law and Practice (1988) (Geller, 
P. E. and Nimmer, M. B., Matthew Bender, 1988) (and annual updates, 1989-2005), at 
§7. 
156 The facts of the case are set out in para. 3.2. 
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Overall, German courts have illustrated that, at times, they will take freedom of 
expression into account. However, the lack of judicial consistency and relevant 
legal rules it would be unsound to draw a conclusion at this stage of the 
development of the jurisprudence as to whether the moral right predominates 
freedom of expression. 
3.5.5.2 INTEGRITY RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Article 14 of the Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law 1965 is 
worded in a similar manner to Article 6bis of the Berne Convention and the test 
for assessing infringement of the right is objective157. 
Case law appears to suggest that the author's moral right of integrity will be held 
to have been infringed where the author's honour or reputation has been 
prejudiced. Examples of such infringement include placing songs in a 
compilation of recordings with a distinct neo-fascist ambiance158, a modern 
version of an operetta with deletions from and additions of films to the original 
'so script159 and an altered poster 
On the facts of The Paris Novel case161, D will try to establish prejudice to his 
honour or reputation as a result of E's parody novel, and thus argue that his 
integrity right has been infringed. In turn, E will have to rely on a statutory 
defence. Although there is no exception in the 1965 Law regarding parody, E is 
entitled to turn to the "free use" provision that protects derivative works "created 
without the consent of the author of the used work" provided it is 
"independent"162. "Independent" has. been interpreted to mean that the 
"characteristic features of the original [work) fade or completely disappear" , 
that the. new work has gained an "inner distance" from the original work164. This 
interpretation was confirmed in the case of Asterix Parodies165, where the BGH 
stated that "The difference required, in the case of fair use, in relation to the 
borrowed, peculiar features of the utilised work can also exist - even in a case 
157 For a discussion of the integrity right under the 1965 Law, see para. 1.3.2.3. 
'Sß Neo-Fascist Slant In Copyright Works, OLG Frankfurt-am-Main, December 6,1994: 
Q996] E. C. C. 375. 
9 "Maske in Blau", BGH, April 29,1970; (1971) G. R. U. R. 35 
160 "Viel Spass Mit", LG Munich I, August 2,1966: (1974) Copyright 97. 
16' The facts of this hypothetical case are set out in para. 3.2. 
162 Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law 1965, article 24(1). 
163 Sherlock Holmes case, BGH, February 2,1958: (1959) G. R. U. R. 402. 
16' Alcolix case, BGH, March 11,1993: (1994) G. R. U. R. 206, (1994) 25 I. I. C. 605. 
165 BGH, March 11,1993: (1994) 25 I. I. C. 605, at 610. 
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of an obvious appropriation, especially in the formal make up - where the new 
work, on the basis of original, creative authorship, maintains such an internal 
distance in relation to the borrowed, peculiar features of the pre-existing work 
that the new work must be viewed as being independent. In such a case, the 
borrowed, peculiar features of the pre-existing work also 'fade' in the new work, 
albeit in a broader sense: they become superimposed by the new work's 
original, creative content"'ss 
As a result of the Alcolix case167, a case with similar facts to the those at issue, it 
is questionable whether E will succeed in establishing the required inner 
distance and thus be allowed to rely on the free use defence. The court's 
assessment of this issue would appear to depend on the extent of features used 
in E's novel that were borrowed from D's original work, and whether the former 
employed sufficient creativity to render his novel independent of the latter's 
work. It could be argued that, provided that E has not copied or extensively 
borrowed the personal features of D's work, E could succeed in invoking the free 
use defence. 
Alternatively, E could argue that his right of freedom of expression could, in 
these circumstances, constitute a defence per se. It is clear that there is no 
statutory defence of freedom of expression under German law. However, there 
has been a limited number of cases where courts have commented upon the 
interaction between the author's integrity right and another party's freedom of 
expression. 
In 1968, the Berlin Court of Appeal16' held that the re-publication, without 
permission, of cartoons stereotyping students by a Berlin periodical, was 
justified as it took place in the context of a critical analysis of the way left-wing 
Berlin students were being portrayed by the Springer press. The Court ruled that 
166 BGH, March 11,1993: (1994) 25 I. I. C. 605, at 615. 
167 In the Alcolix case, BGH, March 11,1993: (1994) G. R. U. R. 206, the defendant's story 
line used figures of Alcolix and Obelix. The plaintiffs argued that the work was an 
adaptation of the Asterix series, in which they owned the copyright, that elements of the 
Asterix characters had been used and, that the moral rights of the artists and text writers 
had been infringed. The Supreme Court held that the original main characters were 
protected under copyright. See Pilny, K. H., "Germany: Copyright: Protection of Comic 
Strips under Copyright Law -'Alcolix/Astrerix' - Parodies" (1995) 17(7) E. I. P. R. 198. 168 Bild Zeitung, Court of Appeal (Kammergericht) Berlin, November 26,1968, [1969] 54 
U. F. I. T. A. 296. 
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copyright law should be interpreted in the light of the free speech provision as 
enshrined in article 5 of the German Basic Law'69 
In 1984, the BGH gave its decision in the case of Re the Parodying of Cigarette 
Advertising170 
. The case involved a claim by a cigarette distributor for an 
injunction preventing an anti-smoking campaign for distributing a parody of its 
advertisement. The court, in rejecting the distributor's claim and refusing to grant 
an injunction, referred, among other issues, to the relationship between 
"personality rights" and freedom of expression stating that: "The calendar affects 
the defendant's interests relating to its enterprise, which are protected by its 
personality rights and the right in the business which it has established and 
carries on .... The defendant complains of the use of its trade mark and the 
image it has created by advertising for an anti-smoking campaign, particularly by 
ridicule in a way which causes it to consider itself disparaged and discriminated 
against""'. The parody was allowed "... the plaintiff may place the defendant at 
the forefront of its criticism only if it appears materially justified when weighed 
against the defendant's economic interests. Also, contrary to the appellant's 
opinion, the calendar sheet does not expose the defendant to ridicule in a 
discriminatory manner or even disparage it in a defamatory manneri12. 
More recently, in 2000, the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe lifted a 
1998 injunction against the publisher of Germania 3 Gespenster am toten Mann, 
Heiner Moller's last play, strengthening freedom of art in Germany. The court 
rejected Brecht's heirs claims that Moller had slandered Brecht by parodying 
several Brecht poems. In addition, Moller's ironic naming of Brecht's partners as 
the "three Brecht widows" was held not to be insulting. 
At this stage of the development of the jurisprudence, it is difficult to predict how 
the German courts would decide The Paris Novel case, in particular their 
approach to balancing the moral right of integrity against freedom of expression. 
Even though author's right law in Germany does not expressly provide for a 
freedom of expression defence, the courts do appear to be willing to take a 
party's right of freedom of expression into account. In addition, the availability of 
, 69 For a discussion of provisions of Article 5, see para. 2.5.5. 
10 BGH, April 17,1984, (1986) E. C. C. 1. 
71 BGH, April 17,1984, (1986) E. C. C. 1, at4. 
172 BGH, April 17,1984 (1986) E. C. C. 1, at 6. 
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the free use defence does constitute a basis, albeit limited, for the alleged 
infringer to safeguard his freedom of expression. 
3.6 SUMMARY 
The debate of relationship between copyright and freedom of expression has 
become prominent in recent years. The debate has primarily focused on the 
economic aspect of copyright and how this aspect can give rise to conflicts with 
the right of freedom of expression. The debate has also concentrated on the 
theoretical justifications of the respective rights and to what extent these 
justifications overlap, clash or create unresolved concerns. However, absent 
from this debate has been the issue of moral rights and how such rights might 
impact on the individual's right of freedom of expression. The lack of scholarly 
commentary and jurisprudence may be due to a number of reasons. At the 
international, regional and national levels, moral rights occupy positions of 
varying importance. At the one end of the spectrum, are the civil law countries, 
which place great emphasis on the personality of the author and his intellectual 
creations and thus, moral rights. At the other end are the common law countries, 
which place greater emphasis on the author's economic exploitation rights. At 
the international level, not all copyright instruments oblige their member States 
to recognise moral rights. Such variation coupled with the fact that freedom of 
expression has relatively recently begun to be discussed in the context of 
copyright infringement, in the majority of countries, could underlie the delayed 
legal reaction towards the right's relationship with the author's moral rights. 
This Chapter examined the relationship between the two sets of rights in order 
to ascertain whether, and if so to what extent, clashes do at present or may in 
the future arise between the rights. Overall, the legal picture in this context lacks 
uniformity, not only among the various levels but also among national laws. On 
the international and regional levels, there appears to be lack of legislative and 
judicial guidance on the issue. On a national level, some countries arguably 
afford a higher level of protection to the author's moral rights while others 
appear more willing to take account of another party's freedom of expression. It 
is suggested that copyright law should be supplemented at an international level 
to take into account of the relationship between every author's basic moral rights 
and every individual's right of freedom of expression. This is proposed in order 
to alleviate the current lack of guidance and uniformity and in order to resolve 
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any clashes that are evident at present and to prevent further conflicts from 
arising in the future 13. 
'7-' Further details in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Economic Rights and Freedom of Expression: Areas 
of Potential Conflict 
4.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
This Chapter consists of an enquiry into the relationship between an author's 
economic rights and another party's right of freedom of expression. This 
relationship is examined on the international, regional and national levels in order to 
ascertain whether and, if so, under what circumstances, there can be instances of 
conflict or overlap between the two sets of rights. 
As far as economic rights are concerned, there is a large degree of variation in the 
number of such rights vested in the author among national laws. At the one end of 
the spectrum, the French Intellectual Property Code basically provides for two 
economic rights (reproduction and communication to the public)', while, at the other 
end, the German Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law guarantees the 
author more than ten separate exclusive rights2. It can however be suggested that, 
despite the existence of diverse rights, most economic rights can be classified 
under the rights of reproduction or communication to the public3. 
In the context of the of the author's economic rights with another party's right of 
freedom of expression, the Chapter focuses on the right of reproduction since 
examples of actual and potential conflict with freedom of expression arise in various 
national jurisdictions. 
' French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 122-1. 
2 Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law 1965, articles 15-27. 
3 In general, in the context of economic rights, reproduction refers to the action of making a 
copy, or to a copy produced through reproduction. Communication to the public refers to the 
act of communicating a work to the public through a number of means, ranging from giving a 
public performance of the work to communicating the work by broadcasting or over the 
internet. 
For a more detailed discussion of an author's basic economic rights, see para. 1.3.2.4. 
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As far as the economic right of communication is concerned, case law in the area of 
conflict of rights does not appear to have developed. Nevertheless, conflicts are 
theoretically possible and the types of such conflicts will be similar to those 
identified in the context of the right of reproduction. 
This Chapter is primarily designed to provide a comprehensive answer to the 
following question: Are there or can there be circumstances where the author's 
invoking of his economic right of reproduction in his work can interfere with or 
otherwise restrict another party's freedom of expression, and vice versa? If such 
conflicts can be established or potential conflicts foreseen, they could amount to a 
serious gap in the present national laws, such conflicts going to the heart of the 
relations between the author, the party using his work and the general public. 
4.2 CASE FOR COMPARISON 
In the Chapter, a hypothetical "standard" case4 is taken for the purpose of 
comparison at various levels, namely: 
The Historical Novel Case 
A is the author of a well-known novel. The fictional work's central theme is the 
relationship between two athletes competing in the Olympic Games in Ancient 
Greece. Through its storyline, A depicts the free daily life of women and their valued 
assistance in the organisation of (but not participation in) the Games. 
B is the author of a sequel to A's novel. B's novel makes use of several elements of 
A's work, including plots, scenes and characters with a view to showing that A had 
given a distorted picture of the way of life of women in Ancient Greece. B portrays 
the discrimination women to which were, according to him, subjected, while the 
work's focus on their exclusion from the Olympic Games appears to be indicative of 
their derogatory treatment. 
For the purposes of the present analysis, infringement of the author's economic rights is 
not taken into consideration in this Chapter, this aspect having been considered in Chapter 
3. 
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4.3 COMPARISON AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
Article 9(1) of the Berne Convention guarantees "authors of literary and artistic 
works", among rights, "the exclusive right of authorising the reproduction of these 
works, in any manner or form". Article 9(2), added in the Stockholm Revision 
Conference, contains general provisions concerning limitations on the reproduction 
right5. 
Against this framework, the Convention sets out a number of restrictions on the 
reproduction right under the heading of "free uses of works". It provides for a 
mandatory limitation for the making of quotations under Article 10(1). In addition, 
the Convention sets out a number of discretionary exceptions, including certain 
uses of lectures and addresses6, the use of illustrations for teaching' and the use if 
works for the purpose of reporting current events8. 
On the facts of The Historical Novel case9, A will claim that B has infringed his right 
of reproduction through the unauthorised copying of extracts from his novel. In 
order to rebut the presumption of copyright infringement, B will have to invoke a 
defence or limitation under the Berne Convention. It is submitted that B could rely 
on the defence of making quotations10. However, in order to succeed, he will have 
to prove that the making of his book is compatible with fair practice, and that the 
extent of copying that took place does not exceed that justified by the particular 
purpose". Therefore, a court would have to balance the two rights and reach a 
conclusion on the basis of the above-mentioned factors. 
Alternatively, B could invoke his right of freedom of expression in order to justify his 
actions vis-ä-vis A's copyright work. On the international level, freedom of 
5 Union countries are allowed to permit reproduction of works in certain special cases, 
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work 
and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. These conditions 
constitute the so-called three-step test. For an analysis of the historical background and 
scope of the author's reproduction right, see Ricketson and Ginsburg at pp. 622-45. 
6 Berne Convention 1971, Article 2bis(2). 
Berne Convention 1971, Articles 10(2) and 10(3). 
$ Berne Convention 1971, Article 1lbis. 
9 The facts of this hypothetical case are set out in para. 4.2. 
10 Berne Convention 1971, Article 10(1). 
" It appears that, on the present facts, there is no other defence under the Berne 
Convention that B could invoke to justify his use of A's work. 
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expression is safeguarded under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 194812 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 196613. In this case, a 
court would again be called upon to weigh the parties competing interests and 
reach a decision on the basis of legislative interpretation and judicial precedent. 
For the purposes of the present examination of the relationship between the 
author's reproduction right and another party's freedom of expression, it is difficult 
to analyse the courts potential approach to such claims under the given facts, or 
reach a comprehensive conclusion as to the underlying reasoning to their potential 
decision. The Berne Convention, as the Universal Declaration and International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, is an instrument whose primary purpose is 
to set minimum standards of copyright protection which its country members must 
observe. Consequently, each country has put in place its own copyright and human 
rights legislation14 and this may provide authors and other parties alike with greater 
protection than that afforded under the respective international instruments. On an 
international level, there is little, if any, case law on the subjects of copyright 
infringement per se or copyright infringement vis-ä-vis freedom of expression. It 
would be unsound to reach any conclusions on the rights relationship under such 
general provisions and lack of judicial guidance and interpretation. 
4.4 COMRARISON AT REGIONAL LEVEL 
A comparison can be made of the respective copyright and human rights 
instruments in the context of the relationship between economic rights and freedom 
of expression within the American. region but not in Europe or Africa where there 
are no general regional copyright agreements. 
In the American region, the human right of freedom of expression is guaranteed 
under the American Convention on Human Rights 196915. The relevant copyright 
'Z Article 19. For a general discussion of the Universal Declaration and Article 19 in 
particular, see para. 2.3.2. 
13 Article 19. For a general discussion of the Covenant and Article 19 in particular, see para. 
2.3.3. 
14 The relevant legislative provisions are analysed and critically examined in paras. 4.5.2 
(United Kingdom), 4.5.3 (United States of America), 4.5.4 (France) and 4.5.5 (Germany). 
15 Article 13. For a discussion of the Convention and the right of freedom of expression, as 
defined therein, see para. 2.4.3. 
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instruments are NAFTA and Cartagena Decision 351. Both instruments make 
provision for the author's economic rights. NAFTA sets out that authors and their 
successors in interest shall have, in respect of their works, the exclusive rights 
enumerated in the Berne Convention, including the first public distribution of the 
original and each copy of the work by sale, rental or otherwise16. Cartagena 
Decision 351 imposes the obligation to grant the author or his successors in title, 
among other rights, the exclusive right of reproduction". 
The Cartagena Decision 351 is generally consistent with the TRIPS Agreement and 
the Berne Convention. However, it is generally considered to serve as a tool for 
integration within the Andean Community and for setting the stage for further 
enhancement of intellectual property protection. Each of its member countries18 has 
developed its own copyright legislation, safeguarding, among other rights, the 
author's economic rights. As such, case law on economic rights under this 
instrument over the years has been sparse. Thus, for the purposes of the present 
examination, Cartagena Decision 351 cannot provide an adequate forum for 
examining the interaction between the author's right of reproduction and freedom of 
expression. Any cases regarding such issues would generally arise on a national 
level. It would be unsound to reach any conclusions on the rights relationship to 
each other under such general provisions and lack of judicial guidance and 
interpretation. 
4.5 COMPARISON AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
4.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Part examines the relationship between the author's economic right of 
reproduction and another party's right of freedom of expression on a national level. 
The countries whose laws are analysed are the United Kingdom, the United States 
of America, France and Germany. 
In order to provide a general overview of the rights relationship, the respective 
sections examine the following issues: 
16 NAFTA, Article 1705(2). 
Cartagena Decision 351, Article 13. 
'$ Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela (subject to confirmation). 
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(i) whether freedom of expression is or could be effectively accommodated 
within the framework of existing legislative limitations and defences to 
copyright infringement, and 
(ii) whether freedom of expression per se is afforded sufficient recognition 
as an actual or potential limitation or restraint to the author's exclusive 
right of reproduction. 
The following Tables summarise the relevant rights and legislative provisions that 
are considered under each national law. 
United Kingdom 
Reproduction Right Limitations Freedom of Expression_ 
Section 18(1) CDPA 1988 Section 30 CDPA 1988 Article 10 ECHR 
Section 12 HRA 
United States 
Reproduction Right Limitations Freedom of Expression 
Section 106(1) Copyright 
Act 1976 
Section 107 Copyright 
Act 1976 
First Amendment to the US 
Constitution 
France 
Reproduction Right Limitations Freedom of Expression 
Article L. 122-5-3 French 
Article L. 122-1 French Intellectual Property Code 1992 
Intellectual Property Article 10 ECHR 
Code 1992 Article L. 122-5(4) French 
Intellectual Property Code 1992 
Germany 
Reproduction Right Limitations Freedom of Expression 
Article 15(1) Author's Article 24(1) Author's Right Article 5 German Basic 
Right and Related and Related Rights Law 1965 Law 
Protection Rights Law 
1965 
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4.5.2 UNITED KINGDOM 
4.5.2.1 REPRODUCTION RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Under the CDPA 1988, the author's right of reproduction is described as an "act 
restricted by copyright"19 and "copying in relation to any description of work includes 
the making of copies which are transient or incidental to some other use of the 
worki20. Copying2' in relation to a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work22 is 
defined as "reproducing the work in any material form", including storing the work in 
any medium by electronic meansi23. "The issue to the public of copies of the work"24 
is also an act restricted by copyright in every description of copyright work. 
Against this background of exclusive rights of the copyright owner, the CDPA 
provides for an extensive list of acts that may be done in relation to copyright 
without infringing it. The limitations are set out in Chapter III of the CDPA and 
include, among other provisions25, fair dealing with a literary work, or a dramatic, 
musical or artistic work for the purposes of research or private study26, fair dealing 
with a work for the purpose of criticism, review or reporting of current events 
(accompanied by sufficient acknowledgement, where necessary)27, the incidental 
19 CDPA 1988, section 1(2) and Chapter II (sections 16-22). 
20 CDPA 1988, section 17(6). 
21 What constitutes copying in relation to a film, television broadcast or cable programme, 
and the typographical arrangement of a published edition, is also defined in sections 17(4) 
and 17(5). 
22 Note that there is an additional provision. in relation to the copying of an artistic work, 
including "making a copy in three dimensions of a two-dimensional work and the making of a 
copy in two dimensions of a three-dimensional work". See CDPA 1988, section 17(3). 
23 CDPA 1988, section 17(2). 
24 CDPA 1988, section 18(1). This exclusive right of the copyright owner is further defined in 
sections 18(2) - (4). 25 Other exceptions outlined in Chapter III regard use of copyright works in connection with 
education (sections 32-36A), exceptions for copying by libraries and archives (sections 37- 
44), exceptions regarding public administration (sections 45-50), exceptions in the case of 
design documents (sections 51-53) and a number of other miscellaneous provisions 
(sections 57-76). 
26 CDPA 1988, section 29(1). Sections 29(2) - (4) contain various provisions concerning the 
application of the general rule in section 29(1). There are similar provisions regarding 
databases under section 29(1A). 
27 CDPA 1988, section 30. The provisions are subject to a further condition that the work has 
been made available to the public, and section 30(1A) defines what constitutes "making 
available to the public". 
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inclusion of copyright material in certain categories of work28, and adaptations of a 
work29. 
On the facts of The Historical Novel case30, A will bring a claim of copyright 
infringement against B under section 16(1)(a) of the CDPA 1988. A will have the 
burden of proving that the defendant, B, has copied his work, but, having 
discharged that burden, the burden of proof will then shift to A who will have to 
rebut this inference, and "this burden has, broadly speaking, not been found easy to 
discharge in a number of cases"31. In order for A to succeed in his claim, he will 
have to prove that B has copied a substantial part of his work. In deciding whether a 
substantial part has been copied, the courts will look at B's work as a whole32. 
Substantiality will be judged on a qualitative basis33; even a relatively short part of a 
work can amount to a substantial part if it is an essential part of the work34. Courts 
will also have regard to whether B has added elements and expressions to his work 
that were not present in A's novel and thus distinguish his work from the earlier 
one35. In order to determine whether the parts of A's work copied in B's novel 
constitute a substantial part courts will consider if they were important enough in A's 
novel, when viewed in its entirety; more specifically, they shall have regard at the 
"number and extent of the extracts" and ask whether they are "too many and too 
long to be fair, 36. As regards B's use of plots and scenes from A's novel, the courts 
will examine whether B has added to them original features so as to distinguish 
them, and hence his work, to an extent, from A's work. It is unclear whether the 
courts will rule that, on these facts, B copied a substantial part of A's work. If the 
courts decide that B's use of A's work does not amount to a substantial part, the 
28 CDPA 1988, section 31. 
29 CDPA 1988, section 76. 
'o For the facts of this hypothetical case, see para. 4.2. 
31 See, Sterling at pp. 450-51. 
32 Francis, Day & Hunter Ltd v. Bron [1963] Ch. 587; Betsen v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd 
[1994] E. M. L. R. 467. 
3 It must be borne in mind that courts will also take account of the well-established principle 
that B is allowed to make use of the underlying ideas in A's novel. See, L. B. (Plastics) Ltd v. 
Swish Products Ltd [1979] R. P. C. 551, HL; Johnstone Safety Ltd v. Peter Cook (Int. ) Plc 
[1990] F. S. R. 161, C. A.; Harman Pictures N. V. v. Osborne [1967] 1 W. L. R. 723. The 
principle of the idea/expression dichotomy is extensively examined in para. 5.4. 
34 Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd v. Paramount Film Service Ltd [1934] Ch. 593; Francis, Day 
& Hunter Ltd v. Bron [1963] Ch. 587. 
's Designers Guild Ltd v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2001] 1 W. L. R. 2416. 
36 Hubbard v. Vosper[1972] 2 Q. B. 84, per Lord Denning. 
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latter's claim will be dismissed. If, however, they come to the opposite conclusion, 
the burden will shift on B to prove that copyright infringement has not taken place. 
In order to prove this, it is submitted that B can rely on a number of grounds, 
namely that his work is a parody, the work amounts to fair dealing for the purposes 
of criticism or review and freedom of expression. 
As far as the parody argument is concerned, there is no express statutory parody 
defence under UK copyright law, however 6 could invoke this defence in two 
contexts: either argue that his work is a parody of A's novel and should thus be 
permitted purely on this basis, or argue that even though parody is not expressly 
defined as a permitted act to copyright, it falls within the scope of the fair dealing 
defence under section 30 of the CDPA. It should be noted that although Article 
5(3)(k) of the Information Society Directive 2001 allows member states to provide a 
"caricature, parody or pastiche" exception, the UK has chosen not to take 
advantage of this provision by a statutory exception37. It is interesting to point out 
that there appears to be no case law to date where UK courts have had to rule 
directly on the question of whether parody can be considered a defence to copyright 
as such, or a form of fair dealing. One of the reasons for this could be the fact that a 
parodist will not necessarily have copied a substantial part of the original work. This 
was the case in Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co. 38 and Joy Music v. Sunday 
Pictorial Newspapers (1920) Ltd39 where the courts held that the defendants had 
not copied a substantial part of the plaintiffs original works; consequently, the courts 
did not have to take stance regarding the position of parody in this context40. Thus, 
the courts decision will heavily depend on whether substantial copying has 
occurred41; the defendant's intention of creating a parody of the plaintiffs work will 
not constitute a defence if what has been taken is a substantial part of the earlier 
" See, Gredley, E. and Maniatis, S., "Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part 1: The Nature of 
Parody and Its Treatment in Copyright" (1997) 7 E. I. P. R. 339. 
'$ [1916] 1 Ch. 261 (Ch. D. ) (The case concerned the making of a film parodying a novel). 
39 [1960] 2 W. L. R. 645; [1960] 1 All E. R. 703 (The case concerned a musical parody). 
40 Note that in Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co. [1916] 1 Ch. 261, Ch. D., Younger J. stated 
obiter that if the issue of parody were to be considered, the defendant's claim that his work 
was a parody and thus did not infringe the plaintiff's copyright could have succeeded. 
41 For an analysis of what constitutes a substantial part and relevant case law, see Garnett, 
K., Davies, G. and Harbottle, G., Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (15`h ed., Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2005) at pp. 380-95. 
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work42. It could therefore be concluded that it is unlikely that B would succeed on 
this ground. Courts do not appear to consider parody as a defence to copyright 
infringement and neither do they seem willing to create such a precedent. 
On this basis, B could alternatively rely on the permitted act of fair dealing as an 
indirect means of protecting his parody work. UK courts have generally interpreted 
the fair dealing provisions strictly43. In addition, the list of permitted acts under this 
provision is clearly exhaustive in nature. The list cannot be used by the courts as a 
general guide to permitted acts44. Instead, the particular circumstances of each 
case will have to be brought into line with the statutory provisions. In other words, 
since there is no express statutory defence covering parody, the party wishing to 
rely on it must ensure that it corresponds exactly to one of the objectives allowed 
under the fair dealing provisions45 before the courts will consider whether the use of 
the other work is fair. 
It can therefore be concluded that B is unlikely to be successful by arguing that his 
work, as a parody, falls within the scope of any of the fair dealing provisions. 
Consequently, B will have to rely on the fair dealing provision under section 30 of 
the CDPA and claim that his work should be allowed as it merely reviews and/or 
criticises A's work. In this case, the courts will assess whether B's use of A's work 
can be described as fair. In their assessment, the court will judge B's activities on 
the objective basis of whether a fair minded and honest person would have dealt 
with A's work in the same manner as B. did under the given circumstances. Courts 
42 Williamson Music Ltd v. Pearson Partnership [1987] F. S. R. 97 (The lyrics of Oscar 
Hammerstein II's song "There is Nothin' Like a Dame" were parodied - but not copied - for 
use in a bus service advertisement. Held: no copyright infringement since there was no 
substantial copying); Schweppes Ltd v. Wellingtons Ltd [1984] F. S. R. 210 (The plaintiffs 
claimed infringement of their label, SCHWEPPES, by the defendants' label, SCHLURPPES, 
in relation to Indian tonic water. The defendants argued that their label was a joke in the 
nature of a caricature. Held: parody constitutes no defence to copyright infringement). 
43 See, Sterling at pp. 450-51. 
44 See, Spitz, B., "Droit D'Auteur, Copyright et Parodie, Ou Le Mythe De L'Usage Loyal" 
(2005) 204 R. I. D. A. 54 at 78. 
as Pro Sieben Media A. G. v. Carlton UK Television Ltd [1998] F. S. R. 43 at 49; Beloff V. 
Pressdram [1973] 1 All E. R. 241 at 262. 
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will consider a number of factors46 in assessing whether a fair dealing defence 
should be available on the facts of the case, including the purpose and type of use 
made of the quotations and extracts47, and the proportion of the work consisting of 
quotations and extracts as compared with the proportion of the work consisting of 
comment and analysis48. UK jurisprudence has interpreted the scope of criticism 
and review as not necessarily confined to the literary style or merit of the original 
work but extending to the thoughts and ideas underlying that work49. In this context, 
it is not clear whether, on the facts of this case, B would succeed in invoking the fair 
dealing defence; the court's decision will depend on its assessment of the purpose 
and nature of B's work and the amount of extracts it has used from A's work. 
Apart from the defences already discussed, B could also invoke his right of freedom 
of expression, as enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights50, applicable in the UK under section 12 of the Human Rights Acts'. 
UK case law in this area appears to be limited. However, the effect of the Human 
Rights Act, and in particular freedom of expression, on copyright law was discussed 
in the leading case of Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd52. On the facts of the case, 
a national newspaper, the Sunday Telegraph, appealed against an earlier 
46 For further discussion of this non-exhaustive list of factors that courts have taken into 
account when considering whether the use of a work was fair, see Garnett, K., Davies, G. 
and Harbottle, G., Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (15th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
2005) at pp. 498-500. 
47 Hyde Park Residence Ltd v. Yelland and Others [2001] Ch. 43; British Broadcasting Corp. 
v. British Satellite Broadcasting Ltd [1992] Ch. 141; Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd V. 
Marks and Spencer Plc [2001] Ch. 257; [2001] R. P. C. 76. 
48 Pro Sieben Media A. G. v. Carlton UK Television Ltd [1999] 1 W. L. R. 605; [1999) F. S. R. 
610, C. A.; Independent Television Publications v. Time Out [1984] F. S. R. 64; PCR Ltd V. 
Dow Jones Telerate Ltd [1998] F. S. R. 170; Time Warner Entertainment Ltd v. Channel 4 
Television Corporation Plc [1994] E. M. L. R. 1. 
49 Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q. B. 84. 
50 The provisions of Article 10 are examined in para. 2.3.2.3. 
51 The provisions of section 12 are discussed in para. 2.4.2. On the hierarchy level of Article 
10 and section 12, it has been suggested that the Article 10 rights have been intended to be 
given pre-eminence over the equivalent provisions in the Human Rights Act - it seems to 
us that section 12 does no more than underline the need to have regard to contexts in which 
[the Strasbourg] jurisprudence has given particular weight to freedom of expression, while, 
at the same time, drawing attention to considerations which may nonetheless justify 
restricting that right", Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd [2002] Ch. 149, C. A., at para. 27. 
Note however that in the earlier case of Imutran Ltd v. Uncaged Campaigns Ltd [2001] 2 All 
E. R. 385, Sir Andrew-Morritt V. C. took into account the requirements of section 12 in a 
copyright infringement case where Article 10 was also involved. 
52 [2001] E. M. L. R. 44. This decision is also discussed in para. 2.5.2.3. 
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decision53 to grant summary judgement to a well-known politician, Paddy Ashdown, 
in his claim for copyright infringement. The politician was contemplating publishing 
his political memoirs; among other documents, the minutes of a meeting with the 
Prime Minister was shown in confidence to representatives of newspapers and 
publishers. Subsequently, the newspaper published verbatim quotations from the 
minutes. The defendant newspaper asserted that the Court was obliged, under 
section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act, to take into account the right of freedom of 
expression, under Article 10 of the European Convention, in assessing the 
defences of fair dealing54 and public interest55 under the CDPA 1988. The Court of 
Appeal, dismissing the newspaper's appeal, held that its publication of extracts of 
A's meeting was mainly done for commercial purposes and could not be justified by 
public interest considerations. The court acknowledged that it is "a rare case where 
it is in the public interest that the words in respect of which another has copyright 
should be published without any sanction"56. Nevertheless, the court went on to 
state that, given the right circumstances, the defence of public interest could apply 
to breach of copyright57. On the scope of freedom of expression, Lord Phillips M. R. 
commented that "The prime importance of freedom of expression is that it enables 
the citizen freely to express ideas and convey information. It is also important that 
the citizen should be free to express the ideas and convey the information in a form 
of words of his or her choice. It is stretching the concept of freedom of expression to 
postulate that it extends to the freedom to convey ideas and information using the 
form of words devised by someone else"58. In other words, since information and 
ideas are not protected as such by copyright, it is unlikely that, in practice, copyright 
can operate as a considerable restraint on freedom of expression. However, he did 
acknowledge that, on a theoretical level, "copyright is antithetical to freedom of 
expression" since the "Act gives the owner of the copyright the right to prevent 
others from doing that which the Act recognises the owner alone has a right to 
s' [2001] 2 W. L. R. 967. 
sa CDPA 1988, section 30. Fair dealing is also discussed in para. 5.2.1. 
ss CDPA 1988, section 171(3) which provides that "Nothing in this Part affects any rule of 
law preventing or restricting the enforcement of copyright, on grounds of public interest or 
otherwise". The public interest aspect is further analysed in para. 5.3. 
56 [2001] E. M. L. R. 44, at para. 47. 
57 [2001] E. M. L. R. 44, at para. 57. 
58 [2001] E. M. L. R. 44, at para. 31. 
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do"59, copyright being essentially a negative right60. Overall, having established an 
infringement of the CDPA 1988, the court did not deem necessary to examine 
further the relationship of the two rights61. 
Two important aspects of the Ashdown case may be noted62. Firstly, the court 
discussed, to an extent, the approach to cases of copyright infringement involving 
the invoking of freedom of expression. Even though the court did not directly rule on 
the predominance of the rights, it did demonstrate the courts hesitation to override 
the copyright owner's interests in favour of freedom of expression. Secondly, by 
suggesting that the public interest defence could in certain circumstances be 
available in relation to copyright infringement63 - although it kept a cautionary 
stance by clarifying that what would amount to such circumstances was not capable 
of precise categorisation or definition - it left a window open for freedom of 
expression to be indirectly invoked and accommodated under that heading64 
On the facts of The Historical Novel case, it could be argued that, on the basis of 
the Ashdown decision, B would not succeed in a claim based on freedom of 
expression. The right is not recognised as a defence per se, and it is unlikely that 
B's novel content, or indeed his criticism of A's portrayal of persons with physical 
disabilities to be in the public interest. The Ashdown judgement made clear that the 
public interest defence will only override copyright in rare and compelling 
circumstances. It seems unlikely that the present facts could remotely fall in this 
category. Thus, the sole way that B's copying of A's work could be allowed would 
be under the fair dealing defence for the purposes of criticism or review; and even 
on this ground, given the restrictive interpretation and approach traditionally 
adopted by UK courts, the outcome is uncertain - on the facts of Ashdown, the 
Court of Appeal rejected the fair dealing defence. 
59 [2001] E. M. L. R. 44, at para. 30. 
60 Despite sections 2(1) and 16(2). 
61 [2001] E. M. L. R. 44, at para. 83. 
62 For analyses of the Ashdown case, see Burrell, R., "Reining in Copyright: Is Fair Use the 
Answer? " (2001) 4 I. P. Q. 361, and Griffiths, J., "Copyright Law After Ashdown - Time to 
Deal Fairly with the Public" (2002) 3 I. P. Q. 240. 
63 See Garnett, K. QC, "The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on UK Copyright Law" in 
Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Griffiths, J. and 
Suthersanen, U. (eds. ), Oxford University Press, 2005) at p. 176. 
"Also, see para. 5.3. 
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Having examined the relevant legislative provisions and case law, it could be 
argued that the UK system is generally strict in its approach to assessing copyright 
limitations and defences. This has been illustrated to be the case with the fair 
dealing and public interest provisions. Court reasoning has been rather rigid and it 
appears that, irrespective of the cases given facts, court decisions have, in the 
majority, turned on the amount of copying that had occurred and, to a lesser extent, 
the purpose and the nature of the later works, and the interests of the general 
public. It has been suggested that the underlying reason for this approach could be 
the argument that there is no place in UK law for the notion that, if an idea can only 
be expressed in one way, it cannot be the subject of copyright65. It appears to be 
the case that, in cases of copyright infringement involving fair dealing, the right of 
freedom of expression does not, in substance, come into play. Courts seem to be 
more willing to consider the right in cases where there is an important public 
interest66. However, even in such cases, the "Article 10 right to freedom of 
expression is only ever likely to override the rights of the copyright owner where 
there is a compelling public interest in the publication of the very expression of an 
author's ideas or information, and which the rigorous application of the 1988 Act 
would otherwise prevent"67. Overall, it could be submitted that the odds of freedom 
of expression being accommodated under these statutory exceptions are low. 
As far as the invoking of freedom of expression per se is concerned, it could be 
asserted that the situation is not clear, mainly due to the limited jurisprudence on 
this matter. Despite the fact that courts appear to recognise that there could be 
instances of conflicts between that right and copyright, they are hesitant, if not 
unwilling, to pave the way for an in-depth examination of the rights interaction. The 
Court of Appeal in Ashdown stated that: 
"The infringement of copyright constitutes interference with 'the peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions'. It is, furthermore, the interference with a right 
65 IBCOS Computers Ltd v. Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd [1994] F. S. R. 275, at 
291. 
66 Such cases are examined and more detailed conclusions are drawn in para. 5.3. 
67 See Garnett, K. QC, "The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on UK Copyright Law" in 
Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Griffiths, J. and 
Suthersanen, U. (eds. ), Oxford University Press, 2005) at p. 207. 
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arising under a statute which confers rights recognised under international 
convention and harmonised under European law - see the Berne 
Conventions of 1886 and 1971 and EC Council Directive of 29 October 
1993. There is thus no question but that restriction of the right of freedom 
of expression can be justified where necessary in a democratic society in 
order to protect copyright. The protection afforded to copyright under the 
1988 Act is, however, itself subject to exceptions. Thus, both the right of 
freedom of expression and copyright are qualified. This appeal raises the 
question of how the two rights fall to be balanced, when they are in 
conflict"68. 
Nevertheless, it could safely be argued that courts have not, to date, embarked into 
such a substantial balancing process. As to the potential suggestion of freedom of 
expression per se constituting an independent defence to copyright infringement, it 
is submitted that the following statement by Lord Phillips in Ashdown accurately 
summarises the current stance of the UK courts: "I can see no reason why the 
court should travel outside the provisions of the 1988 Act and recognise on the 
facts of the particular case further or other exceptions to the restrictions on the 
exercise of the right to freedom of expression constituted by the 1988 Act"69 
4.5.3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
4.5.3.1 REPRODUCTION RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Section 106 of the 1976 US Copyright Act guarantees authors, among other 
rights70, the exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or 
phonorecords"". Against the copyright owner's exclusive rights, the Act provides a 
s 
68 [2002] Ch. 149, C. A., at para. 28. 
69 [2002] Ch. 149, C. A., at para. 38. 
70 Other exclusive rights of the author include the right to prepare derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work (section 106(2)); the right to distribute copies or phonorecords of 
the copyrighted work to the public by sale, rental, lease or lending (section 106(3)); the right 
to perform the work publicly, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, motion pictures and other audiovisual works (section 106(4)); and the 
right to display the copyrighted work publicly, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic or sculptural works (section 
106(5)). 
" US Copyright Act 1976, section 106(1). 
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long list of extensive limitations72. For the purposes of the current analysis, the most 
important limitation is that of fair use, as defined in section 107 of the 1976 
Copyright Act. Under this provision, the fair use of a copyrighted work for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research, is 
not copyright infringement73. Section 107 goes on to state that, in determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors 
(hereinafter, the "fair use factors") to be considered shall include: (1) the purpose 
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as 
a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
work in which copyright subsists. 
On the facts of The Historical Novel case74, A will claim that B's novel amounts to 
an infringement under section 501(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act75 of his exclusive 
right of reproduction, as guaranteed in section 106(1) of the Act. If A can prove that 
B copied a substantial amount of his work, and hence infringed his copyright, B will 
rely on the following grounds: fair use for the purpose of criticism, parody under fair 
use and free speech. 
As far as the fair use limitation is concerned, this provision has given rise to 
extensive case law. The wording of section 107 suggests that the statement of the 
fair use principle is intended to offer the courts mere guidance, rather than lay down 
rigid rules for courts to apply strictly; the list of factors to be taken into account when 
72 Available limitations include reproduction by libraries and archives (section 108), the 
exhaustion of the distribution right (section 109), exemption of certain performances and 
displays (section 110), exemption of certain cable transmissions (section 111), certain 
limitations concerning the right to prevent use of pictures, useful articles etc. (section 113), 
limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright owners in sound recordings (section 114), 
conditions and limitations on the use of certain works in connection with non-commercial 
broadcasting (section 118), and limitations on the scope of rights in architectural works 
(section 120). 
" Section 107 also provides that the fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use, if such a finding is made upon consideration of the factors set out in the 
section. 
74 The facts of this hypothetical case are set out in para. 4.2. 
75 Section 501(a) provides that "anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 121 ... is an infringer of the copyright 
or right of the author, as the case may be". 
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assessing the application of fair use appears to be illustrative and non-exhaustive76. 
Courts have generally adopted a flexible approach in interpreting the fair use 
limitation. Courts will consider the fair use factors on the facts of each case; the 
factors will "be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes 
of copyright'". 
In relation to the first fair use factor, namely the purpose and character of the use78, 
B will argue that the purpose of his use of A's work is criticism, which is itself 
specifically enumerated in section 107. It has to be noted that even if B's use falls 
within the first factor, this will not necessarily equate to a finding of fair use; this 
factor must be balanced against the other factors79. Under this factor, courts will go 
on to assess whether B has made "productive use"80 of A's work. In the words of 
the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff - Rose Music, Inc. 81, the "central purpose" 
of the investigation under this factor is to determine whether "the new work merely 
supersedes the objects of the original creation, 82 or adds features and character to 
the new work, thus rendering it a new intellectual creation. In this context, the courts 
will examine the extent to which the new work is transformative83. Finally, courts will 
also take into account whether the use is of a commercial nature. It has been 
suggested that "any commercial use tends to cut against a fair use defences84 and 
76 New Era Publications Intl, ApS v. Carol Pub. Group, 729 F. Supp. 992 (S. D. N. Y. 1990), 
rev'd in part, 904 F. 2d, 152 F. 2d (2d Cir. ), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 921 (1990); Basic Books, 
Inc. v. Kinkos Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S. D. N. Y. 1991) at 1534; New Era 
Publications Intl, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F. 2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989) at 588 (Oakes, Chief 
Judge concurring, "I emphasize non-exclusive"); Castle Rock Enter. v. Carol Pub. Group, 
Inc., 150 F. 3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) at 141. 
" Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U. S. 569 (1994) at 577. 
78 1976 US Copyright Act, section 107(1). 
79 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U. S. 539 (1985) at 561. 
80 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 (9`h Cir. 1981), rev'd, 
464 U. S. 417 (1984); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications International Ltd, 996 F. 2d 
1366 (2d Cir. 1993) at 1374-76. 
81 510 U. S. 569 (1994). 
82 510 U. S. 569 (1994) at 579. 
83 Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409 (S. D. N. Y. 1997) at 413, aff'd on 
other grounds, 147 F. 3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998); Riggold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 
126 F. 3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) at 78; Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Pub. Group, 11 F. 
Supp. 2d 329 (S. D. N. Y. 1998) at 335; Nünez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F. 3d 18 (1st 
Cir. 2000) at 23; Duffy v. Penguin Books USA Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S. D. N. Y. 1998) at 
274. For an extensive analysis of the concept of transformative use, see Nimmer at 
para. 13.05[A][1 ][b]. 
8d Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171 (5th Cir. 
1980) at 1175. 
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that "while commercial motivation and fair use can exist side by side, the court may 
consider whether the alleged infringing use was primarily for public benefit or for 
private commercial gain"85. It appears to be the case that just because the use is of 
a commercial nature, that will not necessarily negate fair use86. Commercial uses 
are broad. Consequently, the Supreme Court has stated that "the crux of the 
profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain 
but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material 
without paying the customary price"87 . 
On the facts of the present case, B could potentially satisfy all the "requirements" 
that courts will observe. His work, it could be said, is fair for the purposes of 
criticism; he has added his own features in the novel; and, even though his work 
could be described as being of a commercial nature, his novel was arguably not 
created on the grounds of monetary considerations. However, every case is judged 
on its individual facts and it is not clear how courts would interpret the present facts 
under the first fair use factor. 
The second fair use factor regards the nature of the work88. Under this factor, the 
courts make a distinction between creative works, which are afforded greater 
degree of protection, and informational or factual works which receive lesser 
protection. In Campbell v. Acuff - Rose Music, Inc. ", the court stated that "this 
factor calls for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended 
copyright protection than others with the consequence that fair use is more difficult 
to establish when the former works are copied"90. It is generally accepted that this 
factor "typically recedes into insignificance". On the facts of the present case, it 
could be argued that the novel is likely to possess a degree of originality as it is not 
a work purely of an informatory nature. 
85 MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F. 2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981). 
86 Rosemont Enterprises., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F. 2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); Arica 
Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F. 2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1992) at 1078. Note however the categorical 
statement of the Supreme Court in Sony Corp of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U. S. 417 (1984) at 451, that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumably 
an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright". 
87 Harper & Row, Publsihers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U. S. 539 (1985) at 562. 
88 1976 US Copyright Act, section 107(2). 
S9 510 U. S. 569 (1994). 
90 510 U. S. 569 (1994) at 586. Also, see Monster Communications, Inc. v. Turner 
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490 (S. D. N. Y. 1996) at 494. 
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The third fair use factor, namely the amount and substantiality of the portion used91, 
refers to whether there exists substantial similarity between the two works. The 
courts will look at both qualitative and quantitative similarity. It is difficult to define 
similarity and the courts do not have a rule of thumb but seem to base their 
decisions on the facts of each individual case. Court decisions have ranged from 
holding that copying three hundred words out of a two hundred thousand-word long 
book constitutes infringement since the part copied is "essentially the heart of the 
book"92, to holding that it is fair use to copy a whole magazine cover as part of 
comparative advertising93. 
On the facts of the present case, it is difficult to foresee what conclusion a court 
would reach. However, it appears that the more significant the parts he has copied 
were to A's novel, the more likely that the courts will find a substantial similarity 
between the two works. 
Finally, the fourth fair use factor refers to the effect upon the plaintiff's potential 
market94. This factor looks in effect at whether demand for the plaintiffs work 
diminishes as a result of the defendant's usurpation95. The Second Circuit 
described this factor as aiming to strike a balance "between the benefit the public 
will derive if the use is permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will 
receive if the use is denied. The less adverse effect that all alleged infringing use 
has on the copyright owner's expectation of gain, the less public benefit need to be 
shown to justify the usei96. 
On the present facts it is unclear to predict how the courts would balance the parties 
respective interests, but it is possible that the balance would tip to holding fair use in 
91 1976 US Copyright Act, section 107(3). 
92 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U. S. 539 (1985) at 566. 
93 Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 1171 (5t' Cir. 
1980) at 1177. For an extensive list of additional case law on this issue, see Nimmer at 
para. 13.05[A][4]. 
9; 1976 US Copyright Act, section 107(4). 
95 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257 (11u' Cir. 2001) at 1274; Fisher v. 
Dees, 794 F. 2d 432 (9`h Cir. 1986) at 438; Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 
413 (S. D. N. Y. 1986) at 425, rev'd, 811 F. 2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) at 99, cert. denied, 484 U. S. 
890 (1988). 
96 MCA, Inc. V. Wilson, 677 F. 2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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view of the judgement in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co97. Presumably, both 
parties will produce some evidence as to the economic impact of B's book on A's 
work has been. 
Overall, it is arguable that B could succeed in a fair use defence for the purposes of 
criticism. US courts appear to adopt a flexible approach and consider a number of 
factors, judging each case on its particular facts. 
Alternatively, B can rely on the fact that his work is a parody and, as such, exempt 
from copyright infringement, under the fair use limitation. It is interesting to note that 
until 1994, there was no controlling Supreme Court guidance on this issue98. In 
1994, the Supreme Court accepted the parody defence in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc. ". On the facts of the case, the plaintiff (Acuff-Rose) alleged that the 
defendants song "Pretty Woman" infringed their copyright in the song "Oh, Pretty 
Woman". The defendants pleaded that their song was a fair use parody of the 
plaintiffs song. The court, reversing the Sixth Circuit's decision, accepted the 
defendants' version of the song to be a parody100. It then went on to state that 
97 60 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1225 (11`h Cir. 2001). The case is discussed in detail below. 
98 Lower courts however did accept that parody could constitute a defence to copyright 
infringement provided that it did not plagiarise or seriously compete with the original work. 
The standard of differentiation that should exist between the works was addressed in 
various cases. See, Elsemere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 
(S. D. N. Y. 1980), affd, 623 F. 2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980), (The song "I Love Sodom" held to be fair 
use parody of the song "I Love New York". The court stated that "just as imitation may be 
the sincerest form of flattery, parody is an acknowledgement of the importance of the thing 
parodied. In short, the defendant's [parody] ... has not in the least competed with or 
retracted from the plaintiffs work); Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F. 2d 541 (2d Cir. 
1964), ("Parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom - both as entertainment and 
as a form of social and literary criticism" and, where "the parody has neither the intent nor 
the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and where the parodist does not 
appropriate a greater amount of the original work than is necessary to 'recall or conjure up' 
the object of his satire, a finding of infringement would be improper"); Walt Disney Prods. v. 
Air Pirates, 581 F. 2d 751 (9'h Cir. 1978), (A parodist should be denied the fair use defence 
only if he "has appropriated a greater amount of the original work than is necessary to 'recall 
or conjure up' the object of his satire"); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F. 2d 301,22 U. S. P. Q. 2d 
1492 (2d Cir. 1992), (The defendant made a sculpture of plaintiff's photograph, depicting a 
man and his wife and eight puppies. The court held that the defendant's action constituted 
copyright infringement. The sculpture was not a parody as it was difficult to discern any 
parody of the plaintiffs photograph, more copying than was necessary for a parody had 
taken place, and the plaintiffs market for his work had been prejudiced. ). For a detailed 
discussion of pre-1994 case law on parodies, see Nimmer at para. 13.05[CJ[1J. 
99 510 U. S. 569 (1994). 
'oo "... the heart of any parodist's claim to quote from existing material, is the use of some 
elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments 
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"parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use under section 107i101. 
Having resolved those threshold matters in favour of the defendant, the Court 
considered the crucial question of where should the line be drawn between 
legitimate appropriation and infringement. It held that, in assessing this issue, 
"parody, like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be 
judged case by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law"102. In this context, the 
court stressed the importance of the concept of transformative use and stated that, 
in general, a court's decision of whether or not to allow a parody as fair use of a 
work "will depend, say, on the extent to which the song's overriding purpose and 
character is to parody the original or, in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may 
serve as a market substitute for the original. But using some characteristic features 
cannot be avoided"' 03 
In 2001, the Eleventh Circuit was called upon to decide a parody case and to 
answer the question of whether a parody must be funny, as a matter of necessity. In 
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. 104, the plaintiff owned the copyright in the 
well-known novel by Margaret Mitchell "Gone With the Wind". The defendant 
planned to publish a book entitled "The Wind Done Gone" in which the author set 
out to criticise Mitchell's novel and demonstrate that it wrongly portrayed the status 
and condition of negro slaves. To achieve this, the defendant used characters, 
settings and themes from "Gone With the Wind". The Appeal's Court, rejecting the 
District Court's conclusion, held that the defendant's parody novel was entitled to 
the fair use defence. It held that, although the parody novel did not have a comic 
effect, it should qualify for fair use as "a specific criticism of and rejoinder to the 
depiction of slavery and the relationships between blacks and whites" in "Gone With 
on that author's works. If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing on the 
substance or style of the original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get 
attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in 
borrowing from another's work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other 
factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger. Parody needs to mimic an original to 
make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim's (or collective 
victims') imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires 
justification for the very act of borrowing", 510 U. S. 569 (1994) at 580-81. 
0' 510 U. S. 569 (1994) at 579. 
102 510 U. S. 569 (1994) at 581. 
103 510 U. S. 569 (1994) at 588. 
10'60 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1225 (11`h Cir. 2001). 
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the Winds105; consonant with the goals of parody, the defendant "conscripted 
elements from Gone With the Wind to make war against it: "'o6 
US courts have had to assess defendants submissions that their parodies as fair 
use should not amount to copyright infringement on a number of occasions and on 
diverse facts. In Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp. 107, the defendant 
superimposed the head of a smirking man on the plaintiffs photograph of a 
pregnant actress and used the picture as a motion picture advertisement. The court 
held fair use on the basis that the defendant's picture constituted a parody. In Dr. 
Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA Inc. and another. '", the defendants used 
the image of character "Cat in the Hat" in the plaintiffs copyright work in a book 
about the O. J. Simpson trial. The court held that the work did not constitute a 
parody as it did not, in any way, criticise the plaintiffs work. 
On the facts of The Historical Novel case, it could be argued that, given the 
flexibility applied by US courts, it is likely that B could succeed in claiming that his 
work constitutes a permissible parody, provided that the courts do not find that he 
has copied A's work more than what is necessary for a parody. In addition, the fact 
that his novel does not have a humorous effect should not negate a finding of fair 
use parody. B could rely on the judgement of Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
Co. 109 to argue that it is permissible, in this context, for his work to criticise A's work 
instead. In conclusion, on a balance of probabilities, B could succeed in a fair use 
parody defence. 
Having discussed the possibilities of B relying on current legislative defences as a 
means of accommodating his right of free speech and the courts potential approach 
to such claims, the following part will examine the courts attitude towards claims of 
free speech in copyright infringement cases1'. 
pos 60 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1225 (11`h Cir. 2001) at 1269. 
106 0 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1225 (11`h Cir. 2001) at 1271. 
'0'41 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1598 (S. D. N. Y. 1996), aff'd, 137 F. 3d 109 (2° Cir. 1998). 
10' 109 F. 3d 1394,42 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1184 (9`h Cir. 1997). 
109 60 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1225 (11th Cir. 2001). 
10 Important works in this field include Tushnet, R., "Copy This Essay: How Fair Use 
Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It" (2004) 109 Yale L. J. 101; Baker, 
C. E., "First Amendment Limits on Copyright? " (2002) 55 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 891; Eisgruber, 
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On the facts of The Historical Novel case, B could invoke his free speech right 
under the First Amendment to the US Constitution"' as a defence to A's claim of 
copyright infringement. 
In the 1960s, a number of cases drew attention to the relationship of copyright and 
free speech. In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. "Z, the plaintiff, 
Rosemont Enterprises (a company controlled by Howard Hughes), brought an 
action for copyright infringement against the defendant on the ground that his book, 
a biography of Howard Hughes, infringed the copyright they owned in a series of 
articles about Hughes published in a magazine. The Second Circuit reversed a 
preliminary injunction against publication arguing that the plaintiff had failed to prove 
a strong infringement claim, while the defendant had a strong fair use defence. The 
court further held that copyright should not be used to interfere with the right of the 
public to be informed about matters of general interest. 
In 1968, the case of Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates13 came before the 
courts. This case is considered by some scholars to be the case most responsible 
for firing the debate over the First Amendment complications of federal copyright 
law' 4. The case involved the use of sketches based on frames from the famous 
amateur film of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The defendants 
argued as affirmative defences that "the book [was) protected by the First 
C. L., "Censorship, Copyright, and Free Speech: Some Tentative Skepticism About the 
Campaign to Impose First Amendment Restrictions on Copyright Law" (2003) 2 J. 
Telecommunications & High Technology L. 17; Denicola, R. C., "Copyright and Free Speech: 
Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression" (1979) 67 Cal. L. Rev. 283; 
Goldstein, P., "Copyright and the First Amendment" (1970) 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983; Lessig, 
L., "Copyright's First Amendment" (2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1057; Netanel, N. W., "Market 
Hierarchy and Copyright in our System of Free Expression" (2000) 53 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 
1879; Patterson, L. R., "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use" (1987) Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1; 
Rubenfeld, J., "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality" (2002) 112 Yale 
L. J. 1; Yen, A. C., "A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and 
Copyright in a Work's 'Total Concept and Feel'" (1989) 38 Emory L. J. 393. 
"' For a discussion of the Constitutional Clause and relevant case law determining its 
scope, see para. 2.4.3. 
"Z 366 F. 2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 395 U. S. 1009 (1967). 
113 293 F. Supp. 130 (S. D. N. Y. 1968). 
14 See, Fraser, S., "The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and Its 
Impact on the Internet" (1998) 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 1, at 23. 
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Amendment and on that account an injunction [could not be] issued°15 and, 
alternatively, that their copying should qualify as fair use. At the time the case was 
decided, the fair use defence was still at the stage of a legislative proposal for 
codification. Thus the case did constitute an important jurisprudential development; 
the judicially created fair use exception to copyright weighed in favour of the 
defendant1'. 
Following these precedents, the argument that free speech should, to some extent, 
limit copyright law was raised in numerous cases. However, courts systematically 
rejected First Amendment claims on various grounds' . 
The apparently categorical rejection of the First Amendment came in 1985 in the 
case of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises18. The case involved 
the unauthorised publication in the Nation news magazine of three hundred words 
of a forthcoming autobiography of President Gerald Ford entitled "A Time to Heal" 
15 293 F. Supp. 130 (S. D. N. Y. 1968) at 131-32. 
116 Professor Nimmer criticised Judge Wyatt's "short shrift" consideration of the fourth fair 
use factor, namely the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. See, Fraser, S., "The Conflict Between the First Amendment and 
Copyright Law and Its Impact on the Internet" (1998) 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. Law. J. 1, at 
27; Nimmer, M. B., "Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free 
Speech and Press? " (1970) UCLA L. Rev. 1180, at 1201. 
"' See, McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415 (S. D. N. Y. 1971); 
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1013 (1978); Sid & 
Marty Krafft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F. 2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) at 
1170 (held that an idea-expression dichotomy accommodates First Amendment concerns); 
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F. 2d 751 (9'h Cir. 1978); Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, ' 600 F. 2d 1184 (5`h Cir. 1979) at 1187 ("the 
judgment of the Constitution is that free expression is enriched by protecting the creations of 
authors from exploitation by others, and the Copyright Act is the congressional 
implementation of that judgment"); Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. 
American Broadcasting Company, Inc., 621 F. 2d 57(2d Cir. 1980); Roy Export Co. v. CBS, 
Inc., 672 F. 2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) at 1099 ("No circuit that has considered the question ... has ever held that the First Amendment provides a privilege in the copyright field distinct 
from the accommodation embodied in the 'fair use' doctrine"); Consumers Union of the 
United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F. 2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1983); Pacific and 
Southern Company, Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F. 2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984), rehearing denied, 749 
F. 2d 733 (11`h Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1004 (1984). For further analysis, see 
Birnhack, M., "Acknowledging the Conflict Between Copyright Law and Freedom of 
Expression Under the Human Rights Act" (2003) 14(2) Ent. L. Rev. 24; Birnhack, M., "The 
Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and Breaking-Up" (2003) 43 Idea: J. of 
Law & Tech. 233; Barendt, E., "Copyright and Free Speech Theory" in Copyright and Free 
Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Griffiths, J. and Suthersanen, U. (eds. ), 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
18 471 U. S. 539 (1985). 
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(nearly two hundred thousand words long). The court acknowledged that "Nowhere 
could the need to construe the concept of copyrightability in accord with First 
Amendment freedoms be more important than in the instant case. Here we are 
presented with an article describing political events of major significance, involving 
a former President of the United States. The paraphrasings concern the very 
essence of news and of history. In such works, courts have carefully confined that 
troublesome concept 'expression' to its barest elements - the ordering and choice 
of the words themselves""'. It went on to examine several internal copyright safety 
valves, such as the principle of idea/expression dichotomy, under section 102(b) of 
the 1976 Copyright Act120 and fair use under section 107 of the Act and concluded 
that the fair use doctrine should not be expanded since the First Amendment 
protections are already embodied in the "Copyright Act's distinction between 
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for 
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use"121. The court's approach 
to the relationship between copyright and free speech is summarised in Justice 
O'Connor's statement that "In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be 
forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free 
expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, 
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas"122. 
After Harper & Row123 followed a period where the discussion of the First 
Amendment versus copyright issue had seemingly faded. That changed in the mid- 
1990s when attention was again turned to the expanded nature of copyright and 
increasing calls for First Amendment restraints124. A number of cases came before 
1 19 471 U. S. 539,544 (1985). 
120 "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a 
work". 
121471 U. S. 539,560 (1985). 
122 471 U. S. 539,559 (1985). 
123 For commentary of the case, see Morrill, S. S., "Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation 
Enterprises: Emasculating the Fair Use Accommodation of Competing Copyright and First 
Amendment Interests" (1984) 79 NW. U. L Rev. 587; Shipley, D. E., "Conflicts Between 
Copyright and the First Amendment after Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises" 
(1987) 1986 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 983. 
124 It has been put forward that the Congress's decision to extend copyright protection for 
existing works combined with the new digital rights afforded to authors under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act have contributed to too much power being vested in authors. See, 
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the courts, whose approach in this area has not, on its surface, been wholly 
consistent. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
Co. 125, presents an example of the approach that First Amendment principles must 
animate the understanding and application of copyright law. The court, making a 
finding of fair use parody, "invoked the First Amendment as a lodestar for 
interpreting copyright law"126. The court stated that the fair use privilege in particular 
has "constitutional significance as a guarantor to access and use for First 
Amendment purposes"127 and, in examining this limitation "we must remain 
cognizant of the First Amendment protections interwoven into copyright law"128. The 
court concluded that "the issuance of the injunction [by the lower courts] was at 
odds with the shared principles of the First Amendment and the copyright law, 
acting as a prior restraint on speech because the public had not had access to [the 
defendant's] ideas or viewpoint in the form of expression that she chose"129 . 
In Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. 130, artist Tom Forsythe used Barbie dolls 
in a series of photos131 as a commentary on "America's culture of consumption and 
conformism". Mattel sued for copyright infringement. The defendant claimed that his 
work should qualify as fair use parody. The court, dismissing Mattel's action, held 
that: 
"Having balanced the four section 107 fair use factors, we hold that 
Forsythe's work constitutes fair use under section 107's exception. His 
work is a parody of Barbie and highly transformative. The amount of 
Mattel's figure that he used was justified. His infringement had no 
Netanel, N. W., "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society" (1996) 106 Yale L. J. 283; 
Netanel, N. W., "Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein" (2001) 54 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1; Elkin-Koren, N., "Its All About Control: Rethinking Copyright in the New Information 
Landscape" in The Commodification of Information (Elkin-Koren, N. and Netanel, N. W. 
(eds. ), Kluwer, 2002). 
125 268 F. 3d 1257 (US Ct of Apps (11`h Cir. ) 2001). The facts of this case have already been 
discussed in this section. 
126 Netanel, N. W., "Copyright and the First Amednment: What Eldred Misses - And 
Portends" in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Griffiths, 
J. and Suthersanen, U. (eds. ), Oxford University Press, 2005) at 148. 
12' 268 F. 3d 1257,1260 (US Ct of Apps (11'h Cir. ) 2001). 
12' 268 F. 3d 1257,1265 (US Ct of Apps (11`h Cir. ) 2001). 
129 268 F. 3d 1257,1277 (US Ct of Apps (11th Cir. ) 2001). 
1° 353 F. 3d 792 (9`" Cir. 2003). 
131 In the photos concerned, Barbie dolls were juxtaposed against vintage kitchen appliances 
in threatening poses. 
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discernable impact on Mattel's market for derivative uses. Finally, the 
benefits to the public in allowing such use - allowing artistic freedom and 
expression and criticism of a cultural icon - are great". 
Even though the court did not base its decision on purely First Amendment 
considerations, they were evidently weighed in the defendant's favour132. 
In January 2003, the Supreme Court laid down its view on the relationship between 
copyright and free speech in the case of Eldred v. Ashcroft133. Its facts are unique in 
this context, as the free speech claim did not arise as a defence to a particular 
copyright infringement claim but as a primary First Amendment challenge to new 
copyright legislation, the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998134. The 
court, rejecting Eldred's challenge, held that: 
"The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make - or decline 
to make - one's own speech. The opinion of [the lower] court bears less 
heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches. 
To the extent such assertions raise First Amendment concerns, 
copyright's built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to 
address them. " 
"Z For cases where courts have taken a similar approach as in SunTrust Bank, see 
MasterCard Intl, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1046 (S. D. N. Y. 
2004) (parody within the context of political campaign held to be fair use); American Family 
Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N. D. Ohio 2002) (defendant produced 
commercial website aimed against the plaintiff, taking off on the latter's Duck ad campaign; 
the subject ads were validated by the court although they were not parodies); Mattel, Inc. v. 
Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S. D. N. Y. 2002) (Mattel lost the action for copyright infringement it 
brought against the defendant for depicting Barbie "Lederhosen-style Bavarian bondage 
dress and helmet in rubber with PVC-mask and waspie"). Cf. cases that have followed the 
view that copyright requires no external First Amendment scrutiny, A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (US Ct of Apps (91' Cir. ) 2001; Worldwide Church of God v. 
Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F. 3d 1110 (US Ct of Apps (9 Cir. ) 2000); LA Times v. Free 
Republic, 54 U. S. P. Q. 2d (BNA) 1453 (CD Cal. 2000); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah 
Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999); Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 
2d 1 (DDC 1999). 
"" 537 U. S. 186 (2003). 
134 The plaintiff brought a legal action to challenge the CTEA on the ground that it conflicted 
with the US Constitution. 
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It concluded that when Congress has not altered the traditional contours of 
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary"' 31 . The 
court, echoing the earlier Harper & Row decision, stated that "The Copyright Clause 
and First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in 
the Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech 
principles"136. However, rejecting copyright's categorical immunity from First 
Amendment scrutiny, the court did recognise that, in principle at least, copyright 
does implicate the First Amendment. It could be argued that this case can hardly be 
characterised as a victory for the First Amendment. Professor Netanel137 observed 
that, while the court's decision stops short of the lower court's "blanket rejection of 
any cognizable First Amendment interest in copying or building upon others' 
copyrighted works, it runs squarely against established First Amendment precedent 
and wholly mischaracterizes the First Amendment values that copyright's continuing 
expansion lays barei138. 
Having examined the relevant case law concerning copyright vis-ä-vis First 
Amendment concerns, it could be argued that if, on the facts of The Historical Novel 
case, B were to invoke his constitutional right of free speech as a defence per se to 
copyright infringement, it is unlikely that courts would uphold such a free-standing 
argument. Eldred demonstrated the courts unwillingness to develop a wholly new 
and expanded premise based on the First Amendment rights to restrict an author's 
copyright. 
Thus the question could be posed of where this leaves a party's free speech right. 
US jurisprudence arguably reveals a consistent approach of the courts to First 
Amendment concerns, even though judicial decisions do appear, at first glance, to 
be diverse. Although courts are prepared to recognise the importance of free 
speech, they seem inclined to accommodate it within the framework of safety valves 
"' 537 U. S. 186,221 (2003). 
136 537 U. S. 186,228 (1985). 
"' Netanel, N. W., "Copyright and the First Amendment: What Eldred Misses - And 
Portends" in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Griffiths, 
J. and Suthersanen, U. (eds. ), Oxford University Press, 2005) at 137. 
"' For extensive analysis and commentary on the Eldred decision, see Volokh, E., 
"Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts after Eldred, 44 Liquomart, 
and BarfnickP (2003) 40 Houston L. Rev. 697; Samuelson, P., "The Constitutional Law of 
Intellectual Property after Eldred v. Ashcroft" (2003) J. Copyright Socy 547. 
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to copyright already in place as opposed to recognise it as a limitation to copyright 
in its own right. 
Courts do not appear willing to depart from the present limitations context and 
extend it. Nevertheless, they are prepared to acknowledge that, in principle at least, 
First Amendment concerns underlie their assessment of cases and ultimately their 
decisions. It could be argued that a defendant, in similar circumstances to those of 
B in the present case, is more likely to succeed in a free speech claim under fair 
use rather than under the Constitutional Clause. It is thought-provoking that even 
though US courts take a liberal and flexible approach to fair use, partly reflecting 
First Amendment considerations, they are not prepared as yet to give free speech a 
more concrete place within copyright law. 
It is thus submitted that there can be situations of potential conflict between the two 
sets of rights despite the courts efforts to mask them under their broad 
interpretation of fair use and other limitations to copyright law. 
4.5.4 FRANCE 
4.5.4.1 REPRODUCTION RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Article L. 122-1 of the French Intellectual Property Code provides that "the right of 
exploitation belonging to the author shall comprise the right of performance13' and 
the right of reproduction". The scope of the right of reproduction is defined in article 
L. 122-3 as consisting "in the physical fixation of a work by any process permitting it 
to be communicated to the public in an indirect way" and "may be carried out, in 
particular, by printing, drawing, engraving, photography, casting and all processes 
of the graphical and plastic arts, mechanical, cinematographic or magnetic 
recording". 
Against this evidently wide ambit of the reproduction right140, the Code sets out a list 
of limitations which includes private and gratuitous performances within the family 
139 The author's right of performance is defined in articles L. 122-2, L. 122-2-1 and L. 122-2-2. 
This right is not examined in the context of the present analysis. 
140 For a more detailed examination of the right and its scope, see Sterling at pp. 399-400. 
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circle141, copies or reproductions for the private use of the copier'42, analyses and 
short quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational or informatory nature 
of the work in which they are incorporated, press reviews, dissemination of public 
speeches through the press or by telediffusion as current news (under the condition 
that the name of the author and the source are clearly stated)143, and parody, 
pastiche and caricature (provided that the rules of the genre are observed) 144 
On the facts of The Historical Novel case14', A will claim that B's novel infringes the 
right of reproduction in his work by copying parts of his novel and making use of 
some of his plots and scenes. Under the provisions of the French Intellectual 
Property Code, B will argue that the publication of his novel is a permitted act 
justified either as a work of a critical and informatory nature14' or as a parody' 17 . As 
far as the first ground is concerned, it is uncertain whether courts would decide that, 
on the facts of the case, the quotation defence is applicable. French jurisprudence 
has allowed the transportation of characters14' and plots149 from an original work to 
a new one. Thus, they might find B's unauthorised use of A's plots and scenes 
permissible. However, the fact that B has also copied parts of the original work 
without any modifications is likely to put him in a disadvantageous position150 
Courts would only allow such an act if the sections borrowed did not amount to a 
14' French Intellectual property Code 1992, article L. 122-5-1. 
"Z French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 122-5-2. 
143 French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 122-5-3. 
144 French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 122-5(4).. 
For a discussion concerning the issue of creating other "exceptions" that are not based on 
any statutory text, see Geiger, C., "Creating Copyright Limitations Without Legal Basis: The 
'Buren' Decision, a Liberation? " (2005) 36(7) I. I. C. 842. 
gas The facts of this hypothetical case are set out in para. 4.2. 
146 Under article L. 122-5(4). 
147 Under article L. 122-5-3. 
148 Delorme v. Clavier, TGI Nanterre, March 1,1996, (1996) 167 R. I. D. A. 180 (transplanting 
of a character amounted to use of unprotectable idea). 
149 Deforge v. Trust Co. Bank (La Bicyclette Bleu), Cass. 1, Civ., February 4,1992, (1992) 
152 R. I. D. A. 196; C. A. Versailles, December 15,1993, (1994) 160 R. I. D. A. 255 (analysis of 
plot intrigue, characters and dramatic progression amounted to no infringement by literary 
reproduction); Gamier v. Rochette, C. A. Paris, 4e Ch., February 21,1996, (1996) 169 
R. I. D. A. 383 (transplanting of scenario did not constitute copyright infringement). 
Aso J. L' Hoir v. Hatje Cantz Verlag - RG 03/12669, TGI Paris, 3 Ch. Sect., September 14, 
2004 (A photographer brought an action for infringement of his economic rights against a 
German firm that had published a book containing three of his photographs, without his 
consent. The court held that the photographs were original works enjoying copyright 
protection as "the choice of the composition of the pictures, the framing and the lighting 
confers on the photographs their own original, aesthetic appearance reflecting the stamp of 
their author's personality". Copyright infringement established. ). 
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substantial part of A's work and this, on a balance of probabilities, appears unlikely 
- courts are generally unwilling to excuse use of a work without its author's consent 
when copying of the form of the expression is involved1" and there is substantial 
similarity between the two works. 
Alternatively, B could claim that his novel constitutes a parody under article L. 122- 
5(4), and thus, does not infringe A's reproduction right. For this legal argument to 
succeed, the court must be satisfied that there is enough proximity between the two 
works so that the public can recognise that the reference is to the first work but, at 
the same time, recognise that the second work is separate from the first. In addition, 
the second work must have a humorous or satirical effect152 - , It is essential that 
the public to whom the parody is presented can understand that it is a parody. The 
public will not realise this unless the work presented to it is such as to prompt a 
connection, in its mind, between the parody and the parodied worki153. In this 
context, the Paris TGI stated that "parody pre-supposes the intention of amusing 
people without being harmful"154. Despite the existence of these general pre- 
requisites, by referring to the "rules of the genre"155 in its definition of the parody 
exception156, the French Intellectual Property Code gives the courts "more room to 
manoeuvre" and a "very general standard"157. In 2000, the Paris TGI151 followed the 
approach of broad interpretation of the "rules of the genre" stating that "... they thus 
adapt to the parodist's intention from the moment that it is fair and useful15'. Here, 
15' See, Sterling at pp. 507-9. 
152 "Phillip Morris", C. A. Versailles, March 17,1994, (1995) 164 R. I. D. A. 350. Also, see 
Frangon, A., "Questions de Droit d' Auteur Relatives aux Parodies et Productions Similaires" 
(1988) Copyright 302. 
's' Frangon, A., "Questions de Droit d' Auteur Relatives aux Parodies et Productions 
Similaires" (1988) Copryight 302. 
154 SNC Prisma Presse and EURL Femme v. Monsieur V. and Association Apodeline, TGI 
Paris, February 13,2001. 
'ss For a discussion of the courts interpretation of "the rules of the genre" over the years, see 
Spitz, B., "Droit D' Auteur Copyright et Parodie, ou le Mythe de I' Usage Loyal" (2005) 204 
R. I. D. A. 54, at 84-86. 
116 French Intellectual Property Code 1992, article L. 122-5(4). 
157 See, Spitz, B., "Droit D'Auteur Copyright et Parodie, Ou Le Mythe de L'Usage Loyal" 
(2005) 204 R. I. D. A. 54, at 64. 
158 BMG Music Pub., Laurent Boutonnat, Jean-Claude Dequeant and Universal Music Pub. 
v. Lancelot Films, TGI Paris, November 29,2000, (2001) 189 R. I. D. A. 377 (A song by 
Mylene Farmer caricatured in the film "Presque Rien" constituted a parody and did not 
infringe copyright. ). 
159 Ste Sebdo and Jacques Faizant v. Editions Enoch, C. A. Paris, May 11,1993, (1993) 157 
R. I. D. A. 340. 
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the travesty was fair and useful because, as the Court noted, it was not intended to 
ridicule the original work but rather to make the audience smile and served to depict 
a parenthesis, a moment of insouciance and joy in a serious film". It is now 
generally accepted that the courts are required to determine on a case-by-case 
basis the purpose of a parody - which can include a tribute or an artistic exercise - 
and whether that purpose is fair and useful. Thus, a French court, in deciding this 
case, will examine whether B's novel fulfils the above-mentioned conditions. In 
addition, B's novel will have to possess a level of distinctiveness and novelty that 
clearly separates it from A's work. In this framework, the following statements of the 
Paris TGI, in cases involving parodies, are of significance: "There is parody only to 
the extent that the author obtains a caricatured effect that is completely alien to the 
original work, thus ruling out any risk of confusion between the two 
compositions"760; "As parody necessarily implies borrowing, it matters little that the 
parodist reproduces material from the first work as long as he or she shows 
originality, providing the work with his or her personal touch"161. Following these 
precedents it is likely that the court will reach the conclusion that B's work 
constitutes a parody162. 
Apart from the defences already discussed and which are provided under the 
French Intellectual Property Code, B could also invoke his right of freedom of 
expression in order to justify the unauthorised use of A's work. The balancing of 
copyright and freedom of expression is a legal area that has not yet fully developed 
in France. There appears to be very limited case law to date that involves 
infringement of an author's reproduction right and another party's freedom of 
expression. Nevertheless, there are some important cases that involve freedom of 
expression in another area of intellectual property, namely trade mark law. It is 
therefore suggested that a critical analysis of these cases can be employed as a 
'60 SARL Ed. Prod. Musicales du Pactole et al. v. Ste Ed. Arpege, TGI Paris, January 9, 
1970, RTD com. 1972,383 (parodist merely re-used in a burlesque manner a well-known 
song that was already burlesque. That was held to amount to plagiarism of the original 
song's humour and thus, to infringe copyright. ). 
161 Charles Schultz and United Syndicate Inc. v. Editions Albin Michel, Marion Vidal, TGI 
Paris, January 19,1977, (1977) 92 R. I. D. A. 167. 
162 For a detailed examination of the treatment of parodies in France and the common law 
copyright system, see Spitz, B., "Droit D' Auteur Copyright et Parodie, ou le Mythe de I' 
Usage Loyal" (2005) 204 R. I. D. A. 54. 
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tool for forming a view of the way French courts treat freedom of expression and the 
weight they attach to this right vis-ä-vis intellectual property rights' 63 
In Fabris v. Ste France 2164, a case concerning author's right, a national 
broadcasting company showed twelve paintings - protected by copyright - in a two- 
minute news item concerning a Utrillo exhibition. The Utrillo estate brought a claim 
of copyright infringement against the broadcasting and demanded compensation. 
The company relied on Article 10 of the ECHR and argued that the right of the 
public to be informed of cultural events predominated the interests of the copyright 
owner. This reasoning was upheld by the Paris Court of First Instance165. However, 
the court's decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal which held that the 
exception for incidental use of works under the French Intellectual Property Code 
implicitly embraces the right of freedom of expression; thus, a healthy balance 
between the two rights is already in place in the legislation. This ruling was upheld 
by the French Supreme Court which stated that "the right of the public to 
information and culture" cannot justify by-passing the consent of the copyright 
owner. 
A similar case concerning author's right, France 2 v. France166, before the Cour de 
Cassation and then the European Commission of Human Rights, involved a 
television news broadcast by a broadcasting company (France 2), in which it 
displayed the famous frescos of Edouard Vuillard at the theatre on the Champs 
Elysees. The visual arts collecting society SPADEM, representing the Vuillard 
estate, demanded compensation. The Cour de Cassation held that the broadcasting 
company could not rely on the statutory defence of briefly quoting existing works for 
informational purposes167 - communicating an entire work to the public amounts to 
more than a "brief quotation" - and awarded SPADEM compensation. On appeal 
163 For a critical analysis of these cases, see Geiger, C., "Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard 
for the Coherence of Intellectual Property Law? " (2004) 35(3) I. I. C. 268. 
164 C. A. Paris, 4th Ch., May 30,2001, (2002) I. I. C. 995. 
'65 Court of First Instance, Paris, February 23,1999: (2000) R. I. D. A. 374. For a discussion of 
the underlying issues in this case, see Strowel, A. and Tulkens, F., "Freedom of Expression 
and Copyright under Civil Law: Of Balance, Adaptation and Access", in Copyright and Free 
Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Griffiths, J. and Suthersanen, U. (eds. ), 
Oxford University Press, 2005) at p. 306. 
'66 ECommHR, January 15,1997, case 30262/96, Informatierecht, 1999, at 115. 
167 French Intellectual Property Code, article L. 111-1. 
167 
before the European Commission, France 2 invoked freedom of expression under 
Article 10 of the ECHR. The Commission did not uphold the argument, and 
effectively re-affirmed the French court's decision, albeit reducing SPADEM's claim 
to paying royalties. It should be noted that even though the Commission 
acknowledged that, in principle, copyright can restrict free expression and 
information, as protected under Article 10, it stated that it is not normally for the 
organs of the Convention to decide, in the context of Article 10(2), potential conflicts 
between the right to freely communicate opinions and information, and the interests 
of the authors of the works communicated16'. 
Within the framework of trade mark law, three recent cases are considered to be 
representative of the stance of French courts towards freedom of expression. In the 
Danone case16', the Court of Appeal held that the constitutional right of freedom of 
expression of a group of activists who created a website to boycott Danone's 
products prevailed over the trade mark rights of Danone since Danone's rights were 
respected and its products had not been denigrated. 
Similarly, the Paris Court of First Instance ruled in favour of freedom of expression 
in the case of Esso v. Greenpeace 10. On the facts of the case, the oil company 
Esso brought a claim against Greenpeace on the grounds that its website 
undermined Esso's environmental policy by depicting its logo as E$$O and using 
the slogan STOP E$$O. the court held that Greenpeace's actions amounted to a 
controversial debate outside the course of business and did not cause confusion in 
the mind of the public. They thus remained within the ambit of freedom of 
expression and did not violate Esso's trade mark rights. It has been argued that this 
case should not necessarily be viewed as an absolute victory for freedom of 
expression, as essentially the court did not exercise an extensive balancing act of 
the two rights; it effectively ruled that Esso's trade mark rights had not been 
168 See, Hugenholtz, P. B., "Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe" in The 
Commodification of Information (Elkin-Koren, N., and Netanel, N. W. (eds. ), Kluwer, 2002). 
'69 C. A. Paris, April 30,2003, Ubiquite-Rev dr techn inf [2003/17181. 
1° TGI Paris, January 30,2004. 
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infringed in the first place - there was no likelihood of confusion among the public 
" and neither had Esso's products or services been denigrated'. 
Lastly, in the case of Areva v. Greenpeace 12, the Paris Court of First Instance, 
1 unlike in the case of Esso v. Greenpeace3, upheld a finding of trade mark 
infringement. On the facts of the case, Greenpeace posted certain comments about 
Areva -a company specialising in the treatment of nuclear waste - and a parody of 
Areva's logo on its website. The court held that even though there could be no 
confusion in the mind of the public, the activities of Greenpeace denigrated Areva's 
products and the parody of its logo - which could be interpreted as Areva spreading 
death - overstepped the boundaries of the right of freedom of expression without, at 
the same time, contributing to a public debate. 
On the facts of The Historical Novel case, B could invoke his right of freedom of 
expression as a defence to A's claim of copyright infringement. Following the court 
decisions in relevant cases, it is difficult to reach an informed conclusion as to how 
the present circumstances would be assessed. Courts have not set out the limits of 
the respective rights to date, and neither have they commented on their interaction 
or potential conflicts. Thus, at this stage of the development of the jurisprudence, it 
is not clear what view the courts would take. It is however more likely that B's 
freedom of expression will be accommodated incidentally if it is held to fall within 
the scope of the parody defence, that it succeeding purely on its constitutional 
merits. 
Having examined the relevant legislative provisions and case law, it could be 
suggested that the position of freedom of expression within the French system, 
cannot be characterised as substantial. The arguably wide scope of the statutory 
exceptions and defences to copyright might be viewed capable of embracing a 
party's freedom of expression right. However, the very nature of the right, as a 
constitutional provision and human right, does not appear to have been given 
171 See Strowel, A. and Tulkens, F., "Freedom of Expression and Copyright under Civil Law: 
Of Balance, Adaptation and Access", in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and 
International Analyses (Griffiths, J. and Suthersanen, U. (eds. ), Oxford University Press, 
2005) at p. 301. 
12 TGI Paris, July 9,2004. 
173 TGI Paris, January 30,2004. 
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appropriate recognition to date by French jurisprudence. On the one hand, the 
number of cases in which the right has been invoked is limited. On the other, in 
those few cases where the right has been pleaded, the courts have demonstrated 
great hesitation in entering into any substantive balancing exercise of the rights and 
have not been willing to discuss their relationship or set out the boundaries of each 
of the rights - apart, in vague and general terms, from two instances. 
It could thus be concluded that although a party's right of freedom of expression 
could potentially be safeguarded in an indirect way through existing copyright 
limitations, the lack of the courts acknowledgement of the right and its potential of 
conflicting with copyright can prove problematic. France has historically been one of 
the strongest advocates of author's rights in their intellectual creations. That could 
be a contributing factor to the courts hesitation in welcoming freedom of expression 
claims or limitations. Nevertheless, the recent trade mark law could be interpreted 
as a step forward towards a greater degree of endorsement of freedom of 
expression. 
4.5.5 GERMANY 
4.5.5.1 REPRODUCTION RIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Article 15(1) of the Author's Right and Related Rights Law 1965, provides that the 
author of a work shall have, among other rights, the exclusive right of reproduction 
which is defined as "the right to make copies of the work by whatever method and in 
whatever quantity" 14. 
On the facts of The Historical Novel case 15, A would claim that B infringed the 
copyright in his novel by taking a substantial part of it and using it in his own work 
without A's consent. Since there is no rigid rule of numerical portion as to what 
constitutes a substantial part, A could also claim that even if the amount taken is 
proportionately small, copyright infringement can still be established on the basis of 
a qualitative test. 
14 Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law 1965, article 16(1). Article 16(2) 
additionally provides that "reproduction of a work shall also be constituted by the fixation of 
the work on devices which permit the repeated communication of sequences of images or 
sounds (video or audio recording mediums) whether by recording a communication of the 
work on a video or audio medium or by transferring the work from one medium to another". 
115 The facts of this hypothetical case are set out in para. 4.2. 
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As a rule of thumb, B will have to rely on the provision under the 1965 Law that 
allows the free use of the work of another person 176 since none of the specific 
limitations listed in Chapter VI of the Law"' appear to be applicable in the present 
case 18. It is not clear whether a German court would uphold the availability of this 
defence - free use of A's work as a parody - in B's case on a number of grounds. 
Firstly, claims of copyright infringement are judged on a case-by-case basis. 
Secondly, German courts decisions on parodies under the provisions of article 24 of 
the 1965 Law have been diverse. In the Disney Parody case 19, the Federal 
Supreme Court held that a parody would only fall in the ambit of the free use 
provision if the parts copied from the original work are necessary in creating the 
new parody work. However, the court rejected this criterion in the later case of 
Mattscheibe18D, where it stated that in cases where large parts of the original work 
are copied without any modifications, the courts shall adopt a restrictive approach 
on the availability of the parody defence. In 2003, ruling on the case of 
Bundesadler181, the Court held that for a new work to qualify as a parody, it must 
have sufficient inner distance from the original work, the amount of the copied parts 
from the original works being irrelevant. It appears that following this ruling, and the 
Court's approach in the Alcolix182 and Asterix Parodies183 cases, the creation of a 
176 Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law 1965, article 24(1). However, under 
article 24(2), the free use defence "shall not apply to the use of a musical work where a 
melody has been recognizably borrowed from the work and used as a basis for a new work". 
It has to be noted that the free use defence should not be confused with the fair use and fair 
dealing provisions in the common law system. The free use provision covers, for example, 
"the taking of features from a work and transforming these into an entirely new work, 
sufficiently distanced from the essential features of the used work". See, Sterling at pp. 448- 
50 and 521-25. 
"' A non-exhaustive list of available limitations to copyright infringement includes 
administration of justice and public safety (article 45), collections made for religious, school 
or instructional use (article 46), certain school broadcasts (article 47), public speeches 
(article 48) and newspaper articles and broadcast commentaries (article 49), visual and 
sound reporting on events of the day (article 50), quotation of individual works in 
independent scientific works and passages from works in independent works of language 
(article 51), public communication subject to conditions (article52), reproduction for private 
and other personal uses (article 53), reproduction of works on public display (article 59). 
"8 Note that the exception of quoting passages from individual works in independent works 
of language could be applicable. However, the fact that B has not only quoted parts of A's 
work but has also made use of some of the original scenes and plots might render this 
exception inapplicable on the present facts. 
19 BGH, (1971) G. R. U. R. 588. 
180 BGH, (2000) G. R. U. R. 703. 
'$' BGH, (2003) G. R. U. R. 956. 
182 BGH, March 11,1993 (1994) 25 I. I. C. 605. 
'$' BGH, March 11,1993 (1994) 25 I. I. C. 610. 
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new, independent work would now constitute the decisive factor in the applicability 
of the parody defence to cases of alleged copyright infringement"' 
It is likely that courts might not be satisfied that B's novel is an independent work 
with sufficient inner from A's work since B has made use of scenes and plots 
described by A in his novel. It is questionable whether B's work would be viewed, in 
the context of German jurisprudence, as an entirely new work, and thus, a 
permissible parody. The courts approach will depend to a large extent on the level 
of distinctiveness displayed in B's work - "As a rule ... the features borrowed from 
the protected older work [must] fade into the background in the new work in such a 
way that the use made of the older work by the more recent work appears merely 
as a stimulus to create the new and independent work"785. Consequently, it could be 
suggested that, on the present facts, it is uncertain whether the court would allow 
B's defence. 
For the purposes of the present analysis, it is important to examine German 
jurisprudence on the relationship between the reproduction right and freedom of 
expression and, whether B invoking his right of freedom of expression would 
influence or even shape the court's decision on the current facts. Freedom of 
expression is to be understood as defined in article 5 of the Basic Law186 since the 
1965 Law doe not provide for a freedom of expression defence or limitation to 
copyright infringement. 
Since the 1960s, there has been a number of cases where courts have taken a 
defendant's right of freedom of expression into account in considering instances of 
alleged copyright infringement. In 1962, the Berlin District Court allowed an 
unauthorised re-broadcasting of sections of a news program produced in the 
German Democratic Republic, by Berlin television on the grounds of article 5 of the 
Basic Law187. Similarly, in 1977, the court allowed the broadcast of copyright 
protected photographs of members of the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group which had 
184 For a discussion of the Alcolix and Asterix Parodies cases, and the Federal Supreme 
Court definitions of "inner distance" and "independent', see para. 3.5.5.3. 
"'"Gies Eagle", BGH, March 20,2003: (2004) 35 I. I. C. 984, at 986. 
186 For a detailed discussion of article 5 of the German Basic Law, see para. 2.4.5. 
'$' Maifeiern, Landgericht Berlin, (1962) G. R. U. R. 1962. 
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previously been published in a critical news report18'. On this instance, the Court 
held that the importance of free political speech overrode any possible violation of 
copyright in the photographs. 
In 1985, the Federal Supreme Court acknowledged that "under exceptional 
circumstances, because of an unusually urgent information need, limits to copyright 
exceeding the express statutory limitations may be taken into consideration"189 
although, on the facts of the case, it ruled that the constitutional freedoms protected 
in article 5 could not provide a separate defence as they were already embraced in 
the provisions of the 1965 Lawt9o 
The Federal Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in the CB-Infobank 
19' cases, ruling that, on the facts before it, the interests of the copyright owner 
predominated over the public interest in accessing information. Nevertheless, 
despite this conclusion, the Court stressed that information as such is not protected 
under copyright legislation and thus, it should be freely provided and circulated. 
In Germania 3192, the Federal Constitutional Court considered freedom of art under 
article 5 of the German Basic Law, in the context of an artistic author citing and 
criticising another author, under article 51 of the 1965 Law. Article 51(2) allows 
passages from a published work to be quoted in an independent work of language 
to the extent justified by the purpose. The fundamental constitutional question of the 
case was the extent of this freedom. The Court of Appeal granted an injunction 
holding that the citations taken from the original work did not support the 
defendant's opinion but merely substituted the plaintiff author's ideas. The 
defendant appealed against the decision invoking, among other rights, the right of 
freedom of art, research and teaching under article 5(3) of the German Basic Law. 
'$$ Terroristenbild, Landgericht Berlin, May 26,1977: (1978) G. R. U. R. 108. 
189 Lili Marlene, BGH, March 7,1985: (1987) G. R. U. R. 34. 
'90 The case involved the unauthorised publication by a newspaper of the lyrics of the "Lili 
Marlene" song which featured in a forthcoming film about Lili Marlene's life. 
19' CB-Infobank 1, BGH, January 16,1997: (1997) G. R. U. R. 459 at 463; CB-lnfobank 11, 
January 16,1997: (1997) G. RU. R. 464 at 466. 
'92 BVerfGE, June 29,2000: (2001) 2 G. R. U. R. 149, Zeitschrift für Urheber - und 
Medienrecht, 2000,867. On the facts of the case, an author quoted in a chapter of his 
seventy five-page long play about four pages from another writer's play without obtaining the 
consent of the latter author's heirs. The case also involved claims of infringement of the 
author's moral rights. These claims are discussed in para. 3.5.5.3. 
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The Federal Constitutional Court overturned the Court of Appeal's decision on the 
basis that the court had not adequately considered the influence of article 5(3) when 
interpreting article 51(2) of the 1965 Law. It held that, when considering the scope 
of a party's right to use quotations from another author's or artist's work, the right of 
freedom of art has the effect of broadening that party's right because of the internal 
connection between the author's or artist's original ideas and the artistic style of the 
new work containing the quoted extracts193. The Court acknowledged that article 
5(3) serves the purpose of protecting an artist from public encroachments194 and of 
contributing to the framing of a free environment where authors can create and 
discuss art. It is for the courts to balance this right against the economic and other 
interests of the copyright owner, and define the boundaries of the respective rights 
for the benefit of the public195. In exercising this balancing act, the Court held that, 
the interests of the public to make unauthorised use of the copyright owner's work 
in order to freely discuss art, outweigh the interests of the copyright owner provided 
that the encroachment in his rights is negligible and that there is no real threat of 
him suffering considerable economic disadvantages19'. In conclusion, the Court 
ruled that, in assessing infringement in this context, the judiciary must evaluate the 
new work produced as a whole and that it is acceptable for an author to use a 
combination of citations - even if these are extensive - from a work protected by 
copyright and his own writings in order to create a new work, provided that the 
citations or quotations are used as a functional part of his own ideas and appear to 
be part of his own separate artistic expression. 
The Court's decision in Germania 3197 appears to be supported by the earlier case 
of Havemann198, where the Constitutional Court ruled that freedom of information, 
under article 5(1) of the Basic Law, outweighed the property interests of the 
copyright owner in his work, under articles 2 and 14 of the German Basic Law199 
19' At para. 22. 
19a At para. 18. The Court also stated that despite the wide scope of article 5(3), it does not 
confer an absolute right but one that can be restricted under certain circumstances. 
195 At paras. 19 and 23. 
'96 At para. 24. 
197 BverfGE, June 29,2000: (2001) 2 G. R. U. R. 149, Zeitschrift für Urheber - und 
Medienrecht, 2000,867. 
198 BVerfGE, 1BvR 1611/99, December 17,1999. 
199 On the facts of the case, a company published a book which contained the appeal 
speech of a lawyer defending a critic of the former German Democratic Republic. The 
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The court held that, on the facts of the case, the right of freedom of information, 
safeguarded a forum for free discussion on an issue of public interest - the history 
of the former German Republic - and that the public's right to have access to 
information and opinions, outweigh the economic interests200 of the copyright 
owner201. 
In the more recent case of "Gies Eaglei202, the Federal Supreme Court discussed 
the interaction between copyright and freedom of the press, under article 5(1) of the 
Basic Law. The case involved a parody in which a political news magazine used a 
parodied eagle sculpture203 as a picture heading for an article about misuse of 
taxation law by the State entitled "The 'Unserious State"'. The plaintiff, the Bild- 
Kunst collecting society204, argued that the Gies Eagle was protected by copyright, 
and that its reproduction in the magazine constituted a restricted adaptation. The 
magazine claimed that the reproduction should be permitted as a means of 
expression of political discussion within the framework of the free use defence 
under article 24(1) of the 1965 Law and the right of freedom of the press under 
article 5(1) of the Basic Law. The court, dismissing the plaintiffs appeal, upheld that 
the reproduction of the Gies Eagle "is not covered by the author's exclusive rights 
but is permitted as a means of expression of political discussion within the 
framework of an unrestricted use within the meaning of Sec. 24(1) of the Copyright 
Act ... [and] by the freedom of press (Art. 5(1), second sentence, of Basic Law)i205 
Acknowledging the need to balance copyright with the constitutional freedoms 
guaranteed under article 5 of the Basic Law, the court commented that "if ... there is 
a greater public interest in the reproduction of a protected work, this may, under 
published appeal was ten pages long. The lawyer brought a claim against the publishing 
company seeking an injunctive relief, on the basis that the unauthorised publication infringed 
his property rights (copyright) in the work. The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal on 
other grounds, but upheld the interpretation and balance of the parties interests applied by 
the lower courts. 
zoo It should be noted that the court deemed the potential economic exploitation rights of the 
copyright owner to be limited. It is not clear whether the court would have reached the same 
conclusion if the author's potential pecuniary interests being compromised were greater. 
201 At paras. 5,6 and 22. 
202 BGH, March 20,2003: (2004) 35 I. I. C. 984. 
203 The sculpture of the Eagle, created by Ludwig Gies in 1953, hung at the front of the 
German Federal Parliament in Bonn from 1955 until it was rebuilt. 
204 The collecting society owned the copyright in the Eagle sculpture subject to a collecting 
agreement concluded with the heirs of Gies. 
205 BGH, March 20,2003: (2004) 35 I. I. C. 984, at 987. 
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certain circumstances, be taken into account in the interpretation of the powers to 
which the author is entitled, and in any event, in the interpretation of the limits to 
copyright, and may in the individual case mean that a narrow construction focused 
on the wording of the legislation may have to give way to a more generous 
interpretation that takes account of the general public's interest in information and 
use .... In any event, account must be taken of both the author's interests and the 
interests protected by the limits on copyright, which must be applied with 
"Z appropriate weighting to the construction of the statutory provisionO6 
Having examined the relevant German case law in this area and analysed the 
courts approach to cases of alleged infringement of the author's right of 
reproduction, it could be suggested that freedom of expression is becoming an 
increasingly important right in this context. Despite the fact that the right has been 
becoming more prominent only in recent years, courts appear willing to balance it 
against those of the copyright owner. It appears that German courts have not 
dismissed or undermined the importance of this constitutional freedom. In fact, in 
the majority of the cases where the right has been invoked, it has been held to 
override the author's pecuniary interests. Thus, on the facts of The Historical Novel 
case, it is probable that B could succeed if he raises his right of freedom of 
expression. Even if that claim does not succeed as such, it is almost certain that 
courts will have taken it into account and balanced it against A's interests, before 
reaching its verdict. 
In conclusion, it could be argued that German case law provides evidence that 
there exist situations where freedom of expression and the exclusive right of 
reproduction can clash. Courts, in acknowledging that this is becoming a 
problematic area, are prepared to give judgements interpreting the rights 
relationship and setting their respective boundaries; it also appears that the parody 
exception is mostly viewed as a limitation in favour of free expression207. 
206 BGH, March 20,2003, (2004) 35 I. I. C. 984, at 986. 
207 Guibault, L., "Limitations Found Outside Copyright Law" in ALAI Study Days Documents, 
Cambridge 1998, The Boundaries of Copyright - Its Proper Limitations and Exceptions 
(Australian Copyright Council, 1999), at p. 44. 
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It can thus be submitted that, in the context of German jurisprudence, there is no 
real potential of the right of freedom of expression to be seriously compromised or 
jeopardised. However, due to the relatively small number of decided cases and the 
consequent lack of concrete precedents, this conclusion cannot be held to be 
categorical. 
4.6 SUMMARY 
The relationship between the author's exclusive right of reproduction and another 
party's right of freedom of expression has developed at different stages in the 
various national legal systems. Judicial guidance and interpretation on the rights 
interaction has been developed in some countries more extensively than in others. 
Different countries with different legal traditions afford different treatment to the law 
of copyright. Civil law author's right systems appear to attach greater importance to 
the author's personality and his intellectual creations. At the other end of the 
spectrum, common law countries seemingly attach more weight to the author's 
exploitation and pecuniary interests. 
Freedom of expression, as a human and, at instances, constitutional right, has in 
general been legislatively defined and judicially interpreted in a more consistent 
manner on the national level. The fact that this right is less complicated in nature, 
and that it does not comprise a bundle of diverse sub-rights could be contributing 
elements to its more uniform interpretation and application. Freedom of expression 
is increasingly used as a right to be juxtaposed against the arguably strong rights of 
the copyright owner under some national laws. 
Given the countries diverse approach to copyright and their differing rate of legal 
development, their response to calls for freedom of expression restraints on 
copyright is equally diverse. In general, jurisprudence on this subject in the majority 
of national laws has not fully developed. However, it appears that the pressure on 
the judiciary to halt the expanding nature of the bundle of rights that comprise 
copyright, as supported by technological development, and in particular, the 
pressure to bring it into line with the principle of freedom of expression is mounting. 
Although no national law has to date recognised freedom of expression per se as a 
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limitation to copyright, some national courts are more willing than others to validate 
the right's progressive prominence in this context. 
Potential conflicts between the two rights have here been illustrated. These conflicts 
cannot necessarily be resolved or successfully accommodated within the traditional 
copyright framework. It is thus submitted that rendering freedom of expression a 
limitation to copyright could constitute a welcome introduction for legislature and 
judiciary alike, alleviating the current or potential problems of interpretation and 
balancing of the rights. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Copyright Limitations and Exceptions in Conflict 
Resolution 
5.1 GENERAL OVERVIEW 
In general, courts have demonstrated a high degree of reluctance in acknowledging 
that situations exist that could give rise to conflicts between the protection afforded 
by copyright and the effective recognition of the human right of freedom of 
expression'. 
Having brought into light areas of potential conflict within the context of the 
relationship between an author's morale and economic rights3 and freedom of 
expression, this Chapter examines the limitations4 that are in place to curtail 
' See, McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415 (S. D. N. Y. 1971) at 422 
("Defendants First Amendment argument can be dismissed as flying in the face of 
established law"); United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265 (W. D. Okla. 1974) at 1267-68 
("We fail to see any protected First Amendment right or privilege to usurp the benefits" of the 
copyright owner); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F. 2d 751 (90' Cir. 1978) at 758, cert. 
denied, 439 U. S. 1132 (1979) ("[The] defendants [First Amendment] claim can be dismissed 
without a lengthy discussion"); Schnapper v. Foley, 471 F. Supp. 426 (D. D. C. 1979) at 428, 
affd, 667 F. 2d 102 (D. C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 948 (1982) ("It is well established 
that there is no conflict between the First Amendment and the copyright laws. "). 
2 For an examination of areas of potential conflicts identified in the context of the relationship 
between the author's moral rights of paternity and integrity and another party's right of 
freedom of expression, see Chapter 3. 
' For an examination of areas of potential conflict identified in the context of the relationship 
between the author's economic right of reproduction and another party's right of freedom of 
expression, see Chapter 4. 
4 The term "limitations" to copyright used throughout this Chapter is to be understood as 
encompassing the concepts of exceptions, restrictions, permitted acts (all three terms to be 
understood as exceptions to exploitation rights awarded to an author under copyright 
legislation), and limits to be understood as concepts that limit copyright without necessarily 
constituting express restrictions to an author's exclusive rights) to copyright, unless such 
other concepts are specifically used. International copyright Conventions and national 
legislative documents use several terms to describe permitted derogations from copyright, 
which "designate concepts of varying nature and thereby influence the interpretation of the 
respective provisions". For a discussion of the varying terminology of inherent and outer 
limitations to copyright laws in general, see Spoor, J. H., "General Aspects of Exceptions and 
Limitations to Copyright: General Report", in ALAI Study Days Documents, Cambridge 
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copyright expansion, as it may be argued, and which are most frequently cited in 
copyright jurisprudence and legislation. Courts have likewise employed these 
limitations, at times, to rationalize and substantiate decisions that copyright does 
not encroach upon another party's human right of freedom of expression. 
The Chapter seeks to evaluate the validity and status of the argument that current 
limitations and exceptions to copyright are sufficient means of safeguarding a 
party's right of freedom of expression vis-ä-vis the author's exclusive rights. It 
appears that this line of reasoning is more prevalent in the common law countries 
and, in particular, the United Kingdom and United States, as these countries 
legislations provide for extensive copyright limitations-. 
On the other hand, the copyright culture in civil law countries, such as France and 
Germany, is different. Despite the fact that the national legislations afford limitations 
to copyright, they are more specific in nature and consequently narrower in scope. 
In addition, such countries primarily view a party's right of freedom of expression is 
primarily viewed as a constitutional right. Accordingly, judicial interpretation of cases 
involving potential conflicts between copyright and freedom of expression focuses 
on balancing two distinct sets of rights, as opposed to attempting to accommodate 
freedom of expression within the realms of copyright exceptions6. 
1998, The Boundaries of Copyright: Its Proper Limitations and Exceptions (Australian 
Copyright Council, 1999) at p. 29. 
5 For an examination of judicial interpretation in the UK of cases involving potential conflicts 
between an author's reproduction right and another party's right of freedom of expression, 
see para. 4.5.2.1. 
For an examination of judicial interpretation in the US of cases involving potential conflicts 
between an author's reproduction right and another party's right of freedom of expression, 
see para. 4.5.3.1. 
Both of the above-mentioned paragraphs refer, in part, to the respective national courts 
willingness to accommodate freedom of expression arguments within the context of 
exceptions to copyright. It should be noted that such exceptions are not applicable to 
alleged infringement of an author's moral rights. Alternative judicial approaches to cases 
involving potential conflicts between an author's moral rights and freedom of expression are 
discussed in paras. 3.5.2 (UK approach) and 3.5.3 (US approach). 
6 For an examination of judicial interpretation in France of cases involving potential conflicts 
between an author's reproduction right and another party's right of freedom of expression, 
see para. 4.5.4.1. 
For an examination of judicial interpretation in Germany of cases involving potential conflicts 
between an author's reproduction right and another party's right of freedom of expression, 
see para. 4.5.5.1. 
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Overall, the Chapter will make reference to legislative provisions, relevant legal 
commentary and case law of the United Kingdom and United States. Respective 
issues within civil law countries will also be discussed. 
The structure of the Chapter reflects the disparity among national laws and 
discusses the copyright exceptions of fair dealing and fair use, the public interest 
aspect, the principle of idea/expression dichotomy and the arguably limiting factor of 
restricted copyright duration. The Chapter's closing paragraph draws conclusions 
as to the current role of copyright limitations and exceptions within the context of the 
interaction of copyright and freedom of expression. It also questions whether such 
limitations do afford implied protection to freedom of expression and, most 
importantly, whether this is a proper avenue for safeguarding a universal human 
right. 
5.2 THE FAIR DEALING AND FAIR USE EXCEPTIONS 
The fair dealing defence is found in the copyright laws of the United Kingdom and 
Commonwealth countries', while the fair use doctrine is present in the copyright law 
of the United States of America. 
The defences were judicially created and developed8 and were not codified until 
1911 in the UK and 1976 in the US. They appear to have emanated from public 
interest concerns; an attempt by the courts to balance the exclusive interests of the 
copyright owner against those of the general public who ultimately benefit from the 
creation and dissemination of works of authorship. 
Cases involving alleged infringement of an author's moral rights and the application of 
specific exceptions in the context of such rights interaction with the right of freedom of 
expression, see paras. 3.5.4 (French approach) and 3.5.5 (German approach). 
For the purposes of the thesis, fair dealing is analysed from the UK legal perspective. The 
respective statutory provisions of other Commonwealth countries are not hereby considered. 
8 See Garnett, K., Davies, G. and Harbottle, G., Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(15`h ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at pp. 481-82. 
181 
These exceptions are consistent with the provisions of international copyright 
instruments, such as the Berne Convention 19719 and the TRIPS Agreement 
199410. 
5.2.1 THE FAIR DEALING DEFENCE 
The fair dealing defence is set out in section 30 of the CDPA 1988, and allows acts, 
otherwise infringing, to be carried out in relation to a work for the purposes of "non- 
commercial research and private study"", "criticism or review"12 and "reporting 
current events"13. Over the years, courts have consistently observed that the 
primarily objectives of this defence are the promotion of informed and critical debate 
on matters of social, artistic and political importance as well as the preservation of 
freedom of expression14. However, the relatively narrow scope of the fair dealing 
coupled with the courts varied approach to the invoking of the defence do pose a 
considerable challenge to the argument that freedom of expression constitutes an 
underlying justification for fair dealing. 
9 The Berne Convention 1971 provides for a number of exceptions to the author's exclusive 
right of reproduction, including free use of a work "for the purpose of reporting current 
events" (Article 10bis(2)). Article 9(2) of the Convention is of particular importance as it sets 
out the so-called "three-step" test for the introduction of copyright exceptions in national 
laws. Article 9(2) states that any limitations or exceptions to the reproduction right must "not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work" nor "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author". 
10 Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994 extends Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention 
1971 to apply not merely to the reproduction right but to all authors rights. 
" "Fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purposes of research 
or private study does not infringe any copyright in the work or, in the case of a published 
edition, in the typographical arrangement", CDPA 1988, section 29(1). See, Senftleben, M., 
Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test - An Analysis of the Three-Step Test in 
International and EC Copyright Law (Hugenholtz, P. B. (ed. ), Kluwer Law International, 
2004). 
12 "Fair dealing with a work for the purpose of criticism or review, of that or another work or 
of a performance of a work, does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that it is 
accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement", CDPA 1988, section 30(1). 
13 "Fair dealing with a work (other than a photograph) for the purpose of reporting current 
events does not infringe any copyright in the work provided ... it is accompanied by a 
sufficient acknowledgement", CDPA 1988, section 30(2). Note that "No acknowledgement is 
required in connection with the reporting of current events by means of a sound recording, 
film, broadcast or cable programme". CDPA 1988, section 30(3). 
'4 See, Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] Q. B. 84; British Broadcasting Corp. v. British Satellite 
Broadcasting Ltd. [1991] 2 All. E. R. 833; Time Warner Entertainment Ltd. v. Channel Four 
Television Corp. plc, [1994] E. M. L. R. 1. 
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Regarding the restricted ambit of the defence, two important points should be 
noted. Firstly, fair dealing is only applicable for the purposes set out in sections 29 
and 30 of the CDPA 1988. Any activity that falls outside the definition of those terms 
will not be covered by the defence. Secondly, in order to rely on this defence, a 
defendant must, in certain cases, ensure compliance with two further requirements, 
namely that the work has been made available to the public15 and that a sufficient 
acknowledgement has been made16. 
Regarding the courts interpretation of the defence, this at times has been restrictive 
as well. Fair dealing for the purpose of reporting current events has often been 
construed in a manner that has imposed limits on the meaning of "current events". 
In other words, in such cases courts have read "current events" literary without 
necessarily taking into account the fact that past events might have a direct impact 
on current concerns and might need to be reported at a later time than at the time 
they actually occurred". In Associated Newspapers Group plc v. News Group 
Newspapers Ltd. 18, Walton J., dismissing the section 30(2) fair dealing defence, 
observed in relation to the requirement of current events that "although ... there is 
no requirement ... of necessity [within the statutory provision] ..., that at any rate is 
a good start ... [I]s it reasonably necessary to refer to these matters in order to deal 
with current events? "19. The Ashdown judgment also dealt with the issue of use of 
an existing work for reporting events which are not current. The Court commented 
15 CDPA 1988, sections 30 and 30(1A). 
16 CDPA 1988, section 30. For a criticism of the unnecessary technical restrictions posed by 
this requirement, see Laddie, H., "Copyright: Over-strength, Over-regulated, Over-rated? " 
(1996) E. I. P. R. 253. 
" See Distillers Co. (Biochemicals) Ltd. v. Times Newspapers [1975] Q. B. 613 (publication 
of detailed effects of the drug thalidomide did not constitute fair use for the purpose of 
reporting current events because the drug had been withdrawn from the market twelve 
years previously); Beggars Banquet Ltd. v. Carlton Television and Spidercom Ltd. [1993] 
E. M. L. R. 349, at 365 ("whether events that took place in August 1992 can be said to have 
been 'current' in January 1993 would be for determination at trial"). For a more detailed 
discussion of this issue, see Griffiths, J., "Copyright Law and Censorship - The Impact of 
the Human Rights Act 1998" (1999) 4 The Yearbook of Copyright and Media Law 3, at 16- 
18. 
18 [1986] R. P. C. 515. In this case, the plaintiff owned rights in letters sent by the Duke of 
Windsor to the Duchess of Windsor. The defendant obtained copies of the letters and 
published them without the plaintiffs consent. The plaintiff brought an action for copyright 
infringement and the defendant relied on the fair dealing defence. (Note that when this case 
was heard before the courts, the CDPA 1988 had not yet been passed. Thus, the defendant 
relied on the predecessor of section 30(2), that is section 6(1) of the Copyright Act 1956. ). 
19 [1986] R. P. C. 515, at 519. 
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that "[I]t is possible to conceive of information of the greatest public interest relating 
not to a current event, but to a document produced in the past. We are not aware of 
any provision of the 1988 Act which would permit publication in such circumstances, 
unless the mere fact of publication, and any controversy created by the disclosure, 
is sufficient to make them 'current events'. This will often be a 'bootstraps' argument 
of little merit, but on other occasions (such as disclosure by the Public Record 
Office under the 30-year rule) it may have a more solid basis"20. 
A further issue that has been the subject of much academic debate has been the 
definition of what is "fair". Generally, courts, in answering this question, have taken 
into consideration a number of factors, including the proportion of the original work 
used by the defendant and the defendant's motives for his actions. As far as the 
proportion of the original work used is concerned, it appears that, as a general rule 
of thumb, the longer the extract(s) taken, the less likely it is that fair dealing will be 
upheld. However, there have been instances where courts have ruled in favour of 
fair dealing even where the whole of the original work has been taken, the original 
work being short2'. 
The motives of the defendant are generally taken into account by the courts in 
reaching their conclusion22. It has been held that if a copyright work is deliberately 
used within the context of business competition, fair dealing is unlikely to be 
upheld23. In Associated Newspapers Group v. News Group Newspapers Ltd24, the 
20 [2002] Ch. 149, at 166-7. 
21 See British Oxygen v. Liquid Air Ltd. [1925] Ch. 383; Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q. B. 84, 
at 94 ("Suppose that there is on a tombstone in a churchyard an epitaph consisting of a 
dozen or of 20 words. A parishioner of the church thinks that this sort of epitaph is out of 
place on a tombstone. He writes a letter to the parish magazine setting out the words of the 
epitaph. Could it be suggested that the citation is so substantial, consisting of 100 per cent 
of the 'work' in question that it must necessarily be outside the scope of the fair dealing 
provision? To my mind it could not validly be so suggested"); Beloff v. Pressdram [1973] 1 
All E. R. 241. 
22 Note that some case law supports the proposition that when the work or part of the work 
used was of a confidential nature this would constitute a factor that can negate a finding of 
fair dealing. See Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd. [1973] 1 All E. R. 241. However, in Time Warner 
Entertainment Co. v. Channel Four Television Corporation plc [1994] E. M. L. R. 1, at 17, Neill 
L. J. stated that "I do not intend to throw any doubt on the decision in the Beloff case itself, 
but it is my present view that criticism of a work already in the public domain which would 
otherwise constitute fair dealing for the purposes of section 30(1) would seldom if ever be 
rendered unfair because of the method by which the copyright material has been obtained". 
23 Weatherby v. International Horse Agency and Exchange Ltd. [1910] 2 Ch. 297. 
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court concluded that the defendant's motive in publishing the letters in question was 
to "attract readers" and that did not constitute "fair" use of the letters25. 
Despite the restrictions placed on the interpretation of fair dealing by the courts, the 
Court of Appeal in Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd26 made it clear that fair dealing 
in works for the purpose of reporting current events, as set out in CDPA 1988, will 
often allow publication of the words used and thus provide the required protection to 
a defendant's right of freedom of expression. It also noted that the open-ended 
scope of the "fairness" requirement will normally "afford the court all the scope that 
it needs to reflect properly the public interest in freedom of expression and, in 
particular, the freedom of the press"27. The court concluded that: 
"The infringement of copyright constitutes interference with the 'peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions'. It is, furthermore, the interference with a right 
arising under a statute which confers rights recognised under international 
convention and harmonised under European law - see the Berne 
Conventions of 1886 and 1971 and EC Council Directive of 29 October 
1993. There is thus no question but that restriction of the right of freedom 
of expression can be justified where necessary in a democratic society in 
order to protect copyright. The protection afforded to copyright under the 
1988 Act is, however, itself subject to exceptions. Thus both the right of 
freedom of expression and copyright are qualified. This appeal raises the 
question of how the two rights fall to be balanced, when they are in 
conflict"2B. 
In Hubbard v. Vosper29, a case decided long before Ashdown, Lord Denning 
referred to the potential conflict that might arise between copyright and freedom of 
24 [[1986] R. P. C. 515. 
25 [1986] R. P. C. 515, at 518. 
26 [2002] Ch. 149. 
27 See, Garnett, K., "The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1988 on UK Copyright Law", in 
Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Griffiths, J. and 
Suthersanen, U. (eds. ), Oxford University Press, 2005), at p. 183. For a more detailed 
discussion of the Ashdown case, see paras. 4.5.3.1 and 5.3.2. 
28 [2002] Ch. 149, at para. 28. 
29 [1972] 2 Q. B. 84. The defendant published a book containing long extracts from published 
and unpublished works of the founder of the Church of Scientology. The book was highly 
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expression and the role that statutory defences, such as fair dealing and the public 
interest serve in such instances, observing that: 
"But here, although Mr Hubbard owns the copyright, nevertheless, Mr 
Vosper has a defence of fair dealing: and although Mr Hubbard may 
possess confidential information, nevertheless, Mr Vosper has a defence 
of public interest. These defences are such that he should be permitted to 
go ahead with the publication... So in [a] copyright action, we ought not to 
restrain a defendant who has a reasonable defence of fair dealing. Nor in 
an action for breach of confidence, if the defendant has a reasonable 
defence of public interest. The reason is because the defendant, if he is 
right, is entitled to publish it: and the law will not intervene to suppress 
freedom of speech except when it is abusedi30. 
5.2.2 THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE 
The fair use doctrine developed in the nineteenth century as an equitable privilege 3 
and is now codified in section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act32. Unlike the UK fair 
dealing provisions, fair use in the US is a more flexible defence. Use of a work is 
not confined to prescribed purposes. Thus any use of an existing work can be held 
to be non-infringing provided that it is fair. In addition, courts are given further 
guidance by a set of non-exclusive policy factors that they should take into account 
33 in reaching their decision 
critical of the Church of Scientology. The plaintiff brought an action for copyright 
infringement and breach of confidence. The defendant relied on fair dealing for the purpose 
of criticism and review and public interest for the respective infringement actions. The Court 
of Appeal allowed both defences. Note that if this case were to be brought before the courts 
today, the defendant would not have been able to rely on fair dealing regarding the plaintiffs 
original works because of the amendment to section 30(1) that now requires that the work 
must have been made available to the public. 
'o [1972] 2QB 84, at 96-7. this statement was made by Lord Denning and related to the 
grant of an interim injunction. 
31 See, Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C. C. D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728); Folsom v. Marsh, 
9 F. Cas. 342 (C. C. D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
32 The fair use provision under the 1976 Copyright Act as well as relevant case law is 
examined in greater detail in para. 4.5.3.1. 
33 Copyright Act 1976, section 107. For a more detailed discussion of the provisions of 
section 107 and relevant case law, see para. 4.5.3.1. 
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The debate regarding the potential conflict between copyright and free speech 
flared up in 1960s34. There is a large body of case law which supports the 
proposition that fair use adequately accommodates First Amendment concerns35. 
Such decisions conclude that given the restricting role of the fair use limitation, 
copyright does not require any external First Amendment scrutiny" 
5.2.3 CONCLUSIONS 
Fair dealing under the CDPA 1988 appears to be defined less flexibly defined than 
the equivalent fair use doctrine in the US. The use of the existing work must be 
made for one of the purposes set out in the Act, while, at the same time, as Lord 
Dennis indicated in Hubbard v. Vosper37 "It is impossible to define what is 'fair 
dealing'. It must be a question of degreei". 
It appears that, over the years, courts have expanded the application of the 
defence. However it is questionable whether such an expansion is satisfactory for 
the purposes of protecting freedom of expression. Although the courts are prepared 
to acknowledge that there might be situations of conflict between copyright and free 
expression, they have historically maintained that fair dealing, coupled with the 
'a See, Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55 (S. D. N. Y. ) at 
67, rev'd, 366 F. 2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) at 311-13 (Lumbard and Hays, J. J., concurring), cert. 
denied, 385 U. S. 1009 (1967); Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 268 F. Supp. 444 
(D. D. C. 1967) at 446 and 456; Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130 
(S. D. N. Y. 1968) at 146. 
3s See, Roy Export Co. v. CBS, Inc., 672 F. 2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) at 1099 ("No Circuit that 
has considered the question ... has ever held that the First Amendment provides a privilege in the copyright field distinct from the accommodation embodied in the 'fair use' doctrine"); 
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications International Ltd., 996 F. 2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993) at 
1378 ("Except perhaps in an extraordinary case, 'the fair use doctrine encompasses all 
claims of first amendment in the copyright field'" (citing New Era Publications International V. 
Henry Holt & Co., 873 F. 2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989) at 584); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. 
Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F. 3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999) at 74 ("[The Second Circuit] has 
repeatedly rejected First Amendment challenges to injunctions from copyright infringement 
on the ground that First Amendment concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair 
use doctrine"). 
36 See, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U. S. 562 (1977), at 574-78; Worldwide 
Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F. 3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2000); L. A. Times v. 
Free Republic, 54 U. S. P. Q. 2d (BNA) 1453 (C. D. Cal. 2000); Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. Of 
Trustees v. Substance, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N. D. Ill. 2000); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge 
Corp., 53 U. S. P. Q. 2d (BNA) 1490 (E. D. Pa. 2000); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F. 3d 1004 (91" Cir. 2001). 
37 [1972] 2 Q. B. 84. 
38 [1972] 2 Q. B. 84, at 89. 
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other internal controls to copyright are sufficient for the resolution of any such 
conflicts. 
Following recent case law and the introduction of the Information Society Directive 
200139, it has been suggested40 that the UK should take advantage of one of the 
exceptions in the Directive which is currently lacking from the 1988 Act, namely 
"use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche, 41 in order to provide 
strengthened protection to freedom of expression in situations that are currently not 
taken into consideration under the UK Act. If one could draw a conclusion from the 
experience of the French legal system, which expressly provides for such a 
defence, it might be said that the inclusion of this further exception within the UK 
law would add a higher degree of protection to free expression. However, if one 
were to judge from the fact that the UK chose not to take up that option it is 
questionable whether it will do so in the future. 
Commentators have concluded that fair use is not an appropriate means of 
securing the effective protection of free speech. The statutory fair use provision 
requires courts to undertake a case-by-case analysis, taking into account a number 
of factors42 in order to reach their decision. This contributes to the open-ended 
nature of the limitation43, which, in turn, exacerbates its inconsistent application. 
Netanel's conclusion appears to give a succinct, yet accurate, overview of the fair 
use landscape at present, "In sum, if ever fair use secured First Amendment 
interests, today's fair use doctrine provides no more than a bare, insubstantial trace 
"aa of that protection 
39 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society. 
ao See, Dworkin, G., "Copyright, the Public Interest, and Freedom of Speech: A UK 
Copyright Lawyer's Perspective", in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and 
International Analyses (Griffiths, J. and Suthersanen, U. (eds. ), Oxford University Press, 
2005), at p. 169. 
" Information Society Directive 2001, article 5(3)(k). This defence is present in other national 
copyright laws, notably in the French Intellectual Property Code 1992. 
42 See, Copyright Act 1976, section 107. 
43 The fair use factors are characterised by an "infinite elasticity" which results in their 
"inability to resolve difficult questions", Nimmer at para. 13.05[A]. 
44 Netanel, N. W., "Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein" (2001) 54 Stanford 
L. Rev. 1, at 23. 
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5.3 THE PUBLIC INTEREST ASPECT 
"When considering the public interest ... it is to be remembered that one feature ... 
is that justice should always be done and should be seen to be done , 45 
The concept of public interest is wide and may be said to underlie most national 
copyright laws; copyright systems in general seek to strike an appropriate balance 
between the rights of the copyright owner and the benefit of the public. "Whether a 
particular act is 'in the public interest' is probably not subject to any objective tests. 
Inherent in the noble motive of the public good is the notion that, in certain 
circumstances, the needs of the majority override those of the individual"46 
Public interest is also expressly taken into account in the context of international 
copyright law. The TRIPS Agreement 1994 provides that "The protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations"47. Perhaps more significant is the express reference to the balance 
between the rights of authors and those of the general public in the Preamble to the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, "Recognising the need to maintain a balance 
between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, 
research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention s48. 
4s Ellis v. Home Office [1953] 2 Q. B. 135, per Morris, LJ.. 
46 Davies, G., Copyright and the Public Interest (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), at p. 2. 
47 TRIPS Agreement 1994, Article 7. 
48 Similar provisions can be found in the Preamble to the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty 1996. 
It is interesting to note that the Berne Convention does not make any express provisions of 
the public interest, apparently paying more attention to the rights of authors. "The countries 
of the Union, being equally animated by the desire to protect, in as effective and uniform a 
manner as possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works", Preamble to the 
Berne Convention 1971. See Phillips, J., "The Berne Convention and the Public Interest" 
(1986) 11(157) Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts 165. 
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The public interest debate in the UK can be traced back to the early cases of Millar 
v. Taylo? 9 and Donaldson v. Becketi50. Both cases strongly focused on the need to 
find a balance between the rights of the author, on the one hand, and the interests 
of the general public, on the other51. Lord Macaulay addressed the importance that 
the public interest should occupy within the context of copyright law52, "The 
advantages arising from a system of copyright are obvious. It is desirable that we 
should have a supply of good books; we cannot have such a supply unless men of 
letters are liberally remunerated: and the least objectionable way of remunerating 
them is by means of copyright. ... It is good that authors should be remunerated; 
and the least exceptionable way of remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet 
monopoly is an evil. For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil 
ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the 
good , 53. The public interest has ultimately guided the legislator54 in determining 
many aspects of copyright protection, such as the term of copyright55 and the extent 
of the statutory defences and permitted acts in relation to copyright56 
49 (1769) 4 BURR. 2301. 
50 (1774) 4 BURR. 2407. 
51 For a general discussion of the cases and their underlying importance, see Davies, G., 
Copyright and the Public Interest (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), at pp. 28-33. 
For discussion of Millar v. Taylor, see Sherman, B. and Bently, L., The Making of Modem 
Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge University Press, 2002) at pp. 19-35, and Deazley, R., 
On the Origin of the Right to Copy (Hart Publishing, 2004), Chapter 7.. 
For discussion of Donaldson v. Beckett and its implications, see generally Rose, M., Authors 
and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Harvard University Press, 1993), and in particular 
Appendix B which sets out Justice Nares' Vote, the opinion he delivered to the House of 
Lords on 15 February 1774. See also Deazley, R., On the Origin of the Right to Copy (Hart 
Publishing, 2004), Chapter 8. 
52 The speech was made in 1842, when Lord Macaulay was opposing the passing of bills for 
a new Copyright Act to extend the period of copyright protection. The new 1842 Copyright 
Act was eventually passed and the term of copyright protection extended. 
 Seville, C., Literary Copyright Reform in Early Victorian England (the Framing of the 1842 
Copyright Act), (Cambridge University Press, 1999), at p. 6. 
54 "In Britain or any other Berne Convention State, copyright arises upon the creation of a 
literary or artistic work and is enforceable without formalities: its potency is accordingly the 
greater and the need to qualify it in the public interest may be more pressing", Cornish, 
W. R., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (4`" ed., 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999), at para. 13-03. 
ss "The public at large has an overwhelming interest in the reproduction of literary, dramatic 
and musical works, and we are satisfied that it would be quite impossible to justify a right in 
perpetuity", Report of the Copyright Committee, Cmnd 8662, HMSO, October 1952 at 7, 
para. 17; "The term of life plus 50 years is a compromise between on the one hand the 
economic interests of authors and their direct descendants and on the other hand the public 
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UNITED STATES US copyright law is based upon the public interest and this is clearly reflected in the 
OF AMERICA Constitution 57. In Film Corp. v. Doya158, the Court stated that "The sole interest of 
the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the 
general benefits derived by the public from the labours of authors , 59 
The passing of the 1790 Copyright Act6° and the 1834 landmark case of Wheaton V. 
Peters61, rejecting the natural rights theory as a premise for copyright protection, re- 
enforced the stance that copyright existed primarily to benefit the public interest and 
only secondarily to benefit the individual author62. 
Overall, within US jurisprudence, public interest has had an important impact63 on 
the limited duration of copyright protection64 and on the exceptions, including both 
interest in widespread and unfettered dissemination of works", Reform of the Law relating to 
Copyright, Designs and Performers' Protection, Cmnd 8302, HMSO, July 1981, Chapter 12, 
para. 5. 
56 "The public interest demands that not every unauthorised reproduction of copyright 
material should constitute an infringement of copyright. The aim of such exceptions is to 
avoid copyright acting as an impediment to the use of copyright material for certain defined 
purposes, while ensuring the economic interests of copyright owners are not thereby 
damaged", Reform of the Law relating to Copyright, Designs and Performers' Protection, 
Cmnd 8302, HMSO, July 1981, Chapter 3, para. 1. 
57 US Constitution, Article 1, section 8, "The Congress shall have power... to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries". 
58 286 U. S. 123 (1932). 
59 286 U. S. 123,127 (1932). 
60 Copyright Act on May 31,1790, "An Act for the encouragement of learning by securing the 
copies of maps, charts and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the 
times therein mentioned". Laws of the First Congress, Second Session, Chapter XV. 
61 33 U. S. (8 Peters) 591 (1834). 
62 Patterson, reviewing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. (8 Peters) 591 (1834) and its dissenting 
judgments, observed that "The striking point about the premises of the majority and the 
dissenters is that they are polar, one proceeding from the interest of the public, the other 
from the interest of the individual creator. This is not to say that both views did not take into 
account the interest of both the public and the individual author; it is to say that their 
premises brought the justices to different conclusions as to how best to resolve the conflict 
between the public's interest in learning and the author's interest in his property. The 
majority, viewing copyright as a monopoly, were content to protect the author's property for 
a limited period under the conditions prescribed by the Statute. To do otherwise would be 
contrary to the public interest". See Patterson, L. R., Copyright in Historical Perspective 
(Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1968), at p. 211. Also, see Goldstein, P., Copyright 
Principles, Law and Practice 3 Vols. (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1989), at para. 1.1. 
63 See, Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the US Copyright 
Law, 87`h Congress, First Session, July 1961, at p. 6. On the purpose of copyright, the 
Report concluded that "The primary purpose of copyright is to stimulate the creation and 
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the doctrine of fair use and other specific statutory limitations65, granted under the 
1976 Copyright Act66 
FRANCE The position the public interest occupied in French copyright law over the centuries 
has been diverse. Leading commentators have argued that the regime of author's 
rights centres on the person of the author excluding, to a large extent, the interests 
of the public67. However, public interest played a prominent role in the revolutionary 
French Decrees of 179168 and 1793; a role69, not clearly different from its role in the 
dissemination of intellectual works, thus advancing 'the progress of science and useful arts'. 
The grant of exclusive rights to authors is a means of achieving this end, and of 
compensating authors for their labors and their contributions to society. Within limits, the 
author's interests coincide with those of the public. Where they conflict, the public interest 
must prevail. The ultimate task of the copyright law is to strike a fair balance between the 
author's right to control the dissemination of his works and the public interest in fostering 
their widest dissemination". Also, see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 
U. S. 562 (1977), at 573 and 575 ("The State's interest is closely analogous to the goals of 
patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his 
endeavours", ".. the respondent's news broadcast increased the value of petitioner's 
performance by stimulating the public's interest in seeing the live act"). 
6a Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 186 U. S. P. Q. 67 (1974) ("The limited scope of 
the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the 
Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: creative work is 
to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of 
promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and other arts. The immediate effect 
of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labour. But the 
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. "); 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417 (1984) ("... the limited 
grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to 
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, 
and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of 
exclusive control has expired. "). 
65 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 225 U. S. P. Q. 1073 (1985), at 1089 
("Congress thus seeks to define the rights included in copyright so as to serve the public 
welfare and not necessarily so as to maximize an author's control over his or her product. "). 
Also, see Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546 (1973); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 
1023 (1994). 
66 For a critical analysis of the importance of the public interest in the development of US 
statutory and judicial jurisprudence, see Davies, G., Copyright and the Public Interest (2"a 
ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), at Chapter 5. 
67 Desbois, H., "La loi frangaise du 11 mars 1957" (1957) Le droit d' auteur 84; Desbois, H., 
Le Droit d' auteur en France (3rd ed., Dalloz, Paris, 1978), at p. 265; Plaisant, R., "La 
protection du logiciel par le droit d' auteur" (1983) G. P. 2.348. 
68 "The most sacred, the most legitimate, the most unassailable, and, if I may say, the most 
personal of all properties is the work, fruit of the thought of a writer; however, it is a property 
of a kind quite different from other properties. When an author has given his work to the 
public, when this work is in the hands of everyone when all educated men know it, when 
they take to themselves the beauties it contains, when they have memorised its most 
felicitous aspects; it seems that from this moment the writer has associated the public with 
his property, or rather that he has transferred it to [the public] entirely; however, as it is 
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English and American copyright systems70. By the time the Law of March 11,1957 
was adopted, French jurisprudence appeared to attach greater weight to the 
interests of the author than of those of the public". In 1985 the public interest 
debate flourished again in the context of the reform of the Iaw72 and the same holds 
true at the turn of the twenty-first century; the first signs of the revival of the public 
interest have once again started to appear. The prevalence of the public interest 
has apparently not been consistent over the years; however that should not be 
interpreted as a disregard by French jurisprudence of such an important societal 
principle. The overall placement of the public interest today and its evolutionary 
journey have thus been described by Caron, "The public's interest exists discreetly 
[emphasis added for the present purposes] in copyright law. It is a controversial 
subject. Thus, while Balzac exclaimed 'a terrible word looms up here: the public's 
extremely just that men who cultivate the domain of thought should draw some fruit from 
their work, it is necessary that, for their whole life and for some years after their death, no- 
one may, without their consent, dispose of the product of their genius. But also, after the 
fixed time, the property of the public commences, and everyone may print, publish the works 
which have contributed to the enlightenment of the human spirit", Translation (Sterling at pp. 
1258-9 (with pemission)) of the speech by Le Chapelier introducing the draft Decree of 
January 13-19,1971. For the full text of Le Chapelier's speech, see Archives 
Parlementaires de 1787 6 1860, Premiere Serie, Tome xxii, January 13,1791, p. 210 et 
seq.; Le Moniteur Universe!, January 15,1791. 
69 In 1825, a committee, appointed by the government, and set up under the Chairmanship 
of Vicomte de la Rochefoucault rejected a perpetual copyright concluding that "Such a 
privilege existed nowhere else; it would harm education by a monopoly lasting too long; it 
would become either onerous for the public, or illusory for the families; it would often falsely 
interpret the intentions of the author himself, who by publishing his work, had hoped that 
editions would increase and multiply easily after him. It therefore appeared to us, Sire, that 
while the present term of the exclusive right should be extended there should be a limit 
thereto". See, Matthyssens, J., "Copyright Law Schemes in France during the Last Century" 
(1954) R. I. D. A. 15. 
70 "Appreciation of the similarities between the initial French and US literary property regimes 
may hold significance for modern copyright systems if only because it undermines 'historical' 
assertions of the inherent and original incompatibility of the French and Anglo-American 
approaches to copyright", Ginsburg, J. C., "A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in 
Revolutionary France and America" (1991) 147 R. I. D. A. 125, at 131. 
" "The public interest at that time seems only to have been taken into account in relation to 
limitations upon the rights of authors, including the question of duration. It was recognised 
that the author had a social role and must therefore make certain concessions in the public 
interest", Davies, G., Copyright and the Public Interest (2n' ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), at 
172. 
Commenting on the adoption of the 1985 Law on Authors' Rights and on the Rights of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Videograms and Audiovisual Communication 
Enterprises, Jack Lang, the then Minister of Culture, stated that "This draft law drew its 
inspiration from three principles: to facilitate concerted action among those participating in 
the creation of intellectual works; to provide them with one of the most advanced systems of 
legal protection in the world; to foster the dissemination of works to the public". See, Lang, 
J., "The law of 3 July 1985" (1986) 127 R. I. D. A. 6. 
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interest', Victor Hugo considered that 'literary property belongs, more than any 
other, to the general interest'. The fact nevertheless remains that the history of 
authors' rights testifies to a variable consideration of the general interest in literary 
and artistic property law - which proves that the rights of the author and those of 
the public are indissociable in nature, a fact which was perceived right from the 
revolutionary period-73. 
GERMANY In German author's rights jurisprudence, the rights of authors have traditionally 
been considered to derive primarily from natural law, while social and cultural 
factors have also contributed74. In the early 1837 Prussian Law, public interest was 
apparently not taken into account in a positive sense, as had been the case in the 
UK, US and France, but it was in a negative sense in the context of limiting the term 
of protection. In the context of the evolution of German copyright law, its judicial and 
legislative development has been, since 1949, increasingly influenced by the Basic 
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Basic Law provides certain rules 
regarding the public interest, "Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public 
interest. It may be effected only by or pursuant to a law which shall provide for the 
nature and extent of the compensation. Such compensation shall be determined by 
establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of 
those affected"75. Case Iaw76 indicates that, within the context of article 14 of the 
73 Caron, C., "Abuse of Rights and Authors' Rights" (1998) 176 R. I. D. A. 3, at p. 54. 
74 Schricker, G., in Schricker, G., Urheberrecht, Kommentar (2"d ed., Munich, C. H. 
Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1999), Introduction, para. 11; Wandtke, A., "Zur kulturellen 
und sozialen Dimension des Urheberrechts" (1993) 123 U. F. I. T. A. 5.. 
75 Basic Law, article 14(3). Article 14 concerns the rights to property, including protection of 
the economic rights of the copyright owner, and expropriation, and has to be interpreted in 
the light of article 5 concerning freedom of expression and information. Article 5 is analysed 
in para. 2.4.5. 
76 "Bibliotheksgroschen", BVerfG E, (1972) 8 G. R. U. R. 485; "Kirchen-und Schulgebrauch", 
BVerfGE, (1972) 8 G. R. U. R. 481; "Schulfunksendungen", BVerfGE, (1972) 8 G. R. U. R. 487; 
"Tonbandvervielfaltigung", BVerfGE, (1972) 8 G. R. U. R. 488; "Schallplatten", BVerfGE, 
(1972) 8 G. R. U. R. 491; "Kirchenmusik", BVerfGE, (1979) 84 U. F. I. T. A. 317. All these cases 
considered situations where there was a need to balance author's economic interests 
against the general public interest, both sets of interests safeguarded under the German 
Constitution. For a discussion of and commentary of the cases, see Fechner, F., Geistiges 
Eigentum und Verfassung (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1999), at p. 165; Ruete, M., "The 
Kirchenmusik Judgment - Constitutional and Intellectual Property Rights" (1980) E. I. P. R. 
198; Dietz, A., "Letter from Germany" (1973) Copyright 93. 
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Basic Law, the "public interest arises in a negative sense as the basis for possible 
restrictions upon the property rights of authors', 77. 
However, since the adoption of the 1965 Author's Right and Related Protection 
Rights Law, the need for balancing the interests of authors with those of the general 
public has developed78. Recently, "there are signs that the public interest in having 
an effective copyright system is being increasingly recognised , 79_ "Copyright policy 
is challenged by the precarious situation facing music, film and literature. What is 
needed is an up-to-date and reliable law for the protection of authors' rights and 
related rights, which gives the cultural industries the security required to trade 
successfully, thereby encouraging culture to flourish"ao 
5.3.2 A STATUTORY PUBLIC INTEREST? 
For the present purpose of examining the relationship between public interest and 
freedom of expression, public interest must be considered in its role as a statutory 
provision, an exception and limiting factor to the exclusive rights awarded to an 
author under national copyright regimes. This analysis is necessary in order to 
evaluate the argument that public interest is one of the internal controls of copyright 
which, when combined with other existing limitations8', provides adequate 
protection to another party's right of freedom of expression. 
It is interesting that, of the four national laws covered in this thesis, the United 
Kingdom is the only national law that appears to have given express statutory 
" Davies, G., Copyright and the Public Interest (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), at p. 209. 
'g "Exploitation rights grant to authors the material gain from their works. This granting is 
subject to certain limitations which are important from the practical standpoint: the needs of 
cultural life are served by freedom of quotation and borrowing. In the interests of public 
information, limits are placed on copyright in favour of press, radio and film reporting", 
Ulmer, E., "Letter from Germany" (1965) Copyright 275,278. 
79 Davies, G., Copyright and the Public Interest (2nd ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2002), at p. 231. 
Also, see Kleinke, Y., Pressedatenbanken und Urheberrecht (Köln etc., Carl Heymans 
Verlag, 1999); Fechner, F., Geistiges Eigentum und Verfassung (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 
1999), at p. 134. 
80 Speech of Prof. Dr. H. Däubler-Gmelin, the then German Minister of Justice, "Privater 
Vervielfaltigung unter dem Vorzeichnen digitaler Technik" at POPKOMM, Cologne, August 
20,1999 (Available online at http: //www. bundesjustizministerium. de). 
81 Such limitations include the fair use and fair dealing doctrines (see para. 5.2), the principle 
of idea/expression dichotomy (see para. 5.4), the limited copyright term (see para. 5.5) and 
the requirement of originality (see para. 5.5). 
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recognition to the public interest82. The CDPA 1988 provides, "Nothing in this part 
affects any rule of law preventing or restricting the enforcement of copyright, on 
grounds of public interest or otherwisei83. However, those opposed to the 
recognition of a public interest defence, have suggested that section 171(3) does 
not amount to an express statutory recognition84. 
The defence has been raised on a number of cases85. More recently, the public 
interest defence was considered in the case of Hyde Park Residence Ltd v. Yelland 
and Others86. The case involved the publication by a newspaper of still 
photographs, taken on a security camera, of a visit by Diana, Princess of Wales, 
and Dodi Fayed, to Villa Windsor in Paris, on the day before their deaths in a car 
accident. A set of the stills prints, showing their arrival at and departure from the 
villa, were sold by a villa employee to a newspaper. The newspaper, without the 
claimant's consent, published two prints in a five-page article entitled "Video that 
82 The public interest was initially applied in cases of breach of confidence where the plaintiff 
sought to maintain the confidentiality of facts revealing his or her own 'iniquity' - Gartside v. 
Outram (1856) 26 L. J. 113. Over the years, the definition of 'iniquity' expanded to cover 
disclosures of information which the public "needs to know" - Lion Laboratories v. Evans 
[1985] Q. B. 526 (C. A. ). 
$' CDPA 1988, section 171(3). It is generally accepted that this section preserves the 
common law defence of public interest which "is a defence outside and independent of 
statutes, is not limited to copyright cases and is based upon a general principle of common 
law" - Betoff v. Pressdram [1973] R. P. C. 783. $; This view is consistent with Lord Phillip's statement in Ashdown that "The other restriction 
which requires consideration is the defence to a claim for breach of copyright that can be 
mounted on the basis of "public interest". This is not a statutory defence, but one which 
arises at common law, and which subsists by virtue of section 171(3) of the 1988 Act", 
Ashdown v. Daily Telegraph [2002] Ch. 149, at para. 34. For a discussion of the alternative 
interpretations of the section, see Burrell, R., "Defending the Public Interest" (2000) E. I. P. R. 
394, at 402-3 - "A technical or pedantic construction focuses on the fact that the wording of 
the section does not actually provide for a defence. Rather, the section only states that any 
existing defence is preserved. If one concludes from the pre-1988 authorities that a public 
interest defence never in fact existed, it can be argued that section 171(3) is in no way 
sufficient to bring such a defence into being. ... Alternatively, it has been argued that the 
reference in this section to 'restricting enforcement' shows that Parliament was not referring 
to a public interest defence at all, but rather was only making it clear that equitable remedies 
are to remain discretionary". Also, see MacMillan, F., "Towards a Reconciliation of Free 
Speech and Copyright" (1996) The Yearbook of Media and Ent. Law 199, at 223-26. 
85 See, Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 W. L. R. 394; BSC v. Granada TV Ltd. [1981] A. C. 1096; 
Times Newspapers Ltd. and Harper Collins Ltd. v. MGN Limited [1993] E. M. L. R. 442; A-G v. 
Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1990] 1 A. C. 109. Also, see Griffiths, J., "Copyright Law 
and Censorship - The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998", (1999) 4 The Yearbook of 
Copyright and Media Law 3. 
16 [2001] Ch. 143. For commentary of the case, see Burrell, R., "Defending the Public 
Interest" [2000] E. I. P. R. 394; Phillips, J., "When is a Fact" (2000) Ent. L. Rev. 116. 
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shames Fayed's father". The claimant brought an action for copyright infringement 
against the editor, publishers and printers of the newspaper and the employee. The 
defendant relied on the fair dealing and public interest defences under the CDPA 
1988. The trial judge upheld both defences and dismissed the claimant's application 
for summary judgement. On appeal, the Court overturned that decision. A majority 
of the Court of Appeal rejected the submission that there was a general public 
interest defence to an action for copyright infringement. The court defined the scope 
of the defence narrowly, "A court would be entitled to refuse to enforce copyright if 
the work is: (i) immoral, scandalous or contrary to family life; (ii) injurious to public 
life, public health and safety or the administration of justice; (iii) incites or 
encourages others to act in a way referred to in (ii)"87. 
The relationship between the public interest defence and freedom of expression has 
been considered in a number of cases. In PCR Limited v. Dow Jones Telerate 
Limited", the court made an express connection between the two rights, "This 
defence of public interest is more common in relation to breach of confidence, but it 
has been recognised, often in overlapping cases of copyright and breach of 
confidence, as being relevant as a defence to a claim of breach of copyright. It is 
also established that it is not limited to the disclosure of iniquity. It is consistent with 
and reinforced by Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights"89. 
The potential of the public interest to protect freedom of expression was illustrated 
in the case of Lion Laboratories v. Evans90 where the Court of Appeal accepted that 
publication of information concerning the effectiveness of certain breathalysing 
machines was in the public interest and could not be prevented on the basis of 
breach of confidence or copyright infringement. Even though the case pre-dated the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the Court of Appeal referred to the potential of a conflict 
between the interests of the copyright owner and freedom of expression91. 
$' [2001] Ch. 143, at para. 64. This narrow interpretation of the scope of the public interest 
was effectively rejected in the later case of Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Limited [2002] Ch. 
149; see discussion below. 
$$ [1998] F. S. R. 170. 
89 [1998] F. S. R. 170, at 187. 
90 [1985] Q. B. 526 (C. A. ). 
91 "The problem before the judge and before this court is how best to resolve, before trial, a 
conflict of two competing public interests. The first public interest is the preservation of the 
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The ambit of the public interest defence and its role in cases where freedom of 
expression is invoked was considered in Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Limited 2. 
The Court of Appeal, rejected the narrow interpretation that Aldous L. J. applied to 
the public interest in Hyde Park Residence v. Yelland And Others93, stating that: 
"... we do not consider that Aldous L. J. as justified in circumscribing the public 
interest defence to breach of copyright as tightly as he did. We prefer the 
conclusion of Mance L. J. that the circumstances in which public interest may 
override copyright are not capable of precise categorisation or definition"14 
Acknowledging that situations of conflict between copyright and freedom of 
expression can arise, albeit rarely, the court went on to observe that "Now that the 
Human Rights Act 1998 is in force, there is the clearest public interest in giving 
effect to the right of freedom of expression in those rare cases where this right 
trumps the rights conferred by the 1988 Act. In such circumstances, we consider 
that section 171(3) of the Act permits the defence of public interest to be raised"95. 
The court stressed the rarity of such situations further, concluding that "We do not 
consider that this conclusion will lead to a flood of cases where freedom of 
expression is invoked as a defence to a claim for breach of copyright. It will be very 
rare for the public interest to justify the copying of the form of a work to which 
copyright attaches"96. 
5.3.3 CONCLUSIONS 
right of organisations, as of individuals, to keep secret confidential information. The courts 
will restrain breaches of confidence, and breaches of copyright, unless there is just cause or 
excuse for breaking confidence or infringing copyright. The just cause or excuse with which 
this case is concerned is the public interest in admittedly confidential information. There is 
confidential information which the public may have a right to receive and others, in particular 
the press, now extended to the media, may have a right and even a duty to publish, even if 
the information has been unlawfully obtained in flagrant breach of confidence and 
irrespective of the motive of the informer. The duty of confidence, the public interest in 
maintaining it, is a restriction on the freedom of the press which is recognised by our law, as 
well as by article 10(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1953) (Cmd. 8969); the duty to publish, the countervailing interest 
of the public in being kept informed of matters which are of real public concern, is an inroad 
on the privacy of confidential matters. ", [1985] Q. B. 526 (C. A. ), at 536-7. 
92 [2002] Ch. 149. For a discussion of the facts of the case and further analysis, see pares. 
3.5.2 and 4.5.2.1. 
93 [2001] Ch. 143. 
94 [2002] Ch. 149, at para. 58. 
95 [2002] Ch. 149, at para. 58. 
96 [2002] Ch. 149, at para. 59. 
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Public interest has played an important role in the framing of copyright laws. Most 
such laws have their origin in the need to balance the interests of an author in his 
intellectual creations against those of the general public. In this respect, the public 
interest has prominently featured in national jurisprudence and judicial decision- 
making. Thus the public interest as a general legal concept of an abstract nature, 
could arguably be consistent with the protection of another party's right of freedom 
of expression, in the sense that it serves to curtail, to an extent, the exclusive rights 
awarded to an author. 
In UK cases the scope of the public interest has been narrowly defined, which 
would appear to imply that, given this restricted ambit, it cannot adequately protect 
freedom of expression. The case of Ashdown97 seems to be the only case that has 
set out the potential interaction of copyright and freedom of expression, in terms 
less vague than its predecessors: any potential claim to freedom of expression can 
be accommodated through the limitations already present in the 1988 Act and 
although instances can arise where it might be in the public interest to allow 
freedom of expression to prevail over an author's copyright, such instances would 
appear to be rare. 
In conclusion, it may be argued that UK courts appear to support the general 
argument that existing limitations, the public interest included, do afford sufficient 
protection to the individual's right of freedom of expression. 
However, given the analysis of the relevant case law and of the reasoning 
underlying these decisions, such an argument does not appear sustainable. Given 
the fact that the public interest is almost absent from most national copyright 
legislations, coupled with the fact that even where it is statutorily provided for, "the 
question whether any public-interest defence really does exist in relation to an 
action for breach of copyright ... is quite unresolved 
i98, paint a weak picture of the 
actual importance of the public interest in cases involving freedom of expression. It 
could thus be deduced that public interest does not appear to provide sufficient 
97 [2002] Ch. 149. 
98 MacMillan, F., "Towards a Reconciliation of Free Speech and Copyright" (1996) The 
Yearbook of Media and Ent. Law 199, at 225. 
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means for individuals to protect their human right in cases of alleged copyright 
infringement; it is a right loosely defined and not recognised as a right of the 
individual per se. 
5.4 NON-PROTECTION OF IDEAS 
On the international level, the principle of non-protection of ideas is expressly 
recognised in the TRIPS Agreement 199499. 
On the national level, the doctrine of the idea/expression dichotomy is mostly 
prevalent in the Anglo-American copyright tradition. Although the doctrine is 
expressly protected in section 106(2) of the US Copyright Act 1976100, it does not 
enjoy such distinct legislative protection under the UK CDPA 198810'. Nevertheless, 
both national laws and the US law in particular, have developed extensive case law 
on this internal safety valve to copyright. 
The principle is to be understood as preventing third parties from copying the 
copyright owner's specific expression, while allowing them to make free use of 
ideas102 and facts contained in any given work which is protected by copyright' 03 
The essence of the doctrine has been said to be that it "assures authors the right to 
99 Article 9(2), "Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, 
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such". This principle is 
further discussed in paras. 1.3.2.1 and 5.4. 
loo "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated or embodied in such 
work". 
'01 The idea/expression dichotomy is also recognised in Article 2(8) of the Berne Convention 
1971; "The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to 
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information". 
"z "Ideas, it has always been admitted... are free as air", Birrell, A., Seven Lectures on the 
Law and History of Copyright in Books (2nd ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co, London, 1971) at 
167. 
103 Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers Ltd. [1938] Ch. 106, at 109-10; Gleeson v. H. R. Denne 
Ltd. [1975] R. P. C. 471; Gomme (E. ) Ltd. v. Relaxateze Upholstery Ltd. [1976] R. P. C. 377; 
Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd. [1978] F. S. R. 405; LB (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish 
Products Ltd. [1979] R. P. C. 551, H. L.; George Ward (Moxley) Ltd, v. Richard Sankey Ltd. 
[1988] F. S. R. 66; Designers Guild Ltd. v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd. [2001] F. S. R. 11, 
H. L.. 
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their original expression, but encourages others to build upon freely upon the ideas 
and information conveyed by a work" 104 
UNITED The case of IBCOS Computers Ltd v. Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd'os 
KINGDOM stated the position of the UK concept of the idea/expression dichotomy "If an idea 
embodied in the plaintiffs work is sufficiently general, the mere taking of that idea 
will not infringe. If however, the idea is worked out in some detail in the plaintiffs 
work and the defendant reproduces the expression of that idea, then there may be 
an infringement. It is a question of degree. The same applies if the work is 
functional or not, and whether visual or literary"'o6 
Ravenscroft v. Herbert107 is a frequently cited point of reference on the issue of 
idea/expression dichotomy. The case involved a claim by the author of a non-fiction 
book entitled 'The Spear of Destiny' that the defendant had infringed his copyright in 
the book by writing a novel called 'The Spear. The central feature of both books 
was a spearhead which forms part of the Hapsburg Treasure exhibited in Vienna. 
However, the books were of a different nature; while the plaintiffs book combined 
historical facts and a degree of mysticism, the defendant's book was a thriller. 
Brightman J. concluded that "the plaintiff cannot claim a monopoly in historical facts. 
The law of copyright does not preclude another author from writing upon the same 
theme .... Otherwise one would be 
driven to the conclusion that the plaintiff has a 
monopoly of the facts"108. However, protection was given to the plaintiff on the basis 
of appropriation of elements of the novel's plot. 
Another case of considerable importance within the UK jurisprudence of the 
idea/expression dichotomy is Designers Guild Ltd. v. Russell Williams (Textiles) 
Ltd. 109. The case involved a claim of copyright infringement by the plaintiff, owner of 
copyright in the artwork for a fabric design, against the defendant, creator of a 
similar design, on the basis that the latter's design had copied many elements, 
amounting to a substantial part, of the plaintiffs design. The Court of Appeal, 
104 Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Senn. Co., Inc., 499 U. S. 340 (1991), at 349-50. 
'0' [1994] F. S. R. 275. 
106 [1994] F. S. R. 275, at 291. 
107 [1980] R. P. C. 193. 
108 [1980] R. P. C. 193, at 205. 
109 [2001] F. S. R. 11 (H. L. ). 
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overturning the trial judge, held that no substantial part of the original design had 
been copied. Designers Guild appealed to the House of Lords arguing that the test 
for infringement was not whether the images looked the same, but whether their 
similarities and differences amounted to a substantial taking of skill, labour and 
judgement in the image. Lord Hoffmann's statement regarding "ideas and 
expression" is considered to be of significance. In his judgement, he discussed the 
question of what is really meant by the notion that there is no copyright in ideas and 
what is the basis of the so-called idea/expression dichotomy1'. 
The most recent case where the idea/expression dichotomy was considered is 
Michael Baigent and Richard Leigh v. The Random House Group Limited"'. In this 
case, the two claimants alleged that the novel 'The Da Vinci Code' authored by Dan 
Brown, constituted an infringement of copyright in their earlier novel entitled 'The 
Holy Blood and the Holy Grail', on the basis that Dan Brown had appropriated the 
theme and ideas explored in their book. The court, dismissing the plaintiffs claim, 
held that "... it is accepted that an author has no copyright in his facts nor in his 
ideas but only in his original expression of such facts or ideas. Original in that 
"o "It is often said ... that copyright subsists not 
in ideas but in the form in which the ideas 
but in the form in which the ideas are expressed. The distinction between expression and 
ideas finds a place in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) ([1994] O. J. L336/213), to which the United Kingdom is a party (see Article 
9.2: 'Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas ... '). Nevertheless, 
it 
needs to be handled with care. What does it mean? As Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone 
said in L. B. (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Products Ltd. [1979] R. P. C. 551 at 629, 'it all depends on 
what you mean by'ideas'. 
Plainly there can be no copyright in an idea which is merely in the head, which has not been 
expressed in copyrightable form, as a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, but the 
distinction between ideas and expression cannot mean anything so trivial as that. On the 
other hand, every element in the expression of an artistic work (unless it got there by 
accident or compulsion) is the expression of an idea on the part of the author.... 
My Lords, if one examines the cases in which the distinction between ideas and the 
expression of ideas has been given effect, I think it will be found that they support two quite 
distinct propositions. The first is that a copyright work may express certain ideas which are 
not protected because they have no connection with the literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
nature of the work. ... The other proposition is that certain ideas expressed by a copyright 
work may not be protected because, although they are ideas of a literary, dramatic or artistic 
nature, they are not original, or so commonplace as not to form a substantial part of the 
work.... 
Generally speaking, in cases of artistic copyright, the more abstract and simple the copied 
idea, the less likely it is to constitute a substantial part. ", [2001] F. S. R. 11 (H. L. ), at paras. 
23-26. 
'11 [2006] E. W. H. C. 719 (Ch. ). 
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context does not mean novel of course' 2.... In other words, the facts and the 
themes and the ideas cannot be protected but how those facts, themes and ideas 
are put together can be"73. 
The interrelation between the idea/expression dichotomy and freedom of 
expression was addressed in the case of Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. 114 . The 
Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether that principle was sufficient to 
safeguard a party's freedom of expression vis-ä-vis the author's copyright and 
concluded that "Copyright does not normally prevent the publication of the 
information conveyed by the literary work. Thus it is only the freedom to express 
information using the verbal formula devised by another that is prevented by 
copyright. This will not normally constitute a significant encroachment on the 
freedom of expression. It is also important that the citizen should be free to express 
the ideas and convey the information in a form of words of his or her choice. It is 
stretching the concept of freedom of expression to postulate that it extends to the 
freedom to convey ideas and information using the form devised by someone 
elsei1'. 
UNITED STATES The US case of Baker v. Selden16(1879) employed the doctrine of idea/expression 
OF AMERICA dichotomy to deny a claim of copyright infringement. The case involved two books 
describing a system of accounting. Both books also included various forms which 
could be used to implement the accounting system but the defendant's forms had 
their columns arranged in a different way from the plaintiffs forms. The court held 
that "contrary to the plaintiffs assertion, copyright did not and could not extend to 
the system itself, which was the 'idea' behind the plaintiffs work"'W and although 
the plaintiffs description of the accounting system was entitled to copyright 
protection, copyright could not be used to prevent others from describing or using 
the same system themselves7'. 
"Z [2006] E. W. H. C. 719 (Ch. ), at para. 172. 
113 [2006] E. W. H. C. 719 (Ch. ), at para. 176. 
14 [2001] E. M. L. R. 44 (C. A. ). For a discussion of the facts of the case and further 
commentary, see paras. 2.5.2 and 3.5.2.1. 
15 [2001] E. M. L. R. 44 (C. A. ), at para. 31. 
16101 U. S. 99(1879). 
101 U. S. 99,104-05 (1879). 
"$ 101 U. S. 99,104 (1879). 
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In Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc. 19, the Ninth Circuit 
considered a claim for copyright infringement involving two books which described 
different strategies that could be used in playing the game of Scrabble. Even though 
the defendant had paraphrased a "significant part" of the plaintiffs book, the court 
dismissed the plaintiffs claim holding that "while the similarities between the two 
works might prove infringement in many cases, the limited range of expressions 
inherent in the ideas behind a book about how to play Scrabble requires more literal 
copying to prove infringement" t20. A similar decision was reached in Litchfield v. 
Spielberg121, where copyright infringement was denied on the basis that the movie 
E. T. - The Extra Terrestrial was not sufficiently similar to the elements of the 
musical play Lokey from Maldemar. In Berkic v. Crichton 122, the production of the 
movie Coma was held to be not sufficiently similar to the screenplay Reincarnation, 
Inc., thus not constituting copyright infringement, while in Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co. 123, 
the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that the defendant's line of stuffed dinosaurs 
infringed her `Ding-A-Saur' line of stuffed dinosaurs124. 
A number of cases have expressly referred to the doctrine of the idea/expression 
dichotomy as representing a "definitional balance" 125 between copyright and First 
Amendment claims126. In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's 
19 736 F. 2d 485 (9"' Cir. ), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1037 (1984). 
120 736 F. 2d 485,488-89 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1037 (1984). 
121 736 F. 2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U. S. 1052 (1985). 
122 761 F. 2d 1289 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 826 (1985). 
123 831 F. 2d 898 (9'h Cir. 1987). 
124 "No copyright protection may be afforded to the idea of producing stuffed dinosaur toys or 
to elements of expression that necessarily follow from the idea of such dolls. Appellants 
therefore may place no reliance upon any similarity in expression resulting from either the 
physiognomy of dinosaurs of from the nature of stuffed animals. ", 831 F. 2d 898,901 (91h Cir. 
1987). 
125 See, Nimmer, M. B., "The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory 
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy", (1968) 56 Cal. L. Rev. 935, at 944. 
126 In adopting this approach, US courts have often relied on early academic commentary 
and, in particular a review article by Nimmer, M. B., "Does Copyright Abridge the First 
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press? " (1970) 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180. In his 
article, Nimmer concluded that copyright should in general be immune to strict First 
Amendment scrutiny because any conflict between copyright and free speech could be 
resolved through "safety valves" inherent in copyright, those safety valves being the 
idea/expression dichotomy principle, the fair use exception and the limited copyright 
duration. For subsequent commentary on this matter, see Goldstein, P., "Copyright and the 
First Amendment" (1970) 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983; Sobel, L. S., "Copyright and the First 
Amendment: A Gathering Storm? " in 19 Copyright Law Symposium 43 (American Society of 
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Corp. 127, the Ninth Circuit stated that "The impact, if any, of the First Amendment on 
copyright has not been discussed by the [Supreme] Court. We believe this silence 
stems not from neglect but from the fact that the idea-expression dichotomy already 
serves to accommodate the competing interests of copyright and the First 
Amendment. n128. This view was later supported in Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty129 which 
upheld that "The 'idea/expression' dichotomy serves to accommodate any First 
Amendment concernss130 
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. 131, the court once again 
stressed that First Amendment protections are "already embodied in the Copyright 
Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and 
ideass132. In effect, Harper & Row "allowed restrictions of speech because the 
limitations were seen as enhancing speech overall by protecting the economic 
incentive for expression" 133. The same conclusions were reached by the court in the 
case of United Video, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission134, "In the 
present case, the petitioners desire to make commercial use of the copyrighted 
works of others. There is no [F]irst [A]mendment right to do so. Although there is 
some tension between the Constitution's copyright clause and the [F]irst 
[A]mendment, the familiar idea/expression dichotomy of copyright law, under which 
ideas are free but their particular expression can be copyrighted, has always been 
held to give adequate protection to free expressioni13s 
CONCLUSIONS However, it appears that the idea/expression dichotomy principle falls short of 
adequately safeguarding free speech vis-ä-vis copyright in several respects. Firstly, 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (eds. ) 1971); Denicola, R. C., "Copyright and Free 
Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression" (1979) 67 Cal. L. Rev. 
283. 
127 562 F. 2d 1157 (9t' Cir. 1977). 
128 562 F. 2d 1157,1170 (9t' Cir. 1977). 
129 664 F. Supp. 1345 (N. D. Cal. 1987). 
130 664 F. Supp. 1345,1351 (N. D. Cal. 1987). 
"' 471 U. S. 539 (1985). For the facts of the case and further commentary, see para. 4.5.3.1. 
132 471 U. S. 539,560 (1985). 
133 Chemerinsky, E., "Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the 
Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional" (2002) 36 Loy. L. A. L Rev. 82, at 88. Also, see 
Fraser, S., "The Conflict Between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and Its Impact 
on the Internet" (1998) 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. Law J. 1, at pp. 10-21. 
"a 890 F. 2d 1173 (D. C. Cir. 1989). 
135 890 F. 2d 1173 (D. C. Cir. 1989) at 1191. 
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there are instances where literal copying is necessary in order effectively, 
authentically and convincingly to convey a message13'. Verbatim copying will 
sometimes be allowed under the fair use/fair dealing limitations137, but only if it 
satisfies the limitation's requirements. In addition, such copying must not constitute 
a substantial portion of existing literary expression. Case law does exist, albeit 
limited, which appears to suggest that the right of freedom of expression might not 
be adequately served if verbatim copying is indiscriminately prohibited. In Cohen v. 
California"', the Supreme Court recognised that "we cannot indulge in the facile 
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial 
risk of suppressing ideas in the process"139. In the UK case of Ashdown v. 
Telegraph Group Ltd. 140, the Court of Appeal observed that there are situations 
where preservation of freedom of expression might extend to protecting the very 
format of expression of the original work: 
"In most circumstances, the principle of freedom of expression will be 
sufficiently protected if there is a right to publish information and ideas set 
out in another's literary work, without copying the very words which that 
person has employed to convey the information or express the ideas. In 
such circumstances, it will normally be necessary in a democratic society 
that the author of the work should have his property in his own creation 
protected. Strasbourg jurisprudence 14' demonstrates, however, that 
circumstances can arise in which freedom of expression will only be fully 
effective if an individual is permitted to reproduce the very words spoken 
by another"142. 
136 In his 1970 article, Nimmer had proposed a compulsory license to copy news 
photographs. See Nimmer, M. B., "Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees 
of Free Speech and Press? " (1970) 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 However, years later he did 
recognize that a speaker's need to copy expression in order to effectively convey a 
message need not be confined to news photographs or even other graphic works; he 
accepted that there are a number of instances where "vital news elements will be lost unless 
the exact language can be quoted". See, Nimmer at para. 1.10[D]. 
137 For a detailed discussion of the limitations, see para. 5.2. 
138 403 U. S. 15 (1971). 
139 403 U. S. 15 (1971) at 26. 
140 [2001] E. M. L. R. 44 (C. A. ). 
14' The court cited the cases of Jersild v. Denmark; (15890/89) (1994) 19 E. H. R. R. 1, and 
Fresoz and Roire v. France (1999) 5 B. H. R. C. 654. 
142 [2001] E. M. L. R. 44 (C. A. ), at paras. 39-43. 
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Nevertheless, case law to date appears to illustrate that, in its current state, 
copyright law does not expressly recognise that there might be instances where 
verbatim quotation of large portions of existing works should be allowed in order to 
enhance the effectiveness of communication. 
Secondly, it is clearly difficult to draw a clear line between what constitutes an idea 
and what constitutes expression. According to Yen, "The idea/expression dichotomy 
is notoriously malleable and indeterminate, far more useful as a shorthand for 
justifying judges' case-by-case conclusions regarding when a defendant has prima 
facie inappropriately copied than as a mechanism for predicting what sorts of 
copying and borrowing are permissible"' 43 
It appears that over the years, courts have broadened the scope of the author's 
exclusive right of reproduction. As a result, appropriation of an author's expression 
has not only been upheld where literal copying has taken place, but also in cases 
where the overall style and structure of a work has been taken even if the actual 
speech of the original work has only been copied at a high level of abstraction and 
there is no close similarity of word between the two works144. Substantial similarity 
between two works can constitute copyright infringement: the boundaries of this 
concept are not necessarily confined to the establishment of literal copying. If the 
new work can be viewed overall as evoking the same "total concept and feel" as the 
143 Yen, A. C., "A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and 
Copyright in a Work's 'Total Concept and Feel'" (1989) 38 Emory L. J. 393, at pp. 405-06. 
144 See, Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F. 2d 87,91 (2d Cir. 1976); Sid & 
Marty Krafft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F. 2d 1157,1167 (91' Cir. 
1977); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F. 2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), at 
619-20; Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F. 2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), at 
1232-33; Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N. D. Cal. 
1986); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F. 2d 117 (81h Cir. 1987), at 120-21; Digital 
Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N. D. Ga. 1987); 
Chuck Blare & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671 (D. Minn. 
1987); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S. D. N. Y. 1987); McCulloch 
v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F. 2d 316 (91h Cir. 1987); Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 
F. 2d 731 (4"' Cir. 1990) at 734; Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F. 2d 1379 (1S` Cir. 1993) at 1395. For a 
detailed discussion of this issue, see Netanel, N. W., "Locating Copyright Within the First 
Amendment Skein" (2001) 54 Stanford L. Rev. 1, at pp. 12-19. For a critical analysis of the 
above-mentioned cases, see Yen, A. C., "A First Amendment Perspective on the 
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's 'Total Concept and Feel'" (1989) 38 
Emory L. J. 393, at pp. 407-420. 
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original, the defendant is in risk of having breached the latter work's copyright145. 
Commenting on the vague nature of this principle, Judge Learned Hand observed 
that the line between idea and expression, "wherever it is drawn, will seem 
arbitrary"146. In Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp. 147, the Second Circuit 
recognised the difficulty of separating idea from expression "Obviously, no principle 
can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea', and has 
borrowed its 'expression'. Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hocaa "' 
Commentators have argued that the non-protection of ideas does not constitute an 
effective means of preserving the right of freedom of expression and accordingly, 
should not be considered as a safety valve inherent to copyright sufficient to 
accommodate freedom of expression interests. Netanel observes that "the First 
Amendment protection afforded by copyright's idea/expression dichotomy is no less 
gas Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Corp., 81 F. 2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936) (held that 
parallel plot development between a movie and a play did constitute copyright infringement 
despite the absence of literal copying); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F. 2d 
1106 (9th Cir. 1970), at 1110 (held that the defendant's greeting card may constitute 
copyright infringement because it was imitative despite the fact that it had copied neither 
copyright text nor copyright artwork). 
146 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), at 122. In this case, 
concerning two plays with similar plots and characters, Judge Learned Hand authored the 
most widely quoted distinction between idea and expression: "Upon any work, and 
especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally 
well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the 
most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; 
but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since 
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas', to which, apart from their 
expression, his property is never extended" (at 121). Several cases dealing with the issue of 
the idea/expression dichotomy have cited Hand's test, including Burroughs v. Metro- 
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F. 2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982), at 624; Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin 
Computer Corp., 714 F. 2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), at 1253, cert. dismissed, 464 U. S. 1033 
(1984); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F. 2d 44 (2d Cir. ), at 49, cert. denied, 476 U. S. 
1159 (1986). The importance of the judge's statement was emphasized in Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F. 2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), at 1163, where 
the Ninth Circuit stated that "No court or commentator ... has been able to improve upon Judge Learned Hand's famous 'abstractions test' articulated in Nichols... ". Despite the 
importance that has been attached to Hand's assertion, his statement still does not clarify 
the boundaries between ideas and expression. Besides, Hand himself admitted that his 
solution rested ultimately upon instinct "Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and 
nobody ever can" - Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), at 121. 
Also, see Yen, A. C., "A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
and Copyright in a Work's 'Total Concept and Feel'" (1989) 38 Emory L. J. 393, at p. 405. 
147 274 F. 2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). 
148 274 F. 2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960), at 489. Also, see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. 
Kalpakian, 446 F. 2d 738 (9`h Cir. 1971), at 742. 
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uncertain, unstable and illusory than the dichotomy itself'149. In fact, some 
commentators have gone as far as to suggest that the vagueness characteristic of 
this principle goes not only against freedom of expression150, but undermines the 
argument that copyright can not amount to censorship15'. 
The difficulty in drawing the line between an idea and expression, coupled with the 
fact that there are instances where the very expression of an idea must be copied 
verbatim in order to convey the desired message render this principle inefficient as 
a means of protecting freedom of expression. It is submitted that freedom of 
expression should not be attempted to be hastily accommodated within the blurred 
and vague ambit of the idea/expression dichotomy. It is suggested that while the 
doctrine goes some way towards taking into account the individual's human right, it 
does not cover all situations of potential conflict. Freedom of expression should not 
be dependent upon ad hoc judicial decisions. 
5.5 TERM OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
In addition to the exceptions and limitations already examined in this Chapter, 
commentators have, on occasions, referred to the limited term of copyright 
protection as a factor that curtails an author's copyright, thus contributing to the 
harmonisation of copyright and freedom of expression. 
This issue was addressed by Nimmer in 1970152. In his frequently cited article, he 
put forward the argument that copyright is immune from challenges under the First 
149 See, Netanel, N. W., "Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein" (2001) 54 
Stanford L. Rev. 1, at p. 19. 
150 The doctrine "may be a tolerable burden as a matter of copyright policy, it is less tolerable 
when considered from the vantage of free speech, because the uncertainty can cast a 
serious chill on communicative activities", Zimmerman, D., "Information as Speech, 
Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights" (1992) 33 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 665, at p. 709. 
'51 "Faced with the fuzzed line between idea and expression, would-be speakers, unsure of 
their rights, might conclude that they are better off bargaining with the copyright owner for 
permission than risking the costs of litigation, a possible injunction, and an assessment of 
damages. Once the would-be speaker asks the first author, the first author may, of course, 
deny the license for any or even for no reason, thereby giving her a degree of control that 
can extend beyond the technical confines of her actual rights under the statute", 
Zimmerman, D., "Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on 
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights" (1992) 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 665, at p. 709. 
'52 At the time Nimmer was writing his article, Congress was considering legislation that 
would have extended the term of protection for subsisting copyright works for an additional 
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Amendment as there exists a "definitional balance" between the two sets of rights, 
copyright's limited terms being one of the factors contributing to the achievement of 
such balance. However, he maintained that "a serious question exists as to the 
constitutional validity of the proposed extension [and the interim extensions], given 
the countervailing interest in free speech"153. He also noted that retrospective 
copyright term extensions provide no incentive for the creation of new 
expression"' 
Since Nimmer's article, the US Congress has, on a number of occasions, 
lengthened the copyright term for published works and has also provided for the 
protection of unpublished works. The 1976 Copyright Act set out a general 
copyright term of the life of the author plus fifty years, both for published and 
unpublished works. In 1998, Congress extended that term to the life of the author 
plus seventy years with the passing of the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA). 
In 1999 the landmark case of Eldred v. Ashcroft155 came before the courts. In this 
case, the plaintiff brought an action challenging the constitutionality of the CTEA. 
One of the grounds they relied upon was that such an extension interfered with the 
First Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected Eldred's challenge and concluded 
that Congress's extension of the copyright term did not exceed its powers under the 
Copyright Clause and did not violate the First Amendment156 
nineteen years beyond the then term. The proposed legislation was later enacted as part of 
the 1976 Copyright Act currently in force. 
153 Nimmer, M. B., "Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free 
Speech and Press? ", (1970) 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, at 1195. 
154 Netanel, N. W., "Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein" (2001) 54 
Stanford L. Rev. 1, at 23-4. 
iss 537 U. S. 186 (2003). The case is widely considered very important in two respects: the 
extension of the copyright term and the court's observations regarding the relationship 
between copyright and free speech. The latter aspect has already been discussed in para. 
3.5.3.1. For commentary on the case, see Netanel, N. W., "Locating Copyright Within the 
First Amendment Skein" (2001) 54 Stanford L. Rev. 1; Chemerinsky, E., "Balancing 
Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act is 
Unconstitutional" (2002) 36 Loy. L. A. L Rev. 82. Cf. Yen, A. C., "Eldred, the First 
Amendment and Aggressive Copyright Claims" (2003) 40(3) Houston L. Rev. 101. 
's6 For a critical analysis of the case's implications in the area of copyright vis-ä-vis free 
speech, see Birnhack, M. D., "Copyrighting Speech: A Trans-Atlantic View", in Copyright and 
Human Rights: Freedom of Expression - Intellectual Property- Privacy (Torremans, P. L. C. 
(ed. ), Kluwer Law International, 2004), 37, at pp. 47-8; Gordon, J. W., "Do We Have a Right 
to Speak with Another's Language? Eldred and the Duration of Copyright", in Copyright and 
Human Rights: Freedom of Expression - Intellectual Property- Privacy (Torremans, P. L. C. 
(ed. ), Kluwer Law International, 2004), 109, at pp. 109-12. 
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Given these developments, it is difficult to discern how the argument that limited 
copyright protection promotes freedom of expression holds valid. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
An argument that has been put forward by courts and legislators alike in both 
common law and civil law countries is that existing defences, exceptions and 
limitations to copyright protect the human right of freedom of expression; the way 
copyright laws of some countries are framed emanates from public interest 
concerns and thus freedom of expression concerns are inherently protected within 
the realms of copyright. 
Having examined the most frequently cited limitations to copyright, it is debatable 
whether they do adequately protect freedom of expression. The current situation 
can probably be accurately summarised using the words of Yen, "It is dangerous to 
put free speech at the mercy of the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use because 
those doctrines do not have enough substance to adequately protect something so 
importanti15'. 
It is not clear why courts appear so reluctant to consider freedom of expression per 
se as a right that could directly limit or indeed be limited by copyright law. It is 
equally unclear why courts appear so eager to try to accommodate any such 
concerns within existing copyright law provisions. Given the increasing rate of 
litigation involving freedom of expression and, at times, the insurmountable 
difficulties courts are faced with in giving fully comprehensive rulings in such cases, 
the right time has arrived for freedom of expression to be evaluated for what it truly 
is: a universal human right that should be juxtaposed with copyright in its proper 
character and nature as a human right quite distinct from limitations and exceptions 
to copyright, none of which expressly refer to the principles of human rights. 
157 Yen, A., "Eldred, the First Amendment and Aggressive Copyright Claims", (2003) 40(3) 
Houston L. Rev. 101, at 109. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Proposals and Conclusion 
6.1 1 NTRODUCTION 
Copyright law does not generally take specific account of freedom of expression. 
On the international level, the Berne Convention does not recognise freedom of 
expression as such. The same appears to apply at the regional and national levels. 
Courts have not generally subjected private causes of action under copyright law to 
freedom of expression scrutiny'. Instead, provisions on limitations and exceptions to 
copyright have, in some cases, been used as means of taking account of freedom 
of expression. The fair use/fair dealing defences to copyright infringement have, on 
a number of occasions, been held to protect a person's freedom of expression right 
fully and adequately vis-ä-vis the author's protection2. The principle of 
idea/expression dichotomy, inherent in copyright jurisprudence and recognised 
' However, this has not been the case with similar causes of action in other contexts, such 
as publicity rights and defamation. In these contexts, courts have generally been more 
willing to exercise freedom of expression scrutiny and uphold freedom of expression 
arguments. See, Cardfoons v. Major League Baseball Players Association 95 F 3d 959,39 
U. S. P. Q. 2d 1865,1865 (10th Cir, 1996) (the right to free expression of producer of playing 
cards (plaintiff), in the form of parody baseball trading cards, outweighs the proprietary 
publicity rights held by the members of the Baseball Players Association (defendants) since 
justifications for the right of publicity are not nearly as compelling as those offered for other 
forms of intellectual property, and are an important form of entertainment and social 
commentary that deserve First Amendment protection); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc. 
255 F 3d 1180,59 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1363 (9°i Cir, 2001) (a magazine that published, in the 
context of a feature about Hollywood stars' past and present, a manipulated photograph of 
actor Dustin Hoffman, giving the impression that he was wearing a contemporary silk gown, 
was entitled to the full First Amendment protection awarded to non-commercial speech); 
New York Times v. Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964) (the Supreme Court ruled that libel should 
no longer be treated as immune to First Amendment scrutiny). For a discussion of the 
relationship between defamation and freedom of expression and relevant case law, see 
Barendt, Chapter VI, Nimmer, M. B., "The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First 
Amendent Theory Appled to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy" (1986) 56 Cal. L. Rev. 935, 
Wellington, H. H., "On Freedom of Expression" (1979) Yale L. J. 1105. 
2 For a detailed discussion of this proposition, see para. 5.2. 
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under the TRIPS Agreement 1994, has also been held to provide effective 
protection to freedom of expression concerns'. 
However, it appears that the current limitations to copyright are not effective means 
of safeguarding freedom of expression. The thesis has identified a number of gaps 
in the law despite the existence and application of copyright exceptions. Most 
importantly, it appears that the courts are reluctant to consider the right of freedom 
of expression per se in the context of copyright law. Judicial decisions discussing 
even the interrelation between the human right and copyright limitations are 
comparatively rare4. 
6.2 MAIN PROPOSALS IN OUTLINE 
This Chapter puts forward a number of proposals with a view to ameliorating the 
present legal landscape. Firstly, it is proposed that the right of freedom of 
expression receives express recognition within copyright law as opposed to implied 
recognition through other rights and limitations already in places. 
The second proposal flows directly from the suggestion of express recognition of 
freedom of expression. The right of freedom of expression is a human right and 
therefore of a universal character; in other words, the right is vested in every 
individual indiscriminately and without pre-requisite conditions6. It is here 
considered that its character should be reflected in its recognition within the field of 
copyright law. It is therefore proposed that the principle of non-discrimination? 
should be introduced within the body. of copyright. This proposal aims to render 
3 For a detailed discussion of this proposition, see para. 5.4. 
4 See the conclusions drawn from the respective analyses in Chapters 3,4 and 5. 
5 This proposal is discussed further in para. 6.3. 
6 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Preamble, ("Whereas recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world"), Article 2 ("Everyone is entitled to 
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the 
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person 
belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty"). 
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or 
international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be 
independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 
This proposal is discussed further in para. 6.4. 
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international copyright compliant with another international law, that of human 
rights, while, at the same time, reflecting the copyright law's own nature and 
character as a human right8. 
The thesis puts forward that these proposals are implemented by revising the Berne 
Convention 1971. The proposition that the Convention is the appropriate 
implementation forum rests on a number of reasons. These are arguably 
encapsulated in Ricketson's statement that "the evidence of state practice ... is that, 
100 years after the establishment of the Convention, its members continue to 
subscribe to the basic object of the Convention: the effective and uniform protection 
of the rights of authors"9. 
The Convention constitutes the principal international source of copyright law, its 
Member States being from all continents. The large number of Members reflects the 
uniform nature of the Convention in its objective of constituting the "ultimate 
universal codification of copyright"10. 
These attributes of the Berne Convention and its continuing significance in the 
context of copyright law are reflected in the text of a "solemn declaration" that was 
made on 9 September 1986 by the Assembly of the Berne Union, recognising that: 
" ... copyright is based on human rights and justice and that authors ... 
deserve that their rights be recognised and effectively protected both in their 
own country and in all other countries of the world. 
... the law of copyright has enriched and will continue to enrich mankind by 
encouraging intellectual creativity and by serving as an incentive for the 
$ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Article 27(2), "Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author". 
The nature of copyright as a human right is discussed in para. 2.2. 
9 See Ricketson S., The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
1886-1986 (Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, Kluwer, 1987), at pp. 
892-93. 
'° Actes de la Conference international pour la protection des Droits d' auteur reunie ä Berne 
du 8 au 19 septembre 1884, International Office, Berne (1884), 28-29 (debate on the 
German motion in favour of a universal codification). 
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dissemination throughout the world of expressions of the arts, learning and 
information for the benefit of all people, 
... international respect for the law of copyright opens paths across frontiers 
for works of the mind, thus contributing to a better international 
understanding...; 
... the Berne Convention ... by providing an outstanding, comprehensive 
and harmonised codification of the rights of authors has guaranteed ... the 
most effective international protection of these rights. "" 
For the purposes of the thesis proposals, the "solemn declaration" is of great 
importance as it constitutes the sole Berne Convention document where member 
States expressly recognise that copyright is "based on human rights" and 
constitutes an "incentive for the dissemination of expressions of the arts, learning 
and information for the benefit of all people". The original text of the Berne 
Convention makes no express reference to human rights in general, or freedom of 
expression in particular. This is also the case with all subsequent revisions of the 
Convention. However, this declaration illustrates that the Berne Convention is 
interrelated to the body of human rights, and it is submitted, implies recognition that 
copyright is a human right itself, thus clearly and unequivocally supporting the 
proposed revisions of this thesis to the Convention. 
In practice, the proposal that the Berne Convention should be brought into line with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the principal international source of 
recognition of human rights, entails that the Convention be revised so as to (i) 
encompass fundamental principle of non-discrimination underlying the body of 
human rights, and (ii) incorporate a clause recognising a person's freedom of 
expression. 
It could be argued that as an alternative to the revision of the Berne Convention as 
a means of the proposals implementation would be an associated Treaty modelled 
on the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996. Such Treaty could be said to constitute a more 
" WIPO, "Centenary of the Berne Convention - Celebration of the Hundredth Anniversary of 
the Berne Convention (Part I)" (1986) 22 Copyright 367. The full original and translated texts 
of the solemn declaration are set out in Appendix 2. 
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practical means of achieving the outlined objectives, as the proposed revisions in 
the Berne Convention would require unanimity in voting12. 
It is submitted that such an alternative would not achieve the envisaged solutions. 
The reasoning underlying this submission is two-fold. Firstly, the inclusion of the 
thesis proposals in a Treaty would detract from the pivotal role that the human 
rights elements in general, and the right of freedom of expression in particular, 
should occupy within copyright law. 
Secondly, the adoption of such a Treaty, unless ratified by all Berne Union States, 
would clash with the very proposal of non-discrimination. Ratification by some 
states only would not realise the objective of copyright and the right of freedom of 
expression being vested in every individual. Rather, application of such a proposal 
would be confined to the Treaty's limited number of Member States. 
Its membership status, uniform nature and sustained value within the realm of 
copyright law are the principal elements that render the Berne Convention 1971 the 
appropriate means of implementing the thesis proposals. 
6.3 RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
In the last few decades, human rights laws and individual rights guaranteed under 
them have been steadily receiving greater recognition. In the context of intellectual 
property and copyright law in particular, a person's right of freedom of expression 
has, at times, been increasingly put forward as a competing interest to an author's 
copyright. 
'Z This reasoning appears to be supported by the adoption of the WIPO Treaties 1996 (the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996) 
regarding the incorporation of the digital agenda into the context of copyright protection. The 
adoption of the Treaties was favoured over a revision of the Berne Convention, as the latter 
was considered impractical. In order to amend substantive provisions of the Convention, 
there must be unanimity of votes cast in a Revision Conference (Berne Convention 1971, 
Article 27(3)). It was concluded that, given the number of country members of Berne and the 
diversity of opinions among them, such a requirement would be almost impossible to 
achieve. For a detailed discussion of the workings of the WIPO Committee Experts in 
adopting the WIPO Treaties, see Sterling at pp. 705-07. 
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The response of commentators to such claims has been varied. At one end of the 
spectrum is the argument that copyright itself is an engine for freedom of 
expression and that an individual's entitlement to freedom of expression is already 
accommodated within copyright through existing safety valves preventing authors' 
over-protection. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the argument that the right of freedom of 
expression is not adequately protected under current principles and provisions of 
copyright law. 
In addition, decisions of different national courts that have been called upon to rule 
on the relationship between copyright and the human right of freedom of expression 
are inconsistent. Some countries appear to be more willing to afford protection to 
freedom of expression over copyright while others are more reluctant. The 
necessity for consistency is undermined by the fact that the number of cases where 
individuals invoke their freedom of expression vis-ä-vis the authors copyright is 
steadily increasing, as are the grounds on which the right is invoked. 
The Berne Convention contains a number of provisions on the exclusive rights 
vested in the author of a work as well as on limitations and exceptions to these 
rights13. Limitations and exceptions have the object of setting limits to the author's 
exclusive rights under the Convention, thus balancing his rights against other 
potentially competing rights of individuals and the public interest in general. 
However the Convention, like other international, regional and national copyright 
instruments, is silent on the relationship between copyright and freedom of 
expression. 
This phenomenon has lead to diversity of opinion, legal inconsistencies and lack of 
authoritative guidance. it is thus proposed that Article 5(1) of the Convention14 be 
" For a discussion of the provisions on limitations and exceptions under the Berne 
Convention, see Sterling at pp. 624-26. 
14 Article 5(1) contains the two basic principles of the Convention, namely that protected 
authors are entitled in respect of their works entitled to national treatment in countries other 
than the country of origin of the work, and to the specific rights (for example, right of 
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revised to recognise expressly the right of freedom of expression in cases of 
alleged copyright infringement. Since the Convention only sets out minimum rights 
to be adopted by national legislations, the proposal has the additional effect of 
allowing Member States to decide on the exact scope of the right. 
The proposed addition to Article 5(1) reads as follows: 
"Whenever an author's work is used or is to be used by another person, the 
right of freedom of expression of such other person is to be taken into 
account in any proceedings concerning the application of the rights granted 
in accordance with this Convention to the author whose work is so useds1'. 
The revision of the Article is designed to promote the balancing of copyright with 
freedom of expression. This balancing exercise is dual in nature as copyright law 
belongs not only to the field of intellectual property but to that of human rights as 
well. Accordingly, the effect of the revised Article 5(1) is to achieve a balance 
between two separate legal fields on the one hand, and two distinct human rights 
on the other. 
6.4 INTRODUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DICSRIMINATION 
6.4.1 GENERAL 
The thesis proposes the introduction of the introduction of the principle of non- 
discrimination by extending copyright protection to all authors, irrespective of their 
nationality, for their works, whether these are published or unpublished. 
Articles 3 to 6 of the Berne Convention set out the basic structure of protection 
under the Convention, identifying the authors who are protected and the level of 
protection that they are afforded. These provisions concern two distinct issues: 
reproduction) granted by the Convention ("Convention rights"). For a discussion of national 
treatment and Convention rights under Article 5(1), see Sterling at pp. 605-06. 
15 See Annex 1, Article 5(1). 
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(a) The categories of authors who are entitled to protection. In order to be 
protected, authors must comply with the relevant conditions and status 
criteria established in the Convention16. (Articles 3,4 and 6) 
(b) The rights that the protected authors are afforded, the laws that are applied 
to their works and the concept of a work's country of origin". (Article 5) 
The following sections examine each of these issues in turn, discussing: 
  the current rules applicable under the relevant Articles of the 
Convention, and any gaps that might exist in the law regarding 
authors' protection and the determination of a work's country of 
origin, 
" the limitations in the current rules which might render them 
inconsistent with the principle of non-discrimination, as defined in 
Article 2 of the Universal Declaration, 
  the proposed revisions of the relevant Articles of the Convention, and 
" the effects of the proposed revisions 
There are (as at February 2006) eighteen countries that are Members of the United 
Nations and are not Members of the Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement or the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty. These countries are Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, San 
Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Yemen. The number of additional authors who would be 
covered by the non-discrimination principle is thus, in comparison with the number 
of authors of the other 173 United Nations Members1', not extensive. 
16 See para. 6.4.2 and Annex 2. 
See para. 6.4.3 and Annex 3. 
'$ For a list of United Nations Members, see Appendix 3. For a list of Berne Convention, 
TRIPS Agreement and WIPO Copyright Treaty Members, see Appendix 2. 
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6.4.2 AUTHORS' PROTECTION19 
6.4.2.1 STATUTORY PROVISIONS UNDER THE BERNE CONVENTION 1971 
Under Article 3 of the Berne Convention, protection is afforded to two distinct 
categories of authors: Union authors20, that is authors who are nationals of one of 
the countries of the Union, and non-Union authors, that is authors who are nationals 
of one of the countries outside the Union21. 
Union authors are protected for their works, whether published22 or unpublished23. 
However, non-Union authors are not protected for their unpublished works24, or for 
their published works unless (by virtue of Article 3(1)(b) of the Convention) they are: 
(a) first published in a Union country", or 
(b) first published in a non-Union country, with simultaneous publication in a 
Union country26. 
Article 4 of the Convention contains supplementary criteria of entitlement to 
protection for non-Union authors applicable only to their cinematographic, 
19 Throughout this section, extensive reference is made to Annex 2. The Annex contains 
analytical tables illustrating all cases of protection of both Union and non-Union authors (the 
criteria of publication for non-Union authors included) for their literary and artistic works - 
whether these are published or unpublished - under Article 3 of the Berne Convention (Part 
A). 
The Tables include the additional criteria for protection of cinematographic works (Part B, 
section 1), works of architecture and certain artistic works (Part B, section 2) by non-Union 
authors under Article 5(4)(c) of the Berne Convention. 
The Tables highlight gaps in the Convention's rules - i. e. those situations where certain 
non-Union authors are afforded no protection in respect of their works (Part A). 
Further, the Tables illustrate the proposed revisions to the current provisions and the effect 
they will have on authors' protection rules. 
20 The category of Union authors embraces authors who are not nationals of a Union country 
but have their "habitual residence" in one of them. See, Berne Convention, 1971, Article 
3(2). For a detailed discussion of the criterion of habitual residence, see Ricketson and 
Ginsburg at pp. 240-44. 
21 Berne Convention, 1971, Article 3(1). 
22 For the definition of "published works", see Berne Convention, 1971, Article 3(3). For the 
definition of "simultaneous publication", see Berne Convention, 1971, Article 3(4). 
2' Berne Convention, 1971, Article 3(1)(a). Also, see Annex 2, Part A, cases 1,3,5,7,9 and 
11. 
24 See Annex 2, Part A, case 12. 
25 See Annex 2, Part A, case 2. 
26 See Annex 2, Part A, cases 6 and 8. 
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architectural and certain artistic works, even if the publication criteria under Article 
3(1)(b) are not fulfilled27. Under the Article's provisions: 
(a) Non-Union authors of cinematographic works - whether these are published 
or unpublished - will be protected provided that the maker of the works has 
his headquarters or habitual residence in a Union country28 
(b) Non-Union authors of works of architecture - whether these are published 
or unpublished - will be protected provided that the works are erected in a 
Union country29. 
(c) Non-Union authors of certain artistic works incorporated in a building or 
other structure - whether these are published or unpublished - will be 
protected provided that the building or other structure they are incorporated 
in, is located in a Union country30. 
Having set out the rules concerning authors' protection, the Convention's approach 
to protection could be described as selective. The scope of protection of non-Union 
authors is considerably restricted. There are important cases where non-Union 
authors are not protected in respect of their works - i. e. unpublished works (other 
than those conforming to the supplementary criteria)31, and works not conforming to 
the publication criteria32. 
6.4.2.2 STATUTORY PROVISIONS UNDER PROPOSED REVISION 33 
It is proposed that the Articles of the Berne Convention that guarantee authors' 
protection be revised in order to afford protection to all authors, irrespective of their 
21 Where these works are first published, or simultaneously published in a Union country, the 
ordinary rules under Article 3, as set out above, shall apply. 
28 Berne Convention, 1971, Article 4(a). Also, see Annex 2, Part B, section 1, cases 1,3 and 
5. 
29 Berne Convention, 1971, Article 4(b). Also, see Annex 2, Part B, section 2, cases 1,3 and 
5. 
3o Berne Convention, 1971, Article 4(b). Also, see Annex 2, Part B, section 2, cases 7,9 and 
11. 
31 See, Annex 2, Part A, case 12; Part B, section 1, case 6; Part B, section 2, cases 6 and 
12. 
32 See, Annex 2, Part A, cases 4 and 10; Part B, section 1, cases 2 and 4; Part B, section 2, 
cases 2,4,8 and 10. 
" This paragraph makes extensive reference to Annex 2. The Annex sets out the proposed 
revisions to the relevant articles of the Berne Convention. The 1971 Berne text is modified in 
order to incorporate the thesis proposals. In addition, the effects of the proposals are 
illustrated in Annex 1. 
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nationality, of the publication criteria and of the supplementary criteria regarding 
cinematographic, architectural and certain artistic works. 
In order to give effect to the above-mentioned objective, it is proposed that: 
  The preamble to the Convention be revised to recognise that all authors 
should receive protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of 
publication of their works34 
  Article 3(1) be revised to recognise that all authors should receive protection 
for the works - whether these are published or unpublished. The distinction 
made in the provisions of the Article between Union and non-Union authors 
should thus be removed 35 
" Article 6 be deleted. Article 6 deals with the retaliatory measures that may 
be taken by Union countries against the works of non-Union authors whose 
countries fail to protect the works of Union authors in an "adequate manner". 
Under this proposal, all authors - Union and non-Union alike - would 
receive protection for their works, thus rendering Article 6 no longer 
relevant" 
6.4.3 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN37 
6.4.3.1 STATUTORY PROVISIONS UNDER THE BERNE CONVENTION 1971 
Having examined both the categories of authors and classes of works entitled to 
protection under the Berne Convention38, this part examines the level of protection 
3a See, Annex 1, Preamble. 
35 See, Annex 1, Article 3. The effects of the revision of Article 3 are illustrated in Annex 3, 
Part B. 
36 See Annex 1, Article 6. Also, see Annex 1, revised Article 7(8) - for a discussion of the 
relevance of this Article, see para. 6.4.3. 
37 Throughout this section, extensive reference is made to Annex 3. The Annex contains 
analytical Tables illustrating the rules for determination of the country of origin of literary and 
artistic works - whether published or unpublished - by both Union and non-Union authors 
(Part A). 
The Tables include the additional criteria for the determination of the country of origin of 
cinematographic works (Part B, section 1), works of architecture and certain artistic works 
(Part B, section 2) by non-Union authors. 
The Tables highlight gaps in the Convention rules - i. e. situations where no country of origin 
is provided for works of certain non-Union authors (who, in these instances, are not 
protected themselves under Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention) (Part A). 
Further, the Tables illustrate the proposed revisions of the current provisions and the effect 
that they will have in relation to the determination of a work's country of origin. 
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accorded to authors entitled to protection under Article 5 of the Convention. This 
involves a discussion of the principle of national treatment39 and the concept of 
country of origin. 
The principle of national treatment is laid down in Articles 5(1) and (3) of the Berne 
Convention. Under Article 5(1), authors entitled to protection under the Convention 
shall enjoy, in respect of their works, in Union countries, other than the country of 
origin, "the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their 
nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by the Conventioni40. As far as 
protection of works in their country of origin is concerned, Article 5(3) states that 
protection shall be governed by domestic law, with no requirement that the rights 
specially granted by the Convention are also accorded to these works. This is 
supplemented by the provision that authors who are not nationals of the country of 
origin of the protected work, shall enjoy in that country the same rights as national 
authors41. 
For the purposes of the thesis proposals, the determination of a work's country of 
origin is of central importance. Following the proposal that protection under the 
Convention should be afforded to all authors in respect of their works42, it is 
proposed that the Convention should specify a country of origin for all authors of all 
classes of works. 
Article 5(4) of the Convention sets out the rules for the determination of a work's 
country of origin. The rules concerning the determination of the country of origin of 
works by Union authors can be summarised as follows: 
38 Berne Convention, 1971, Articles 3 and 4. 
39 In general, under the principle of national treatment, works that originate in one of the 
Union countries must be treated in each of the other Union countries in the same way that 
such countries protect their works of their own nationals. 
40 Note that, under Article 5(2), "the enjoyment and exercise of these rights shall not be 
subject to any formality". For a detailed discussion of the meaning of formality, its scope and 
implications, see Ricketson and Ginsburg at pp. 311-12. 
" For a detailed discussion of the principle of national treatment under the Berne 
Convention, see Ricketson and Ginsburg at pp. 309-11. 
42 See para. 6.4.2. 
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(a) In the case of works first published in a Union country, without simultaneous 
publication in other Union countries, their country of origin is that country 43 
(b) In the case of works first published in a Union country, with simultaneous 
publication in other Union countries, their country of origin is the country 
whose legislation grants the shortest term of protection 44 
(c) In the case of works first published in a Union country, with simultaneous 
publication in a non-Union country, their country of origin is the former 
country" 
(d) In the case of works first published in a non-Union country, without 
simultaneous publication in a Union country, their country of origin is the 
country of which the author is a nationa146 
(e) In the case of unpublished works, their country of origin is the country of 
which the author is a nationa147 
The rules concerning determination of the country of origin of works by non-Union 
authors can be summarised as follows: 
(a) In the case of works first published in a Union country, without simultaneous 
publication in other Union countries, their country of origin is that country 48. 
(b) In the case of works first published in a Union country, with simultaneous 
publication in other Union countries, their country of origin is the country 
whose legislation grants the shortest term of protection49. 
(c) In the case of works first published in a Union country, with simultaneous 
publication in a non-Union country, their country of origin is the former 
country" 
The rules concerning determination of the country of origin of works by non-Union 
authors have supplementary criteria which are only applicable to cinematographic, 
43 Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(a). Also, see Annex 3, Part A, case 1. 
as Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(a). Also, see Annex 3, Part A, case 5. 
as Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(b). Also, see Annex 3, Part A, case 7. 
46 Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(c). Also, see Annex 3, Part A, case 3. 
4' Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(c). Also, see Annex 3, Part A, case 11. 
4' Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(a). Also, see Annex 3, Part A, case 2. 
49 Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(a). Also, see Annex 3, Part A, case 6. 
50 Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(b). Also, see Annex 3, Part A, case 8. 
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architectural and certain artistic works of non-Union authors'. The current 
Convention rules for the determination of the country of origin of these classes of 
works can be summarised as follows: 
(a) In the case of cinematographic works, the maker of which has his 
headquarters or habitual residence in a Union country, first published in a 
non-Union country, with or without simultaneous publication in another non- 
Union country, their country of origin is the country of the headquarters or 
habitual residence of the maker52. 
(b) In the case of unpublished cinematographic works, the maker of which has 
his headquarters or habitual residence in a Union country, their country of 
origin is that country 53. 
(c) In the case of architectural works erected in a Union country, first published 
in a non-Union country, with or without simultaneous publication in another 
non-Union country, their country of origin is the country where the work was 
erectedsa 
(d) In the case of unpublished architectural works erected in a Union country, 
ss their country of origin is that country 
(e) In the case of artistic works incorporated in a building or other structure 
located in a Union country, first published in a non-Union country, with or 
without simultaneous publication in another non-Union country, their country 
of origin is the country where the work is located 
(f) In the case of unpublished artistic works incorporated in a building or other 
structure located in a Union country, their country of origin is that country57. 
Since non-Union authors are, in certain cases, excluded from protection under the 
Convention for their works, there are no provisions for the determination of the 
51 Where these works are first published or simultaneously published in a Union country, the 
ordinary rules, set out above, apply. 
52 Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(c)(i). Also, see Annex 3, Part B, section 1, cases 1 
and 3. 
s' Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(c)(i). Also, see Annex 3, Part B, section 1, case 5. 
s' Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(c)(ii). Also, see Annex 3, Part B, section 2, cases 1 
and 3. 
ss Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(c)(ii). Also, see Annex 3, Part B, section 2, case 5. 
56 Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(c)(ii). Also, see Annex 3, Part B, section 2, cases 7 
and 9. 
57 Berne Convention, 1971, Article 5(4)(c)(ii). Also, see Annex 3, Part B, section 2, case 11. 
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country of origin of their works in such cases. These gaps in the law of 
determination of country of origin (other than in cases where the supplementary 
criteria apply) can be summarised as follows: 
(a) Works by non-Union authors, first published in a non-Union country, without 
simultaneous publication in another country58. 
(b) Works by non-Union authors, first published in a non-Union country, with 
simultaneous publication in another non-Union country59 
(c) Unpublished works by non-Union authors"' 
6.4.3.2 STATUTORY PROVISIONS UNDER PROPOSED REVISION61 
The concept of the country of origin of a work is, inter alia, important in determining 
copyright duration under Articles 5(2) and 7(8) of the Berne Convention. The 
Convention sets out rules governing the determination of the country of origin for 
works of Union authors. 
In application of the non-discrimination principle, the Convention should be revised 
in order to provide for a country of origin for works of non-Union authors. All Union 
authors, in general, receive protection for 50 years pma. As a result of the 
introduction of additional rules regarding a work's country of origin, if the non-Union 
country of origin gives, say, 30 years pma protection, the work would receive 50 
years pma protection in a Union country; if the non-Union country of origin does not 
have a copyright law, the work should, it is submitted, be protected for the life of the 
author and 50 years pma62. These proposals aspire to introduce the principle of 
non-discrimination to the subject of copyright protection; all countries, Union and 
non-Union alike, will, as a result, protect the works of all authors for a minimum term 
of the life of the author and 50 years pma. 
" See Annex 3, Part A, case 4. 
59 See Annex 3, Part A, case 10. 
6o See Annex 3, Part A, case 12. 
61 This paragraph makes extensive reference to Annex 1. The Annex sets out the proposed 
revisions to the relevant Articles of the Berne Convention. The 1971 text is modified in order 
to incorporate the thesis proposals. In addition, the effects of the proposals are illustrated in 
Annex 3. 
62 See Annex 1, revised Article 7(8) of the Berne Convention. 
226 
It is thus proposed that the provisions under Article 5 of the Berne Convention 
concerning determination of the country of origin of authors' works are revised in 
order to fill in the gaps under the current rules. In addition, the revisions will reflect 
the human rights principle of non-discrimination. 
In order to give effect to the above-mentioned objectives, it is proposed that: 
  Article 5(4) be revised to provide that, in the case of works by non-Union 
authors, first published in a non-Union country, without simultaneous 
publication in a Union country, their country of origin shall be the non-Union 
country" 
  Article 5(4) be revised to provide that, in the case of works by non-Union 
authors, first published in a non-Union country, with simultaneous 
publication in several non-Union countries which grant different terms of 
protection, their country of origin shall be the country whose legislation 
grants the shortest tem of protection64, with a minimum term of 50 years 
pma65 
  Article 5(4) be revised to provide that in the case of unpublished works by 
non-Union authors, their country of origin shall be the country of which the 
author is a national66 
  All authors of cinematographic, architectural and artistic works will be 
protected for these works. Union authors will be protected on the basis of 
the respective conditions relating to the headquarters or habitual residence 
of the maker and the location of the work, as set out in Article 5(4)(c)(i) and 
(ii)67. Non-Union authors will be protected on the basis of the non- 
discrimination rule68. 
63 See Annex 1, Article 5(5)(b). Also, see Annex 3, Part A, case 4. 
64 See Annex 1, Article 5(5)(d). Also, see Annex 3, Part A, case 10. 
65 In cases where the country of origin provides for a shorter term of protection or makes no 
such provision due to the absence of a copyright/author's right law. See further proposed 
revisions to Article 7(8) of the Convention. 
66 See Annex 1, Article 5(5)(f). Also, see Annex 3, Part A, case 12. 
67 Article 5(5)(e)(i) and (ii), under the proposed revision (see, Annex 1). The effects of this 
revision are illustrated in Annex 2, Part B, section 1, cases 1,3 and 5; Part B, section 2, 
cases 1,3,5,7,9and11. 
68 Article 5(4)(c), (d) and (f), under the proposed revision (see, Annex 1). The effect of this 
revision are illustrated in Annex 2, Part B, section 1, cases 2,4 and 6; Part B, section 2, 
cases 2,4,6,8,10 and 12. 
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  Article 5(3) be revised to additionally provide that where the country of origin 
of a work is a non-Union country, the Article's provisions relating to national 
treatment shall not extend to such a country. 
  Article 7(8) be revised to additionally provide that where the country of origin 
of a work is a non-Union country which has no copyright law, the protection 
afforded under the Convention shall last for the life of the author and 50 
years pmass 
6.5 SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS 
The thesis proposals can be viewed as offering new avenues for the application of 
the law on copyright. 
At the time of the drafting the Berne Convention, it was argued that the restrictions 
that are found in it concerning the inconsistent treatment of Union and non-Union 
authors were put in place with the belief that they would act as an incentive for 
countries to join Berne. At the present time, some hundred and twenty years later, 
the Berne Convention is the "ultimate universal codification of copyright" with most 
of the countries in the world having joined the Convention. The proposed 
introduction of the principle of non-discrimination, in the sense of Article 2 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, has a two-fold effect. It acts as a means of 
demonstrating that the Convention is now shifting forward from its original 
aspirations, having achieved them. Affording non-discriminatory protection to all 
authors, irrespective of their nationality, highlights the uniform nature and appeal of 
the Convention. 
The thesis proposal of express recognition of the right of freedom of expression in 
copyright law not only resolves the inconsistencies and grey areas that exist but 
accentuates the importance of human rights in the application of the Berne 
Convention. By introducing the human right of freedom of expression within the 
realm of copyright law, the two otherwise different sets of rights are both seen in the 
perspective of, and as balancing two equally important human rights. 




The primary aim of this thesis has been to examine and evaluate the relationship 
between the rights vested in the author of a work under copyright law and the 
human right of freedom of expression which is vested in every individual. This 
analysis has been carried out on a comparative basis. The provisions under the 
relevant copyright and human rights instruments, agreements, treaties, conventions 
and laws have been identified and examined on the international, regional and 
national levels. Relevant jurisprudence and judicial precedents have been analysed 
in detail. In this context, the main economic and moral rights of the author have 
been juxtaposed against another party's right of freedom of expression. In addition, 
the main defences, exceptions and limitations to copyright law have been examined 
in order to ascertain the extent to which they impact on the scope of the author's 
various rights. 
The primary objective underlying this analysis has been the identification of areas of 
actual and potential conflicts between copyright and freedom of expression. In 
particular, the identification of the boundaries between the two sets of rights, the 
identification of grey areas in the context of their interaction, the identification of 
conflicts that may exist but are alleviated through provisions limiting copyright and 
most importantly, the identification of current and foreseeable conflicts that have not 
been addressed by legislatures and courts alike, that have consequently been left 
unresolved and which can endanger the effective protection of the respective rights 
have been presented. 
The analysis carried out in the thesis appears to suggest that the relationship 
between the rights can be controversial. Conflicts can and do arise between moral 
rights and freedom of expression and economic rights and freedom of expression 
alike. Tensions in their respective interactions can be identified. It is submitted that 
such tensions and conflicts are not always resolved in a satisfactory manner, while 
at times courts are reluctant even to acknowledge their existence. On a number of 
occasions, courts have not been willing to upset the balance that they assume they 
have to date struck between the rights. Their approach to freedom of expression 
claims can, at times, be anachronistic. However, given the growing importance of 
the body of human rights they seem that they are being forced to reconsider their 
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interpretation. This realisation is relatively recent and therefore there are as yet no 
marked changes in their approach. Different laws and national courts evolve with 
different speeds and through the development of diverse principles and rules. This 
results in further lack of uniformity. 
In order to resolve these problems the thesis has proposed the express recognition 
of the right of freedom of expression in the context of international copyright law, in 
particular the Berne Convention. The international nature of the proposal intends to 
achieve two objectives: 
  The realisation of uniformity in the recognition of the right. The Berne 
Convention sets minimum standards of copyright protection. Consequently, 
national legislatures can assess and determine the precise scope of the 
right within their respective copyright laws and ultimately implement their 
individual provisions. 
  The attribution of a truly universal nature to copyright law. Freedom of 
expression is a universal human right and its recognition within the realm of 
the Berne Convention will result in every individual being vested with this 
right. Equally, every author of a work should be vested with the economic 
and moral rights that comprise copyright. Thus the thesis has proposed that 
the Convention is further amended to recognise that each and every author 
is attributed with copyright in his creation. 
In 1986, on the centenary of the Berne Convention, the Assembly of the Berne 
Union signed a Solemn Declaration unequivocally declaring that copyright is based 
on human rights. This thesis has intended to illustrate that this Declaration should 
be fully realised in modern copyright law. Today, at the twentieth year anniversary 
of this Declaration, time has come to give effect, in the Berne Convention itself, to 
the Declaration's recognition of copyright as a human right, relevance to it of 
freedom of expression and ultimate balancing of the rights. 
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ANNEX 1 
Comparative Table; Berne Convention and Proposed Revisions 
The following is a comparative table setting out extracts from the provisions of the Berne 
Convention 1971, as amended 1979, and the proposed revisions 
Berne Convention Text Proposed Revisions 
[Proposed Amendments shown in bold] 
The countries of the Union, being equally 
animated by the desire to protect, in as 
effective and uniform a manner as 
possible, the rights of authors in their 
literary and artistic works, 
Recognizing the importance of the work 
of the Revision Conference held at 
Stockholm in 1967, 
Have resolved to revise the Act adopted 
by the Stockholm Conference, while 
maintaining without change Articles 1 to 20 
and 22 to 26 of that Act. 
The countries of the Union, being equally 
animated by the desire to protect, in as 
effective and uniform a manner as 
possible, the rights of authors in their 
literary and artistic works, 
Recognizing the importance of the work 
of the Revision Conference held at 
Stockholm in 1967, 
Recognizing that all authors, 
irrespective of their nationality or place 
of publication of their works, should 
receive protection, 
Recognizing the importance of human 
rights in general, and the importance of 
the right of freedom of expression as 
provided in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, in particular, 
Have resolved to revise the Act adopted 
by the Stockholm Conference, while 
maintaining without change Articles 1 to 20 
and 22 to 26 of that Act. 
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Consequently, the undersigned 
Plenipotentiaries, having presented their 
full powers, recognized as in good and due 
form, have agreed as follows: 
Article I 




Possible Limitation of Protection of Certain 
Works 
Article 3 
Criteria of Eligibility for Protection 
(1) The protection of this Convention 
shall apply to: 
(a) authors who are nationals of one 
of the countries of the Union, for 
their works, whether published 
or not; 
(b) authors who are not nationals of 
one of the countries of the Union, 
for their works first published 
in one of those countries, or 
simultaneously in a country 
outside the Union and in a 
country of the Union. 
Consequently, the undersigned 
Plenipotentiaries, having presented their 
full powers, recognized as in good and due 
form, have agreed as follows: 
Article I 










Criteria of Eligibility for Protection 
(1) The protection of this Convention 
shall apply to all authors for their works, 
. whether published or not. 
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(2) Authors who are not nationals of one 
of the countries of the Union but who have 
their habitual residence in one of them 
shall, for the purposes of this Convention, 
be assimilated to nationals of that country. 
(3) The expression "published works" 
means works published with the consent of 
their authors, whatever may be the means 
of manufacture of the copies, provided that 
the availability of such copies has been 
such as to satisfy the reasonable 
requirements of the public, having regard 
to the nature of the work. The performance 
of a dramatic, dramatico-musical, 
cinematographic or musical work, the 
public recitation of a literary work, the 
communication by wire or the broadcasting 
of literary or artistic works, the exhibition of 
a work of art and the construction of a work 
of architecture shall not constitute 
publication. 
(4) A work shall be considered as having 
been published simultaneously in several 
countries if it has been published in two or 
more countries within thirty days of its first 
publication. 
Article 4 
Criteria of Eligibility for Protection of 
Cinematographic Works, Works of 
Architecture and Certain Artistic Works 
(2) Authors who are not nationals of one 
of the countries of the Union but who have 
their habitual residence in one of them 
shall, for the purposes of this Convention, 
be assimilated to nationals of that country. 
(3) The expression "published works" 
means works published with the consent of 
their authors, whatever may be the means 
of manufacture of the copies, provided that 
the availability of such copies has been 
such as to satisfy the reasonable 
requirements of the public, having regard 
to the nature of the work. The performance 
of a dramatic, dramatico-musical, 
cinematographic or musical work, the 
public recitation of a literary work, the 
communication by wire or the broadcasting 
of literary or artistic works, the exhibition of 
a work of art and the construction of a work 
of architecture shall not constitute 
publication. 
(4) A work shall be considered as having 
been published simultaneously in several 
countries if it has been published in two or 
more countries within thirty days of its first 
publication. 
Article 4 
Criteria of Eligibility for Protection of 
Cinematographic Works, Works of 





(1) Authors shall enjoy, in respect of 
works for which they are protected under 
this Convention, in countries of the Union 
other than the country of origin, the rights 
which their respective laws do now or may 
hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as 
the rights specially granted by this 
Convention. 
(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of 
these rights shall not be subject to any 
formality; such enjoyment and such 
exercise shall be independent of the 
existence of protection in the country of 
origin of the work. Consequently, apart 
from the provisions of this Convention, the 
extent of protection, as well as the means 
of redress afforded to the author to protect 
his rights, shall be governed exclusively by 
the laws of the country where protection is 
claimed. 
(3) Protection in the country of origin is 
governed by domestic law. However, when 
the author is not a national of the country 
of origin of the work for which he is 
Article 5 
Rights Guaranteed 
(1) Authors shall enjoy, in respect of 
works for which they are protected under 
this Convention, in countries of the Union 
other than the country of origin, the rights 
which their respective laws do now or may 
hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as 
the rights specially granted by this 
Convention. 
Whenever an author's work is used or 
is to be used by another person, the 
right of freedom of expression of such 
other person is to be taken into account 
in any proceedings concerning the 
application of the rights granted in 
accordance with this Convention to the 
author whose work is so used. 
(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of 
these rights shall not be subject to any 
formality; such enjoyment and such 
exercise shall be independent of the 
existence of protection in the country of 
origin of the work. Consequently, apart 
from the provisions of this Convention, the 
extent of protection, as well as the means 
of redress afforded to the author to protect 
his rights, shall be governed exclusively by 
the laws of the country where protection is 
claimed. 
(3) Protection in the country of origin is 
governed by domestic law. However, when 
the author is not a national of the country 
of origin of the work for which he is 
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protected under this Convention, he shall 
enjoy in that country the same rights as 
national authors. 
(4) The country of origin shall be 
considered to be: 
(a) in the case of works first published in a 
country of the Union, that country; in 
the case of works published 
simultaneously in several countries of 
the Union which grant different terms of 
protection, the country whose 
legislation grants the shortest term of 
protection; 
(b) in the case of works published 
simultaneously in a country outside the 
Union and in a country of the Union, 
the latter country; 
(c) in the case of unpublished works or of 
works first published in a country 
outside the Union, without 
simultaneous publication in a country 
of the Union, the country of the Union 
of which the author is a national, 
provided that: 
(i) when these are cinematographic 
works the maker of which has 
his headquarters or his habitual 
residence in a country of the 
Union, the country of origin 
shall be that country, and 
protected under this Convention, he shall 
enjoy in that country the same rights as 
national authors. 
Where the country of origin is a non- 
Union country, the provisions of the 
second sentence of this Article shall 
not extend to that country. 
(4) The country of origin shall be 
considered to be: 
(a) in the case of works first published in a 
country of the Union, that country; in 
the case of works published 
simultaneously in several countries of 
the Union which grant different terms of 
protection, the country whose 
legislation grants the shortest term of 
protection; 
(b) in the case of works published 
simultaneously in a country outside the 
Union and in a country of the Union, 
the latter country; 
(c) in the case of works by a non-Union 
national first published in a country 
outside the Union, without 
simultaneous publication in a 
country of the Union, that country; 
(d) in the case of works by a non-Union 
national published simultaneously 
in several countries outside the 
Union which grant different terms of 
protection, the country whose 
legislation grants the shortest term 
of protection; 
(e) in the case of unpublished works or 
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(ii) when these are works of 
architecture erected in a 
country of the Union or other 
artistic works incorporated in a 
building or other structure 
located in a country of the 
Union, the country of origin 
shall be that country. 
Article 6 
Possible Restriction of Protection in 
Respect of Certain Works of Nationals of 
of works first published in a country 
outside the Union, without 
simultaneous publication in a 
country of the Union, the country of 
the Union of which the author is a 
national, provided that: 
(i) when these are 
cinematographic works 
the maker of which has 
his 
headquarters or his 
habitual residence in a 
country of the Union, 
the 
country of origin shall 
be that country, and 
(ii) when these are works of 
architecture erected in a 
country of the Union or 
other artistic works 
incorporated in a 
building or other 
structure located in a 
country of the Union, 
the country of origin 
shall be that country. 
(f) in the case of unpublished works by 
a non-Union national, the country of 
which the author is a national. 
Article 6 
Possible Restriction of Protection in 
Respect of Certain Works of Nationals of 
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Certain Countries Outside the Union 
(1) Where any country outside the Union 
fails to protect in an adequate manner the 
works of authors who are nationals of one 
of the countries of the Union, the latter 
country may restrict the protection given to 
the works of authors who are, at the date 
of the first publication thereof, nationals of 
the other country and are not habitually 
resident in one of the countries of the 
Union. If the country of first publication 
avails itself of this right, the other countries 
of the Union shall not be required to grant 
to works thus subjected to special 
treatment a wider protection than that 
granted to them in the country of first 
publication. 
(2) No restrictions introduced by virtue of 
the preceding paragraph shall affect the 
rights which an author may have acquired 
in respect of a work published in a country 
of the Union before such restrictions were 
put into force. 
(3) The countries of the Union which 
restrict the grant of copyright in 
accordance with this Article shall give 
notice thereof to the Director General of 
the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (hereinafter designated as 
"the Director General") by a written 
declaration specifying the countries in 
regard to which protection is restricted, and 
the restrictions to which rights of authors 
who are nationals of those countries are 
Certain Countries Outside the Union 
Deleted 
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subjected. The Director General shall 
immediately communicate this declaration 




Term of Protection 
(1) The term of protection granted by this 
Convention shall be the life of the author 
and fifty years after his death. 
(2) However, in the case of 
cinematographic works, the countries of 
the Union may provide that the term of 
protection shall expire fifty years after the 
work has been made available to the 
public with the consent of the author, or, 
failing such an event within fifty years from 
the making of such a work, fifty years after 
the making. 
(3) In the case of anonymous or 
pseudonymous works, the term of 
protection granted by this Convention shall 
expire fifty years after the work has been 
lawfully made available to the public. 
However, when the pseudonym adopted 
by the author leaves no doubt as to his 
identity, the term of protection shall be that 
provided in paragraph (1). If the author of 
an anonymous or pseudonymous work 





Tenn of Protection 
(1) The term of protection granted by this 
Convention shall be the life of the author 
and fifty years after his death. 
(2) However, in the case of 
cinematographic works, the countries of 
the Union may provide that the term of 
protection shall expire fifty years after the 
work has been made available to the 
public with the consent of the author, or, 
failing such an event within fifty years from 
the making of such a work, fifty years after 
the making. 
(3) In the case of anonymous or 
pseudonymous works, the term of 
protection granted by this Convention shall 
expire fifty years after the work has been 
lawfully made available to the public. 
However, when the pseudonym adopted 
by the author leaves no doubt as to his 
identity, the term of protection shall be that 
provided in paragraph (1). If the author of 
an anonymous or pseudonymous work 
discloses his identity during the above- 
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mentioned period, the term of protection 
applicable shall be that provided in 
paragraph (1). The countries of the Union 
shall not be required to protect anonymous 
or pseudonymous works in respect of 
which it is reasonable to presume that their 
author has been dead for fifty years. 
(4) It shall be a matter for legislation in 
the countries of the Union to determine the 
term of protection of photographic works 
and that of works of applied art in so far as 
they are protected as artistic works; 
however, this term shall last at least until 
the end of a period of twenty-five years 
from the making of such a work. 
(5) The term of protection subsequent to 
the death of the author and the terms 
provided by paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) 
shall run from the date of death or of the 
event referred to in those paragraphs, but 
such terms shall always be deemed to 
begin on the first of January of the year 
following the death or such event. 
(6) The countries of the Union may grant 
a term of protection in excess of those 
provided by the preceding paragraphs. 
(7) Those countries of the Union bound 
by the Rome Act of this Convention which 
grant, in their national legislation in force at 
the time of signature of the present Act, 
shorter terms of protection than those 
provided for in the preceding paragraphs 
shall have the right to maintain such terms 
mentioned period, the term of protection 
applicable shall be that provided in 
paragraph (1). The countries of the Union 
shall not be required to protect anonymous 
or pseudonymous works in respect of 
which it is reasonable to presume that their 
author has been dead for fifty years. 
(4) It shall be a matter for legislation in 
the countries of the Union to determine the 
term of protection of photographic works 
and that of works of applied art in so far as 
they are protected as artistic works; 
however, this term shall last at least until 
the end of a period of twenty-five years 
from the making of such a work. 
(5) The term of protection subsequent to 
the death of the author and the terms 
provided by paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) 
shall run from the date of death or of the 
event referred to in those paragraphs, but 
such terms shall always be deemed to 
begin on the first of January of the year 
following the death or such event. 
(6) The countries of the Union may grant 
a term of protection in excess of those 
provided by the preceding paragraphs. 
(7) Those countries of the Union bound 
by the Rome Act of this Convention which 
grant, in their national legislation in force at 
the time of signature of the present Act, 
shorter terms of protection than those 
provided for in the preceding paragraphs 
shall have the right to maintain such terms 
when ratifying or acceding to the present when ratifying or acceding to the present 
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Act. 
(8) In any case, the term shall be 
governed by the legislation of the country 
where protection is claimed; however, 
unless the legislation of that country 
otherwise provides, the term shall not 
exceed the term fixed in the country of 
origin of the work. 
Articles 8- 38 and Appendix 
Act. 
(8) In any case, the term shall be 
governed by the legislation of the country 
where protection is claimed; however, 
unless the legislation of that country 
otherwise provides, the term shall not 
exceed the term fixed in the country of 
origin of the work, but where the country 
of origin is not a member of the Union, 
the term shall not be less than that 
provided in the foregoing paragraphs. 




Authors' Protection - Effect of Proposals 
Part A 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works' under the Berne Convention 
Under the proposed revision of the Berne Convention, non-Union authors, like Union 
authors, will receive protection for their published works - wherever these are first 
published or simultaneously published - and for their unpublished works (cf. Berne, 
Article 3). 
[Cases of additional protection resulting from the proposals are shown in bold. ] 
Nationality of Published Work Unpublished Protection Protection 
Author Work under Berne under 
Place of First Places of 1971 Proposed 
Publication Simultaneous Revision 
Publication 
1 National of a Any Union Protected Protected 
Union Country Country 
(British) (France) (Art. 3(1)(a)) (Art. 3(1)) 
2 National of a Any Union Protected Protected 
Non-Union Country 
Country 
(Urbanian) (France) Art. 31 b Art. 31 
3 National of a Any Non-Union Protected Protected 
Union Country Country 
(British) (Ruritania) (Art. 3(1)(b)) (Art. 3(1)) 
4 National of a Any Non- Not Protected Protected 
Non-Union Union 
Country Country 
(Urbanian) (Ruritania) (Art. 3(1)) 
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5 National of a Any Union Any Union 
_ 
Protected Protected 
Union Country Country Country 
(British) (France) (Germany) Art. 31 a Art. 31 
6 National of a Any Union Any Union 
_ 
Protected Protected 
Non-Union Country Country 
Country 
(Urbanian) (France) (Germany) Art. 31 b Art. 31 
7 National of a Any Union Any Non-Union 
_ 
Protected Protected 
Union Country Country Country 
(British) (France) Ruritania Art. 31 a Art. 31 
8 National of a Any Union Any Non-Union 
_ 
Protected Protected 
Non-Union Country Country 
Country 
(Urbanian) (France) (Ruritania) Art. 31 b Art. 31 
9 National of a Any Non-Union Any Non-Union Protected Protected 
Union Country Country Country 
(British) (Ruritania) (Atlantia) (Art. 3(1)(a)) (Art. 3(1)) 
10 National of Any Non- Any Non- 
_ 
Not Protected Protected 
a Non- Union Union Country 
Union Country 
Country 
(Urbanian) (Ruritania) (Atlantia) (Art. 3(1)) 
11 National of a Unpublished Protected Protected 
Union Work 
Country 
(British) Art. 31 a Art. 31 
12 National of Unpublished Not Protected Protected 
a Non- Work 
Union 
Country 
(Urbanian) (Art. 3(1)) 
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Part B 
Protection of Cinematographic, Architectural and Other Artistic Works; 
Supplementary Berne Criteria Concerning Authors Not Covered under 
Article 3(1)(a) 
Section 1- Cinematographic Works 
Under the proposed revision of the Berne Convention, non-Union authors of 
cinematographic works will receive protection for their published works - wherever these 
are first published or simultaneously published - and for their unpublished works, 
irrespective of the location of the maker. 
[Cases of additional protection resulting from the proposals are shown in bold. ] 
Headquarters/ Published Work Unpublished Protection Protection 
l bit H W k und B und r a ua Place of First Places of or 
er erne e 




1 Any Union Any Non-Union Protected Protected 
Country Country 
(UK) (Ruritania) Art. 4 a Art. 3 1 
2 Any Non- Any Non-Union Not Protected Protected 
Union Country 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Ruritania) (Art. 3(1)) 
3 Any Union Any Non-Union Any Non-Union 
_ 
Protected Protected 
Country Country Country 
(UK) (Ruritania) Atlantia Art. 4 a (Art. 3 1 
4 Any Non- Any Non-Union Any Non-Union 
_ 
Not Protected Protected 
Union Country Country 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Ruritania) (Atlantia) (Art. 3(1)) 
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5 Any Union Unpublished Protected Protected 
Country Work 
(UK) Art. 4 a Art. 3 1 
6 Any Non- Unpublished Not Protected Protected 
Union Work 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Art. 3(1)) 
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Section 2- Architectural and Other Artistic Works 
Under the proposed revision of the Berne Convention, non-Union authors of works of 
architecture and artistic works incorporated in a building (or other structure) will receive 
protection for their published works - wherever these are first published or 
simultaneously published - and for their unpublished works, irrespective of the location 
of the works. 
[Cases of additional protection resulting from the proposals are shown in bold. ] 
Type and Published Work Unpublished Protection Protection 
ti f W k d B ne under Loca on o Place of First Places of 
or un er er 




1 Work of Any Non-Union Protected Protected 
Architecture Country 
Erected in a 
Union Country 
(UK) (Ruritania) Art. 4 b Art. 3 1 
2 Work of Any Non-Union Not Protected Protected 
Architecture Country 
Erected in a 
Non-Union 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Ruritania) (Art. 3(1)) 
3 Work of Any Non-Union Any Non-Union _ 
Protected Protected 
Architecture Country Country 
Erected in a 
Union Country 
(UK) (Ruritania) (Atlantia) Art. 4 b (Art. 3 1 
4 Work of Any Non-Union Any Non-Union _ 
Not Protected Protected 
Architecture Country Country 
Erected in a 
Non-Union 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Ruritania) (Atlantia) (Art. 3(1)) 
5 Work of Unpublished Protected Protected 
Architecture Work 
Erected in a 
Union Country 
UK Art. 4 b Art. 3 1 
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Work of Unpublished Not Protected Protected 
Architecture Work 
Erected in a 
Non-Union 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Art. 3(1)) 
7 Artistic Any Non-Union Protected Protected 
Work Country 
Incorporated in a 
Building/ Other 
Structure in a 
Union Country 
(UK) (Ruritania) (Art. 4(b)) (Art. 3(1)) 




Structure in a 
Non-Union 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Ruritania) (Art. 3(1)) 
9 Artistic Any Non-Union Any Non-Union 
_ 
Protected Protected 
Work Country Country 
Incorporated in a 
Building/ Other 
Structure in a 
Union Country 
(UK) (Ruritania) Atlantis Art. 4 b Art. 3 1 
10 Artistic Any Non-Union Any Non-Union 
_ 
Not Protected Protected 
Work Country Country 
Incorporated in 
a Building/Other 
Structure in a 
Non-Union 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Ruritania) (Atlantia) (Art. 31)) 
11 Artistic Unpublished Protected Protected 
Work Work 
Incorporated in a 
Building/ Other 
Structure in a 
Union Country 
UK Art. 4 b Art. 3 1 
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Structure in a 
Non-Union 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Art. 3(1)) 
' The term "literary and artistic works" is used here in the broad sense of Article 2(1) of the Berne 
Convention, including, as well as literary and artistic works, dramatic and musical works, 
cinematographic works and works of architecture etc. 
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ANNEX 3 
Country of Origin - Effect of Proposals' 
Part A 
Country of Origin under the Berne Convention: Literary and Artistic Works2 
Under the proposed revision of the Berne Convention, all works of non-Union authors, 
like Union authors, will have a country of origin, whether published - wherever these are 
first published or simultaneously published - or unpublished (cf. Berne, Article 5(4)). 
[Cases of additional allocations of country of origin resulting from the proposals are 
shown in bold. ] 
Nationality of Published Work Unpublished Country of Country of 
Author Work Origin Origin 
Place of First Places of under Berne under 
Publication Simultaneous 1971 Proposed 
Publication Revision 
1 National of a Any Union France France 
Union Country 
Country 
(British) (France) Art. S 4a Art. S 4a 
2 National of a Any Union France France 
Non-Union Country 
Country 
(Urbanian) (France) (Art. 5(4)(a)) (Art. 5(4)(a)) 
3 National of a Any Non-Union UK UK 
Union Country 
Country 
(British) (Ruritania) Art. 5 4c Art. 5 4e 
4 National of a Any Non- No Specific Ruritania 
Non-Union Union Provision (work 
Country Country (work protected) 
unprotected) 
(Art. 5(4)(b))/ 
(Urbanian) (Ruritania) (Art. 7(8)) 
249 
5* National of a Any Union Any Union 
_ 
China China 
Union Country Country (Country with (Country with 
Country Shortest Term Shortest Term 
of Protection) of Protection) 
(France (70 (China (50 
(British) years pma)) years pma)) Art. 5 4a Art. 5 4a 
6 National of a Any Union Any Union 
_ 
China China 
Non-Union Country Country (Country with (Country with 
Country Shortest Term Shortest Term 
of Protection) of Protection) 
(France (70 (China (50 
(Urbanian) years pma) years pma)) Art. 5 4a Art. 5 4a 
7 National of a Any Union Any Non-Union _ 
France France 
Union Country Country 
Country 
(British) (France) (Ruritania) (Art. 5 4)(b) (Art. S 4c 
8 National of a Any Union Any Non-Union _ 
France France 
Non-Union Country Country 
Country 
(Urbanian) (France) (Ruritania) Art. S 4b Art. 5 4c 
9 National of a Any Non-Union Any Non-Union _ 
UK UK 
Union Country Country 
Country 
(British) (Ruritania) (Atlantia) Art. S 4c Art. 5 4e 
10 National of Any Non- Any Non- _ 
No Specific Country with 
a Non- Union Union Country Provision Shortest Term 
Union Country (work of Protection 
Country unprotected) 
(Art. 5(4)(d))/ 
(Urbanian) (Ruritania) (Atlantia) (Art. 7(8)) 
11 National of Unpublished UK UK 
a Union Work 
Country 
(British) Art. S 4c Art. 5 4e 
12 National of Unpublished No Specific Urbania 






(Urbanian) (Art. 7(8)) 
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* Note 
It appears that the rules of the Berne Convention do not cover the case where works are 
simultaneously published in Union countries which grant the same term of protection. 
Ricketson points out that this constitutes a gap in the Convention rules and argues that 
"the view of Nordemann et a/ that there are two countries of origin, in this situation, must 
be correct". See Ricketson at para. 5.72. 
For a detailed discussion of this gap in the law and the possible solutions that have been 
put forward, see Nordemann, W., Vinck, K., and Hertin, P. W., Internationales 
Urheberrecht und Leistungsschutzrecht der deutschaprachigen Länder unter 
Berücksichtigung auch der Staaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Kommentar, 
Werner, Düsseldorf (1977) at 60. 
Other special problems relating to the identification of the country of origin (e. g. where 
there is a change of nationality) are also considered in Ricketson, at paras. 5.72-5.81, 
but are not considered here. 
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Part B 
Country of Origin: Cinematographic, Architectural and Other Artistic Works; 
Supplementary Berne Criteria 
Section 1- Cinematographic Works 
Under the proposed revision of the Berne Convention, cinematographic works of non- 
Union authors will have a country of origin, whether published - wherever these are first 
published or simultaneously published - or unpublished, irrespective of the location of 
the maker (cf. Berne, Article 5(4)(c)). 
In the case where the country of origin of a cinematographic work does not protect such 
a work, or protects it for less than 50 years pma, the provisions under revised Article 7(8) 
of the Berne Convention shall apply. 
Assume that interpretation of Articles 3(1), 4 and 5(4) of the Berne Convention is that if 
the author of a Union work is a Union national, the rules of Part A will apply. 
[Cases of additional allocations of country of origin resulting from the proposals are 
shown in bold. ] 
Nationality Headquar- Published Work Unpubli- Country of Country of 
fA th /H bit t shed Work Ori in Ori in or o u a u- ers Place of First Places of 
g g 
al under Berne under 
Residence Publication Simulta- 1971 Proposed 
of Maker neous Publication 
Revision 
1 National Any Union Any Non-Union UK UK 
of a Non- Country Country 
Union 
Country 
(Urbanian) (UK) (Ruritania) (Art. 5(4)(c)(i)) (Art. 5(4)(e)(i)) 
2 National Any Non- Any Non- No Specific Ruritania 
of a Non- Union Union Provision (work 
Union Country Country (work protected) 
Country unprotected) 
(Urbanian) (Arcadia) (Ruritania) (Art. 5(4)(c)) 
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_3 _National Any Union Any Non-Union Any Non-Union 
_ 
UK UK 
of a Non- Country Country Country 
Union 
Country 
(Ruritania (70 (Atlantia (50 
Urbanian (UK) years ma years pma)) Art. 5 4ci Art. 5 4ei 
4 National Any Non- Any Non- Any Non- 
_ 
No specific Atlantia 
of a Non- Union Union Union Provision (Country with 
Union Country Country Country (work Shortest Term 
Country unprotected) of Protection) 
(work 
protected) 
(Ruritania (70 (Atlantia (50 
(Urbanian) (Arcadia) years pma)) years pma)) (Art. 5(4)(d)) 
5 National Any Union Unpubli- UK UK 
of a Non- Country shed Work 
Union 
Country 
Urbanian (UK) Art. S 4ci Art. S 4ei 
6 National Any Non- Unpubli- No specific Urbania 
of a Non- Union shed Work Provision (work 
Union Country (work protected) 
Country unprotected) 
(Urbanian) (Arcadia) (Art. 5(4)(f)) 
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Section 2- Architectural and Other Artistic Works 
Under the proposed revision of the Berne Convention, works of architecture and artistic 
works incorporated in a building (or other structure) by non-Union authors will have a 
country of origin, whether published - wherever these are first published or 
simultaneously published - or unpublished, irrespective of their location (cf. Berne, 
Article 5(4)(c)). 
In the case where the country of origin of a work of architecture or artistic work 
incorporated in a building (or other structure) does not protect such a work, or protects it 
for less than 50 years pma, the provisions under revised Article 7(8) of the Berne 
Convention shall apply. 
Assume that interpretation of Articles 3(1), 4 and 5(4) of the Berne Convention is that if 
the author of a Union work is a Union national, the rules of Part A will apply. 
[Cases of additional allocations of country of origin resulting from the proposals are 
shown in. bold. ] 
Type and Nationality Published Work Unpubli- Country of Country of 
L ti f fA th dW h k O i i O i i oca on o o u or Place of First Places of s e or r g n g r n Work Publication Simulta- under Berne under 1971 Proposed 
neous Revision Publication 
1 Work of National of a Any Non- UK UK 
Architecture Non-Union Union Country 
Erected in a Country 
Union Country 
(UK) (Urbanian) (Ruritania) Art. 5 4c ii Art. S 4e ii 
2 Work of National of Any Non- No Specific Ruritania 
Architecture a Non- Union Provision (work 
Erected in a Union Country (work protected) 
Non-Union Country unprotected) 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Urbanian) (Ruritania) (Art. 5(4)(c)) 
3 Work of National of a Any Non- Any Non- _ 
UK UK 
Architecture Non-Union Union Country Union Country 
Erected in a Country 
Union Country 
(UK) (Urbanian) (Ruritania) (Atlantia) Art. S 4c ii Art. S 4e ii 
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4 Work of National of Any Non- Any Non- _ 
No Specific Atlantia 
Architecture a Non- Union Union Provision (Country with 
Erected in a Union Country Country (work Shortest 




(Ruritania (70 (Atlantia (50 
(Arcadia) (Urbanian) years pma)) years pma)) (Art. 5(4)(d)) 
5 Work of National of a Unpubli- UK UK 
Architecture Non-Union shed Work 
Erected in a Country 
Union Country 
(UK) (Urbanian) Arts 4c ii Art. 5 4e ii 
6 Work of National of Unpubli- No Specific Urbania 
Architecture a Non- shed work Provision (work 
Erected in a Union (work protected) 
Non-Union Country unprotected) 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Urbanian) (Art. 5(4)(f)) 
7 Artistic National of a Any Non- UK UK 
Work Non-Union Union Country 
Incorporated Country 
in a Building/ 
Other 
Structure in a 
Union Country 
(UK) Urbanian (Ruritania) Art. 5 4c ii Art. 5 4e ii 
8 Artistic National of Any Non- No Specific Ruritania 
Work a Non- Union Provision (work 
Incorporated Union Country (work protected) 
in a Building/ Country unprotected) 
Other 
Structure in a 
Non-Union 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Urbanian) (Ruritania) (Art. 5(4)(c)) 
9 Artistic National of a Any Non- Any Non- _ 
UK UK 




Structure in a 
Union Country 





in a Building/ 
Other 
































11 Artistic National of a Unpubli- UK UK 




Structure in a 
Union Country 
(UK) (Urbanian) (Art. S 4c ii) Art. 5 4e ii 
12 Artistic National of Unpubli- No Specific Urbania 
Work a Non- shed work Provision (work 
Incorporated Union (work protected) 
in a Country unprotected) 
Building/ 
Other 
Structure in a 
Non-Union 
Country 
(Arcadia) (Urbanian) (Art. 5(4)(f)) 
' The Tables do not cover situations of works of joint authorship. For a discussion of such works 
in the present context, see Ricketson at para. 5.72. 
2 The term "literary and artistic works" is used here in the broad sense of Article 2(1) of the Berne 
Convention, including, as well as literary and artistic works, dramatic and musical works, 
cinematographic works and works of architecture etc. 
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APPENDIX 1 
"Solemn Declaration" by the Assembly of the Berne Union of 9 
September 1986 
I. Original Text' 
"Les Etats membres de t' Assemb/ee de t' Union internationale pour la protection des 
oeuvres litteraires et artistiques (Union de Beme), 
"Convoques en session extraordinaire par le Directeur general de l' Organisation 
Mondiale de la Propriete Intellectuelle pour celebrer le centieme anniversaire de I' 
adoption de la Convention de Berne pour la protection des oeuvres litteraires et 
artistiques, signee le 9 septembre 1886, 
`Reunis, ä 1' invitation du Conseil federal de la Confederation suisse au Palais federal 
6 Berne, surles lieux memes oü la Convention de Berne a 06 adoptee et signee un 
siede plus töt, 
"S' inspirant de I' enthousiasme, de I' imagination, de la sagesse et du discernement 
des gouvernements et des individus dont les efforts ont donne naissance a la 
Convention de Berne, 
"Honorant la memo ire de tous ceux qui ont contribue ä la modemisation constante de 
la Convention de Berne, grace aux sept revisions effectuees au cours des cent 
demieres annees, 
"Renouvelant leur engagement de proteger les droits des auteurs d' une facon aussi 
efficace et aussi uniforme que possible: 
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`Declarent solennellement que le droit d' auteur se fonde sur les droits de I' homme et 
surla justice et que les auteurs, en tant que createurs de beaute, de divertissement et 
de connaissances, meritent que leurs droits sur leurs creations soient reconnus et 
efficacement proteges aussi bien dans leur propre pays que dans tous les autres pays 
du monde, 
`Declarent solennellement que le droit d' auteur a contribue et continue de contribuer 
J 1' epanouissement de I' humanite en encourageant la creativite intellectuelle et en 
stimulant la dissemination ä travers le monde des expressions de I' art, du savoir et de I' 
information pour le benefice de tous, 
`Declarent solennellement que le respect international du droit d' auteur ouvre les 
fronfieres aux oeuvres de I' esprit, contribuant ainsi ä promouvoir une meilleure 
comprehension internationale et ä faire avancer /a cause de la paix, 
`Declarent solennellement que la Convention de Beme pour la protection des oeuvres 
litteraires et artistiques, en offrant une excellente codification complete et harmonisee 
des droits des auteurs, a garanti depuis cent ans la protection internationale la plus 
efficace de ces droits, 
"S' engagent ä continuer d' oeuvrer ensemble pour sauvegarder les droits des auteurs 
contre toutes formes de piraterie et autres actes illicites et pour assurer une application 
effective de ces droits dans /e cadre des nouvelles possibilites de communication entre 
les auteurs et le public engendrees par le progres economique, social, scientifique et 
technique, 
"Invitent instamment tous les Etats qui ne I' ont pas encore fait 6 sejoindre 6 eux en 
adherant ä la Convention de Berne pour la protection des oeuvres litteraires et 
artistiques. " 
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H. Translated Text' 
"The States members of the Assembly of the International (Berne) Union for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
"Convened in an extraordinary session by the Director General of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization in order to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of 
the adoption of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
signed on September 9,1886, 
"Meeting, at the invitation of the Federal Council of the Swiss Confederation in the 
Palais federal, in Berne, in the same place where the Berne Convention was adopted 
and signed a century ago, 
"Inspired by the enthusiasm, imagination, wisdom and foresight of those Governments 
and those individuals whose efforts brought the Berne Convention into existence, 
"Paying tribute to the memory of all those who contributed to the constant 
modernization, through the seven revisions that took place in the last hundred years, of 
the Berne Convention, 
`Reaffirming their commitment to protect the rights of authors in as effective and 
uniform a manner as possible: 
"Solemnly declare that copyright is based on human rights and justice and that 
authors, as creators of beauty, entertainment and learning, deserve that their rights in 
their creations be recognized and effectively protected both in their own country and in 
all other countries of the world; 
"Solemnly declare that the law of copyright has enriched and will continue to enrich 
mankind by encouraging intellectual creativity and by serving as an incentive for the 
dissemination throughout the world of expressions of the arts, learning and information 
for the benefit of all people; 
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"Solemnly declare that international respect for the law of copyright opens paths 
across frontiers for works of the mind, thus contributing to a better international 
understanding and to the cause of peace; 
"Solemnly declare that the Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, by providing an outstanding, comprehensive and harmonized codification of the 
rights of authors, has guaranteed for a hundred years the most effective international 
protection of those rights; 
`Pledge themselves to continue to work together to safeguard the rights of authors 
against all forms of piracy and other unlawful acts and to ensure the effective application 
of those rights in the framework of new opportunities for communication between 
authors and the public created by economic, social, scientific and technological 
progress; 
"Urge all States that so far have not done so to join them by adhering to the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. " 
' WIPO, "Centenaire de la Convention de Berne - Ceremonies du centieme anniversaire de la 
Convention de Berne (Premiere Partie)" (1986) 22 Droit d' Auteur 367. 
"WIPO, "Centenary of the Berne Convention - Celebration of the Hundredth Anniversary of the 
Berne Convention (Part I)" (1986) 22 Copyright 367. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table of Membership of International Copyright and 












Afganistan   
Albania     
Algeria    
Andorra    
Angola    
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
   
Argentina     
Armenia     
Australia     
Austria     
Azerbaijan    
Bahamas   
Bahrain    
Bangladesh     
Barbados     
Belarus    
Belgium     
Belize     
Benin     
Bhutan   
Bolivia     
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
   
Botswana     




Bulgaria     
Burkina Faso     













Cambodia    
Cameroon     
Canada     
Cape Verde    
Central African 
Republic 
 V V  
Chad     
Chile     
China     
Colombia     
Comoros   
Congo     
Costa Rica     
Cote d' Ivoire     
Croatia     
Cuba    
Cyprus     




   
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
    
Denmark     
Djibouti     
Dominica     
Dominican 
Republic 
   V 
Ecuador     
Egypt     
El Salvador   V  
Equatorial Guinea   V 
Eritrea    
Estonia     
Ethiopia   
Fiji    
Finland     
France     
Gabon   V  
Gambia    V 
Georgia   V V 













Ghana     
Greece     
Grenada     
Guatemala     
Guinea     
Guinea-Bissau     
Guyana     
Haiti     
Holy See  
Honduras     
Hungary     
Iceland     
India     




Iraq   
Ireland     
Israel     
Italy     
Jamaica     
Japan     
Jordan     
Kazakhstan    
Kenya     
Kiribati  
Kuwait    





Latvia     
Lebanon    
Lesotho     
Liberia    
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
   
Liechtenstein     
Lithuania     
Luxembourg     
Madagascar     
Malawi     













Maldives   
Mali     
Malta     
Marshall Islands  
Mauritania     
Mauritius     





Monaco    
Mongolia     
Morocco     
Mozambique    
Myanmar   
Namibia     
Nauru   
Nepal     
Netherlands     
New Zealand     
Nicaragua     
Niger     
Nigeria     
Norway     
Oman    
Pakistan    
Palau  
Panama     
Papua New 
Guinea 
   
Paraguay     
Peru     
Philippines     
Poland     
Portugal     
Qatar    
Republic of Korea     
Republic of 
Moldova 
    
Romania     
Russian 
Federation 
   













Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
   
Saint Lucia    
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
    
Samoa  
San Marino   
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
V  
Saudi Arabia    
Senegal     
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
   
Seychelles   
Sierra Leone    
Singapore    
Slovakia     
Slovenia     
Solomon Islands   
Somalia   
South Africa     
Spain     
Sri Lanka     
Sudan    
Suriname     
Swaziland     
Sweden     
Switzerland     
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
   
Tajikistan    




    
Timor-Leste   
Togo     
Tonga     
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
    
Tunisia     
Turkey     














Uganda    
Ukraine    
United Arab 
Emirates 
   
United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
    
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
    
United States of 
America 
    
Uruguay     
Uzbekistan    
Vanuatu  
Venezuela     
Vietnam .    
Yemen   
Zambia     
Zimbabwe     
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APPENDIX 3 
Table of Membership of Regional Human Rights 
Instruments 
European Convention for 
the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 
American Convention on 
Human Rights 1969 
African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' 
Rights 1981 
Albania Argentina Algeria 
Andorra Barbados Angola 
Armenia Bolivia Benin 
Austria Brazil Botswana 
Azerbaijan Chile Burkina Faso 
Belgium Colombia Burundi 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Costa Rica Cameroon 
Bulgaria Dominica Cape Verde 
Croatia Dominican Republic Central African Republic 
Cyprus Ecuador Chad 
Czech Republic El Salvador Comoros 
Denmark Grenada Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Estonia Guatemala Republic of the Congo 
Finland Haiti Cote d' Ivoire 
France Honduras Djibouti 
Georgia Jamaica Egypt 
Germany Mexico Equatorial Guinea 
Greece Nicaragua Eritrea 
Hungary Panama Ethiopia 
Iceland Paraguay Gabon 
Ireland Peru Gambia 
Italy Suriname Ghana 
Latvia Trinidad and Tobago Guinea 
Liechtenstein United States Guinea-Bissau 
Lithuania Uruguay Kenya 









European Convention for 
the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 
African Charter on 




San Marino Niger 
Serbia and Montenegro Nigeria 
Slovakia Rwanda 
Slovenia Western Sahara (SADR) 
Spain Sao Tome and Principe 
Sweden Senegal 
Switzerland Seychelles 
The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
Sierra Leone 
Turkey Somalia 
Ukraine South Africa 










I. STATUTES, CONVENTIONS AND AGREEMENTS 
International Treaties, Conventions and Agreements 
1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 
September 9,1886, Paris (1971) text 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 10,1948 
1952 Geneva Universal Copyright Convention 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G. A. res. 2200A (XXI), 
U. N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G. A. res. 
2200A (XXI), U. N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 
1994 TRIPS Agreement (Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Annex 1C of World Trade 
Organisation Agreement) (April 15,1994), (MTN/FA II-AIC) 
1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, of December 20,1996, Geneva 
Regional Materials 
1969 American Convention on Human Rights, O. A. S. Treaty Series No. 36 
1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 
5 
1988 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1992 North American Free Trade (NAFTA) Agreement 
1993 Cartagena Decision 351 on Author's Rights and Connected Rights (December 
17,1993) of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement 
European Materials 
1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
270 
1952 First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms 
2001 European Parliament and Council Directive of May 22 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
National Laws 
France 
1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of August 26,1789 
1791 Law of 17 January 1791 on inventions 
1793 Law of 19-24 July 1793 on author's rights 
1946 Constitution of October 27,1946 
1957 Law of March 11th 1957, No. 57-298 on literary and artistic works 
1958 Constitution of October 4,1958 
1985 Law of 3 July 1985, No. 85-660 on computers 
1992 Law of 1 July 1992, No. 92-597 - Intellectual Property Code 
Germany 
1871 Law 
1876 Law concerning the Right of the Author in Works of Figurative Art 
1901 Act of June 19 relating to Publishing Law 
1907 Act of January 9 on Authors' Rights in Artistic Works and Photography 
1910 Law of May 22,1910 
1949 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of May 23,1949, as amended 
by the Unification Treaty of August 31,1990 
1965 Author's Right and Related Protection Rights Law of September 9,1965, as 
amended by the Law of June 9,1993 
Prussia 
1837 Law on the Protection of Property in Works of Science and Art of June 11 
United Kingdom 
1710 Copyright Act (8 Anne c. 19) 
1842 Copyright Act (5 &6 Vict., c. 45, c. 100) 
1911 Copyright Act (1 &2 Geo. 5, c. 46) 
1956 Copyright Act (4 &5 Eliz. 2, c. 74) 
1988 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (c. 48) 
1998 Human Rights Act (c. 48) 
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United States of America 
1787 Constitution of the United States of America 
1790 Act of May 31,1790, Ch. 15,1 Stat. 124 
1909 Copyright Act of March 4,1909, Ch. 320,35 Stat. 1075 
1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 
1976 Copyright Act, 17 U. S. C. §§101-810 (1976) 
1988 Lanham Act, Ch. 540,43(a), 60 Stat. 441 (1946), current version at 15 U. S. C. 
1125(a) (1988) 
II. BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS 
ALAI Study Days Documents, Cambridge 1998, The Boundaries of Copyright - Its 
Proper Limitations and Exceptions (Australian Copyright Council, 1999) [1.3.2.5, 
4.5.5.1,5.1] 
Avril, P. and Gicquel, J., Le Conseil Constitutionnel (4th ed., Montchrestien, 1998) 
[2.5.4] 
Barendt, E., Freedom of Speech (2"d ed., Oxford University Press, 2005) [2.5.2, 
2.5.3,2.5.4,4.2.2.1,6.1] 
Birrell, A., Seven Lectures on the Law and History of Copyright in Books (2' ed., 
Fred B. Rothman & Co, London, 1971) [5.4] 
Burrell, R. and Coleman, A., Copyright Exceptions: The Digital Impact (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) [1.3.2.1,1.3.2.4,1.3.2.5] 
Clayton, R. and Tomlinson, H., Privacy and Freedom of Expression (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) [2.5.2] 
Clayton, R., and Tomlinson, H., The Law of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2000) [2.5.2] 
Garnett, K., Davies, G. and Harbottle, G., Copinger and Skone James on Copyright 
(151h ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) [1.3.2.3,4.5.2.1,5.2] 
Cornish, W. R., Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied 
Rights (5t' ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) [1.3.2.1,5.3.1] 
Davies, G., Copyright and the Public Interest (2"d ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) 
[1.3.2.6,1.5.2,5.3,5.3.1] 
Deazley, R., On the Origin of the Right to Copy (Hart Publishing, 2004) [5.3.1] 
272 
Dicey, AN., Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed., 
Macmillan, 1959) [2.5.2] 
Dietz, A., Copyright Law in the European Community (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978) 
[1.3.2.3] 
Desbois, H., Le Droit d' auteuren France (3`d ed., Dalloz, Paris, 1978) [5.3.1] 
Elkin-Koren, N. and Netanel, N. W., (eds), The Commodification of Information 
(Kluwer, 2002) [4.5.3.1,4.5.4.1] 
Fechner, F., Geistiges Eigentum und Verfassung (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1999) 
[5.3.1] 
Gearon, L., Freedom of Expression and Human Rights: Historical, Literary and 
Political Contexts (Sussex Academic Press, 2006) [2.3.2.1] 
Goldstein, P., Copyright Principles, Law and Practice 3 Vols. (Boston, Little, Brown 
& Co, 1989) [5.3.1] 
Griffiths, J. and Suthersanen, U., (eds. ), Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative 
and International Analyses (Oxford University Press, 2005) [3.3.2,3.5.2.2,4.5.2.1, 
4.5.3.1,4.5.4.1,5.2.1,5.2.3] 
Kleinke, Y., Pressedatenbanken und Urheberrecht (Köln etc., Carl Heymans Verlag, 
1999) [5.3.1 ] 
Laddie, H., Prescott, P., Vitoria, M., The Modem Law of Copyright and Designs (3rd 
ed., Butterworths, 2000) [1.3.2.1,3.5.2.2] 
Lucas, A. and Lucas, H. J., Traite de la Propriete Litteraire et Artistique (2"d ed., 
Litec, 2001) [1.3.2.2] 
Lyons, G. M. and Mayall, J. (eds. ), International Human Rights in the 215 Century: 
Protecting the Rights of Groups (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) [2.3.2.2] 
Makeen, M. F., Copyright in a Global Information Society: The Scope of Copyright 
Protection under International, US, UK and French Law (Kluwer Law International, 
2000) [1.3.2.4] 
Morsink, J., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights - Origins, Drafting & Intent 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999) [2.2,2.3.2.1] 
Nimmer, M. B. and Geller, P. W., International Copyright Law and Practice (Matthew 
Bender, 1988-) [1.3.2.4] 
Nimmer, M. B. and Nimmer, D., Copyright (Matthew Bender, looseleaf, 1963-) 
[3.5.3.1,3.5.3.2,5.2.3] 
Paine, T., Collins, H. and Foner, E., Rights of Man (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1984) [2.5.4] 
273 
Patterson, L. R., Copyright in Historical Perspective (Nashville, Vanderbilt University 
Press, 1968) [5.3.1] 
Renouard, A. C., Traite des Droits d' Auteur dans la Litterature, les Sciences et les 
Beaux-Arts (2 vol., Paris, Jules Renouard, 1838-1839) [1.2.2,1.5.4] 
Ricketson, S., The Beme Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works 1886-1986 (Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, 
Kluwer, 1987) [6.2] 
Ricketson, S. and Ginsburg, J., International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights - 
The Berne Convention and Beyond (2"d ed., Oxford University Press, 2006) 
[1.3.2.3,1.3.2.4,3.3.2,4.3,6.4.2.1,6.4.3.1] 
Robertson, A. H., and Merrills, J. G., Human Rights in the World (4`h ed., Manchester 
University Press, 1996) [2.3.3.1,2.4.2.1,2.4.2.2] 
Rodley, N. S., The treatment of Prisoners in International Law (2nd ed., Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1999) [2.3.2.2] 
Rose, M., Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright (Harvard University 
Press, 1993) [5.3.1] 
Schricker, G., Urheberrecht, Kommentar (2"d ed., Munich, C. H. Beck'sche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1999) [5.3.1] 
Senftleben, M., Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test - An Analysis of the 
Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law (Hugenholtz, P. B. (ed. ), 
Kluwer Law International, 2004) [5.2.1] 
Seville, C., Literary Copyright Reform in Early Victorian England (the Framing of the 
1842 CopyrightAct) (Cambridge University Press, 1999) [1.5.2,5.3.1] 
Sherman, B. and Bently, L., The Making of Modem Intellectual Property Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002) [1.5.2,5.3.1] 
Sieghart, P., The International Law of Human Rights (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1983) [2.4.4.2] 
Smith, R. K. M., Textbook on International Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 
2003) [2.3.2.3,2.3.3.2] 
Steiner, H. J. and Alston, P., International Human Rights in Context - Law, Politics, 
Morals (2"d ed., Oxford University Press, 2000) [2.2,2.3.2.1,2.3.2.2,2.4.2.2, 
2.4.4.2] 
Sterling, J. A. L., and Carpenter, M. C. L., Copyright Law in the United Kingdom and 
the Rights of Performers, Authors and Composers in Europe (Legal Books, 1986, 
supplement 1987) [1.5.2] 
274 
Sterling, J. A. L., World Copyright Law (2"d ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) [1.2.2, 
1.3.2.1,1.3.2.2,1.3.2.3,1.3.2.4,1.5.2,1.5.4,3.1,3.5.4.2,4.5.2.1,4.5.4.1,4.5.5.1, 
6.2,6.3] 
Stewart, S. M. and Sandison, H. (eds. ), International Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights (2nd ed., Butterworths, 1989) [1.3.2.2,1.5.2,1.5.3,1.5.4,1.5.5] 
Stone, R., Textbook on Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4`h ed., Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2002) 
Torremans, P. L. C. (ed. ), Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of Expression - 
Intellectual Property- Privacy (Kluwer Law International, 2004) [2.2,5.5] 
Wadham, J., and Mountfield, H., Blackstone's Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998 
(Blackstone, 1999) [2.5.2] 
III. JOURNAL ARTICLES, BOOK CHAPTERS AND PAPERS 
Baker, C. E., "First Amendment Limits on Copyright? " (2002) 55 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 
891 [4.5.3.1] 
Barendt, E., "Copyright and Free Speech Theory" in Copyright and Free Speech: 
Comparative and International Analyses (Griffiths, J. and Suthersanen, U. (eds), 
Oxford University Press, 2005) [4.5.3.1] 
Barron, A., "Copyright Law and the Claims of Art" [2002] IPQ 368 [3.5.2.2] 
Bernhardt, R., "The Convention and Domestic Law" in MacDonald, R. St. J., and 
Matscher, F., and Petzold, H., (eds. ), The European System for the Protection of 
Human Rights (Nijhoff, 1993) [2.5.4] 
Birnhack, M. D., "Acknowledging the Conflict Between Copyright Law and Freedom 
of Expression under the Human Rights Act" (2003) 14(2) Ent. L. Rev. 24 [Intro. 1, 
4.5.3.1] 
Birnhack, M. D., "The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and 
Breaking-Up" (2003) 43 Idea: J. of Law & Tech. 233 [4.5.3.1] 
Birnhack, M. D., "Copyrighting Speech: A Trans-Atlantic View", in Copyright and 
Human Rights: Freedom of Expression - Intellectual Property - Privacy 
(Torremans, P. L. C. (ed. ), Kluwer Law International, 2004) [5.5] 
Boyle, A., "Freedom of Expression as a Public Interest in English Law" [1992] PL 
574 [2.5.2] 
Brugger, W., "The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law (Part 
I)", (2002) 3(12) German Law Journal [2.5.5] 
Burrell, R., "Defending the Public Interest" (2000) E. I. P. R. 394 [5.3.2] 
275 
Burrell, R., "Reining in Copyright: Is Fair Use the Answer? " (2001) 4 I. P. Q. 361 
[4.5.2.1] 
Caron, C., "Abuse of Rights and Authors' Rights" (1998) 176 R. I. D. A. 3 [5.3.1] 
Chapman, A. R., "Approaching Intellectual Property as a Human Right: Obligations 
Related to Article 15(1)(c)" (2001) vol. XXXV, No. 3 Copyright Bulletin 4 [2.2] 
Chemerinsky, E., "Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why 
the Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional" (2002) 36 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 82 
[5.4,5.5] 
Ciolino, D. S., "Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use" (1997) 54 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 33 [3.5.3.1] 
Cohen, H., Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment, 
CRS Report for Congress (95-815), June 2,2006 [2.5.3] 
Denicola, R. C., "Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the 
Protection of Expression" (1979) 67 Cal. L. Rev. 283 [4.5.3.1,5.4] 
Desbois, H., "La loi frangaise du 11 mars 1957" (1957) Le droit d' auteur 84 [5.3.1] 
Dietz, A., "Germany" in International Copyright and Practice (Geller, P. E. and 
Nimmer, M. B., Matthew Bender, 1988) (and annual updates, 1989-2005) [3.5.4.2] 
Dietz, A., "Letter from Germany" (1973) Copyright 93 [5.3.1] 
Dietz, A., "Legal Principles of Moral Rights in Civil Law Countries" (1993) 2 
Copyright Reporter 1 [1.3.2.3] 
Donnelly, J., "The Universal Declaration Model of Human Rights: A Liberal 
Defence" in International Human Rights in the 21St Century: Protecting the Rights of 
Groups ( Lyons, G. M. and Mayall, J., (eds. ), Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) 
[2.3.2.3] 
Drahos, P., "The Universality of Intellectual Property Rights: Origins and 
Development" in (1999) Intellectual Property and Human Rights, WIPO (Geneva), 
13. [2.2] 
Dworkin, G., "Copyright, the Public Interest and Freedom of Speech: A UK 
Copyright Lawyer's Perspective", in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and 
International Analyses (Griffiths, J. and Suthersanen, U. (eds. ), Oxford University 
Press, 2005) [5.2.3] 
Eisgruber, C. L., "Censorship, Copyright, and Free Speech: Some Tentative 
Skepticism About the Campaign to Impose First Amendment Restrictions on 
Copyright Law" (2003) 2 J. Telecommunications & High Technology L. 17 [4.5.3.1] 
276 
Elkin-Koren, N., "Its All About Control: Rethinking Copyright in the New Information 
Landscape" in The Commodification of Information (Elkin-Koren, N. and Netanel, 
N. W. (eds), Kluwer, 2002) [4.5.3.1] 
Ely, J. H., "Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis" (1975) 88 Harvard L. Rev. 1482 [2.5.3] 
Francon, A., "Questions de Droit d' Auteur Relatives aux Parodies et Productions 
Similaires" (1988) Copyright 302 [4.5.4.1] 
Fraser, S., "The Conflict between the First Amendment and Copyright Law and its 
Impact on the Internet" (1998) 16 Cardozo Arts & Ent. Law J. 1 [4.5.3.1,5.4] 
Garnett, K., "The Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on UK Copyright Law" in 
Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses (Griffiths, J. 
and Suthersanen, U. (eds. ), Oxford University Press, 2005) [4.5.2.1,5.2.1] 
Geiger, C., "Creating Copyright Limitations Without Legal Basis: The 'Buren' 
Decision, a Liberation? " (2005) 36(7) I. I. C. 842 [4.5.4.1] 
Geiger, C., "Fundamental Rights: a Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual 
Property Law? " (2004) 35(3) I. I. C. 268 [4.5.4.1] 
Gendreau, Y., "The Reproduction Right and the Internet" (1998) 178 R. I. D. A. 2 
[1.3.2.4] 
Ginsburg, J. C., "Art and the Law: Suppression and Liberty" (2001) 19 Cardozo Arts 
& Ent. L. J. 9 [3.5.4.1] 
Ginsburg, J. C., "News from US (I)" (1999) 179 R. I. D. A. 143 [1.3.2.6] 
Ginsburg, J. C., "A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary 
France and America" (1991) 147 R. I. D. A. 125 [1.5.4,5.3.1] 
Ginsburg, J. C., "Moral Rights in a Common Law System" (1990) 1(4) Ent. L. Rev. 
121 [3.5.2.2] 
Goldstein, P., "Copyright and the First Amendment" (1970) 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 
[Intro. 1,4.5.3.1,5.4] 
Gordon, J. W., "Do We Have a Right to Speak with Another's Language? Eldred and 
the Duration of Copyright", in Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of Expression 
- Intellectual Property- Privacy (Torremans, P. L. C. (ed. ), Kluwer Law International, 
2004) [5.5] 
Gredley, E. and Maniatis, S., "Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part 1: The Nature of 
Parody and Its Treatment in Copyright" (1997) E. I. P. R. 339 [4.5.2.1] 
Griffiths, J., "Copyright Law and Censorship - The Impact of the Human Rights Act 
1998" (1999) 4 The Yearbook of Copyright and Media Law 3 [Intro. 1,5.2.1,5.3.2] 
277 
Griffiths, J., "Copyright Law After Ashdown - Time to Deal Fairly with the Public" 
(2002) 3I. P. Q. 240 [4.5.2.1] 
Griffiths, J., "Not Such A 'Timid Thing': The UK's Integrity Right and Freedom of 
Expression" in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses 
(Griffiths and Suthersanen (eds. ), Oxford University Press, 2005) [3.3.2,3.5.2.2] 
Guibault, L., "Limitations Found Outside of Copyright Law", in ALAI Study Days 
Documents, Cambridge 1998, The Boundaries of Copyright - Its Proper Limitations 
and Exceptions (Australian Copyright Council, 1999) [4.5.5.1] 
Harrison, R., "Pastiched-Off' (1998) 9(5) Ent. L. Rev. 181 [3.5.2.1] 
Henkin, L., "On Drawing Lines" (1968) 82 Harvard L. Rev. 63 [2.5.3] 
Higgins, R., "Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties" (1976-1977) 48 B. Y. I. L. 
281 [2.4.4.3] 
Hugenholtz, P. B., "Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe" in The 
Commodification of Information (Elkin-Koren, N. and Netanel, N. W. (eds), Kluwer, 
2002) [Intro. 1,4.5.4.1] 
Hughes, J., "The Philosophy of Intellectual Property" (1988) 77 Geo. L. J. 287 
[1.3.2.3] 
Jehoram, C., "Freedom of Expression in Copyright Law" (1984) 1 E. I. P. R. 3 [Intro. 1] 
Karlen, P. H., "What's Wrong With VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral Rights" (1993) 
15 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. 905 [3.5.3.1] 
Kemper, K. A., "First Amendment Protection Afforded to Commercial and Home 
Video Games" 106 A. L. R. 5th 337 [2.5.3] 
Kwall, R. R., "The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire 
between Copyright and Section 43(a)" (2002) 77 Wash. L. Rev. 985 [3.5.3.1] 
Kwall, R. R., "Copyright and the Moral Right: Is An American Marriage Possible? " 
(1985) 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1 [1.3.2.3] 
Laddie, H., "Copyright: Over-Strength, Over-Regulated, Over-Rated? " (1996) 
E. I. P. R. 253 [5.2.1] 
Landau, M., "Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox: The Need for Stronger Protection of 
Attribution Rights in the United States" (2005) N. Y. U. Annual Survey of American 
Law 273 [3.5.3.1] 
Lang, J., "The law of 3 July 1985" (1986) 127 R. I. D. A. 6 [5.3.1] 
Lessig, L., "Copyright's First Amendment" (2001) 48 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 1057 [4.5.3.1] 
278 
MacMillan, F., "Towards a Reconciliation of Free Speech and Copyright" (1996) The 
Yearbook of Media and Ent. Law 199 [5.3.2,5.3.3] 
Matthyssens, J., "Copyright Law Schemes in France during the Last Century" 
(1954) R. I. D. A. 15 [5.3.1] 
Merryman, J. H., "The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet" (1976) 27 Hastings L. J. 1023 
[3.5.4.1] 
Morrill, S. S., "Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises: Emasculating the 
Fair Use Accommodation of Competing Copyright and First Amendment Interests" 
(1984) 79 NW. U. L. Rev. 587 [4.5.3.1] 
Netanel, N. W., "Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society" (1996) 106 Yale L. J. 283 
[4.5.3.1] 
Netanel, N. W., "Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression" 
(2000) 53 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1879 [Intro. 1,4.5.3.1] 
Netanel, N. W., "Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein" (2001) 54 
Stan. L. Rev. 1 [4.5.3.1,5.2.3,5.4,5.5] 
Netanel, N. W., "Copyright and the First Amendment: What Eldred Misses - And 
Portends" in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and International Analyses 
(Griffiths, J. and Suthersanen, U. (eds), Oxford University Press, 2005) [4.5.3.1] 
Nimmer, M. B., "The Right to Speak From Times to Time: First Amendment Theory 
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy" (1968) 56 Cal. L. Rev. 935 [5.4,6.1] 
Nimmer, M. B., "Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free 
Speech and Press? " (1970) 17 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 1180 [Intro. 1,3.5.3.1,5.4,5.5] 
Nimmer, M. B., "The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment" 
(1973) 21 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 29 [2.5.3] 
Opsahl, T., "The Human Rights Committee" in The United Nations and Human 
Rights (Alston, P. (ed. ), 1992) [2.3.3.1] 
Ostergard, R. L., "Intellectual Property: A Universal Human Right? " (1999) 21 H. R. Q. 
156 [2.2] 
Patterson, L. R., "Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use" (1987) Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1 
[4.5.3.1] 
Phillips, J., "When is a Fact" (2000) Ent. L. Rev. 116 [5.3.2] 
Phillips, J., "The Berne Convention and the Public Interest" (1986) 11(157) 
Columbia-VLA Journal of Law & the Arts 165 [5.3] 
PiIny, K. H., "Germany: Copyright: Protection of Comic Strips under Copyright Law - 
'Alcolix/Asterix' - Parodies" (1995) 17(7) E. I. P. R. 198 [3.5.5.2] 
279 
Plaisant, R., "La protection du logiciel par le droit d'auteur" (1983) G. P. 2.348 [5.3.1] 
Price, M. E., "Resuscitating a Collaboration with Melville Nimmer: Moral Rights and 
Beyond, " (1998) Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property, Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law Yeshiva University, No. 3. [3.5.4.1] 
Reisman, M., W., "Practical Matters for Consideration in the Establishment of a 
Regional Human Rights Mechanism: Lessons from the Inter-American Experience" 
(1995) St. Louis-Warsaw Transnat'I 89 [2.4.3.2] 
Roeder, M. A., "The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors 
and Creators" (1940) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554 [1.3.2.3] 
Rubenfeld, J., "The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality" (2002) 
112 Yale L. J. 1 [4.5.3.1] 
Ruete, M., "The Kirchenmusik Judgment - Constitutional and Intellectual Property 
Rights" (1980) E. I. P. R. 198 [5.3.1] 
Samuelson, P., "The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property after Eldred v. 
Ashcroft" (2003) J. Copyright Soc'y 547 [4.5.3.1] 
Shipley, D. E., "Conflicts Between Copyright and the First Amendment after Harper 
& Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises" (1987) 1986 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 983 [4.5.3.1] 
Sobel, L. S., "Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm? " (1971) 19 
Copyright. Law Symposium 43 (American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers (eds. ) 1971) [5.4] 
Sohn, L., B., "A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights" in 
The United Nations and Human Rights, 18th Report of the Commission to Study the 
Organisation of Peace, New York, 1968 [2.2.2.2] 
Spitz, B., "Droit D'Auteur, Copyright et Parodie, Ou Le Mythe De L'Usage Loyal" 
(2005) 204 R. I. D. A. 54 [4.5.2.1,4.5.4.1] 
Spoor, J. H., "General Aspects of Exceptions and Limitations to Copyright: General 
Report", in ALAI Study Day Documents, Cambridge 1998, The Boundaries of 
Copyright: Its Proper Limitations and Exceptions (Australian Copyright Council, 
1999) [5.1] 
Stamatoudi, I., "Moral Rights of Authors in England: The Missing Emphasis on the 
Creators" [1997] IPQ 478 [3.5.2.2] 
Steiner, E., "France" in Gearty, C., A. (ed. ), European Civil Liberties and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Kluwer, 1997) [2.5.4] 
Steiner, H., J., "Securing Human Rights: The First Half-Century of the Universal 
Declaration and Beyond", Harvard Magazine, Sept. -Oct. 1998,45 [2.3.2.2] 
280 
Stone, G. R., "Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of 
Subject-Matter Restrictions" (1987) 46 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 81 [2.5.3] 
Strowel, A. and Tulkens, F., "Freedom of Expression and Copyright under Civil Law: 
Of Balance, Adaptation and Access", in Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative 
and International Analyses (Griffiths, J. and Suthersanen, U. (eds), Oxford 
University Press, 2005) [4.5.4.1] 
Suhl, N. C., "Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne 
Convention: A Fictional Work? " (2002) 12 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 
1203 [3.5.3.2] 
Suthersanen, U., "Exclusions to Design Protection -A New Paradigm" in 
Perspectives in Intellectual Property (Vol. 2, ed. Sterling) (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) 
[1.3.2.1] 
Thorne, C. D., "The Alan Clark Case - What It Is; What It Is Not" (1998) 20(5) 
E. I. P. R. 194 [3.5.2.1] 
Torremans, P. L. C., "Copyright As A Human Right", in Copyright and Human Rights: 
Freedom of Expression - Intellectual Property - Privacy (Torremans, P. L. C. (ed. ), 
Kluwer Law International, 2004) [2.2] 
Tushnet, R., "Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and 
How Copying Serves It" (2004) 109 Yale L. J. 101 [4.5.3.1] 
Ulmer, E., "Letter from Germany" (1965) Copyright 275 [5.3.1] 
Vinje, T., "The New WIPO Copyright Treaty: A Happy Result in Geneva" (1997) 19 
E. I. P. R. 230 [1.3.2.4] 
Volokh, E., "Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts after 
Eldred, 44 Liquomart, and Bartnicki"(2003) 40 Houston L. Rev. 697 [4.5.3.1] 
Voss, E., "Germany" in Gearty, C., A. (ed. ), European Civil Liberties and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Kluwer, 1997) [2.5.5] 
Wandtke, A., "Zur kulturellen und sozialen Dimension des Urheberrechts" (1993) 
U. F. I. T. A. 5 [5.3.1] 
Welch, J., "The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Five Year 
Report and Assessment" (1992) 14 H. R. Q. 43 [2.4.4.3] 
Wellington, H. H., "On Freedom of Expression" (1979) Yale L. J. 1105 [6.1] 
Yen, A. C., "A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and 
Copyright in a Work's 'Total Concept and Feel"' (1989) 38 Emory L. J. 393 [4.5.3.1, 
5.4] 
Yen, A. C., "Eldred, the First Amendment and Aggressive Copyright Claims" (2003) 
40(3) Houston L. Rev. 101 [5.5,5.6] 
281 
Zimmerman, D., "Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on 
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights" (1992) 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 665 [5.4] 
Zimmerman, S. S., "A Regulatory Theory of Copyright: Avoiding a First Amendment 
Conflict" (1986) 35 Emory L. J. 163 [Intro. 1] 
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE RECORDS 
Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty for the Protection of the 
Rights of Performers and Producers of Phonograms (August 30,1996, WIPO 
Document CRNR/DC/5) [1.3.2.4] 
Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions 
Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (August 30,1996, WIPO 
Document CRNR/DC/4) [1.3.2.4] 
Documents de la Conference de Bruxelles, Brussels, 1948 (Bureau de I'Union 
Internationale pour la Protection des Oeuvres Litteraires et Artistiques, Berne, 
1951) [1.3.2.3] 
Documents of the Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights Questions (Geneva, December 2-20,1996) [1.3.2.4] 
V. REPORTS AND CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENTS 
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1998, 
Organisation of the American States (O. A. S. ), Chapter II: Freedom of Expression 
Within the Context of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human 
Rights, 13, OEA/Ser. LN/11.102 doc. 6 rev. [2.3.3.4] 
Archives Parlementaires de 1787 ä 1860, Premiere Serie, Tome xxii, January 13, 
1791; Le Moniteur Universel, January 15,1791 [5.3.1] 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1995 Annual Report, Report No. 
2/96 (Case No. 10.325 - Steve Clark), Grenada [2.3.3.4] 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1996 Annual Report, Report No. 
11/96 (Case No. 11.230 - Francisco Martorell), Chile [2.4.3.3] 
Memorandum of the International Bureau of WIPO on Questions concerning a 
possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, Doc. BCP/CE/I/3, October 1991 
[1.3.2.6] 
Reform of the Law relating to Copyright, Designs and Performers' Protection, Cmnd 
8302, HMSO, July 1981 [5.3.1] 
Report of the Copyright Committee, Cmnd 8662, HMSO, October 1952 [5.3.1] 
282 
Report of the Human Rights Committee to the General Assembly, 38"' Sess., Supp. 
No. 40,1983 (A/38/40), Annexe VI [2.3.3.3] 
Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the US Copyright 
Law, 87`h Congress, First Session, July 1961 [5.3.1] 
The United Nations and Human Rights, 18th Report of the Commission on Human 
Rights to Study the Organisation of Peace, New York, 1968 [2.2.2.2] 
United States House of Representatives Report, No. 101-514,101st Congress, 
Second Session, 15 (1990) [3.5.3.1] 
White Paper, Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, CM. 3782 (HMSO, 
1997) [2.5.2] 
283 
Table of Cases 
France 
Areva v. Greenpeace, TGI Paris, July 9,2004 .................................................. 4.5.4.1 
Babolat Maillot Witt v. Pachot, Cass., March 7,1986: (1986) 129 R. I. D. A. 
130 .................................................................................................................... 1.3.2.2 
BMG Music Pub., Laurent Boutonnat, Jean-Claude Dequeant and Universal 
Music Pub. v. Lancelot Films, TGI Paris, November 29,2000: (2001) 189 
R. I. D. A. 377 
....................................................................................................... 
4.5.4.1 
Chaplin v. Chatelus, TGI Paris, January 24,2000: (2000) 186 R. I. D. A. 
305 ....................................................................................................... 1.3.2.3,4.4.4.1 
Charles Schultz and United Syndicate Inc. v. Editions Albin Michel, 
Marion Vidal, TGI Paris, January 19,1977: (1977) 92 R. I. D. A. 167 ................. 4.5.4.1 
"Dali costumes", Cass., March 5,1968, D. 1968,382 ......................... 1.3.2.3,4.4.4.1 
Dechavanne, CA Douai, December 23,1992 ................................................... 3.5.4.2 
Deforge v. Trust Co. Bank (La Bicyclette Bleu), Cass. 1, Civ., February 4, 
1992: (1992) 152 R. I. D. A. 196; C. A. Versailles, December 15,1993, (1994) 
160 R. I. D. A. 255 ................................................................................................. 4.5.4.1 
Delorme v. Clavier, TGI Nanterre, March 1,1996: (1996) 167 R. I. D. A. 
180 .................................................................................................................... 4.5.4.1 
Decision of CA Paris, le ch., April 1,1957: (1957) 18 R. I. D. A. 198 ................. 1.3.2.2 
Decision of CA Paris, 4e ch., March 4,1982: (1983) Dalloz 93 ........................ 1.3.2.2 
Decision of Cour de Cassation, January 31,1961: (1961) Dalloz 81 ............... 3.5.4.1 
Decision of Cour de Paris, October 29,1957: (1958) Ann. 205 ........................ 3.5.4.1 
Decision of Tribunal Grande Instance de Paris, March 31,1969: (1970) 
RTDC 395 (No. 1) ............................................................................................. 3.5.4.1 
Deveria v. "I'Express", CA Paris, October 31,1988: Cahiers du Droit D' Auteur, 
April 22,1989 .................................................................................................... 3.5.4.2 
Duchene v. David Lachapelle Studios et al., TGI Paris, 3e ch., May 10,2002: 
(2002) 194 R. I. D. A. 332 .................................................................................... 3.5.4.2 
Esso v. Greenpeace, TGI Paris, January 30,2004 ........................................... 4.5.4.1 
284 
Fabris v. Ste France 2, C. A. Paris, 4e Ch., May 30,2001: (2002) I. I. C. 
995 .................................................................................................................... 4.5.4.1 
Garnier v. Rochette, C. A. Paris, 4e Ch., February 21,1996: (1996) 169 
R. I. D. A. 383 ....................................................................................................... 4.5.4.1 
"Godot", TGI Paris, October 15,1992: (1993) 155 R. I. D. A. 225......... 1.3.2.3,3.5.4.2, 
4.4.4.1 
J. L' Hoir v. Hatje Cantz Verlag - RG 03/12669, TGI Paris, 3 Ch. Sect., 
September 14,2004 .......................................................................................... 4.5.4.1 
Ophals v. Agence France Presse, TGI Paris, Jere ch., May 5,1999: (2002) 
183 R. I. D. A. 345 ................................................................................... 1.3.2.3,4.4.4.1 
"Phillip Morris", C. A. Versailles, March 17,1994: (1995) 164 R. I. D. A. 
350 .................................................................................................................... 4.5.4.1 
SARL Ed. Prod. Musicales du Pactole et al. v. Ste Ed. Arpege, TGI Paris, 
January 9,1970, RTD corm. 1972,383 ............................................................. 4.5.4.1 
Schoendoerffer v. Mod Films, TGI Paris, March 23,1994: (1995) 164 
R. I. D. A. 401 ......................................................................................... 1.3.2.3,3.5.4.2, 
4.4.4.1 
Scrive v. Rennes, C. A. Paris, July 10,1975, D. 1977,342: (1997) 91 R. I. D. A. 
114 ......................................................................................................... 1.3.2.3,4.4.4.1 
SNC Prisma Presse and EURL Femme v. Monsieur V. and Association 
Apodeline, TGI Paris, February 13,2001 .......................................................... 4.5.4.1 
Ste Marc Dorcel v. Ste Edgar Rice Burroughs, Versailles Court of Appeal, 
November 6,1998: (1999) 181 R. I. D. A. 314 ..................................................... 3.5.4.2 
Ste Sebdo and Jacques Faizant v. Editions Enoch, C. A. Paris, May 11,1993: 
(1993) 157 R. I. D. A. 340 .................................................................................... 4.5.4.1 
Germany 
Alcolix case, BGH, March 11,1993: (1994) G. R. U. R. 206, (1994) 25 
I. I. C. 605 ............................................................................................... 3.5.5.2,4.5.5.1 
Asterix Parodies case, BGH, March 11,1993: (1994) 25 I. I. C. 610..... 2.5.5.2,4.5.5.1 
"Auschwitz Lie", 90 BVerfGE 241 (1994) ............................................................. 2.5.5 
"Bibliotheksgroschen", BVerfGE, (1972) 8 G. R. U. R. 485 .................................... 5.3.1 
Bild Zeitung, Court of Appeal (Kammergericht) Berlin, November 26,1968: 
285 
[1969] 54 U. F. I. T. A. 296 .................................................................................... 3.5.5.2 
"Böll", 54 BVerfGE 208 (1980) ............................................................................. 2.5.5 
Bundesadler, BGH, (2003) G. R. U. R. 956 ......................................................... 4.5.5.1 
CB-Infobank I, BGH, January 16,1997: (1997) G. R. U. R. 459 .......................... 4.5.5.1 
CB-Infobank II, BGH, January 16,1997: (1997) G. R. U. R. 464 ......................... 4.5.5.1 
Disney Parody case, BGH, (1971) G. R. U. R. 588 ............................................. 4.5.5.1 
"Election campaign", 61 BVerfGE 1 (1982) .......................................................... 2.5.5 
"Germania 3", BVerfGE, June 29,2000: (2001) 2 G. R. U. R. 149; Zeitschrift für 
Urheber - und Medienrecht, 2000,867 ............................................................ 3.5.5.1 
"Gies Eagle", BGH, March 20,2003: (2004) 35 I. I. C. 984 ................................ 4.5.5.1 
Havemann, BVerfGE, 1BvR 1611/99, December 17,1999 .............................. 4.5.5.1 
"Holocaust Denial", 90 BVerfGE 241 (1994) ........................................................ 2.5.5 
"Kirchenmusik", BVerfGE, (1979) 84 U. F. I. T. A. 317 ............................................ 5.3.1 
"Kirchen-und Schulgebrauch", BVerfGE, (1972) 8 G. R. U. R. 481 ........................ 5.3.1 
Lili Marlene, BGH, March 7,1985: (1987) G. R. U. R. 34 .................................... 4.5.5.1 
"Lüth", 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958) .............................................................................. 
2.5.5 
Maifeiern, Landgericht Berlin, (1962) G. R. U. R. 1962 ....................................... 4.5.5.1 
"Maske in Blau", BGH, April 29,1970: (1971) G. R. U. R. 35 ................ 1.3.2.3,3.5.5.2, 
4.4.5.1 
Mattscheibe, BGH, (2000) G. R. U. R. 703 .......................................................... 4.5.5.1 
Neo-Fascist Slant In Copyright Works, OLG Frankfurt-am-Main, December 
6,1994: [1996] E. C. C. 375 ................................................................................ 
3.5.5.2 
"Oppenheimer", OLG Munich, April 15,1971 ....................................... 1.3.2.3,4.4.5.1 
Re the Parodying of Cigarette Advertising, BGH, April 17,1984: (1986) 
E. C. C. 1 .............................................................................................................. 3.5.5.2 
"Römerberg Speech", 54 BVerfGE 129 (1980) .................................................... 2.5.5 
"Schallplatten", BVerfGE, (1972) 8 G. R. U. R. 491 ................................................ 5.3.1 
"Schulfunksendungen", BVerfGE, (1972) 8 G. R. U. R. 487 ................................... 5.3.1 
Sherlock Holmes case, BGH, February 2,1958: (1959) G. R. U. R. 402............ 3.5.5.2 
"Soldiers-Are-Murderers" (Tucholsky), 93 BVerfGE 266 (1995) .......................... 2.5.5 
"Strauß Caricature", 75 BVerfGE 369 (1987) ....................................................... 2.5.5 
Terroristenbild, Landgericht Berlin, May 26,1977: (1978) G. R. U. R. 108......... 4.5.5.1 
"Tonbandvervielfaltigung", BVerfGE, (1972) 8 G. R. U. R. 488 .............................. 5.3.1 
"Viel Spass Mit", LG Munich I, August 2,1966: (1974) Copyright 97 ................ 3.5.5.2 
286 
New Zealand 
Plix Products Limited v. Frank M. Winstone (Merchants) and Others (1986) 
F. S. R. 63 ........................................................................................................... 1.3.2.1 
United Kingdom 
A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) [1990] 1 A. C. 109 ..................... 2.5.2,5.3.2 
Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2001] E. M. L. R. 44; [2001] 2 W. L. R. 
967; [2002] Ch. 149, C. A ...................................................................... Intro. 1,3.5.2.2, 
4.5.2.1,5.2.1,5.3.2,5.3.3,5.4 
Associated Newspapers Group plc v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. 
[1986] R. P. C. 515 ................................................................................................. 5.2.1 
Beggars Banquet Ltd. v. Carlton Television and Spidercom Ltd. [1993] 
E. M. L. R. 349 ........................................................................................................ 5.2.1 
Beloff v. Pressdram [1973] 1 All E. R. 241 .............................................. 4.5.2.1,5.2.1, 
5.3.2 
Betsen v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd. [1994] E. M. L. R. 467 ................................ 4.5.2.1 
Bonnard v. Perryman [1891] 2 Ch. 269 ................................................................ 2.5.2 
British Broadcasting Corp. v. British Satellite Broadcasting Ltd. [1991] 
2 All E. R. 833; [1992] Ch. 141 .................................................................. 4.5.2.1,5.2.1 
British Oxygen v. Liquid Air Ltd. [1925] Ch. 383 .................................................. 5.2.1 
BSC v. Granada TV Ltd. [1981] A. C. 1096 .......................................................... 5.3.2 
Campbell v. MGN [2004] HL 22; [2004] 2 AC 257 ............................................... 2.5.2 
Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd. [1978] F. S. R. 405 .............................. 5.4 
Clark v. Associated Newspapers Ltd [1998] 1 W. L. R. 1558 ............................. 3.5.2.1 
Confetti Records v. Warner Music UK Ltd [2003] E. M. L. R. 35 ......................... 3.5.2.2 
Cream Holdings Ltd v. Banerjee [2004] HL 44; [2005] AC 253 ............................ 2.5.2 
Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] A. C. 534 ............... 2.5.2 
Designers Guild Ltd v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [2001] F. S. R. 11; 
[2001] 1 W. L. R. 2416 
................................................................................. 4.5.2.1,5.4 
Distillers Co. (Biochemicals) Ltd. v. Times Newspapers [1975] Q. B. 613............ 5.2.1 
Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 4 BURR. 2407 ........................................................ 5.3.1 
Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers Ltd. [1938] Ch. 106 ............................................. 
5.4 
Douglas v. Hello! (2001) 2 All E. R. 289 ............................................................. 
2.4.2.3 
287 
Ellis v. Home Office [1953] 2 Q. B. 135 .................................................................... 5.3 
Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd. [1982] Ch. 119; 
[1981] All E. R. 241; [1982] R. P. C. 69; [1981] 2 All E. R. 495; [1981] F. S. R. 
238 .................................................................................................................... 1.3.2.2 
Francis, Day & Hunter Ltd. v. Bron [1963] Ch. 587 ........................................... 4.5.2.1 
Frisby v. British Broadcasting Corp. [1967] Ch. 932 ......................................... 4.4.2.1 
G. A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank Smythson Ltd. [1944] A. C. 329, HL; 
Reversing [1943] Ch. 133, CA .......................................................................... 1.3.2.2 
Gartside v. Outram (1856) 26 L. J. 113 ................................................................ 5.3.2 
George Ward (Moxley) Ltd. v. Richard Sankey Ltd. [1988] F. S. R. 66 .................... 5.4 
Gleeson v. H. R. Denne Ltd. [1975] R. P. C. 471 ....................................................... 5.4 
Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co. [1916] 1 Ch. 261 (Ch. D. ) ............................. 4.5.2.1 
Gomme (E. ) Ltd. v. Relaxateze Upholstery Ltd. [1976] R. P. C. 377 ........................ 5.4 
Harman Pictures N. V. v. Osborne [1967] 1 W. L. R. 723 .................................... 4.5.2.1 
Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd v. Paramount Film Service Ltd [1934] Ch. 
593 .................................................................................................................... 4.5.2.1 
Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q. B. 84 ...................................................... 4.5.2.1,5.2.1, 
5.2.3,5.3.2 
Humphreys v. Thompson & Co Ltd [1905-10] Mac. C. C. 148 ............................ 
4.4.2.1 
Hyde Park Residence Ltd v. Yelland And Others [2001] Ch. 43......... 2.5.3.1,4.5.2.1, 
5.3.2 
IBCOS Computers Ltd v. Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd [1994] 
F. S. R. 275 .................................................................................................. 4.5.2.1,5.4 
Imutran Ltd v. Uncaged Campaigns Ltd [2001] 2 All E. R. 385 .......................... 4.5.2.1 
Independent Television Publications v. Time Out [1984] F. S. R. 64 .................. 4.5.2.1 
Interlego AG v. Tyco Industries Inc. [1989] A. C. 217; [1988] 3 W. L. R. 678; 
[1988] 3 All E. R. 949; [1988] R. P. C. 343 ........................................................... 1.3.2.2 
Johnstone Safety Ltd v. Peter Cook (Int. ) Plc [1990] F. S. R. 161, C. A .............. 4.5.2.1 
Joy Music v. Sunday Pictorial Newspapers (1920) Ltd [1960] 2 Q. B. 60; [1960] 
2 W. L. R. 645; [1960] 1 All E. R. 703; 104 S. J. 289, QB ..................................... 4.5.2.1 
K (A Child) v. BBC (2001) All E. R. 323 ............................................................. 2.4.2.3 
L. B. (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Products Ltd [1979] R. P. C. 551, H. L ............. 4.5.2.1,5.4 
Lion Laboratories v. Evans [1985] Q. B. 526 ........................................................ 5.3.2 
Marengo v. Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd [1948] 65 R. P. C. 242......... 3.5.2.1 
288 
Michael Baigent and Richard Leigh v. The Random House Group Limited 
[2006] E. W. H. C. 719, Ch ......................................................................................... 5.4 
Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 BURR. 2301 .................................................................. 5.3.1 
Moore v. News of the World Ltd [1972] 1 Q. B. 441 ........................................... 3.5.2.1 
Morrison Leahy Music Ltd v. Lightbond Ltd [1993] E. M. L. R. 144....... 1.3.2.3,3.5.2.2, 
4.4.2.1 
Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v. Marks and Spencer PIc [2001] Ch. 257; 
[2001) R. P. C. 76 ................................................................................................ 4.5.2.1 
NWL Ltd. v. Nelson [1979] I. C. R. 867 .................................................................. 2.5.2 
Pasterfield v. Denham [1999] F. S. R. 168 .......................................................... 3.5.2.2 
PCR Ltd v. Dow Jones Telerate Ltd [1998] F. S. R. 170 ........................... 4.5.2.1,5.3.2 
Pro Sieben Media A. G. v. Carlton UK Television Ltd [1998] F. S. R. 43; 
[1999] F. S. R. 610, C. A.; [1999] 1 W. L. R. 605 ................................................... 4.5.2.1 
Ravenscroft v. Herbert [1980] R. P. C. 193 ............................................................... 5.4 
R V. Advertising Standards Authority Ltd, ex parte Vernons Organsisations Ltd 
[1992] 1 W. L. R. 1289 ........................................................................................... 2.5.2 
R v. Central Independent Television plc [1994] 3 All E. R. 641, C. A ................. 2.3.2.4 
R v. Shayler [2003] 1 A. C. 247 ............................................................................. 2.5.2 
Redmond-Bate v. DPP (1999) 7 B. H. R. C. 375 .................................................. Intro. 1 
Silkin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [1958] 1 W. L. R. 743 ............................. Intro. 1 
Schweppes Ltd v. Wellingtons Ltd [1984] F. S. R. 210 ....................................... 4.5.2.1 
Time Warner Entertainment Ltd v. Channel 4 Television Corporation Pic 
[1994] E. M. L. R. 1 .................................................................................... 4.5.2.1,5.2.1 
Times Newspapers Ltd. and Harper Collins Ltd. v. MGN Limited [1993] 
E. M. L. R. 442 ........................................................................................................ 5.3.2 
Tidy v. Trustees of the Natural History Museum [1996] EIPR 86; (1995) 
39 I. P. R. 501 ....................................................................................... 1.3.2.3,3.5.2.2, 
3.5.4.2 
University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch. 601 
(Ch. D) .............................................................................................................. 1.3.2.2 
Venables v. News Group Newspapers [2001] 1 All E. R. 908 ........................... 2.3.2.4 
Weatherby v. International Horse Agency and Exchange Ltd. [1910] 2 Ch. 
297 ....................................................................................................................... 5.2.1 
Williamson Music Ltd v. Pearson Partnership [1987] F. S. R. 97 ........................ 4.5.2.1 
289 
United States 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209 (1977) ................................. 2.5.3 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919) ....................................... 2.5.5,4.2.2.1 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 207 F. Supp. 678 (E. D. N. Y. 
1962) ................................................................................................................. 2.5.3.2 
Alfred Bell & Co Ltd v. Catalda Fine Arts Inc., 191 F. 2d 99 (2"d Cir. 1951)....... 1.3.2.2 
Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F. 2d 898 (9`h Cir. 1987) ............................................. 5.4 
American Communications Ass. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950) ......................... 2.5.3 
American Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N. D. Ohio 
2002) ................................................................................................................. 4.5.3.1 
American Law Book Co. v. Chamberlayne, 165 F. 313 (2d Cir. 1908) ............. 3.5.3.1 
America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, Dept. of Bldgs, 
536 F. Supp. 170 (E. D. N. Y. 1982) ....................................................................... 2.5.3 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)......... 4.5.3.1,5.2.2 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F. 2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), 
cent. dismissed, 464 U. S. 1033 (1984) .................................................................... 5.4 
Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F. 2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1992) .................................. 4.5.3.1 
Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F. 2d 607 
(7th Cir. 1982) .......................................................................................................... 5.4 
Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F. 2d 667 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied, 348 U. S. 
858 (1954) ......................................................................................................... 3.5.3.2 
Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99 (1879) ......................................................... 1.3.2.1,5.4 
Barnicki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 514 (2001) ............................................................... 2.5.3 
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinkos Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S. D. N. Y. 
1991) ................................................................................................................. 3.5.3.1 
Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N. Y. 250,167 N. E. 432 (1929)............ 3.5.3.1 
Benson v. Paul Winley Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 (S. D. N. Y. 1978).......... 3.5.3.1 
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F. 2d 1289 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 826 
(1985) ...................................................................................................................... 5.4 
Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F. 2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964) ........................... 4.5.3.1 
Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U. S. 
469 (1989) ............................................................................................................ 2.5.3 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969) .......................................................... 2.5.3 
290 
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N. D. Cal. 
1986) ....................................................................................................................... 5.4 
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 (1966) ............................................................ 2.5.3 
Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F. 2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982) ................. 5.4 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U. S. 569 (1994) ................................ 4.5.3.1 
Cardtoons L. C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association 95 F 3d 959,39 
U. S. P. Q. 2d 1865,1865 (10`x' Cir, 1996) ................................................................. 6.1 
Carte v. Ford, 15 F. 439 (C. C. D. Md. 1883) ...................................................... 3.5.3.1 
Carter v. Hemsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228 (S. D. N. Y. 1994), later opinion, 
861 F. Supp. 303 (S. D. N. Y. 1994) .................................................................... 3.5.3.2 
Castle Rock Enter. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F. 3d 132 (2d Cir. 
1998) ................................................................................................................. 4.5.3.1 
Central Hudson Gas & Electrical Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York, 447 U. S. 557 (1980) ........................................................................... 2.5.3 
Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. Of Trustees v. Substance, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 919 
(N. D. III. 2000) ...................................................................................................... 
5.2.2 
Choe v. Fordham University School of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44 (S. D. N. Y. 
1995) ................................................................................................................. 
3.5.3.2 
Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 
671 (D. Minn. 1987) ................................................................................................ 
5.4 
City of Dallas v. Stranglin, 490 U. S. 19,109 S. Ct. 1591,104 L. Ed. 2d 18 
(1989) ................................................................................................................... 
2.5.3 
Clark v. Grenada, Case 10.325, Report No. 2/96, Inter. Am. C. H. R., 
OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 91 Doc. 7 (1996) ...................................................................... 2.4.3.3 
Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co, 14 F. 728 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1883) ........................ 3.5.3.1 
Clevenger v. Baker, Voorhis & Co., 8 N. Y. 2d 187 N. E. 2d 643 (1980), appeal 
denied, 9 N. Y. 2d 755,214 N. Y. S. 2d 736 (1961) ............................................... 3.5.3.1 
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F. 2d 
490 (2d Cir. 1989) ............................................................................................. 
3.5.3.1 
Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971) ................................................................. 5.4 
Comins v. Discovery Comms., Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 512 (D. Md. 2002).......... 3.5.3.1 
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F. 2d 1485 (D. C. Cir. 
1988) (dictum), affd, 490 U. S. 730 (1989) ........................................................ 2.5.3.2 
Conant v. Walters, 309 F. 3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) .................................................. 2.5.3 
291 
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F. 2d 
1044 (2d Cir. 1983) ........................................................................................... 4.5.3.1 
Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570,89 N. Y. S. 2d 813 
(S. Ct. 1949) ...................................................................................................... 3.5.3.2 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, 600 F. 2d 1184 
(5th Cir. 1979) .................................................................................................... 4.5.3.1 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. et al, 123 S. Ct. 2041 
(June 2,2003), on re-hearing C. D. Cal. 68 USPQ 2d 1538 (October 14, 
2003); 539 U. S. 23 (2003) ................................................................... 1.3.2.3,3.5.3.1, 
3.5.3.2,4.4.3.1 
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F. 2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990) ................................ 5.4 
Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951) ..................................................... 2.5.3 
Desney v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715,299 P. 2d 257 (1956) ..................................... 2.4.3 
Diamond v. Am-Law Corp., 745 F. 2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984) .................................. 3.5.3.2 
Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 
449 (N. D. Ga. 1987) ................................................................................................ 5.4 
Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. and another, 109 F. 3d 
1394,42 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1997) ........................................................ 4.5.3.1 
Duffy v. Penguin Books USA Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S. D. N. Y. 1998) ............. 4.5.3.1 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769; 537 U. S. 186 (2003); 65 U. S. P. Q. 2d 
1225 (SC 2003) ......................................................................................... 1.3.2.6,1.4, 
4.5.3.1,5.5 
Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (DDC 1999) .................................................. 4.5.3.1 
Elsemere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 
(S. D. N. Y. 1980), affd, 623 F. 2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) .......................................... 4.5.3.1 
English v. BFC &R East 11th Street LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446,1997 WL 
746444 (S. D. N. Y. 1997), affd, 198 F. 3d 233 (2d Cir. 1999) ............................. 3.5.3.2 
Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 
(N. D. Ill. 2005) ...................................................................................................... 2.5.3 
Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345 (N. D. Cal. 1987) ................................ 5.4 
Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc., 499 U. S. 340; 111 
S. Ct. 1282; 18 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1275 (1991) .................................................... 1.3.2.2,5.4 
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932) ............................................................ 5.3.1 
292 
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) ..................................................... 4.5.3.1 
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994) ................................................. 5.3.1 
Follett v. Arbor House Publishing Co., 208 U. S. P. Q. 597 (S. D. N. Y. 1980)....... 3.5.3.1 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. (C. C. D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) ............................. 5.2.2 
Frisby v. Schultz, 478 U. S. 474 (1988) ................................................................ 2.5.3 
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 (1961) ........................................................... 2.5.3 
Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261 (S. D. N. Y. 1968), 295 F. 
Supp. 331 (S. D. N. Y. 1968) ............................................................................... 3.5.3.1 
Gershwin v. Ethical Publishing Co., 166 Misc. 39,1 N. Y. S. 2d 904 (S. Ct. N. Y. 
County 1937) ..................................................................................................... 3.5.3.1 
Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc., 17 Misc. 2d 1034,155 N. Y. S. 2d 171 (Sup. 
Ct. N. Y. County 1956) ....................................................................................... 3.5.3.1 
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, 538 F. 2d 14 
(2nd Cir. 1976) ...................................................................................... 1.3.2.3,3.5.3.1, 
3.5.3.2,4.4.3.1 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546 (1973) ........................................................ 5.3.1 
Graham v. James, 144 F. 3d 229 (2d Cir. 1998) ................................................ 2.5.3.1 
Granz v. Harris, 198 F. 2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) .................................................... 3.5.3.1 
Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C. C. D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728) .................... 5.2.2 
Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music Enters., Inc., 160 F. Supp. 77 (S. D. Cal. 1958)...... 3.5.3.2 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U. S. 539 (1985); 
225 U. S. P. Q. 1073 (1985) ...................................................................... 4.5.3.1,5.3.1, 
5.4 
Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F. 2d 117 (8th Cir. 1987) ............................... 5.4 
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F. 2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971)......... 5.4 
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F. 3d 1180,59 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1865 
(9U' Cir. 2001) ............................................................................................. 3.5.3.1,6.1 
Hospital For Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre, 516 F. Supp. 67 
(E. D. Va. 1980) ................................................................................................. 3.5.3.1 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46 (1988) .............................................. 3.5.3.1 
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976) ................................................. 2.5.3 
Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 
1290 (D. Utah 1999) .......................................................................................... 4.5.3.1 
293 
Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F. 3d 954 
(8 th Cir. 2003) ....................................................................................................... 2.5.3 
Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting 
Company, Inc., 621 F. 2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980) ....................................................... 4.5.3.1 
Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S. D. N. Y. 1971)....... 3.5.3.1 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495,72 S. Ct. 777,96 L. Ed. 1098,1 
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1357 (1952) ........................................................................ 2.5.3 
Kennedy v. National Juvenile Detention Ass'n, 187 F. 3d 690 (7th Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U. S. 1159 (2000) ................................................................... 2.5.3.1 
Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207,127 P. 2d 577 (1942).......... 3.5.3.1 
King v. Innovation Books, Div. Of Innovative Corp., 976 F. 2d 824 (2d Cir. 
1992) ................................................................................................................. 3.5.3.1 
Klaindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753,92 S. Ct. 2576,33 L. Ed. 2d 683 
(1972) ................................................................................................................... 2.5.3 
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F. 2d 1242 (3`d Cir. 
1992) .................................................................................................................... 2.5.3 
Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450 (S. D. N. Y. 
1968) ................................................................................................................. 
3.5.3.1 
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F. 2d 485 
(9`n Cir. ), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 1037 (1984) .......................................................... 5.4 
L. A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U. S. P. Q. 2d (BNA) 1453 (C. D. Cal. 
2000) ....................................................................................................... 4.5.3.1,5.2.2 
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 41 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1598 (S. D. N. Y. 1996), 
aff'd, 137 F. 3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) ..................................................................... 4.5.3.1 
Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F. 3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000) .............................. 3.5.3.2 
Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F. 2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 
1052 (1985) ............................................................................................................. 5.4 
Lubner v. City of Los Angeles, 45 Cal. App. 4th 525 (1996) ................. 1.3.2.3,4.4.3.1 
Luster Enters., Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 156 U. S. P. Q. 
422 (S. Ct. N. Y. County 1967) 
.......................................................................... 
3.5.3.1 
Malden Amusement Co., Inc. v. City of Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297 (D. Mass. 
1983) .................................................................................................................... 
2.5.3 
Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 982 F. Supp. 625 (S. D. Ind. 1997) ...................... 3.5.3.2 
Marvullo v. Gruner & Jahr, 105 F. Supp. 2d 225 (S. D. N. Y. 2000) .................... 3.5.3.2 
294 
MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U. S. P. Q. 2d 
1046 (S. D. N. Y. 2004) ........................................................................................ 4.5.3.1 
Mattel, Inc., v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F. 3d 894 (9"' Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
537 U. S. 1171 (2003) ........................................................................................ 3.5.3.1 
Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315 (S. D. N. Y. 2002) .................................. 4.5.3.1 
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F. 3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) .............. 4.5.3.1 
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F. 2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) ............................................. 4.5.3.1 
McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F. 2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987) .............................. 5.4 
McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415 (S. D. N. Y. 
1971) .......................................................................................................... 4.5.3.1,5.1 
Meeropol v. Nlzer, 560 F. 2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1013 
(1978) ................................................................................................................ 4.5.3.1 
Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974) ..................................................... 2.5.3 
Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc., 704 F. 2d 1009 (7th Cir. ), 
cert. denied, 464 U. S. 823 (1983) ..................................................................... 3.5.3.2 
Mischawaka Rubber Wollen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U. S. 203,62 S. 
Ct. 1022,86 L. Ed. 1381 (1942) ........................................................................... 2.4.3 
Monster Communications, Inc. v. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 
490 (S. D. N. Y. 1996) .......................................................................................... 4.5.3.1 
National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W. D. Tex. 
1980) ................................................................................................................. 3.5.3.2 
Neinast v. Board of Trustees of Columbus Metropolitan Library, 346 F. 3d 585, 
FED. App. 0363 (6th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................. 2.5.3 
New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Carol Pub. Group, 729 F. Supp. 992 (S. D. N. Y. 
1990), rev'd in part, 904 F. 2d, 152 F. 2d (2d Cir. ), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 921 
(1990) ................................................................................................................ 4.5.3.1 
New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F. 2d 576 
(2d Cir. 1989) .......................................................................................... 4.5.3.1,5.2.2 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119 (1930) ........................... 1.3.2.1,5.4 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F. 3d 65 (2d Cir. 
1999) .................................................................................................................... 5.2.2 
Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F. 3d 18 (15' Cir. 2000) .................... 4.5.3.1 
Pacific and Southern Company, Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F. 2d 1490 (1 1th Cir. 1984), 
rehearing denied, 749 F. 2d 733 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1004 
295 
(1984) ................................................................................................................ 4.5.3.1 
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Pub. Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329 
(S. D. N. Y. 1998) ................................................................................................. 4.5.3.1 
Parks v. La Face Records, 329 F. 3d 437 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
925 (2003) ......................................................................................................... 2.5.3.1 
Pavia v. 1129 Ave. of Americas Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620 (S. D. N. Y 
1994) ................................................................................................... 1.3.2.3,3.5.3.2, 
4.4.3.1 
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F. 2d 487 (2d Cir. 
1960) ....................................................................................................................... 5.4 
Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 89,102 (D. Mass. 
2003) ................................................................................................................. 4.4.3.1 
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (S. D. Cal. 1998)....... 3.5.3.1 
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Moskowitz, 127 U. S. P. Q. 523 (S. D. N. Y. 1960)......... 2.5.3.2 
Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 268 F. Supp. 444 (D. D. C. 1967)...... 5.2.2 
Rand McNally & Co v. Fleet Management Systems, 634 F. Supp. 604 (ND III 
1986) ................................................................................................................. 1.3.2.2 
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F. 2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976) ................. 5.4 
Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F. 2d 1379 (1st Cir. 1993) .............:........................................... 5.4 
Rice v. American Program Bureau, 446 F. 2d 685 (2d Cir. 1971) ..................... 3.5.3.2 
Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 (S. D. N. Y. 1975) ..................................... 3.5.3.1 
Riggold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F. 3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).... 4.5.3.1 
Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. Speber, 332 F. Supp. 1206 (S. D. N. Y. 1971), 
modified, 457 F. 2d 50 (2d Cir. 1972) ................................................................ 3.5.3.2 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F. 2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) .............................................. 3.5.3.1 
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F. 2d 301,22 U. S. P. Q. 2d 1492 (2d Cir. 1992) .............. 4.5.3.1 
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55 
(S. D. N. Y. ), rev'd, 366 F. 2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 1009 
(1967) ...................................................................................................... 4.5.3.1,5.2.2 
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F. 2d 1106 (9`h Cir. 1970) ................ 5.4 
Roy Export Co. v. CBS, Inc., 672 F. 2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982) .................... 4.5.3.1,5.2.2 
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115 (1989) .............. 2.5.3 
296 
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S. D. N. Y. 1986), rev'd, 
811 F. 2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 890 (1988) ......................... 4.5.3.1 
Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409 (S. D. N. Y. 1997), aff'd on 
other grounds, 147 F. 3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998) ...................................................... 4.5.3.1 
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61,101 S. Ct. 2176,68 L. 
Ed. 2d 671,7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1426 (1981) ................................................. 2.5.3 
Schnapper v. Foley, 471 F. Supp. 426 (D. D. C. 1979), aft'd, 667 F. 2d 102 (D. C. 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 948 (1982) ......................................................... 5.1 
Schneck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919) ..................................................... 2.5.3 
Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331 (E. D. Pa. 1996) ....................... 3.5.3.1 
Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co, 566 F. 2d 3 (7u Cir. 1977) ......................... 1.3.2.2 
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Corp., 81 F. 2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936)......... 5.4 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F. 2d 1157 
(9th Cir. 1977) ............................................................................................. 4.5.3.1,5.4 
Simon & Shuster Inc. v. Dove Audio Inc., 970 F. Supp. 279 
(S. D. N. Y. 1997) ................................................................................................. 3.5.3.1 
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566 (1974) ................................................................ 2.5.3 
Smith v. Montoro, 648 F. 2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) ................................................. 3.5.3.1 




Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 53 U. S. P. Q. 2d (BNA) 1490 
(E. D. Pa. 2000) .................................................................................................... 5.2.2 
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S. D. N. Y. 1987)............ 5.4 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359,51 S. Ct. 532,75 L. Ed. 1117 (1931)...... 2.4.3 
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001); 60 
U. S. P. Q. 2d 1225 (11th Cir. 2001) .................................................................... 4.5.3.1 
Texas v Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989) ................................................................ 2.5.3 
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130 
(S. D. N. Y. 1968) ........................................................................................ 4.5.3.1,5.2.2 
Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F. 2d 
1171 (5`h Cir. 1980) ........................................................................................... 4.5.3.1 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 186 U. S. P. Q. 67 (1974) ...................... 5.3.1 
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications International Ltd, 996 F. 2d 1366 
(2d Cir. 1993) .......................................................................................... 4.5.3.1,5.2.2 
297 
United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp. 1265 (W. D. Okla. 1974) ............................... 5.1 
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U. S. 418 (1993) ........................... 2.5.3 
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968) .................................................... 2.5.3 
United Video, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 890 F. 2d 1173 
(D. C. Cir. 1989) ....................................................................................................... 5.4 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F. 2d 963 
(9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U. S. 417 (1984) ......................................................... 4.5.3.1 
Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U. S. 748,96 S. Ct. 1817,48 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1976) ....................................... 2.5.3 
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F. 2d 44 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied, 476 U. S. 
1159 (1986) ............................................................................................................. 5.4 
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F. 2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U. S. 1132 (1979) ........................................................................................ 4.5.3.1,5.1 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943).......... 2.5.3 
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. (8 Peters) 591 (1834) .............................................. 5.3.1 
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F. 2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986)... 5.4 
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) ....................................................... 4.2.2.1 
Williams v. Weisser Publishing Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1969) .......................... 3.5.3.1 
Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 
P. 16,314,106 A. L. R. 5t' 759 (D. Conn. 2002) ..................................................... 2.5.3 
Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507,68 S. Ct. 665,92 L. Ed. 840 (1948)............ 2.5.3 
Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Sys., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 351 
(N. D. Tex. 1986) ................................................................................................ 3.5.3.2 
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. (8 Peters) 591 (1834) .............................................. 5.3.1 
Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F. 3d 1110 
(9th Cir. 2000) .......................................................................................... 4.5.3.1,5.2.2 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S. 562 (1977)........ 5.2.2,5.3.1 
Zim v. Western Publishing Co., 573 F. 2d 1318 (5t' Cir. 1978) .......................... 3.5.3.1 
European Decisions 
European Court of Justice, Court of First Instance (CFI) and 
Commission Decisions 
R v. Home Secretary, Ex. P. Simms [2000] A. C. 115; [1999] 3 W. L. R. 328... 2.4.2.3, 
2.5.5 
298 
European Court of Human Rights and European Commission of Human 
Rights 
Ahmed v. United Kingdom; (22954/93) (1998) 29 E. H. R. R. 1, ECtHR ............. 2.4.2.3 
Autotronic A. G. v. Switzerland; (12726/87) (1990) 12 E. H. R. R. 485, ECtHR... 2.4.2.3 
Barfod v. Denmark; (1989) 13 E. H. R. R. 493, ECtHR ....................................... 2.4.2.3 
Barthold v. Germany; (8734/90) (1985) 7 E. H. R. R. 383, ECtHR ...................... 2.4.2.3 
De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium; (19983/92) (1997) 25 E. H. R. R. 1, ECtHR.... 2.4.2.3 
Demuth v. Switzerland; (38743/97) (2002) 38 E. H. R. R. 20, ECtHR ................. 2.4.2.3 
Engel and others v. Netherlands; (A/22) (1976) 1 E. H. R. R. 647, ECtHR......... 2.4.2.3 
Familiapress-Zeitungs-Gmbh v. Austria; (1992) 80 D. R. 74, ECtHR ................ 2.4.2.3 
Feldek v. Slovakia; (29032/95) (2001) E. C. H. R. 463 ........................................ 2.4.2.3 
France 2 v. France; (30262/96) (1997) Informatierecht, 1999,15, 
ECommHR ........................................................................................................ 4.5.4.1 
Fresoz and Roire v. France (1999) 5 B. H. R. C. 654 ................................................ 5.4 
Groppera Radio A. G. v. Switzerland; (10890/84) (1990) 12 E. H. R. R. 321, 
E CtH R ............................................................................................................... 2.4.2.3 
H v. Austria; (20831/92) Decision of 2.3.94 (unpublished) ................................ 2.4.2.3 
H and K v. United Kingdom; (1983) 34 D. R. 218, ECtHR ................................. 2.4.2.3 
Handyside v. United Kingdom; (A/24) (1976) 1 E. H. R. R. 737, ECtHR ............. 2.4.2.3 
Hodgson, Woolf Productions, and National Union of Journalists and Channel 4 
Television v. United Kingdom; (11553/85 and 11685/85) (1987) 51 D. R. 136; 
(1987) 10 E. H. R. R. 503, ECommH ................................................................... 2.4.2.3 
Jersild v. Denmark; (15890/89) (1994) 19 E. H. R. R. 1, ECtHR .................. 2.4.2.3,5.4 
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark; (1976) 1 E. H. R. R. 711, 
E CtH R ............................................................................................................... 2.4.2.3 
Kosiek v. Germany; (Series A No. 105) (1986) 9 E. H. R. R. 328, ECtHR.......... 2.4.2.3 
Leander v. Sweden; (9248/81) (1987) 9 E. H. R. R. 433, ECtHR ........................ 2.4.2.3 
Lehideux and Insornia v. France; (24662/94) RJD 1998-VII 2864; (1998) 5 B. H. R. C 
540, ECtHR ....................................................................................................... 2.4.2.3 
Lingens v. Austria; (Series A No. 103) (1986) 8 E. H. R. R. 103, ECtHR............ 2.4.2.3 
M v. France; (1982) 41 D. R. 103, ECtHR ......................................................... 2.4.2.3 
Malone v. United Kingdom; (1984) 7 E. H. R. R. 14, ECtHR ............................... 2.4.2.3 
Marais v. France; (31159/96) (1996) 86-A D. R. 184, ECtHR ............................ 2.4.2.3 
299 
Morissens v. Belgium; (11389/85) (1988) 56 D. R. 127, ECommHR ................. 2.4.2.3 
Muller v. Austria (5849/72) (1988) 13 E. H. R. R. 212, ECtHR ............................ 2.4.2.3 
Muller v. Switzerland (Series A No. 133) (1988) 13 E. H. R. R. 212, ECtHR........ 2.4.2.3 
N v. Switzerland; (1982) 34 D. R. 208, ECtHR .................................................. 2.4.2.3 
Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2); (1997) 25 E. H. R. R. 357, ECtHR ........................ 2.4.2.3 
Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria; (13470/87) (1994) 19 E. H. R. R. 34, 
ECtHR ............................................................................................................... 2.4.2.3 
Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria; (15974/90) (1995) 21 E. H. R. R. 1, 
ECtH R ............................................................................................................... 2.4.2.3 
Silver v. United Kingdom; (1983) 5 E. H. R. R. 347, ECtHR ................................ 2.4.2.3 
Stevens v. United Kingdom; (11674/85) (1986) 46 D. R. 245, ECommHR........ 2.4.2.3 
Sunday Times (No. 1) v. United Kingdom (1979) 2 E. H. R. R. 245 (ECtHR)...... 2.4.2.3 
T v. United Kingdom; (1978) 49 D. R. 5, ECtHR ................................................ 2.4.2.3 
Tammer v. Estonia; (41205/98) (2001) 37 E. H. R. R. 43, ECtHR ....................... 2.4.2.3 
The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom; (A/30) (1979) 2 E. H. R. R. 245, 
ECtHR ............................................................................................................... 
2.3.2.4 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson Islande v. Iceland; (13778/88) (1992) 14 E. H. R. R. 843, 
ECtH R ............................................................................................................... 
2.4.2.3 
Tidende v. Norway; (26132/95) (2001) 31 E. H. R. R. 16, ECtHR ....................... 2.4.2.3 
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom; (1995) 20 E. H. R. R. 442, ECtHR.......... 2.4.2. 
2.5.2 
Unabhangige Initiative Informations Vielfalt v. Austria; (28525/95) (2003) 37 
E. H. R. R. 33, ECtHR .......................................................................................... 2.4.2.3 
Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Osterreichs and Gubi v. Austria; (Series 
A No. 302) (1994) 20 E. H. R. R. 55, ECtHR ........................................................ 2.4.2.4 
Walende v. Germany; (21128/92) (1992) 80-A D. R. 94, ECtHR ....................... 2.4.2.3 
Wingrove v. United Kingdom; (17419/90) (1996) 24 E. H. R. R. 1, ECtHR..... 
X v. Germany; (9235/81) (1982) 29 D. R. 194, ECommHR .......................... 
X Ltd. and Y v. United Kingdom; (8710/79) (1982) 28 D. R. 77, ECommHR 






Alphabetical List of Cases 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education [USA] 
Abrams v. U. S [USA] 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown [USA] 
A-G v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [UK] 
Ahmed v. United Kingdom [ECtHR] 
Alcolix Parodies case [Germany] 
Alfred Bell & Co Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts Inc. [USA] 
Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co [USA] 
American Communications Ass. v. Douds [USA] 
American Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan [USA] 
American Law Book Co v. Chamberlayne [USA] 
America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York [USA] 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. [USA] 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. [USA] 
Areva v. Greenpeace [France] 
Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer [USA] 
Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd [UK] 
Associated Newspapers Group plc v. News Group Newspapers Ltd [UK] 
Asterix Parodies case [Germany] 
Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp. [USA] 
Autotronic A. G. v. Switzerland [ECtHR] 
Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc. [USA] 
Babolat Maillot Witt v. Pachot [France] 
Baker v. Seiden [USA] 
Bartod v. Denmark [ECtHR] 
Barnicki v. Vopper [USA] 
Barthold v. Germany [ECtHR] 
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinkos Graphics Corp. [USA] 
Beggars Banquet Ltd v. Carlton Television and Spidercom Ltd [UK] 
Beloff v. Pressdram [UK] 
Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co [USA] 
Benson v. Paul Winley Sales Corp. [USA] 
301 
Berkic v. Crichton [USA] 
Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc. [USA] 
Betsen v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd [UK] 
"Bibliotheksgroschen" [Germany] 
Bild Zeitung [Germany] 
BMG Music Pub., Laurent Boutonnat, Jean-Claude Dequeant and Universal Music 
Pub. v. Lancelot Films [France] 
Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox [USA] 
Brandenburg v. Ohio [USA] 
British Broadcasting Corp. v. British Satellite Broadcasting Ltd. [UK] 
British Oxygen v. Liquid Air Ltd [UK] 
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc. [USA] 
Brown v. Louisiana [USA] 
BSC v. Granada TV Ltd [UK] 
Bundesadler [Germany] 
Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. [USA] 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. [USA] 
Campbell v. MGN [UK] 
Carte v. Ford [USA] 
Carter v. Hemsley-Spear, Inc. [USA] 
Castle Rock Enter. V. Carol Pub. Group, Inc. [USA] 
Catnic Components Ltd v. Hill & Smith Ltd [UK] 
CB-Infobank I [Germany] 
CB-Infobank II [Germany] 
Chaplin v. Chatelus [France] 
Charles Schultz and United Syndicate Inc. v. Editions Albin Michel, Marion Vidal 
[France] 
Chi. Sch. Reform Board of Trustees v. Substance, Inc. [USA] 
Choe v. Fordham University School of Law [USA] 
Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising [USA] 
City of Dallas v. Stranglin [USA] 
Clark v. Associated Newspapers Ltd [UK] 
Clark v. Grenada [USA] 
Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co [USA] 
302 
Clevenger v. Baker, Voorhis & Co [USA] 
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc. [USA] 
Cohen v. California [USA] 
Comins v. Discovery Comms., Inc. [USA] 
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid [USA] 
Conant v. Walters [USA] 
Confetti Records v. Warner Music Uk Ltd [UK] 
Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp. [USA] 
Cream Holdings Ltd v. Banerjee [UK] 
Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterial Church [USA] 
"Dali costumes" [France] 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters [USA] 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. et al [USA] 
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc. [USA] 
Dechavanne [France] 
Deforge v. Trust Co. Bank (La Bicyclette Bleu) [France] 
De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium [ECtHR] 
Delorme v. Clavier [France] 
Dennis v. United States [USA] 
Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd [UK] 
Designers Guild Ltd v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [UK] 
Desney v. Wilder [USA] 
Demuth v. Switzerland [ECtHR] 
Designers Guild Ltd v. . 
Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd [UK] 
Deveria v. "I'Express" [France] 
Diamond v. Am-Law Corp. [USA] 
Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp. [USA] 
Disney Parody case [Germany] 
Distillers Co. (Biochemicals) Ltd v. Times Newspapers [UK] 
Donaldson v. Beckett [UK] 
Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers Ltd [UK] 
Douglas v. Hello! [UK] 
Duffy v. Penguin Books USA Inc. [USA] 
Eldred v. Ashcroft [USA] 
303 
Eldred v. Reno [USA] 
"Election campaign" [Germany] 
Ellis v. Home Office [UK] 
Elsemere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co. [USA] 
Engel v. Netherlands [ECtHR] 
English v. BFC &R East 11th Street LLC [USA] 
Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich [USA] 
Esso v. Greenpeace [France] 
Fabris v. Ste France 2 [France] 
Familiapress-Zeitungs-Gmbh v. Austria [ECtHR] 
Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty [USA] 
Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc. [USA] 
Film Corp. v. Doyal [USA] 
Fisher v. Dees [USA] 
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. [USA] 
Follett v. Arbor House Publishing Co [USA] 
Folsom v. Marsh [USA] 
France 2 v. France [ECommHR] 
Francis, Day & Hunter Ltd v. Bron [UK] 
Fresoz and Roire v. France [ECtHR] 
Frisby v. British Broadcasting Corp. [UK] 
Frisby v. Schultz [USA] 
Garner v. Louisiana [USA] 
Garnier v. Rochette [France] 
Gartside v. Outram [UK] 
Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc. [USA] 
George Ward (Moxley) Ltd v. Richard Sankey Ltd [UK] 
"Germania 3" [Germany] 
Gershwin v. Ethical Publishing Co [USA] 
"Gies Eagle" [Germany] 
Gieseking v. Urania Records, Inc. [USA] 
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies [USA] 
Gleeson v. H. R. Denne Ltd [UK] 
Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co. [UK] 
304 
"Godot" [France] 
Goldstein v. California [USA] 
Gomme (E. ) Ltd v. Relaxateze Upholstery Ltd [UK] 
Graham v. James [USA] 
Granz v. Harris [USA] 
Gray v. Russell [USA] 
Groppera Radio A. G. v. Switzerland [ECtHR] 
H v. Austria [ECtHR] 
H and K v. United Kingdom [ECtHR] 
Handyside v. United Kingdom [ECtHR] 
Harman Pictures N. V. v. Osborne [UK] 
Harms, Inc. v. Tops Music Enters., Inc. [USA] 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters. [USA] 
Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc. [USA] 
Havemann [Germany] 
Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd v. Paramount Film Service Ltd [UK] 
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian [USA] 
Hodgson, Woolf Productions, and National Union of Journalists and Channel 4 
Television v. United Kingdom [ECommHR] 
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. [USA] 
"Holocaust Denial" [Germany] 
Hospital For Sick Children v. Melody Fare Dinner Theatre [USA] 
Hubbard v. Vosper [UK] 
Humphreys v. Thomson & Co. Ltd [UK] 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell [USA] 
Hyde Park Residence v. Yelland and Others [UK] 
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell [USA] 
IBCOS Computers Ltd v. Barclays Mercantile Highland Finance Ltd [UK] 
Imutran Ltd v. Uncaged Campaigns Ltd [UK] 
Independent Television Publications v. Time Out [UK] 
Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc. [USA] 
Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo. [USA] 
Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting 
Company, Inc. [USA] 
305 
Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures [USA] 
Jersild v. Denmark [ECtHR] 
J. L' Hoir v. Hatje Cantz Verlag [France] 
Johnstone Safety Ltd v. Peter Cook (Int. ) Plc [UK] 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson [USA] 
Joy Music v. Sunday Pictorial Newspapers (1920) Ltd [UK] 
K (A Child) v. BBC [UK] 
Kennedy v. National Juvenile Detention Ass'n [USA] 
King v. Innovation Books, Div. Of Innovative Corp. [USA] 
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark [ECtHR] 
"Kirchenmusik" [Germany] 
"Kirchen-und Schulgebrauch" [Germany] 
Klaindienst v. Mandel [USA] 
Kosiek v. Germany [ECtHR] 
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown [USA] 
Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. [USA] 
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc. [USA] 
L. A. Times v. Free Republic [USA] 
LB (Plastics) Ltd v. Swish Products Ltd [UK] 
Leander v. Sweden [ECtHR] 
Lehideux and Insornia v. France [ECtHR] 
Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp. [USA] 
Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc. [USA] 
Lili Marlene [Germany] 
Lingens v. Austria [ECtHR] 
Lion Laboratories v. Evans [UK] 
Litchfield v. Spielberg [USA] 
Lubner v. City of Los Angeles [USA] 
Luster Enters., Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. [USA] 
"Lüth" [Germany] 
M v. France [ECtHR] 
Maifeiern [Germany] 
Malden Amusement Co., Inc. v. City of Malden [USA] 
Malone v. United Kingdom [ECtHR] 
306 
Marais v. France [ECtHR] 
Marengo v. Daily Sketch and Sunday Graphic Ltd [UK] 
Martin v. City of Indianapolis [USA] 
Marvullo v. Gruner & Jahr [USA] 
"Maske in Blau" [Germany] 
MasterCard Int'l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc. [USA] 
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. [USA] 
Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt [USA] 
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods. [USA] 
Mattscheibe [Germany] 
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson [USA] 
McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc. [USA] 
McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc. [USA] 
Meeropol v. Nizer [USA] 
Miami Herald v. Tornillo [USA] 
Michael Baigent and Richard Leigh v. The Random House Group Limited [UK] 
Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc. [USA] 
Millar v. Taylor [UK] 
Mischawaka Rubber & Wollen Mfg. Co v. S. S. Kresge Co [USA] 
Monster Communications, Inc. v. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. [USA] 
Moore v. News of the World Ltd [UK] 
Morissens v. Belgium [ECommHR] 
Morrison Leahy Music Ltd v. Lightbond Ltd [UK] 
Muller v. Austria [ECtHR] 
Muller v. Switzerland [ECtHR] 
N v. Switzerland [ECtHR] 
National Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp. [USA] 
Neinast v. Board of Trustees of Columbus Metropolitan Library [USA] 
Neo-Fascist Slant In Copyright Works [Germany] 
New Era Publications International ApS v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc. [USA] 
New Era Publications International v. Henry Holt & Co. [USA] 
Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v. Marks and Spencer Plc [UK] 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc. [USA] 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. [USA] 
307 
Nunez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp. [USA] 
NWL Ltd. v. Nelson [UK] 
Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2) [ECtHRj 
Ophals v. Agence France Presse [France] 
"Oppenheimer" [Germany] 
Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria [ECtHR] 
Pacific and Southern Company, Inc. v. Duncan [USA] 
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Pub. Group [USA] 
Parks v. LaFace Records [USA] 
Pasterfield v. Denham [UK] 
Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of Americas Associates [USA] 
PCR Limited v. Dow Jones Telerate Ltd [UK] 
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp. [USA] 
Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc. [USA] 
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles [USA] 
Plix Products Limited v. Frank M. Winstone (Merchants) and Others [New Zealand] 
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Moskowitz 
Pro Sieben Media A. G. v. Carlton UK Television Ltd [UK] 
Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover [USA] 
R v. Advertising Standards Authority Ltd, Ex P. Vernons Organisations Ltd [UK] 
R v. Central Independent Television plc [UK] 
R v. Home Secretary, Ex. P. Simms [ECJ] 
R v. Shayler [UK] 
Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Systems [USA] 
Ravenscroft v. Herbert [UK] 
Redmond-Bate v. DPP [UK] 
Re the Parodying of Cigarette Advertising [Germany] 
Rey v. Lafferty [USA] 
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop [USA] 
Rice v. American Program Bureau [USA] 
Rich v. RCA Corp. [USA] 
Riggold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc. [USA] 
Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd v. Speder [USA] 
Rogers v. Grimaldi [USA] 
308 
Rogers v. Koons [USA] 
"Römerberg Speech" [Germany] 
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. [USA] 
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co. [USA] 
Roy Export Co. v. CBS, Inc. [USA] 
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC [USA] 
Salinger v. Random House, Inc. [USA] 
Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp. [USAJ 
SARL Ed. Prod. Musicales du Pactole et al. v. Ste Ed. Arpege [France] 
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim [USA] 
"Schallplatten" [Germany] 
Schnapper v. Foley [USA] 
Schneck v. United States [USA] 
Schoendoerffer v. Mod Films [France] 
Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co. [USA] 
"Schulfunksendungen" [Germany] 
Schweppes Ltd v. Wellingtons Ltd [UK] 
Scrive v. Rennes [France] 
Seale v. Gramercy Pictures [USA] 
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Corp. [USA] 
Sherlock Holmes case [Germany] 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. [USA] 
Silkin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd [UK] 
Silver v. United Kingdom [ECtHR] 
Simon & Shuster Inc. v. Dove Audio Inc. [USA] 
Smith v. Goguen [USA] 
Smith v. Montoro [USA] 
SNC Prisma Presse and EURL Femme v. Monsieur V. and Association Apodeline 
[France] 
"Soldiers-Are-Murderers" (Tucholsky) [Germany] 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. [USA] 
Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. [USA] 
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus. [USA] 
Ste Marc Dorcel v. Ste Edgar Rice Burroughs [France] 
309 
Ste Sebdo and Jacques Faizant v. Editions Enoch [France] 
Stevens v. United Kingdom [ECommHR] 
Stromberg v. California [USA] 
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. [USA] 
T v. United Kingdom [ECtHR] 
Tammer v. Estonia [ECtHR] 
Terroristenbild [Germany] 
Texas v Johnson [USA] 
The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom [ECtHR] 
Thorgeir Thorgeirson Islande v. Iceland [ECtHR] 
Tidende v. Norway [ECtHR] 
Tidy v. Trustees of the Natural History Museum [UK] 
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates [USA] 
Times Newspapers Ltd and Harper Collins Ltd v. MGN Limited [UK] 
Time Warner Entertainment Company v. Channel Four Television Corp. Plc [UK] 
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom [ECtHR] 
"Tonbandvervielfaltigung" [Germany] 
Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Rider Newspapers, Inc. [USA] 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken [USA) 
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications International Ltd [USA) 
Unabhangige Initiative Informations Vielfalt v. Austria [ECtHR] 
United States v. Bodin [USA] 
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co. [USA] 
United Video, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission [USA] 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America [USA] 
Venables v. News Group Newspapers [UK] 
Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Osterreichs and Gubi v. Austria [ECtHR] 
"Viel Spass Mit" [Germany] 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. [USA] 
Walendy v. Germany [ECtHR] 
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc. [USA] 
Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates [USA] 
Weatherby v. International Horse Agency and Exchange Ltd [UK] 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette [USA] 
310 
Wheaton v. Peters [USA] 
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Janslow Dental Lab., Inc. [USA] 
Whitney v. California [USA] 
Williamson Music Ltd v. Pearson Partnership [UK] 
Williams v. Weisser [USA] 
Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc. [USA] 
Wingrove v. United Kingdom [ECtHR] 
Winters v. New York [USA] 
Worlds of Wonder, Inc. v. Veritel Learning Sys., Inc. [USA] 
Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc. [USA] 
X v. Germany [ECommHR] 
X Ltd. and Y v. United Kingdom [ECommHR] 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. [USA] 
Zana v. Turkey [ECtHR] 
Zim v. Western Publishing Co [USA] 
311 
